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Chapter  6  The  Admissibility  of  Evidence  of  Confessions  in 
En  and  -a  Comparative  Note 
6.1  Introduction 
As  has  been  shown,  Scots  law  has  treated  the  admissibility  of 
confessions  and  admissions  almost  entirely  as  a  matter  of 
discretion  based  on  the  notion  of  fairness.  On  the  other  hand, 
prior  to  PACE,  English  law  approached  the  matter  from  two  angles, 
In  the  first  place  there  was  a  more  or  less  firm  exclusionary 
rule  of  considerable  antiquity,  '  based  on  the  concept  of 
voluntariness  and  the  absence  of  inducement.  Later  oppression 
was  added  as  a  further  criterion  leading  to  automatic  exclusion. 
In  the  second  place  the  judge  might  rule  a  confession  inadmiss- 
ible  in  exercise  of  his  general  judicial  discretion,  even  though 
the  confession  was,  as  a  matter  of  law,  voluntary,  To  put  it 
another  way,  where  the  Crown  failed  to  prove  that  the  confession 
was  voluntary  it  was  inadmissible  as  a  matter  of  law,  but  even  if 
the  Crown  overcame  this  test  the  confession  might  still  be 
rejected  by  the  Judge  on  the  ground  of  fairness  to  the  accused. 
In  the  context  of  confessionu  this  exclusionary  discrotion  was 
often,  although  by  no  means  exclusively,  associated  with  breaches 
of  the  Judges  Rules.  As  Lord  Devlin  has  put  it  : 
"The  prisoner  is  entitled  to  demand  as  of  right 
the  rojection  of  an  involuntary  confession.  In 
tho  care  of  evidence  obtained  in  breech  of  the 
Tudgeu  Rules  he  has  no  such  right;  the  Judge  has  a & 
diccrction  tQ  admit  or  rojcct  the  ovldcnce  as  he 
Gees  fit,  ...  °  :x 
The  Judges  Rules  were  intended  to  guide  the  police  as  to  the 
basis  on  which  the  courts  would  exercise  their  discretion  in 
relation  to  the  questioning  of  suspects.  They  were  rules  of 
practice  only  and  did  not  affect  the  overriding  principle  that  an 
involuntary  confession  could  never  be  admissible.  The 
distinction  has  been  put  thus  by  Lord  Goddard  CJ: 
"The  test  of  admissibility  of  a  statement  is 
whether  it  is  a  voluntary  statement.  There  are 
certain  rules,  known  as  the  Judges  Rule,  which  are 
not  rules  of  law  but  rules 
for  the  guidance  of  police 
statement  has  been  made  in 
accordance  with  the  Rules, 
is  not  made  inadmissible  i 
statement,  although  in  its 
can  always  refuse  to  admit 
there  has  been  a  breach  of 
of  practice  drawn  up 
officer;  and  if  a 
circuistances  not  in 
in  law  that  statement 
F  it  is  a  voluntary 
discretion  the  court 
it  if  the  court  thinks 
the  Rules.  " 
Hates 
Joy  p5 
. ^.,  PO  G'riýriýrý1  PP'5  utim  in  Fn  land  p37 
3,  Lt..  ö  YS  1952)  36  Cr  APP  R.  at  93 9 
6.2  The  Development  of  the  Com~non  taw  FxciList  cnarv  Ru'. 
The  early  history  of  confessions  in  England  is  unclear,  English 
law  has  long  distinguished  between  extra--judicial  confessions 
(those  made  to  officials  and  others  before  trial)  and  judicial 
confessions  (those  made  at  the  trial).  A  full  confession  in  open 
court  was,  from  the  earlest  times,  treated  as  equivalent  to  a 
finding  of  guilt  following  trial,  Extra-judicial  confessions  are 
known  to  have  played  a  part  in  the  criminal  process  from  as  early 
as  the  first  quarter  of  the  thirteenth  century.  It  is  also  known 
that  the  law  excluded  involuntary  confessions  even  before  the  the 
historic  decision  in  Wnrickshal,  (1783)  1  Leach  CC  263  and  it  is 
likely  that  the  requirement  of  voluntariness  existed  in  respect 
of  Judicial  confessions  by  the  middle  of  the  sixteenth  century. 
Torture  existed  in  England  in  much  the  %amo  way  as  it  did  in 
Scotland,  It  seems  to  have  reached  a  peak  during  the  second  half 
of  the  sixteenth  century  but,  as  in  Scotland,  it  never  became  a 
routine  part  of  criminal  procedure  and  seems  to  have  been 
principally  (though  not  exclusively)  associated  with  crimes  of 
state.  Torture  was  also  more  commonly  used  to  secure  information 
about  accomplices  then  to  extract  confessions.  The  use  of 
torture  in  England  was  not  extensive  and  the  researches  of  J.  H. 
Langbein  only  uncovered  81  cases  between  1540  and  1640  where  it 
is  definitely  known  that  warrants  for  torture  were  Issued,  2  tt 
is  clear  that  the  Privy  Council  kept  torture  under  close  control 
and  never  allowed  it  to  fall  Into  the  hands  of  regular  law to 
enforcement  officers  11  and  as  in  Scotland  torture  Could  not  be 
employed  without  special  warrant.  Torture  in  England  never 
became  institutionalised,  largely  because  there  was  no  need  for 
it  to  become  so.  The  jury  standard  of  proof  made  it  unnecessary 
to  provide  for  extensive  and  refined  evidence-gathering.  An 
English  jury  could  convict  on  whatever  evidence  persuaded  it  and 
could  convict  an  less  evidence  than  was  required  as  a  pre- 
condition  for  investigation  under  torture  on  the  continent. 
Torture  was  not  abolished  in  England,  it  simply  died  out,  4 
England  experienced  periodic  outbreaks  of  brutal  witch-hunting, 
notably  around  1645,  but  Langbein  takes  care  to  exclude  "coercion 
inflicted  without  authority"  from  his  definition  of  torture  and 
he  also  points  out  that  because  the  witch  finders  lacked 
conciliar  authority  for  their  activities  they  were  liable  to 
civil  and  criminal  legal  actions,  several  of  which  are  known  to 
have  taken  place.  15 
According  to  Mirfield,  it  is  possible  that  the  notion  that  extra- 
Judicial  confessions  should  not  be  received  unless  voluntary 
began  to  grow  up  during  the  "century  of  torture"  between  1540  and 
1640  and  most  probably  from  1600  onwards.  The  case  of  Felton 
U  62a)  3  How,  St,  Tr,  371  has  generally  been  taken  as  deciding 
that  the  use  of  torture  was  in  all  cases  contrary  to  common  law, 
although  the  correctness  of  this  interpretation  is  not  beyond 
doubt,  but  around  the  same  time  Coke,  who  had  himself  been  a 
commissioner  for  torture,  was  arguing  unequivocally  that  torture 11 
was  unlawful  in  all  cases..  '  Mirfieid  suggests  that  the 
"voluntary"  requirement  for  extra-judicial  confessions  arose  from 
three  factors:  (1)  the  existing  requirement  for  voluntariness  in 
relation  to  judicial  confessions;  (2)  the  decision  in  Tongs 
(1662)  6  How.  St.  Tr.  225  holding  that  a  confession  before  a 
Privy  Councillor  or  Justice  of  the  Peace  "without  torture"  would 
remove  the  need  for  two  witnesses  to  an  overt  act  of  treason 
required  by  statute;  and  (3)  the  view  of  the  court  in  the  same 
case  that  no  promise  of  a  pardon  or  threats  should  be  made 
towards  a  witness  in  any  case  lest  he  "did  not  give  the  full 
evidence". 
The  first  clear  statement  of  an  exclusionary  rule  in  English  law 
appeared,  admittedly  obiter,  in  W  rickehell  where  the  court 
stated 
"A  free  and  voluntary  confession  is  deserving  of 
the  highest  credit,  because  it  is  presumed  to  flow 
from  the  strongest  sense  of  guilt,  and  therefore 
it  is  admitted  as  proof  of  the  crime  to  which  it 
refers;  but  a  confession  forced  fron  the  mind  by 
flattery  of  hope,  or  by  the  torture  of  fear,  comes 
in  so  questionable  a  shape  when  it  is  to  be 
considered  as  the  evidence  of  guilt,  that  no 
credit  ought  to  be  given  to  it,  and  therefore  it 
is  rejected.  " 12 
Despite  this  obiter  dictum,  judicial  confidence  in  confessions 
does  not  seem  to  have  been  generally  high  during  this  period, 
although  the  rule  that  a  person  might  be  convicted  on  the  basis 
solely  of  his  confession  and  without  corroboration  of  its 
contents  dates  from  1789.0 
Mirfield  follows  Wigmore  in  referring  to  the  years  from  1800  to 
1852  as  the  period  of  "sentimental  irrationality".  During  this 
period  the  courts  were  keen  to  exclude  confessions,  seemingly 
concentrating  solely  on  whether  there  had  been  a  threat  or 
promise  and  rarely  asking  whether  the  threat  or  promise  would 
have  been  likely  to  induce  a  false  confession.  The  law  also 
tended  to  become  rigid  and  unable  to  adapt  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  individual  case,  leading  to  absurdities  such  as  Croydon 
(1846)  2  Cox  CC  6?  where  it  was  held  that  "you  may  as  well  tell 
me  about  it"  was  equivalent  to  "you  had  better  tell  me",  it  being 
settled  law  that  any  statement  along  the  lines  of  the  latter 
would  lead  to  exclusion.  9  Undue  attention  was  also  paid  to  the 
propriety  of  the  conduct  of  the  person  questioning  the  suspect, 
this  also  tending  to  produce  absurdities  and  decisions  which  are 
impossible  to  support  on  any  sort  of  objective  critera.  10 
Professor  R.  W.  Baker  has  described  this  period  in  the  following 
terms: 
"The  early  years  of  the  nineteenth  century  saw  a 
great  swing  away  from  the  notions  which  had 
prevailed  two  hundred  years  before.  The  period  of 
old  toryism  was  superceded  by  a  new  spirit  of 13 
liberalism.  Confessions  were  excluded  upon  proof 
of  the  most  trivial  inducement  and  it  was  not 
until  the  case  of  R,  v  Baldry  in  1852  that  some 
proportion  was  introduced  into  what  we  can  only 
call  liberalism  run  wild.  "  11 
Three  reasons  have  been  suggested  12  for  this  situation: 
(1)  accused  persons  being  predominantly  from  the  lower  social 
classes  might  be  thought  likely,  by  judges,  to  have  an  attitude 
of  subordination  to  those  in  authority  over  them,  especially 
landowners  and  employers.  Thus  trivial  inducements  and 
meaningless  threats  might  be  effective  to  make  their  confessions 
unreliable;  (2)  at  this  time  there  was  no  formal  system  of 
criminal  appeal  and  this  may  have  predisposed  judges  to  resolve 
doubts  about  admissibility  in  favour  of  the  accusgd;  (3)  the 
accused  had  no  general  right  to  counsel's  assistance  before  1836 
and  he  was  generally  incompetent  to  testify  before  1898. 
A  similar  explanation  has  been  furnished  by  Lord  Hailshanu 
"...  at  that  time  almost  every  serious  crime  was 
punishable  by  death  or  transportation.  The  law 
enforcement  officers  formed  no  disciplined  police 
force  and  were  not  subject  to  effective  control  by 
the  central  government,  watch  committees  or  an 
inspectorate.  There  was  no  legal  aid.  There  was 
no  system  of  appeal.  To  crown  it  all  the  accused 
was  unable  to  give  evidence  on  his  own  behalf  and 14 
was  therefore  largely  at  the  mercy  of  any  evidence 
either  perjured  or  oppressively  obtained,  that 
might  be  brought  against  him.  The  judiciary  were 
therefore  compelled  to  devise  artificial  rules 
designed  to  protect  him  against  dangers  now 
avoided  by  more  rational  means.  "  10 
Passing  reference  has  been  made  to  the  leading  case  of  Baldry 
(1852)  2  !  er  430.  Professor  Baker  describes  this  case  as 
introducing  some  proportion  to  the  admission  of  confessions,  but 
it  would  be  wrong  to  think  that  it  resulted  in  a  drastic  change 
of  approach  by  the  courts.  In  Baldry  a  police  constable  had  told 
the  accused  what  he  was  charged  with  and  had  then  cautioned  him 
that  "he  need  not  say  anything  to  criminate  himself,  what  he  did 
say  would  be  taken  down  and  used  as  evidence  against  him.  " 
Notwithstanding  this  warning,  Baldry  confessed  to  murder.  Lord 
Campbell  CS  considered  that  the  policeman's  words  did  not  amount 
to  a  promise  or  threat  to  induce  the  prisoner  to  confess,  but  he 
thought  it  proper  to  reserve  the  question  for  the  Court  of 
Criminal  Appeal  who  agreed  that  the  confession  had  been  rightly 
admitted  and  took  the  opportunity  to  overrule  a  number  of  earlier 
cases  to  the  opposite  effect.  Parke  B.  put  the  matter  clearly: 
"By  the  law  of  England  in  order  to  render  a 
confession  admissible  in  evidence  it  must  be 
perfectly  voluntary;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that 
any  inducement  in  the  nature  of  a  promise  or  of  a 
threat  hold  out  by  a  person  in  authority  vitiates 15 
a  confession.  The  decisions  to  that  effect  have 
gone  a  long  way;  ...  but  I  think  there  has  been 
too  much  tenderness  towards  prisoners  in  this 
matter.  I  confess  that  I  cannot  look  at  the 
decisions  without  some  shame  when  I  consider  what 
objections  have  prevailed  to  prevent  the  reception 
of  confessions  in  evidence;  and  I  agree  ...  that 
justice  and  common  sense  have,  too  frequently, 
been  sacrificed  at  the  shrine  of  mercy.  " 
The  cases  which  followed  Baldrywere  largely  concerned  with 
whether  the  particular  form  of  words  used  could  be  regarded  as  a 
threat  or  promise  held  out  by  a  person  in  authority  and  if  they 
could,  the  confession  was  excluded.  By  the  close  of  the 
nineteenth  century  the  exclusionary  rule,  although  still 
theoretically  based  on  the  idea  that  confessions  which  followed 
threats  or  promises  were  of  doubtful  reliability,  was  being 
applied  in  this  rigid  and  technical  way  and  the  courts  were  still 
stopping  short  of  asking  the  next  logical  question  namely  whether 
the  particular  threat  or  promise  made  the  particular  confession 
unreliable  in  the  particular  circumstances. 
Notes 
1,  Minieid  pp  42-43 
2,  Langbein  Tortur]  and  tho  taw  of  Priof  (Chicago,  1977)  p91  it  seq,  The 
author  restricts  his  consideration  to  "Judicial  torture",  is  the  use  of 
physical  coercion  by  officers  of  the  state  in  order  to  gather  evidence  for 
Judicial  proceedings, 
3.  Langbein  op  cit  p136 
d.  Langbein  op  cit  pp138.139 
5,  Langbein  op  cit  p210  note  49 
6.  Mirfieid  p45 16 
7  Mirfield  pp48-50 
8,  Wheeling  (1789)  1  Leach  CC  311  (n) 
9,  This  point  was  put  completely  beyond  doubt  by  Garner(l848)  1  Den  329 
10,  eg  Sexton  (1823)  quoted  by  Mirfieid  p51 
11,  The  Ylaarsjy  Rule  (London,  Pitman,  1950)  p54 
12,  Mirfield  p  52,  quoting  Wigmore 
13,  (APP"  v  PingýLin,.  (19761  AC  574  at  600 17 
6.3  The  Mature  Excllusionary  Rule 
The  classic  statement  of  the  common  law  exclusionary  rule  as 
developed  by  the  English  courts  is  in  the  judgment  of  Lord  Sumner 
in  the  Privy  Council  case  of  Ibrahim  vR  (19141  AC  599.  In  this 
case  a  soldier  in  the  Indian  army  was  arrested  and  charged  with 
the  murder  of  an  officer.  The  arrest  took  place  immediately 
after  the  crime  and  some  10  to  15  minutes  later  the  commanding 
officer  asked  Ibrahim  "Why  have  you  done  euch  a  senseless  act?  " 
The  soldier  immediately  replied  "Some  three  or  four  days  he  has 
been  abusing  me;  without  a  doubt  I  killed  him".  It  was  argued 
that  the  trial  judge  ought  to  have  excluded  this  evidence  in 
exercise  of  his  discretion  although  there  was  no  evidence  that 
the  soldier  had  been  subjected  to  any  pressure  of  fear  or  hope. 
Lord  Sumner':  words  have  been  much  quoted: 
"It  has  long  been  established  as  a  positive 
principle  of  English  criminal  law  that  no 
statement  by  an  accused  is  admissible  in  evidence 
against  him  unless  it  is  shewn  by  the  prosecution 
to  have  been  a  voluntary  statement  in  the  sense 
that  it  has  not  been  obtained  from  him  either  by 
fear  of  prejudice  or  hope  of  advantage  exercised 
or  held  out  by  a  person  in  authority.  " 
Mirflaid  points  out  that  Lord  Sumner  makes  no  mention  of 
"threats"  or  "promises"  and  consistently  makes  use  of  the  phrases 
"fear  of  prejudice"  and  "hope  of  advantage".  Hic  conclusion  is 18 
that  his  Lordship  was  restating  the  established  rule  in  his  own 
terminology  rather  than  trying  to  change  the  law.  I  In  any  event, 
this  formulation  was  to  become  the  basis  of  the  exclusionary  rule 
as  operated  by  the  English  courts  for  the  next  seventy  years. 
The  clearest  statement  of  the  mature  exclusionary  rule  is  found 
in  principle  (e)  of  the  Judges  Rules  of  1964  which  laid  down: 
"that  it  is  a  fundamental  condition  of  the 
admissibility  In  evidence  against  any  person, 
equally  of  any  oral  answer  given  by  that  person  to 
a  question  pint  by  a  police  officer  and  of  any 
statement  made  by  that  person,  that  it  shall  have 
been  voluntary,  in  the  sense  that  it  has  not  been 
obtained  from  him  by  fear'of  prejudice  or  hope  of 
advantage,  exercised  or  held  out  by  a  person"in 
authority,  '  or  by  oppression.  "'  - 
The  only  departure  from  Lord  Sumner's  words  11  is  the  addition  of 
the  phrase  "or-'by  oppreusion.  '"  -  This  'addition  'appears  to  derive 
from  an  obiter  dictum  of  Lord  Parker  CJ  in'Calli.  o  V  Gunn  (1963) 
48  pR  36  a  case  which  was  not  directly  concerned  with 
confessions  but  rolatod  'to  the  taking  of  fingerprints.  Hie 
Lordship  pointed  out  that  a  much  stronger  rule  applied  to  the 
admissibility  of  statomento"to  the  police  and  confessions  than 
applied  to  other  evidence  and  added: 
"There  it  i,,  a  fundamental  principle  of  law  that 
no  anower  to'a  question  and  no  statement  is 
admissible  unless  it  is  sSowr  by  the  prosecution 19 
not  to  have  been  obtained  in  an  oppressive  manner 
and  to  have  been  voluntary  In  the  sense  that  it 
has  not  been  obtained  by  threats  or'  inducements,  " 
The  question  of  what  amounted  to  "oppression"  was  considered  in  R. 
v  Prtest1ey  1965)  51  Cr  App  RI  where  Sachs  J.  said  that  it 
"imports  something  which  tends  to  sap  and  has 
capped  that  free  will  which  must  exist  before  a 
confession  is  voluntary.  " 
His  Lordship'dlso  pointed  out  that"the  decision  on  whether  there 
had  been  oppression  in  an  individual  case  would  depend  on  many 
elements., 
"They  include  such'-things  es"the  length  of  time  of 
any  individual  period  of  quä  boning,  the  length 
of  time  intervening  between  periods  of  quest- 
ioning,  whether  the  accused  person  had  been  given 
proper  refreshment  or  not,  'pnd  the  characteristics 
of  the  person  who  makes  the  statement.  What  may 
be  oppressive  as  regards  a  child,  'an1nvalid,  or 
an  old  man,  -or  somebody  inexperienced  in  the  ways 
of  this  world'may:  turn  out  not  to  be-oppressive 
when  `one'  finde"that  'the  accused  `person  is  of  a 
tough  character  and'an  experienced  man  of  the 
world.  " 
The  existence-of  the  "oppression""head  of  the  exclusionary  rule 
was  recognised  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  in-$v  Prager  (1972)  56  Cr 20 
App  R  151.  Their  Lordships  adopted  the  definition  of  oppression 
put  forward  by  Sachs  J.  in  Priestley  and  also  a  passage  from  an 
address  by  Lord  MacDermott  to  the  Bentham  Club  2  when  his 
Lordship  defined  "oppressive  questioning"  as: 
".;.  questioning  which  by  its  nature,,  duration_or 
other  attendant  circumstances  (including  the  fact 
of  custody)  excites  hopes.  (such  as  the'hope  of 
release)  or  fears,  or  so  affects  the  mind  of  the- 
suspect  that  his  will  crumbles  and  he  speaks  when 
otherwise  he.  would  have  remained-  silent.  "ýý  . 
Professor  Cross  has,  pointed  out  3  that 
,a 
literal  interpretation 
of  Lord  MacDermott's  words  could  have  unfortunate  consequences 
since  "if  the  rare  case  of  a  contrite  man  who  makes  a  more  or 
less  spontaneous  confession  is  excluded,  every  confession  that,,,,, 
was  ever  made  was  probably  made  in  consequence  of  questioning  but 
for  which  the  maker  would  have  stayed  silent.  " 
In  a  series  of  cases  between  Prajz2C  and  the  passing  of,  PACE,  *. 
the  Court  ,  of  Appeal  set  a  very  high  threshhold  before  custodial 
interrogation  became  oppressive  per  se.  Although  the  actual 
point  at  which  oppressiveness  arrived  would,  depend  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  the  character  of  the  suspect  was  of 
considerable  relevances 
",.,  serious  and  experienced  criminals  when  they 
are-apprehended  must,  and  do,  expect  their 
interrogation  by  trained  and.  experienced  police 21 
officers  will  be  vigorous.  Long  and  repeated 
questioning  will  not  necessarily  amount  to 
oppression.  "  11 
The  phrase  "person-in  authority",  which  was  certainly  in  use-by 
the  1820s,  41  was  never  authoritatively  defined  but  a  definition 
of-sorts  was  offered  in  Dookinenan  v-R  (12823  1  AC  20  when 
Viscount  Dilhorne  quoted  with  approval  a  statement  by  a  Canadian 
judge  that  "A  person  in  authority  means,  generally  speaking, 
anyone  who  has  authority  or-control  over  the  accused  or  over  the 
proceedings  or  the  prosecution-against  him.  "  The  concept  also 
extended  to-one  who  was  acting  in  tho  prosence`and  without  the 
dissent  of  such  a  parson.  ' 
It  also  followed  that  if  the  inducement  had  come  from`one  who  was 
not  a  "person  in  authority"  the  confession  would  not  necessarily 
be  excluded.  The  test  applied  in'such  a  situation  was  whether 
the  promise  or  threat  was  of  a  description  which  might  be  pre- 
sumed  to  have  had  such  an  effect  on  the  mind  of  the  defendant  as 
to  induce  him  to  confess.  0 
The  categories  of  "inducement"  sufficient  to-render  a  confession 
involuntary  have  never  been  closed.  "  Some  of  the  decisions, 
even  comparativ®1y  recants  are  quite  absurd  and  offend  against 
common  sense.  For  example  in  Fv  korthem  11967)  52  Cr  A12118  97 
the  accused,  before  confessing,  had  asked  the  police  if  it  would 
be  possible  for  another  offence  to  be  taken  into  consideration. 22 
One  of  the  officers  said  that  the  police  would  have  no  objection 
to  this  course,  "  This  was  held0  by  a  rather  reluctant  Court  of 
Appeal,  to  be  a  sufficient  inducement  to  justify  quashing  the 
conviction.  '0  Again  in  Rv  2eyeckes  (1969)  54_Gr  App  R-202  a 
conviction-was  quashed  because  the  accused  asked  the  police  "If-I 
make  a  statement  will  I  get  bail  now?  "  and  an  officer  answerd  . 
"Yes".  Other  examples  in  a  similar  vein  may  be  found.  11 
Obviously  if  violence  were  used  or  threatened  any  resulting 
confession  would  not  be  voluntary.  Apart  from  this  the 
inducement  might  take  many  forms.  The  threat  or  promise  did  not 
have  to  relate  to  the  charge  or  contemplated,  charge  against,  the 
defendant  but  it  might  relate  to  some'other  matter  such  as... 
prosecution  for  another  offence.  12  Likewise  the  threat-or, 
promise  did  not  have  to  impinge  on  the  defendant  personally.  but 
might  relate  to  his  family,  friends  or  possibly  even  a  total 
stranger.  The  remoteness  of  the  person  concerned  would  gox,  to  the 
weight  of  the  evidence  that  a  threat  had  been  made  but  if  the 
threat  were  established  the  confession  would  be  inadmissible.  'a 
If  the  impression  produced  by  the  promise  or  threat  was  clearly 
shown  to  have  been  removed,  for  example-by  lapse  of  time  or  a 
subsequent  caution  by  another  person  of  superior  rank  to:  2 the 
person  who  had  held  out  the  inducement,  a  subsequent  confession 
would  be  admissible. 23 
There  had  been  a  faint  hint  of'a  liberalisation  of  the  rule  in 
D.  P,  P,  yPing  Lin  (19761  AC  574  where  the  House  of  Lords  held 
that  the  prosecution  had  to  show  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  the 
threat  or  promise  had  not  induced  the  confession.  In  this  case  a 
drugs  dealer  had  asked  the  police,  "IV  I  help  the  police  will  you 
help  me?  "  and  an  officer  replied,  "I  can  make  no  deal  with  you 
but  if  you  show  the  judge  that  you  have  helped  the  police  to 
trace  bigger  people  I  am  sure  he  will  bear  it  in  mind  when  he 
sentences  you.  "  The  subsequent  statement  was  held  admissible. 
Subsequently.  there  was  a  much  stronger  hint  in  Rv  Rennte  (1982) 
74  Cr  App  R  207  when  the  Court  of  Appeal  stated  that  the!  law  was 
as  laid  down  by  Lord  Sumner  in  mahl  and  it  was  unnecessary 
and  undesireable  to  complicate  matters  by  considerations  of 
whether  conduct  was  "improper"  or  constituted  an  "inducement.  " 
The  sense  and  spirit  of  Lord  Sumner's  principle  were  more 
important-than  the  particular  wording  in  which'it  was  expressed. 
Above  all  it  was  to  be  applied  with  common  sense.  The  trial 
judge  should  also  remind  himself  that  "voluntary"  in  ordinary 
parlance  meant  "of-one's  own  free  will".  Interestingly, 
-this 
decision  was  criticised  as  tending  to  uncertainty  in  the  law. 
However  PACE  intervened  before  it  became  clear  whether  Rennie 
would  in  fact  have  led  the  courts  to  a  major  change  of  approach. 
The  legal  burden  of  proving  that  a  confession  was  voluntary  was 
clearly  placed  on  the  prosecution  by  the  decision  in  R4  v  Thom>on 
11893]  2  QB  12  where  Cave  3,  reviewod  a  number  of  earlier 24 
authorities  and  laid  down  the  tost: 
"Is  it  proved  affirmatively  that  the  confession 
was  free  and  voluntary  -  that  is.  was  it  preceded 
by  any  inducement  to  make  a  statement  held'out  by 
a  person  in  authority?  If  so,  and  the  inducement 
has  not-clearly  been  removed  before  the  statement 
was  made,  evidence  of  the  statement  is 
inadmissible.  " 
In  the  1960s  it  was  made  clear  that  the  standard  of  proof 
required  in  this  situation  was  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  -Is- 
Noes 
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6.4  Exciusionmry  Discretion  and  the  Judges  Rules 
So  far  what  has  been  considered  is  the  English  common  law 
exclusionary  rule  whereby  involuntary  confessions  were  rendered 
inadmissible  in  evidence  -as  a  matter  of  law.  It'is  now  proposed 
to  consider  the  related  but  distinct  issue  of-exclusionary 
discretion  whereby'a  confession  which  is  legally  admissible  on 
the  test  of  voluntariness  is  nevertheless  excluded  by  the  judge 
in  the  interests  of  fairness.  " 
The  courts  have  long  been  opposed  to  anything  in"the  nature  of  a 
cross-examination  of  a  suspect,  by  the  police  particularly  if  that 
suspect  happens  tobe  in  custody.  -  In`Kni!  ht'and  Theyre  (1905)  20 
Cox  CC  711  Channell  J  put  it`thus: 
"You  are  entitled  to  ask  questions  for,  your' 
information,  as  to  whether-you-will  charge  the 
man,  but  the  moment  you  have  decided,  to  charge  him 
and'prectically  get'him  into  custody,  then,  'in  as 
much.  as  a  judge"can't  ask  a  question  or  a- 
-magistrate,  it  is  ridiculous  to  suppose  that  a 
policeman  can.  " 
Mirfield  I  subdivides--  exclusionary  discretion  into  two  parts 
which  he  terms  the  "unfairness  discretion"  and  the  "unreliability 
discretion"  the  former  relating<to'unlawful  ör  improper  police 
conduct'-towards-the  accused  and  the  latter  arising  from  fear  that 
the  trier  of  fact  will  overestimate  the  probative  value  of  the 26 
confession  or  its  admission  will  otherwise  prejudicially  affect 
the  accused.  It  is  clear  that  discretionary-exclusion  of 
confessions  can  be  brought  into  play-by  factors  other  than 
breaches  of  the  Judges  Rules  '2  but  even  on  that-basis  the  vast 
majority  of  cases  do  relate  to  the  conduct  and  behaviour  of  the 
police  and  Mirfield's  division  of  the  discretion  is  not  further 
pursued  in  this  work. 
The  first  clear  sign  of  the  courts  excluding  'a-confession  as  a 
matter  of  discretion  rather  than  law  appeared  in  Gavin  (1885)  15 
Cox  CC  656.  At  this  period  the  courts  were  beginning  to  concern 
themselves  with  police  interrogation  of  suspects.  Earlier  cases 
had  favoured  the'-admission-of  prisoner's  statements  even  though 
obtained  by  interrogation.  13  However  towards  the  and  of  the 
century  the  view  began  to  change  and  even  before'the  beginning  of 
the  twentieth  century  it  was  apparent  that  the  judges  were 
concerned  to  protect  suspects  from  being  compelled  or  persuaded 
by  policemen  to  incriminate  themselves.  From  Gav  onwards  the 
trend  of  the  decisions  was  that  once  a  suspect  was  taken  into 
custody  he  should  not  be  questioned  although  it  would  be 
necessary  to  wait  for  the  1964  Judges  Rules  before  any  clear  rule 
emerged.  The  unsatisfactory  state  of  the  law  during  this  period 
is  shown  by  the  fact  that  even  as  late  as  1960  it  was  possible 
for  the  question  to  be  posed,  "Do.  the  (1912/1918  Judges)  Rules 
forbid  the  police  to  question  a  person  in  custody,  or  do  they 
merely  advice  them  that,  if  they  do  question  such  persons,  the 
answers  may  be  inadmissible  in  evidence?  "  a 27 
The  first  four  Tudges  Rules  were  formulated  in  1912  with  a 
further  five  Rules  following  In  1918.  The  aim  of  the  Rules  was 
to  regulate  the  legitimate  methods  of  police  inquiry  and  to 
provide  guidance  to  the  police  on  what  was  permissible.  They  had 
no  direct,  effect  on  the  common  law  exclusionary  rule.  The 
relevant  1912/1918  Rules  provided  as  follows: 
1,  When  a  police  officer  is  endeavouring  to 
discover  the  author  of  a  crime,..  there  is  no, 
objection  to  his  putting  questions  in  respect  . 
thereof  to  any  person  or  persona,  whether 
suspected  or  not,  from  whom  he  thinks  useful 
information  can  be  obtained.  I- 
2.  Whenever  a  police  officer  has  made  up  his  mind 
to  charge  a  person  with  a  crime,  he  should  first 
caution  such  person-before  asking-,  any  question  or 
any  further  question,  as  the  caca  may  be.  - 
3.  -Persons  in  custody  should-not-be  questioned 
without  the  usual  caution  being  first 
-administered. 
4.  If  the  prisoner  wished  to  volunteer  any 
statement,  the  usual,  -caution  should.  -be 
administered.  ... 
.,; 
7.  A  prisoner  making  a  voluntary  statement  must 
not  be  cross-examined,  and  and  no  questions  should 
be  put  to  him  about  it-except-for  the,  purpose  of 28 
removing  all  ambiguity  in  what  he  actually  said. 
"6 
In  1930  a  Home  Office  Circular  was  issued  to  make  it  clear  that 
"Rule  3  was  never  intended  to  encourage  or  authorise  the 
questioning  or  cross-examination  of=a  person  in  custody  after  he 
has  been  cautioned,  on  the  subject  of  the  crime  for  which  he  is 
in  custody,  and  long  before  this  Rule  was  formulated,  and  since, 
it  has  been  the  practice  for  the  Judge  not  to  allow-any  answer  to 
a  question  so  improperly  put  to  be  given  in  evidence;  ...  " 
The  1964  Judges-Rules  6  made  various  changes  and  helped  to 
clarify  some  doubtful  areas.  For  the  first  time  it'was  made 
clear'by-the  new  Rule  1  that  a  suspect  might  be  questioned  while 
in  police  cuetody,  as  long  as  he  had  not  been  charged  with  the, 
offence  in  question  or  informed  that  he  might  be"prosecuted  for 
it.  By  the  now  Rule  ,2  a'suspect  was  now  to  be  cautioned  when  a 
policeman  had  "evidence  which  would  afford  reasonable  grounds  for 
suspecting  that  [he]  ha[d)  committed-an  offence"  rather  than  when 
the'policeman  had  made  up  his  mind  to  charge  him.  It-was  also 
made  clear  by  the  new  Rule  3(b)  that  once  an  accused  had  been 
charged  or  informed  that;  he  was  to  be-prosecuted,  it  was  only  in 
an  exceptional  case  that  questions  about  the  offence  might  be  put 
to  him. 
The  new  ,  Rules  were  publiehed  in  an  Appendix  to  Home  Office- 
Circular  No.  3111964  and  in  the  Appendix  they  were  preceded  by  a 29 
preamble  explaining  that  the  Judges  control  the  conduct  of  trials 
and  the  admission  of  evidence,  but  they  do  not  control,  initiate 
or  supervise  police  activities  or  conduct.  It  was  stated  that 
the  Rules  did  not  purport  to  deal  with  the  many  varieties  of 
conduct  which  might  render  answers  or  statements  involuntary  and 
hence  inadmissible,  but  they  dealt  merely  with  particular  aspects 
of  the  matter.  The  preamble  also  set  out  five  gener;  l  principles 
which  the  Rules  were  stated  not  to  affect.  Those  included  as 
principle  (C)  the  entitlement  of  the  suspect  to  communicate 
privately  with  a  solicitor  and  as  principle  (d)"a'requirenent 
that  the-police  should  charge  the  suspect  or  inform  him  that  ha 
is  may  be  prosecuted  as  soon  as  they  have  enough  evidence"to 
prefer  a  charge.  Principle  (a)  has  been  considered  above  in 
connection  with  the  exclusionary  rule. 
The  status  of  the  Judges  Rules-and  their  relationship'to  the 
common  law`  exclusionary  rule  was  first  subject  to  judicial 
consideration  in  R. 
--v 
Vol  in  119187  1Kß  531.  In  this  case  the 
headless  and  handless  torso  of  a  woman  had  been  found  in  a  parcel 
which  also  contained  a  piece  of  paper  with  the  singular  phrase 
"Bladie  Belgiam"  written  on  it.  Voisin  was  interviewed  by  the" 
police  and  asked  to  account  for  his  movements  at  the  time  when 
the  murder  was  believed  to  have  taken  place.  He  was  apparently 
detained  in  custody  for  inquiries  but  the  police  had  not  decided 
to  charge  him  and  indeed'in  the  absence  of  the  head  of  the  victim 
identification  was  not  surprisingly  proving  difficult.  Voisin 
made  a  voluntary  statement  without  being  cautioned  and  then  a 30 
police  officer,  again  without  a  caution,  asked  him  whether  ho  had 
any  objection  to  writing  the  words,  "Bloody  Belgian.  ".  Voisin 
replied  "Not  at  all"  and  promptly  signed  hio  own  death  warrant  by 
writing  "Bladie  Belgiern". 
It  is  not  entirely  obvious  from  the  report  whether.  tho  Court  of 
Appeal,  considered  that  there  had  been  a  breach  of-the,  Judgee 
Rules  but,.  it  was  made  clear  that  the  Ruleo.  did  not  have  the  force 
of  law  and  were  "administrative  directions  the  observance  of 
which  the  police  authorities  should  enforce  upon  their,  , 
subordinates  as  tending  to  the  fair  administration  of  justice.  ",. 
The  court  concluded  "It  is  important  that  they  should  do  so,  -for. 
statements  obtained  from  prisoners,  contrary  to  the  spirit  of 
these  rules  may  be  rejected  as  evidence  by  the  judge  presiding  at 
the  trial,  ",  This,.;  in  essence,  was  the  approach  which  the  courts 
were  to  adopt,.  towards  the-Judges'  Rules  until  they  ware  swept 
away  by  PACE  in  1984,1% 
It  became  well  settled  that  although  a  breach  of  the  Rules 
themselves  or-of  principles  (a)  to  (d)  of..  tho  preamble  '.  did  not 
of.  itself  bring  the  exclusionary  rule  into  play,.  it  did  trigger 
the  court's  discretion  to  exclude  evidence, 
f 
The  exercise  of  the  exclusionary  discretion  was  very  much 
dependant  on  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the  individual  case. 
Initially  it  was  used,  liberally,  and  where  statements  obtained  in 
breach  of  the.  Rules  were  admitted  at  first  instance,  the 31 
appellate  courts  not  infrequently  overturned  the  conviction. 
This  attitude  changed  after  the  Second  World  War  and  from  about 
1950  onwards  confessions  obtained  in  breach  of  the  Rules  were 
almost  uniformly  admitted.  8 
At  times  the  English  courts  seemed  to  be  unaware  of  the 
fundamental  distinction  between  exclusion  by  virtue  of  the 
exclusionary  rule  and  exclusion  by  diocretion.  In  the  much- 
criticised  decision  in  Frager  (1972)_56  Cr  App  R  151  the 
Court  of  Appeal  blurred  the  distinction  to  the  point  where  it 
almost  became  invisible  and  virtually  submerged  breaches-of  the 
Judges  Rules  within  the  general  test  of  voluntariness  related  to 
the  exclusionary  rule  Edmund-Davies  LJ  stating: 
"Their  non-observance  may,  and  at  times  does,  lead 
to  the  exclusion  of  an  alleged  confession;  but 
ultimately  all  turne  on  the  judge's  decision 
whether,  breach  or--no  breach,  it'is  shown  to  have 
been  made  voluntarily.  " 
Prager  was  not  an  isolated  instance  9  and  as'Pattenden  and 
Mirfield  both  point  out  'a  such  an  approach  leaves  the  court 
without  any  discretion  to  protect  an  accused  person  who  has  been 
unfairly  treated.  If  the  prosecution  prove  the  confession  to 
have  been  voluntary  it  becomes,  on  this  approach,  admissible 
almost  without  further  thought.  A  breach  of  the  Judges  Rules 
would  only  lead  to  exclusion  if  it  were  sufficiently  serious  to 
lead  to  either  involuntariness  or  oppression. 32 
Later  decisions,  notably  Rv  lud  on  (1980)  72  Cr  App  R  163  11 
reasserted  the  more  "orthodox"  view,  but  the  problem  was  never 
satisfactorily  resolved  before  the  passing  of  PACE. 
Another  problem  in  relation  to  discretionary  exclusion  was  the  -, 
reluctance  of  the  appellate  courts  to  lay  down  any  guidelines  for 
the  exercise  of  such  discretion,  12  Pattenden-suggests  that  the, 
root  of  both  problems,  is  the  confusion  about  the  existence  of  a 
discretion  to  exclude  a  voluntary  confession  and  the  uncertainty 
surrounding  its  exercise,  lay  in  the  failure  of  the  courts  to 
agree  about  the  object  of  the  discretion.  The  courts  never 
decided  whether  the  discretion  should  be  directed  towards  control 
of  the  police,  the  so-called  disciplinary  principle,  or  whether 
the  point  at  issue  was  reliability. 
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6.5  Prcýä  is  fof  Reform  of  the  Er.  Tlich  Law 
(i)  Introduction 
Increasing  dissatisfaction  with  the  state  of  certain  aspects  of 
English  criminal  law,  which,  in  the  case  of  confessions,  had  coma 
to  consist  of  the  "Jigsaw  pieces  of  two  centuries  of  police  and 
legal  history"  led  to  two  major  reports  in  the  space  of  less  than 
ten  years,  the  Criminal  Law  Revision  Committee's  Eleventh  Report 
of  1972  1  and  the  report  of  the  Royal  Commission  on  Criminal 
Procedure  of  1981.2 
These  two  bodioc  were  different  in  almost  all  respects,  The  CLRC 
is  a  standing  committee  set  up  in  1959  to  consider  such  aspects 
of  the  criminal  law  as  the  Home  Secretary  might  from  time  to  time 
refer  to  it  and  to  make  necessary  recommendations.  The  RCCP  was 
appointed  in  1978  specifically  to  study  and  make'  recommendations 
on  the  process  of  pro-trial  criminal  procedure  and  owed  its 
existence  in  great  measure  to  the  outcry  which  followed  the 
Confai  t  case. 
The  CLRC  consisted  largely  of  trained  lawyers  while  law/era  were 
very  much  in  a  minority  in  the  membership  of  the  RCCP.  The  CLRC 
dealt  with  the  admissibility  of  confessions  in  the  context  of  a 
genera].  review  of  the  rules  of  criminal  evidence  while  the  1CCP 
looked  at  the  issue  from  the  perspective  of  police  investigation 
of  crime.  The  CLRC  worked  behind  closed  doors  and  although  it 
solicited  evidence  it  did  no  research.  The  RCCP  commissioned 34 
extensive  and  far  reaching  research  studies.  Not  surprisingly 
they  reached  different  conclusions  and,  unlike  the  position  in 
regard  to  the  right  to  silence,  it  was  the  views  of  the  CLRC 
which  were  ultimately  to  prevail. 
Notes 
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(ii)  The  Commit  to 
The  CLRC  proposed  to  preserve  the  existing  law  in  general  with  a 
relaxation  of  the  strict  rule  that  any  threat  or  inducement  made 
a  confession  inadmissible  and  with  certain  alterations  in  matters 
of  detail.  A  majority  of  the  committee  recommended  that  there 
should  be  two  grounds  of  exclusion.  Firstly  any  confession 
obtained  by  oppression  should  be  inadmissible;  Secondly  a 
confession  would  be  excluded  if  it  resulted  from  a  threat  or 
inducement  (whether  made  by  a  person  in  authority  or  not)  which 
was  "of  a  sort  likely,  in  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time, 
to  render  unreliable  any  confession  which  might  be  made  by  the 
accused  in  consequence  thereof.  0-1" 
A  minority  of  the  'committee  would  have  allowed  all  confessions  to 
go  before  the  jury  leaving  it  to  them  to  assess  the  question  of 
reliability.  x  This  is,  '  of  course.  essentially  the  modern 
Scottish  practice.  However,  the  majority  of  the  committee 
considered  that  there  was  a  danger  that  when  the  evidence  on 35 
either  side  was  evenly  balanced,  "the  imnediata  effect  on  the 
jury  of  the  evidence  of  a  confession  might  be  too  great  to  be 
undone,  even  with  the  help  of  the  summing  up,  by  the  evidence  of 
the  way  in  which  the  confession  was  'obtained.  "  Secondly  the 
majority'felt  that  to  remove  all  restrictions  on  the  edmies- 
ibiltty  of  confessions,  no  matter  how  they  were  obtained  might, 
as  they  delicately  put  it,  "tempt  the  police  to  resort  on 
occasions  to  at  least  Umall  improprieties.  " 
The  CLRC  did  not  ,  examine  tho  issue  of  discretionary  excluNion. 
As  previously  discussed,  -the  reaction'to  the  recommendation  of 
the  CLRC  that  the  right  to  silence  should  be  restricted  was  such 
that  their  ,  entire  report  was  shelved. 
Notes 
1,  Report  pars,  65  and  Draft  Bill  cl,  2 
2,  Report  paras,  62-63 
3,  Report  pars,  64 
4,  supra  chapter  3,1(U) 
J 
(iii)  The  Cpnfa,  it  Caee  and  the  Eisher  Inquiry 
In  November  1972  three  youths,  Ronald  Leighton,  Ahmet  Salih  and 
Colin  Lattimore,  were  prosecuted  for  the  murder  of  a  transvestite 
prostitute  called  Maxwell  Confait  whose  body  was  found  in  a 
burning  house  in  Catford,  South  London.  The  only  evidence 
against  them  consisted  of  confessions  and  the  fact  that  they  had 
been  amusing  themselves  by  starting  some  small  fires  in  the 36 
vicinity  of  Confait's  house  the  day  after  his  death.  '  Lattimore, 
the  eldest  at  eighteen,  was  mentally  retarded  with  a  mental  age 
of  eight  and  an  I.  Q.  'of  66.  He  was  also  highly  suggestible, 
Leighton,  aged  fifteen,  was  borderline  subnormal  with  an  I.  Q.  of 
75«  Salih  by  contrast  was  bright  and  reasonably  intelligent  but 
he  had  just  celebrated  his  fourteenth  birthday  two  weeks  before 
his  arrest  and  English  was  not  his  first  language.  Leighton  was 
convicted  of  the  murder,  Lattimore  of  manslaughter  on  the  grounds 
of  diminished  responsibility  and  all  three  were  convicted  of 
arson  with  intent  to  endanger  life. 
In  July  1973  the  Court  of  Appeal  refused  leave  to  appeal.  How- 
over  after  a  long  campaign  by  the  boys'  families  aided,  and'poss- 
ibly  encouraged,  by  media  interest,  the  Home  Secretary  agreed  to 
refer  the  case  back  to  the  Court  of  Appeal  and.  in  October  1975 
the  convictions  were  quashed.  Although  their  Lordships  decided 
that  it  was  not  necessary  to  embark  on  a  detailed  analysis.  of  the 
boys'  admissions  and  the  circumstances  in  which  they  were  made, 
they  observed  that  they  contained  a  number  of  very  improbable 
matters  and  some  striking  omissions.  -2 
Following  this,  an  inquiry  was  set  up  under  Str  Henry  Fisher 
which  reported  in  December  1977,  '  Sir  Henry's  findings  must  have 
been  a  grave  disappointment  to  those  who  wanted  to  believe  that 
three  innocent  youths  had  been  "fitted  up"  by  the  police.  He 
found  that  no  police  officer  had-deliberately  falsified  the 
record  of  oral  answers  given  by  the  boys  to  police  questioning  d1 37 
that  Leighton  and  Salih  could  have  been  present  at  and  taken  part 
in  the  killing  of  Confait  and  that  the  confessions  could  not  have 
been  made  unless  at  leaot,  one  of  the  throe  had  been  involved  in 
the  murder  and  arson.  ''"}  On  the  balance  of  probabilities  Sir 
Henry  found  <a)  that  Lattimore's  confession  to  the  arson  was 
true,  but-that  he  was.  persuaded  by  Leighton  and  Salih  to  confess 
falsely  to  having-taken  part  in  'the  killing,  and(b)that  the 
confessions  of  Leighton  and  Salih  to  having  taken  part  in  the 
arson  were  true;  that  their  answers  and  statononto  as  to  the 
killing  were  falsified  to  the  extent  necessary  to  incriminate 
Lattimore;  but  that  both  Leighton  and  Salih  were  involved  in  the 
killing. 
,,  ý`_ 
However,  Sir  Henry  found  that  there  had  been  several  breachee  of 
the  Judges  Rules  and  Administrative  Diroctions,  indludtng  the  . 
failure  to  inform  the  boys  of  ,  the  rights  and  facilities  available 
to  them,  particularly  legal  advice,  and  in  Lattimore'  s  case, 
prompting  and  questioning  during  the  taking  of  a  written 
'statement.  '  In  addition  there  had  been  an-improper  delay-.  in 
charging  the  boyc,.  oven  though  the  police  had  sufficient 
evidence,  because  they-wanted  to  question  Leighton  further,  The 
questioning  of  Lattimore  had  been  unfair  and  oppressive  because 
, inter  alia  the  police  knew  he  was  mentally  retarded  and  had-.. 
nonetheless  questioned-him  (in  a  manner  found  to  be  in  itself 
unfair'and  oppressive)  in  the  absence  of  a  parent  or  guardian.  0 38 
Sir  Henry  found  evidence  of-ignorance  and  misunderstanding  of 
certain  of  the  Judges  Rules  and  Administrative  Directions  on  the 
part  of  both  the  police  and  the  legal  profession  and  he  made 
various.  suggestions  which  would  have-led  to  them  being  strength- 
ened,  particularly  the  right  of  the  suspect  to  legal  advice.  9 
He  also  advocated  tape  recording  of  police  interviews,  pointing 
out  that  if  the  proceedings  involving  the  three  boys  had  been 
recorded  his  Inquiry  might-have  been  unnecessary. 
When  he  turned  to  consider  the  question  of  enforcing  compliance 
with  the  Judges  Rules,  Sir  Henry  considered  that  any  sanction  for 
breach  of  the  Rules  should  be  "certain  and  regularly  applied"  and 
at  that  time  it  was  neither.  14  He  was  implicitly  critical  of 
the  decision  in  Prager  and  pointed  out  that  it  was  not  even 
certain  that  a  breach  of  the  Rules  which  fell  short  of  rendering 
a  confession  involuntary  was  enough  to  entitle-a  judge  to  exclude 
the  confession  as  a  matter  of  discretion. 
Sir  Henry  stopped-short  of  recommending  that  all  confessions 
should  be  corroborated,  -but  he  did  suggest  that  it  should  be  made 
a  rule  of  law  that  no  person  should  be  convicted  on  the  evidence 
of  a  confession  obtained  in  one  of  four  specific-situations 
unless  that  evidence  was  supported-by  other  independent  evidence. 
The  four  situations  ware: 
(a)  a  confession  obtained,  in  response  to  questioning  by  the 
police,  by  muane.  of  a  breach  of  the  Judges  Rules  or 
Administrative  Directions,  whether  or  not  the'effect  of  the 39 
breach  was  to  make  the  confession  involuntary; 
(b)  a  confession  by  a  child  or  young  person  in  response  to 
questioning  by  the  police  without  the  presence  of  a  parent, 
guardian  or  other  person  not  a  police  officer; 
(c)  a  confession  made  by  a  mentally  handicapped  person  (whether 
or  not--known  tobe  so  at  the  time)  in  response  to  questioning  by 
the  police  without  the  presence  of  a  parent,  guardian  or.  other 
person-not  a  police  officer;  and 
(d)  an  oral  confession  made  in  a  police  station  (whether  the 
maker  was  in  custody  or  not)  of  which  a  tape  recording  was  not 
available.  '' 
Point  (d)  could,  of-course,  only  take  effect  if  tape  recording 
were  universally  available  in  police  stations. 
ti1irfield  comments  that  the  reason  for  recommending  introduction 
of  a  supporting  evidence  requirement  would  seem  to  be  that  the 
presence  of  such  evidence  will  increase  confidence  in  the 
reliability  of  the  confession.  If  this  is  so,  he  argues,  the 
recommendations  in  the  report  are  not  entirely  satisfactory. 
While  it  is  easy  to  imagine  circumstances  in  which  the  presence 
of  breaches  of  rules  about  questioning  will  cast  doubt  on  the 
reliability  of  the  confession,  it  does  not  follow  that  any  breach 
of  any  such  rule  will  cost  doubt  upon  reliability.  ''- 
This  is  undoubtedly  so,  but  surely-a  partial  requirement  far 
supporting  evidence  is  better  than  none  at  all,  -  particularly  -- 
where  the  requirement  is  targetted  towards  the  protection  of 40 
identifiably  vulnerable  groups  and  the  suppression  of  police 
malpractice? 
Although  the  Fisher  Report  was  only  concerned  with  the  circum- 
stances  of  one  rather  sordid  case,  its  main  value  was  in  high- 
lighting  the  grossly  unsatisfactory  state  of  the  law  and  the 
urgent  need  for  reform,  for  which  it  provided  a  considerable 
impetus. 
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police  questioning  in  the  investigation  and  prosecution  of  crime. 
Their-proposals  were  considerably  more  radical  than  those  of  the.. 
CLRCI  but  they  ware  made  along  with  various  other  recommendations 41 
for  improving  the  accuracy  of  the  record  of  the  interrogation  and 
for  safeguarding  the  rights  of'the  suspect.  " 
Although  the  RCCP  has  been  criticised  for  dealing  with  the  law  of 
evidence  in  a  way  which  was  "vestigial  in  the  extreme",  I  it 
cannot  be'denied  that  many`of  the  points  mada'in  its  report  were 
very  valid.  The  notion  of  voluntariness  and  the  application  of 
the  exclusionary  rule  was  considered  to  cause  much  difficulty  to 
the  police  and  courts.  The  oppression  concept  arg  expressed  in 
Prap,,  A,  was  criticised  on  the  basis'that  it`  required  a  police 
officer  under  the  confusion  and  pressures  of  an  investigation  to 
make  an  assessment  of  the  character,  susceptibilities  and  mental 
state  of`the  suspect  whom  he  is'interviewing  and  then  try  to 
adopt  his  questioning  to  that  assessment,  "only  to  find  months 
later,  that  the  judge  takes  a  different  view.  As  one  of  their  own 
researchers  had  observed,  "If  any  person  is  subject  to  a  rule  he 
should  know  when  he  is  breaking  it.  This  cannot  be  said  of  the 
rules  governing  the  conduct  of  Interviews  with  respect  to 
voluntariness  or  oppression.  ",  2 
The  Commission  also  pointed  out  that  the  legal  and  psychological 
concepts  of  "voluntarinas&"  did  not  match  since  the  very  facts  of 
custody  and  questioning  in  custody  were  in  themselves  coercive.  ° 
In  order'to  ensure  that  suspects'  statements  were  as  reliable  as 
possible,  there  should  be  "workable  and  enforceable  guidelines 
for  the  police,  criteria  that  the  courts  can  apply  without  a  feat 42 
of  imagination  that  sometimes  defies  belief,  and  a  clear  and 
enforceable  statement  of'the  rights  and  safeguards  for  the 
suspect  in  custody.  "  4  The  safeguards  were  to  be`embodied  in  a 
code  of  practice  and  were  to  include  a  right  not  to  be  held 
incommunicado,  a  right  to  legal  advice,  and  a  right  to  be  fairly 
interviewed  and  properly  cared  for  while  in  custody.  Additional 
rights  to  special  protection  were  proposed  for  vulnerable  people. 
Subject  to  these  requirements  being  met,  the  RCCP  recommended 
that  it  should  be  left  to  the  jury  to  assess  the  reliability  of 
confession  evidence  upon  the  facts  presented  to  them.  11  The 
criterion  of  "voluntariness"  was  to  be  removed. 
The  RCCP  were  against  the  idea  of  automatic  exclusion  of  evidence 
as  a  sanction  for  a  breach  of  the  code  of  practice.  Such  a' 
breach  was  to  be  dealt  with  as  a  matter'of  police  digcipline.  It 
was  to  be  left  to  the  defence  and  the  judge  to  warn'the  jury  of 
the  potential  unreliability  of  a  confession  obtained  in  breach  of 
the  code.  6  However  any  confession  obtained  by  violence,  throats 
of  violence,  torture  or  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  would 
automatically  be  excluded.  7 
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6.6-  The  Police  and  Cri  Hind  Evjdence  Act  1984 
The  proposal  by  the  RCCP  for  the  unfettered  admissibility  of  all 
confessions°(other  than  those  obtained  by  violanco  etc)  did  not 
find  favour  and  the  legislation  which  followed  is  an  amalgamation 
of  the  proposals  of  both  bodies;  but  with  those  of  the  CLRC 
forming  the  real  basis  of  the  modern  law  of  confessions.  This  is 
now  to  be  found  primarily  in  Part  VIII  of  FACE  and  also  in  the. 
Code  of  Practice  issued  under  Section  66  for  the  Detention 
Treatment  and  Questioning  of  Persons  in  Custody  by  Police 
Officers.  Although  a  breach  of  the  provisions  of  the  Code  does 
not  of  itself  render  the  person  responsible  liable  to  criminal  or 
civil  proceedings,  but  only  to  disciplinary  action,  the  pro- 
visions  o¬  the  Code  are-admissible  in  evidence  in  any  proceedings 
and  any  relevant  provision'is  to  bo  takes  into  account  in 
determining  any  question  before  the  Court.  '  Thus  the  court  is 
entitled  to  have  regard  to  such  matters  as  the  length  of  the 
questioning,  breaks  for  rest  and  refreshment  etc. 
Section  82(1)  defines  a  "confession"  as  including  "any  statement 
wholly  or  partly  adverse  to  the  person  who  made  it,  whether  made 
to  ,a  person  in  authority  or  not  and  whether  made  in,  words  or 
otherwise.  " 
By  Section  76(1)  it  in  provided  that  a  confession  made  by  an 
accused  may  b©given  in  evidence  against  him  in  so  for  as  it  is 
relevant  and  not  excluded  under  Section  76(2).  This  latter 44 
subsection  sets  out,  the  tact  of,  admissibility,  ,. 
Mich-  is  clearly 
based  on  the  proposals  of  the  CLRC: 
"If  in  any  proceedings  where  the  prosecution 
proposes  to  give  in  evidence  a  confession  made  by 
,  an  accused  person,  it,  is  represented  to  the  court 
that  the  confession  may  have  been  obtained  - 
(a)  by  oppression  of  the  person  who  made  it;  or, 
(b)  in  consequence  of,  anything  said  or  done  which 
was  likely,  -in  the  circumstances  existing  at  the 
time,  to  render  unreliable  any  confession  which 
might  be  made  by.  him  in  consequence  thereof, 
the  court  shall  not  allow  the  confession  to  be 
given  in  evidence-against  him  except  in  so,  far  as. 
the  prosecution  proves.  to,  the  court  beyond 
reasonable  doubt  that  the  confatsion  (notwith- 
standing  that  it  may  be  tru(3)  was  not  obtained.  as 
aforesaid.  "  I 
"Oppression"  is 
, 
defined  by  Section  J6  (8)  as  including  "torture, 
inhuman  or  degrading 
. 
treat  ,  ent,  and  the  use  or  , 
throat  of  violence 
(whether  or  not  amounting  to  torture).  "  2  Tbip  definition,  which 
is  in  part  based  on  Article  3  ,  of  the  European,  Convention  on 
Human  Rights,  is  not  exhaustive  and  what  amounts  to  oppression 
will  depend  on  the  circumstances  of-the  individual,  cace.  The 
, 
pre-PACE  law  will  presumably  continue  to  be.  relevant  in  deciding 
whether  certain  forms  of  conduct  have  been  oppressive.  However 45 
in  Rv  Fulling  119871  ,2  All  ER  65  it  was  made  clear  that  a°° 
narrower  view  of  what  constituted  oppression  was  now  to  be  taken. 
In  this  case  the  female  defendant  had  initially  been  interrogated 
without  success,  but  confessed  when  told  that  her  lover  had  been 
having  an  affair  with  another  woman  who  was  at  that  time  being 
held  in  the  next  cell.  'According  to  Ms  Fulling  she  was  so  upset 
by  this  revelation  that  she  confessed  in  order  to  got  out  of  the 
police  station  and  away  from  her  rival.  Her  confession  was 
challenged  on  the  basis  of  oppression,  but  the  trial  judge 
admitted  it  and  his  decision  was  upheld  on  appeal. 
The  Court  of  Appeal  criticised  the  common  law  definition  of 
oppression  as  laid  down  in  PsP  as  being  artificially  wide. 
Section  76(2)(b)  (ie  the  potential  unreliability  test)  would, 
their  Lordships  stated,  now  cover  some  of  the  circumstances  which 
would  previously  have  been  dealt,  with  under  oppression.  Their 
Lordships  also  laid  down  that  "oppression"  should  receive  its 
dictionary  meaning,  via:  "exercise  of  power  in  a  burdonsome, 
harsh  or  wrongful  manner;  unjust  or  cruel  treatment  of  suspects, 
inferiors  etc.;  the  imposition-of  unreaconable  or  unjust 
burdens.  "  The  Court  also  quoted  with  approval  one  of  the 
dictionary  illustrations:  "There  is  not  a  word  in  or  language 
which  expresses  more  detestable  wickedness  than  oppression,  "  and 
went  on  to  observe  that,  "It  is  hard  to  envisage  any 
circumstances  in  which°such  oppression  would  not  entail  some 46 
impropriety  on  the  part  of.  the  interrogator.  "  This  approach  has 
been  criticised,  3  but  for  the  moment  it  will  have  to  serve. 
Ej  ng  was  followed  in  R_v  Davison  t19881  Crim  LR  442  where 
there  had  been  a  whole  series  of-breaches  of  both  the  Code  and 
the  Act  itself,  including  unlawful  detention  and  an-improper 
denial  of  access  to  a  solicitor.  Judge  Coombe  hold  that,  the  - 
police  had  been  exercising  their  authority  in  a  wrongful  manner 
and  this  was  capable  of  amounting  to  oppression,:, 
Although  it  remains  to  be  seen  what  degree  of  police  misconduct 
is  necessary  to  qualify  as  oppression,  the  view  has  been 
expressed  that  it  would  be  unfortunate  if  every  breach  of  the 
detention  rules  were  to  result  in, 
-an 
automatic-infercnco  of., 
oppression-4  Clearly  breaches  will  tend  towards.  a  cumulative, 
effect,  `  and  judges  will  have  to  ask  themselves  whether  a  number 
of  breaches  (all  to  the  advantage  of  the  interrogator)  suggest 
inadvertence  or,  intention, 
Opprnscion  apart,  the  few  now  emphasises  reliability  although  the 
teat  is  not  whether  the  confession  is  actually  unreliable  but 
whether  the  circumstances  arc  likely  to  render  it  unreliable. 
The  "person  in  authority"  requirement,  has  been  cwopt  away  and 
there  is  no  requirement  that.  the  "thing  caid  or  done"-must-be 
said  or  done  by  a  policeman,  nor  is  it,  nocessary  that  it,  should 
be'said  or  done  with  the  intention  of  Inducing  a  confession.  It 
has  however  been  held  8  that  the  subsection  is  only  applicable  to 47 
a  thing  said  or  done  by  a  person  other  than  the  defendant 
himself. 
The  potential  unreliability  test  `as  laid  down  in  Section  76(2)(b) 
is  clearly  of  wider  scope  than  the  common-law  test  of 
voluntariness  and  the  limits  of  the  subsection  have  yet  to  be 
explored.  Howdver  it-has  been  arguad  15  that  the  phrase  "anything 
said  or  done"  in  Section  76(2)(b)  is  unlikely  to  be  used  in 
respect  of  ordinary,  ,  proper`  questioning.  Since  few  confessions 
are  entirely  spontaneous,  "  being  generally  induced  by  police 
questioning  at  leant  to  a  point,  this  view  would  seem  to  be 
reasonable,  '' 
-1  " 
The  two  heads;  oppression  and  unreliability,  are  not  mutually 
exclusive  and  there  appears  'to  be  nothing  to  prevent  the  defence 
from  challenging  a  confession  on  both  grounds.  7 
Undcr  Section  76(3)  the  court  may  take  the  point  of  admissibility 
ex  proprio  motu  and  in  that  event  the  prosecution  are  again 
required  to  prove  the  absence  of'oppression  or'  factors'  leading  to 
unreliability  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  Section  76(4)  provides 
that'where  a  confession  is  excluded  that  does  not  affect  the 
admissibility  of  any  facts  discovered  as  a  result  of  the 
confession.  'A  confession  excluded  under  Section  76(2)  may  also 
be  admissible  under  76(4)  as  evidence  that  the  accused  "speaks, 
writes  or  expresses  himself  in"a  particular  way"  but  for  no  other 
purpose.  0 48 
Section  77  makes  special  additional  provision  for  confessions  by 
mentally  handicapped  persons.  Where  such  a  confession  has  been 
made  in  the  absence  of  an  independent  adult  the  judge  must  warn 
the  jury  that  there  is  special  need  for  caution  before  convicting 
in  reliance  on  the  confession.  This  provision  will  only  come 
into  play  if  the  confession  has  managed  to  pass'the  oppression-' 
and  unreliability  tests. 
Section  78(1),  which  applies  to  all  prosecution  evidence  and  not- 
merely  to  confessions,  provides: 
"In  any  proceedings  the  court  may  refuse  to  allow 
evidence  on  which  the  prosecution  proposes  to  rely 
to  be  given-if  it  appears  to  the  court  that, 
having  regard  to  all  the  circumstances,  including 
the  circumstances  in  which  the  evidence'was 
obtained,  the  admission  of  -theevidence  would  have= 
euch  an'adverse  effect'  on  the  fairness  of  the 
proceedings  that  the  court  ought  not  to  admit  it.  " 
Thus  a  confession  which  has  passed  the  oppression  and  unrelia- 
bility  tests  may  nevertheless  be  excluded  under  Section  78(1)  on 
grounds  of  fairness. 
Finally;  Section  82(3)  provides: 
"Nothing  in  this  Part  of  this  Act  shall  prejudice 
any'power  of  e  court  to  exclude  evidence  (whether 49 
by  preventing  questions  from  being  put  or 
otherwise)  at  its  discretion.  " 
It  can  thus  be  seen  that  there  are  now  three  separate  sections  of 
PACE,  76(2),  78(1)  and  82(3),  which  could  lead  to  confession 
evidence  being  excluded.  In  addition  Section  76(2)  contains  the 
two  tests  of  oppression  and  potential  unreliability.  The  precise 
relationship  between  these  provisions,  which  is  by  no  means 
clear,  has  exercised  some  English  writers  but  has  not  as  yet  been 
the  subject  of  express  judicial  decision.  It  has  been  argued 
unsuccessfully  '°  that  as  Section  76  provided  an  exhaustive  code 
on  confessions,  Section  78  must  have  been  intended  to  apply  to 
non-confession  evidence  only.  However  as  Di  Birch  has  pointed 
out,  in  the  course  of  an  exhaustive  survey  of  the,  recent  major 
decisions,  "  if  Section  76  were  repealed  tomorrow,  it  would  still 
be  possible  to  exclude  all  the  evidence  which'it  excludes  by 
invoking  Section  78.  As  far  as  Section  82(3)  is  concerned,  it 
has  been  suggested  '2  that  Sections  76  and  78  can  only  come  into 
play  before  the  evidence  in  question  is  given  and  thereafter 
exclusion  would  have  to  be  under  Section  82(3). 
Zander  has  extracted  no  fewer  than  fourteen  propositions  from,  the 
seventy  or  so  cases  on  Section  78  up-to  July  1990.  '0  The  most 
important  are: 
(a)  [Proposition  1]  The  admissibility  of  confessions  can  be 
challenged  under  Section  78  as  well  as  Section  76  ,.  (or  82(3)); 
(b)  [Proposition  31  Unfairness  to  the  defendant  is-not  the  sole 50 
criterion  for  exercise  of  the  discretion.  The  judge  should 
consider  the  interests  of  the  prosecution  as  well  as  the  defence. 
(c)  [Propositions  6  and  71  Evidence  will  not  be  excluded  as  a  way 
of  ponalicing  the  police.  Obviously  police  misconduct  can'be  the 
basis  of  exclusion  but  wilful.  wrongdoing  by  the  police  is  not  a 
requirement  for  the  operation  of  Section  78,  although  most  cases 
where  evidence  has  been  excluded  have  invlovod  breaches  of  the, 
Act  or  the  Codes 
(d)  [Propositions  101  If  the  suspect  has  previous  convictions  and 
experience-of  police  stations  the  court's  view  of  breaches  of  the 
rules  by  the  police  may  be  less  severe.  - 
One  should  not  make  too  much  of  Proposition  3.  Since  Section  78 
confers  a  discretion  on  the'judge«it'is  self  evident  (at  least  to 
this.  writer)  that  the'exercise  of  such  a  discretion  requires  the 
balancing  of  competing  interests.  English  law  is  stilla  long 
way  from  the  Scottish  test  of  bilateral  fairness.  Zander  bases 
his  proposition  on  three  cases.  Firstly  Rv  O'Loughlin  and 
Another-(1987)  85  Cr'App  R  157  which  is-a  first  instance  decision 
with-nothing  to  do  with  confessions..  The  question  for,  the  court, 
was  whether  depositions  were  admissible  as  evidence  for  the 
prosecution  in  the  absence  of  three-witnesses,  two  of  whom  were- 
known  to  be  afraid  to  come-to  court  and  the  third  had  simply 
vanished..  The  prosecution  had-to  satisfy  the-judge  beyond 
reasonable  doubt  that  the  witnesses  had  been  "kept  out  of  the  way 
by  the  procurement  of.  the  accused"  within=the  meaning  of  Section 
13(3)  of  the  Criminal  Justice  Act  1925  and  this  they  failed  to 51 
do,  although  it  was  not-an  unreasonable  inference  from-the 
circumstances. 
Kenneth  Jones  J.  considered  that  Section  78  required  him  "to 
balance  matters  having  regard,  on  the  one  hand,  to  the  interests 
of  the  defendant;  on  the  other  hand  to  the  interests  of  the 
public  as  represented  by  the  prosecution.  "  In  the  circumstances 
of  the  particular  case  he  considered  that,  "I  must  take  into 
account  in  exercising  my  discretion  also  the  interests  of  the 
Crown,  or  put  another  way,  I  must  take  account  in  measuring  any 
unfairness  to  the  defendant  of  the  defendant's  own  activities,  or 
if  not  his  own  activities  the  activities  of  others  acting  on  hie 
behalf.  "  ThiG  is  self-evident.  It  would  have  been  a  remarkable 
exercise  of-judicial  discretion  which  failed  to  countenance  the 
possibility  of  the  defendant  profiting  from  his  own  efforts, 
direct  or  indirect,.  -to  keep  thn,  witncssss-cut  of  the  way.  It 
hardly  marks  a  major  departure  in  English  law, 
The  other  two  cases  on  which  Zander  relies  do  both  concern 
confetaionz,,  -but  both  are  briefly  reported.  .  In  Ry  Snitth  I1917] 
Crirn  LR  579  the  view  of  the  court  was  that  "The  expression, 
'fairness  of  the  proceedings'  is  not  easy  to  interpret,  It  seems 
that  the  Court  Ghou]d  act  as  a  balance  between  the  prosecution 
and  defence,  bearing  in  mind  that  it  is  in  the  public  interest 
that  persons  who  commit  offences  of=this  sort  should  be  brought 
to  juotice.!  '  In  the  particular  circumstances  the  court  still 52 
excluded  evidence  of  an  interview  which  had  taken  place  after  the 
accused  had  been  wrongly  denied  access  to  a  solicitor. 
Finally  in  v  Hughes.  £198$7  Cr'm  hR  X19  the  report  is  even 
briefer.  Once  again  the  issue  was  access  to  legal  advice.  In 
upholding  the  decision  of  the  trial  judge  to  admit  evidence  of 
damaging  admissions  made  in  the  absence  of°a  solicitor  the  Court 
of  Appeal  observed  that  "The  effect-of  the  evidence  on  the  - 
defence  was  not  the  sole  consideration.  (The  trial  judge]  had  to 
balance  the  interests  of  the  prosecution  and  the  interests  of  the 
defence  in  deciding  what  the  interests  of  justice  were.  " 
Recent  cases  have  shown  the  English  courts  holding  that  where  - 
there  has  been  more  than  one  interview,  irregularities  in'the 
first  will  be-liable  to  "taint"  the  subsequent  interview(s) 
leading  to  the  possibility  of  exclusion-of  any  confession  which 
might  be  obtained,  -In  Rv  Ismail  119901  Crim  LR  there  had  - 
clearly  been  oppression  in  the  first  interview  and  it  was  hold 
that.  to  admit  the  second  would  be  "to  condone  the  flouting  of  the 
provisions  designed  to  protect  against  confessions  which  were  not 
genuine". 
In  Rv  McGovern  !  199  11  Grrim  LE  124  the  report:  in,  leer3  than 
ideally  clear  but  itappears  that  the  defendant;  who  was  of  low 
mental  capacity  was  interviewed  twice,  firstly  without  a 
solicitor  and  subsequently  in  the  presence  of  one.  In  addition 
the  fact  of  the  earlier  interview  and  the  wrongful  denial  of 53 
access  to  legal  advice  was  concealed  from  the  solicitor  when  she 
eventually  did  gain  access  to  the  accused.  A  confession  was 
apparently  made  at  the  first  interview  and  later  repeated.  As 
the  court  noted  "when  an  accused  person  has  made  a  series  of 
admissions  ...  at  a  first  interview,  the  very  fact  that  these 
admissions  have  been  made  is  likely  to  have  an  effect  on  the 
person  in  the  course  of  a  second  interview.  "  Accordingly  the 
first  interview  having  been  in  breach  of  Section  58,  the  court 
considered  that  the  subsequent  one  must  be  similarly  tainted. 
One  slight  oddity  about  McGovern  is  that  the  police  would  appear 
to  have  had  good  grounds,  had  they  so  chosen,  to  invoke  the 
exception  provided  by  subsections  58(6)  and  (8)  under  which  delay 
in  permitting  access  to  legal  advice  may  be  justified  in  the  case 
of  a  serious  arresteble  offence  if  the  exercise  of  the  right  to 
legal  advice  will  inter  alia  lead  to  interference  with  or  harm  to 
evidence  connected  with  a  serious  arresteble  offence  or  inter- 
ference  with  or  physical  injury  to  other  persons.  However  the 
police  failed  to  follow  the  correct  procedure  of  obtaining  the 
authorisation  of  a  senior  officer  for  the  delay  and  the  Crown 
conceded  that  the  first  interview  was  unlawful. 
Finally  it  should  be  noted  that  where  the  subsequent  interview 
can  be  held  not  to  be  tainted  by  the  earlier  one,  it  will  be 
admissible.  14 
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least  potential  unreliability, 
8,  cf  Ry  Yoisin  [1918]  1  KB  531 
9.  Section  77  is  discussed  more  fully  in  the  context  of  sufficiency  infra 
chapter  7,4  (iii) 
10,  R..  v  Mason  t19873  S  All  ER  481  In  this  case  the  suspect  and  his  solicitor 
were  lied  to  by  the  police  who  falsely  claimed  to  have  fingerprint  evidence, 
The  most  remarkable  feature  of  the  case  is  the  fact  that  the  trial  judge  did 
not  exclude  the  confession 
11,  op  cit  note  5  supra 
12,  R.  v  Sat-Bhashra  119281  Crim  L  453 
13,  p202 
14.  Rv  (iilland  and  Barrett  119911  Cris_s  280 55 
6.7  nsr  al-Advir,.  e  Du  c  i_  an  cr 
(1)  Scotl  nd  I_  ,- 
There  are  major  differences  in  Scottish  and  English  law, 
particularly  since'PACE  in  the  question  of  access  to  legal 
advice  for  persons  in  police  cuotody. 
Although  tape  recording  is.  gradually  being  introduced,  -it  has  not 
been  made  a::  critarion-of'admissibility  and  it  may  generally  be-,, 
said  that,  -subject  to  specific  statutory  provision  a  detainee  or 
suspect  in`the  hands  of  the  Scottish  police  even  though  he  is  not 
being  interviewed  on  tape  has-no  right  to  legal  advice  before  he 
is  charged. 
In  Scotland  the-normal  position.  tn  solemn  procedure  is  governed 
by  Section  19  of  the  1975  Act  which,  broadly  stated,  entitles  a 
person-who  has  been  arrested  to  have  intimation-sent  to  a 
solicitor,  and  to  haven  privat  $--interview,  with  the  solicitor- 
before  judicial  examination.,  In  summary  procedure  Section  305 
makes  similar  provision  and  in  both  cases  the  prisoner  is 
entitled  to  be  told  of  his  right  of  access  to  legal  advice.  A 
person  detained  under  Section  2  of  the  1980  Act  is  also  entitled 
to  have  intimation  sent  to  a  solicitor  and  to  be  told  of  his 
right.  '  _; 
However,  theme  general  provioione  do  not  provide  ,  any  riEht  for  e 
Cu5pect  actually  to  sae  the  solicitor  before  ,  he  has  beon:  charged. 56 
The  only  case  known  to  the  writer  where  a  person  in  the  hands  of 
the  Scottish  police  has  a  specific  right  of  access  to  legal 
advice  is  that  of  a  person  arrested  or  detained  under  the 
Prevention  of  Terrorism  (Temporary  Provisions)  Act  1989  which  is 
clearly  framed  on  the  basis  of  English  practice.  2 
In  the  case  of  an  ordinary  detainee  the  Thomson  Committee  had 
specifically  recommended  that  access  to  a  solicitor  should  be  a 
matter  of  police  discretion.  °  Otherwise  they  took  the  view  that 
a  solicitor  should-not-be  permitted  to  intervene  in  police 
investigations  before  charges  '- 
"The  purpose  of  the  interrogation  is  to  obtain 
from  the  suspect  such  informatiQn  as  he  may 
possess  regarding  the  offence,  and  this  purpose 
might  be  defeated  by  the  participation  of  his 
solicitor.  " 
It  is  also  important  to  remember  that  the  Thomson  Committee  made 
its  recommendations  on  the  basis  that  there  should  be  a  reliable 
record  of  police  interrogation  and  in  particular  that  the 
admissibility  of-'a  statement  made  before  arrest'in  answer  to 
questioning  in  a  police  station  should  depend  on  the  statement 
having  been  tape-recorded,  -0 
There  is  a  surprising  lack  of  Scottish  case  law  specifically:  on 
the  issue  of-legal  advice  to  persons  in  custody  and  such  as 
exists  is  largely  unsatisfactory.  6  Judicial  references  to  non- 
existent  "rights"  are  unhelpful.  Lord  Anderson  was  simply 57 
incorrect  when  he  assorted  that:  - 
"A  person  who  is  accused  is  entitled,  from  the 
moment  of  apprehension,  to  have  the  advice  of  a 
skilled  law  agent,  who  will-advise-him  whether  or 
not  he  ought  to  make  a  statement  and  what 
statement  he  ought  to  make.  "  ' 
In  modern  practice  once  the  accused  hea'been  charged,  if  he 
wishes  to  make  a  voluntary  statement,  he  must,  -  at  that  stage,  be 
offered  the  services  of  a  solicitor  0  but  otherwiso'his  only 
right  is  (and  has  been  since  the  passing  of  the  Criminal' 
Procedure  (Scotland)  Act  1887)  to  have  intimation  sent  to  a, 
solicitor  and  to  an  interview  with  the  solicitor  prior  to 
appearance  in  court. 
There  has  never  been  a  Scottish  case  in  which  a  statement  has 
been  excluded  solely  because  of  the  absence  of  legal  advice.  The 
closest  Scottish  law  has  come  to  excluding  a  confession  because 
the  accused  had  been  wrongly  denied  accoec  to  legal  advice  was 
Lmw  V.  Mc,  Nicol  12-65 
-Tr. 
32  where  the  accused'c  solicitor  had  been 
contacted  but  was  unable  to  come  to  the  police  station  immed- 
iately  and  the  police  had  cautioned  and  charged  the  accused  who 
had  then  made  a  statement  before  his  arrival.  However  there  was 
also  an  unjustified  threat  to  keep  the  accused  in  custody  over  a 
public  holiday  and  this  was  an  important  factor  in'the  court 
holding  the  statement  to  have  been-unfairly  obtained. 58 
What  it  really  comes  to  is  that  currently  under  Scottish  law  the 
police  are  under  no  legally  enforceable  obligation  to  allow 
access  to  legal  advice  but  a  statement  obtained  in  the  absence  of 
such  advice  may  well  be  liable  to  exclusion  on  the  grounds  of 
unfairness. 
The  problems  inherent  in  this  situation  are,  to  an  extent,  offset 
by  the  very  limited  periods  during  which  such  a  person-can  be 
detained  in  Scotland  by  comparison-with  England,  A  ,  suspect  may 
only  be  detained  for  six  hours  and  a  person  arrested  must  be 
brought  before  a  court  on  the  next  lawful  day.  -Apart  from  the 
possibility  of  "voluntary"  attendance,  there  is  no  escape  route 
to  allow  the  Scottish  police  to  extend  these  periods. 
Nevertheless  it  is  clearly  unsatisfactory  that  the  law  on  such  an 
important  point  is  in  such  an  ambiguous  condition  and  depends  on 
legislation  more  than  a  century  old  and  conceived  on  the  basis  of 
the  old  form  of  judicial  examination: 
"At  a  time  when  questioning  by  the  police  was 
frowned-upon,  and  the  judicial.  examination  would 
have  been  the  first  attempt  at  ascertaining  the 
accused's  version  of  events,  it  might  have  been 
sufficient  protection  that  the  accused  be 
forewarned  by  his  solicitor  of  the  perils  of 
examination.  Nowadays,  though,  the  most  important 
part  of  the  questioning  will  normally  have 
ocurred,  and  any  incriminating  etatementa  been 59 
lade,  before  the  examination  and  often  without 
legal  assistance.  In  these  circumstances  Section 
19  smacks  of  'shutting  the  stable  door  after  the 
horse  has  bolted.  1"  '3  T 
At  the  moment  the  situation  is  fair  to  no-one.  -  Opinions  may 
differ  as  to  an  appropriate  solution  but  it  is  clear  that 
-the-' 
quo  should  not  be  allowed  to  continue,  In  the  writer's 
view,  provided  there-is-an  accurate-record  (ie  a  tape  or  video 
recording),  and  provided  also  that  there  are  no  legislative 
changes  to  the  maximum  periods  for  which  persons  may  be  hold  by 
the  police,  the"Thomson  Committee's  proposal  that  there  should  be 
no  right  for  a  solicitor  to  intervene  in  police  proceedings  Is 
correct  and  should  become  the  basis  for  the  law.  It  appears  to 
the  writer  that-the  denial  of  legal  advice  for  a  short  period  is 
the  most  practical  compromise  between  the  needs  of  investigation 
of  crime  and  the-rights  of  the  individual. 
Notes  - 
1,1980  Act  Section  3C1)(b) 
2,1930  Act  Sections  3A  and  3C  inserted  by  the  Law  Reform  (Miscellaneous 
Provisions)  Act  1985,  Sea  also  Eorbe$  yH.,  M.  Advocate  1990  S-.  R  65 
3,  -Report  para  5,03 
4,  Report  pars  7.16 
6,  Report  para  7,13c 
6,  eg  H.  M.  Advocate  v  Aitken  1926  JC 83  H.  Advocate--v  Cunningham  1939  SC  bis 
HJ't  vocate  v  Fo  III" 
_31 
30.  See  also  and 
Ettgueon  v  Brown  1942  IC  113 
7,  M  Advocate  v  Aitken  1926  Ja  91  at  peg 
8,  cf  Thomson  Committee  pares  7,16  and  7,19,  While  there  has  been  no  research 
done  on  the  point,  the  writer's  personal  observations  suggest  that  very  few 
accused  do  in  fact  take  up  the  offer, 
9,  K,  0,  Ewing  and  Minnie  Civil  Liberties  in  Scotland;  Casees  and  Materials 
(Edinburgh,  1982)  p93 60 
(ii)  England 
By  contrast  with  the  very  limited  periods  possible  in  Scotland, 
the  modern  English  law  allows  detention  without  charge  for  up  to, 
twenty  four  hours  '  and  this  may  be  extended  to  a  maximum  of 
thirty  six  hours  by  the  police  themselves.  2  Detention  beyond 
thirty  six  hours  requires  the-authority  of.  a  magistrate's  court  ' 
but  if  this  is  granted,  'the  accused  person  will  be  returned  to 
the  police,  and  not  remanded  to  prison.  'The,  maximum  possible 
period  of  detention  is  ninety'cix  hours. 
Prior  to  PACE,  principle  (c)-of  the  preamble  to  the  1964  Judges 
Rules  and  Administrative  Directions  provided: 
'"4  every  person  at  any  stage  of  an  investigation 
should  be  able  to  communicate  and  to  consult 
privately  with  a  solicitor=  This  Is  so  'even  if  he 
is  in  custody-provided  that,  in  such  a  case  no 
unreasonable  delay  or  hinderance"is  caused  to  the 
-processes  of  investigation  or  the  administration 
of,,  justice  by  °his  doing  so.  "  --  -  eý,. 
This  was  reinforced  by-an  Administrative  Direction  which 
provided:  ' 
"A  person-in  custody  should'be  allowed  to"opeak  on 
the  telephone  "to  his  solicitor  or  to  his  friends 
provided  that  no-hinderance-is  reasonably  likely' 
to  be  caused  to  the  processes  of  investigation  or 
to  the  administration  of  Justice  by  his  doing  so.  " 61 
However  the  courts,  with  a  few  notable  exceptions,  4  were  no  more 
inclined  to  exclude  confessions  obtained  in  breach  of  the 
entitlement  to  legal  advice  than  they  were  to  exclude  evidence 
obtained  in  breach  of  any  other  aspect-of-the  Judges  Rules.  6 
In  1971  Lord  Widgery,  the  then  Lord  Chief'7ustice,  was  quoted  in 
the  press  as  having  said  to  the  American  Bar  Association: 
"Any  rule'requiring  the  presence  of  the  suspect's 
lawyer  during,  interrogation  is  quite  unacceptable.,  ' 
It  would  no  doubt  be  an  excellent  thing  for  an 
independent  third  party  to  be  present  so  that  he 
could  later  testify  to  the  court  as  to  what  had 
taken  place,  but  the  accused's  lawyer  is  not  an 
independent  party.  "  6 
t 
To  this  the  riposte  has  been  made  that  the  solicitor  is  not  meant 
to  be  independent,  he  is  the  bons  fide  adviser  of  his  client  and 
the  protector  of  his  interests.  7  Battle  lines  in  this  argument 
t 
tended  to  be  drawn  along  familiar  lines.  On  the  one  side  the 
police  would  invariably  complain  that  a  suspect's  solicitor  would 
impede  the  progress  of-legitimate  police  inquiries.  There  was, 
in  England,  a  deep  seated  mistrust  by  the  police  of  lawyers  and  a 
perception,  usually  based-on  generalisation  from  the  particular, 
that  in  many  cases  they  were  at  least  as  bad  as  their  clients.  8 
On  the  other  side  there  was  widespread  suspicion  and  ignorance  of 
what  went  on  in  police  stations. 62 
Research  by  Zander,  "`  Baldwin  and  McConville-11°  and  Softley  It 
showed  how  unsatisfactory  the  situation  was  with  Baldwin  and 
McConville  finding  fewer  than  one  defendant-in  ten  being 
interviewed  in'the  presence  of  a  solicitor  despite  the  terms  of 
the  Judges  Rules.  Admittedly  many-defendants  did  not  ask  for 
legal  advice,  but  this  often  arose  from  ignorance  or  a  conviction 
that  the  request  would  be.  refused  rather  than  a  conscious 
decision  not  to  exercise  a,  known:  right:  12  Most  disturbing  was 
the  number  of  defendants  who  had  (or.  ciaimed,  to  have  had)-: 
requests  for-legal  advice  refused.  point  blank  by  the-police.  In 
Baldwin  and  McConville's  survey  this  amounted  to  84  defendants 
out  of  a  total  of  i09  who  had  requested  to  be  allowed  to  consult 
a  solicitor.  -_=IV 
Although  the  RCCP  expressed  a  measure  of  scepticism  about 
research  relying  on  defendant  based  samples,  it  did  emphasise  the 
need  to  ensure  a  "completely  effective"  right  to  legal  advice.  'I 
Section  58  of  PACE  '4  broadly  endorses  the  RCCP'e  proposals  and 
now  provides  by  subsection-(1)  that-a  person  who  is  in  police 
detention  shall'be  entitled,  if  ha  so  requests,  to  consult  a 
solicitor  privately-at  any  time.  The  police-are  required-by  the 
Code  of  Practice  to  inform  the  suspect  of  his  rights  both  orally 
and  by  written-notice. 
The  police  are  only  entitled  to  dolay  compliance  with  the  -. 
defendant's  request  if-ha  is  in  custody  for  a  "serious  arrestablo f 
63 
offence"  and  the  circumstances  fall  within  subsection  (8)  is  they 
have  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that  compliance  would  (a). 
lead  to  interference  with  or  harm  to  evidence  connected  with  a 
serious  arrestable  offence  or  interference  with  or  physical 
injury  to  other  persons  or  (b)-lead  to  the  alerting  of-other 
persons  suspected  of  having  committed  such  an  offence  but  not  yet 
arrested  for  it  or  (c)  hinder  the  recovery  of  any  property 
obtained  as  a  result.  of  such  an  offence.  Only  an  officer  of  the 
rank  of  superintendent  or  over.  can  authorise  delay  and  then  only 
for  a  maximum  of  thirty  six  hours.  After  this  period  the  right 
to  legal  advice  becomes  absolute. 
Since  Section-58  cane  into  force,  the  Court  of  Appeal  initially 
took.  a  fairly  robust  line  against  the  denial  of  legal  advice 
although  it  has  left  open  the  possibility  of  a  retreat.  at  a  later 
stage.  18  In  Rv  Samuel  ('19881-2  A11,  RR  115.  the  defendant  was 
arrested  on  suspicion  of  armed  'obbery,  clearly  a  "serious 
arrestable.  offence",  and.  questioned  by  the  police  on  four 
occasions  while  he-was  in-custody.  In  the  course  of  the  second 
interview  he  asked.  to  see,  a-solicitor.  This  was  refused 
apparently  on  the  grounds  that  other,  euspects  might  be  warned  and 
that  the  recovery.  of_outstanding  stolen  money  might  be  hindered, 
and  the  refusal  was  later  repeated.  The  police  made  no  efforts 
to  ascertain  the  identity  of  the  solicitor  whom  Samuel  wished  to 
contact;  he  was  in  fact  a  Mr  Warner.  described  by.  the  Court  of 
Appeal  as  "a.  highly  respected  member  of  his  profession".  Despite 
several  attempts,,  Mr  Warner  only  obtained  access  to  his  client. 64 
after  he  had  confessed.  Evidence  of  the  confession  was  admitted 
at  the  trial  but  on  appeal  it  was  held  that  the  trial  judge,  ought 
to  have  excluded  it  under  Section  78. 
The  Court  took  the  view  that  the  police  must  be  virtually  certain 
that  a  solicitor,  if  contacted,  will  thereafter  either  commit  a 
criminal  offence  or  unwittingly  pass  on  a  coded  message  to  other 
criminals.  Only  in  the  remote  event  of  the  police  being  able  to 
produce  evidence  as  to  the  corruption  of  a  particular  solicitor 
would  a  police  officer  be  able  to  assert  a  reasonable  belief  that 
a  solicitor  would'commit  a  criminal  offence.  They  went  on  to 
hold  that  a  belief  that  a  solicitor  would  inadvertently  alert 
other  criminals  could  only  reasonably  be  hold  by  the  police  if 
the  suspect  was  a  particularly  resourceful  and  sophisticated 
criminal  or  the  solicitor  was  particularly  inexperiencod  or 
naive.  In  this  case  the  Court  concluded  that  the  real  reason  for 
delaying  legal  advice  was  to  allow  the  police  a  final  opportunity 
to  question  Samuel  in  the  absence  of  his  solicitor,  Mr  Warner 
had  stated  in  evidence  that  he  would  probably  on  this  occasion 
have  advised  the  defendant'to  rofu  o  to  answer  further  questions 
and  the  Code  of  Practice  expressly  disallows  denial  of  access  to 
a  solicitor  on  the  ground  that  the  solicitor  will  advice  the 
suspect  to  remain  silent. 
Srmo  accordingly  has  had  the  effect  of  narrowing  greatly  the 
interpretation  of  Section  58(8)  and  preventing  the  police  from 
making  a  general  unsubstantiated  allegation  that  it  war,  thought 65 
that.  otherv  might  be  alerted-if.  a  solicitor  was  contacted.  In 
effect  the  police  have  to  be  in  the  position  of  being  able  to 
prove  that  the  particular  solicitor  requested  by  the  suspect  was 
corrupt.  -- 
An  almost  identical  set  of  circumstances  came  before,  a  differ--,. 
ently  constituted  Court,  of  Appeal  in  Rv  ladice  [19881  Crim  LR 
LQ  and  a  different  result  followed.  While  the  Court  held  itself 
to  be  bound  by  the  restrictive  interpretation  of  Section  58(8)  in 
gamuel  it  hold  that  the  evidence  of  Alladice's  confession  was 
rightly  admitted  since  the  presence  of  the  solicitor.  would  have 
added  nothing  to  his  knowledge  of  his  rights  and  would  have  made 
no  difference  during  the  final  questioning,  -Alladice  having 
apparently  stated  that  ho  only  wanted  a  solicitor  to  be  present 
to  keep  a  check  on  police  conduct.  Interestingly,  the  court 
observed  that-it  was  time  that  comment-upon  a  defendant's  silence 
when  interviewed  should  be  permitted  at  his  trial  together  with 
the  necessary  alterations  to  the  words  of-the  caution=  16 
However,  as  Helen  Fenwick  has  observed,  17  it-  must  be  open  to 
question  whether  the  suspect-is-the  best  person  to  evaluate  the 
effect  of  having  legal.  adviceand  certain,  factore  in  "ktc 
such  as  the  defendant's  relative  youth  and  the  fact-that  the 
admissions  he  made  formed  the  bests  of  the  came  against  him,  -  cast 
doubt  on  the  supposition  that  the  presence  of  a  solicitor  would 
have  had  no  effect  on  the  interview. 66 
The  police  clearly  regard  access  to  legal  advice  under  Section  58 
as  an  obstruction,  and  there  was  outrage  at  the  decision  in 
Semueel.  '6  It-would  therefore  not  be  surprising  if  they  were  to 
attempt  to  circumvent  the  law  and  either  deny  suspects  access  to 
legal  advice  or  persuade  them  not  to  exercise  their  right.  Two 
recent  research  studies  have  reached  differing  conclusions  on  the 
extent  to  which  the  police  comply  with  the  letter  and  spirit  of 
the  law. 
Irving  and  McKenzie  in  their  study  in  Brighton  19  found  that  that 
the  police  were  initially  punctilious  in  observing  the  - 
requirements  of  PACE  in  relation  to  legal  advice,  although  this 
later  began  to  wear  off  slightly  but  even  so  they  only  found  one 
case  where-access  to  advice  had  been  unduly  delayed.  20 
The  proportion  of,  suspects  receiving  legal  advice  in  Brighton 
rose  from  1%  in  1985  to  11%-in-1986  and  27%  in  1987.  Most 
interestingly  the  1987  research  established  that  "far  from 
interfering  with  the,  process  of  criminal  investigation,  most 
solicitors  are  anxious  to  reach  a  fully  informed  conclusion  about 
the,  police  case  and  to  that  end  they  tend  to  advise  clients  to 
cooperate  with  interviews  where  there  appears  to  be  a  reasonable 
case  to  answer.  "  2'  In  addition  there  was  no  evidence  that  the 
presence  of  solicitors  had  an  adverse  affect  on  the  number  of 
admissions  made  by  suspects. 67 
Irving  and  McKenzie  also  suggested  that  solicitors-would  tend  to 
advise  their  clients  not  to  answer  questions  where  the  evidence 
against  them  was  weak,  or  was  not  fully  disclosed  by  the  police. 
In  such  cases  the  police  might  come  to  believe  that  the  failure 
of  the  case  was  "caused"  by  the  solicitor,  rather'that  the  lack 
of  evidence  or  the  lack  of  adequate  disclosure.  Such  a  per- 
ception  could  lead  to  a`vicious  circle  with  the  police  becoming 
less  cooperative  and  disclosing  less  in  subsequent  cases  unless 
positive  moves  were  made  to  break  the  vicious  circle.  However 
the  majority  of  solicitors  in  Brighton  were  found  to  collaborate 
successfully  with  investigating  officers  in  administering  PACE 
and  such  antagonism  as  there  was  tended  to  develop  more  out  of 
"personal  animosities,  perceived  misconduct,  and  a  variety  of 
miscommunication.  "  22 
In  a  considerably  more  widely  based-study  involving  ten  police 
stations  213  sanders  and  Bridges  found  a  very  different  picture 
from  Irving  and  McKenzie's  description  of  amicable  cooperation. 
They  found  that  while  the  police  now  rarely  refuse  suspects- 
access  to'legal  advice  overtly,  many  dubious  practices  and  ploys 
are  used  to  ensure  that  the  suspect  is  either  unaware  of  his 
right  to  advice  or  dissuaded  from  exercising  it,  These  include 
telling  the  suspect  his  rights  too-quickly,  incomprehensibly  or 
incompletely,  implying  that-contacting  a  solicitor  will  result  in 
release  from  custody  being  delayed  and  failing  to  inform  the 
suspect  that  legal  advice  is  available  free  of  charge. 68 
"Informal"  interviewing  is  also  a  problem  and  one  on  which  the 
courts  have  yet  to  take  a  clear  position.  24 
The  crux  of  the  matter  isthe,  fact  that  the  suspect  Is-dependent- 
on  the  police  for  information  about  his  rights.,  The  police  are 
being  asked  to  safeguard  the  rights  of  those  with  whom  they  have 
an  adversarial  relationship  and  hence  to  place  obstacles  in  their 
own  path.  -This,  say  Sanders  and  Bridges,  is  irrational  and,  -- 
doomed  to  failure.  -. 
If  they  are  accurate,  these  findings  are  alarming.  2.11  Since  PACE 
police  malpractice  has  probably  not  been  reduced  but  has  been-: 
made  less  overt  and  hence  more  difficult  to  detect  and  control. 
("If  it  isn't  in  the  custody  record  it  didn't  happen.  ")  In 
giving  the  false  impression  of  complete-police  compliance  with 
the  law,  unduly  great  faith  in  the  police  will  now  be  encouraged. 
In  the  opinion  of  Sanders  and  Bridges,  the  Code  of  Practice  is 
systematically  disregarded  and  the  disregard  appears  to  be 
endorsed  or  even  instigated  at  a  high  level  of  command,  is  by 
precisely  those  senior  officers  who  should  be  responsible  for  its 
enforcement  through  the  discipline  code.  They  suggest  that 
unrestrained  access  to  legal  advice  depends  on  "the  removal  of 
the  police  as  gatekeepers.  ",  The  right  to  legal  advice  does  not 
have  any  remedy  and,  -  in  the  absence  of  a  remedy  which  would  cause 
the  police  to  suffer,  there  is  no  incentive  for  them  to  safeguard 
the  suspect's  right.  Sanders  and  Bridges  suggest  that  in  order 
for  the  right  to  legal  advice  to  be  invested  with  more  than 69 
symbolic  value,  it  should  be  backed  up  by  criminal  liability,  or 
at  the  very  least  liability  in  tort  on  the  part  of  the  police. 
If  Sanders  and  Bridges  are  correct,  PACE  would  appear  to  have  led 
to  a  situation  worse  than  that  which  existed  before.  The  writer 
would  submit  that  even  in  its  present  unsatisfactory  state  Scots 
law  is  preferable.  Scots  law  ensures  that  the  suspect  is  removed 
from  the  hands  of  the  police  and  brought  under  the  protection  of 
the  court  at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  In  this  situation 
there  is  much  less  need  for  legal  advice.  It  is  submitted  that 
English  law  is  fundamentally  illogical  in  permitting  the  police 
to  detain  a  suspect  for  up  to  ninety  six  hours  and  question  him 
repeatedly  during  that  period,  but  at  the  same  time  expecting 
them  to  inform  him  of  a  right  which,  if  exercised,  would  be 
likely  to  prolong  the  inquiry  or  possibly  frustrate  it 
altogether. 
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6.8  Confirm  t  jon  by  Subsequent  Fact 
It  may  happen  that  in  the  course  of  making  a  confession  which  is 
later  held  to  be  inadmissible,  an  accused  brings  to  light 
evidence  which  is  relevant  to  the  case  and  which  the  prosecution 
wish  to  tender.  For  example  he  might  say  during  the  course  of  a 
confession  that  he  threw  the  murder  weapon  into  a  particular 
field  or  that  stolen  property  is  in  his  house  and  the  object  is 
searched  for  and  found.  It  may,  of  course,  be  that  the  object 
has  some  evidential  value  independent  of  the  confession,  for 
example  the  accused's  fingerprints  might  be  found  on  the  weapon 
or  the  stolen  property  might  be  in  a  locked  room  for  which  only 
the  accused  holds  the  key.  However  where  the  confession  is 
inadmissible  two  basic  questions  arise.  (1)  How  is  the  law  to 
treat  such  evidence  when  it  is  discovered  as  a  consequence  of  an 
inadmissible  confession?  and  (2)  Should  the  confession  or  come 
part  of  it  also  be  admitted  if  it  is  verified  by  the  subsequently 
discovered  evidence? 
There  is  an  almost  complete  lack  of  authority  on  these  questions, 
particularly  the  former,  in  Scotland,  but  prior  to  PACE  the 
situation  was  precisely  the  opposite  in  England  with  an  excess  of 
authorities,  many  of  which  were  mutually  contradictory.  I  There 
would,  on  the  basis  of  the  English  cases,  appear  to  be  five 
possible  answers.  to  the  questions  poced  above:  (a)  to  admit  the 
fact  discovered  but  nothing  more;  (b)  to  admit  the  fact 
discovered,  and  that  its  discovery  was  in  consequence  of 72 
something  the  accused  said,  (c)  "to-  admit'theý  fact  'discovered 
together  with  as  much'  of  the  confession  as'reläte'&  strictly  to 
it;  (d)  to  admit  the  fact  discovered  and  the  entire  confession; 
and  (e)  to  exclude,  the  whole  confession  and  all  facts  discovered 
in  consequence  of  it.  2 
It  is  possible  to  find  English  authority  to  support  any  of  these 
five  propositions  and  before  PACE,  the  lawýin  England  wassim.  ply 
a  mass-and  in  sore  need  of'reform.  '  The  position  has"noia'been',  ý 
settled  by  Section  76(4)'of  PACE: 
'(4)  The  fact'that'  a  confession  is  wholly  or  partly 
`äf  this  saction-  shall  not  xckuded  in  püra'uanc  ` 
affect  the  admissibility  in  evidence  -- 
(a)  of  any  f'acts'diccovered  'as'  a  'result  of  tKG, 
confession;  or 
(b)  where  the  confession  is  relevant  ac-,  `6chnwing 
that  the  accused-cpoakc,  '  writes  or,  exprässcs 
himself  its  a'partictilar  -way,  of  so  much  of  the- 
confession  as'tc'neces'sary  to  chow-that'  he  does 
so. 
Section  76(4)(a)  effoctively''restaten  the  hihtoric,  position  of 
English  law  foilöwing'thc  decision  in'  the  oId'  case  of 
￿ 
W2rickshall  (1783)  1  .f  !i  ch1  263.  °  In  that  case  a'  female 
prisoner,  in  the  course  of  an  improperly  induced  confession,  said 
that"  the  stolen:  goods  were  in  her`  lodgings.  '  A'  cübsequent  'search' 
revealed  that  this'was  indeed  sty,  and  theI  goody  were  actually 73 
found  in  her  bedding.  Although  the  confession  was  excluded,  the 
fact  of  the  finding  of  the  stolen  goods  was  admitted.  Section 
76(4)(b)  is  obviously  intended  to  cover  the  sort  of  situation 
which  arose  in  Rv  Voisin  119181  1Kß  531.15 
In'Scotland,  although  Alison  favoured  the  Warickshall  rule,  6  the 
only  decision  bearing  on  the  point.  -is  a  mere°'  and  it  is  less 
than  ideally  clear;  particularly  in  relation  to  the  second 
question.  It  will  be  remembered  that  following  an  interrogation, 
subsequently  found-to  have  been  unfair,  -Chalmers'had  taken  the 
police  to  a  cornfield-where  he  pointed  out'-where'he-had  disposed` 
of  the  deceased's  purse,  which  was  duly  recovered.  -The-evidence 
of  the  accused's  actings  in  the  cornfield  was'admitted  by'the 
trial"judge,  in  the  absence  of  authority  to  the  contrary. 
However,  his  decision  was  overturned  on  appeal.  Lord  Cooper 
referred  to  the  "episode  of  the'cornfield"  and  dealt  with  it 
simply  on  the  basis  that°the  crucial  evidential-paint  wag  the 
accuysed'a  knowledge  of  the  whereabouts  of  the  purse:  ' 
"The  significance  of  the  episode  is  plain,  for  it 
showed  that  the  appellant  knew  where  the  purse 
was.  If  the  police  had-simply  produced,  and 
proved  the  finding  of,  the  purse,  that-'evidence- 
would  have  carried  tham  little  or  no'distance  in 
this  case'towards  implicating  the  appellant.  " 
Since  the  accused's  actings  in  the  field  were'"part  and--parcel  of 
the  same  transaction"  as  the  unfair  interrogation,  evidence  of"- 74 
them  was  inadmissible  and  there  was  accordingly  nothing  to  link 
the  accused  to  the  purse.  The  finding  of  the  purse  on  its  own 
was  irrelevant  and  hence  the  case  collapsed. 
Two  basic  propositions.  can  be  derived  from  Chalmers.  Firstly, 
although  the  point  was,  not  specifically  argued,  -the  discovery  of 
a  subsequent  fact  does  not,  in  Scots'1aw,  'render  an  otherwise 
inadmissible  confession  admissible.  -'This  much  at  least  is  clear. 
Secondly,  and  more  doubtfully,  the  evidence  of  the  finding  of  the 
purse  would  have  been  admissible  quantum  valeat  (which  in  this 
case  was,  of,  course,  nil).  At  the  very  least  Lord  Cooper  was-not 
prepared  in  the  circumstances  of  Calmer  to  hold  that  the 
finding  was  inadmissible.  However  the  point  certainly  cannot  be 
regarded  as  being  beyond.  doubt.  i 
Given  that  Scots  lawýis  unsettled  on  the  issue  of,  the  admiss- 
ibility  of  a  fact  discovered  in  consequence  of  an  inadmissible 
confession,  it  is  appropriate  to  consider  the  arguments  that. 
might  be  advanced.  One  of  the  main  reasons  for  the  unsatis- 
factory  state  of  the  pro-PACE  law  in  England  was  the  failure  of 
the  courts  to-decide  the  policy  behind  the  exclusion  of  improp- 
erly  obtained  confessions.  This  is  not-so  much-of  an.  issue  in 
Scotland  since  the  sole  criterion  is  fairness  to  the  accused,  and 
improperly  obtained  evidence  will  be  excluded  because  it  has  been 
improperly  obtained  and  not  because  it  is  unreliable.  Similarly 
the  courts  have  not,  in  general,  applied,,  the  co-called  discip- 
linary  principle  and  there  are  few  instances  in  Scats  law  of  the 75 
courts  expressly  excluding  evidence  in  order  to  discourage  im- 
proper  police  practices.  However,  even  though  the  courts  may  not 
overtly  apply  the  disciplinary  principle,  the  fact  that  a  case 
has  collapsed  because  improperly  obtained  evidence  has  been 
excluded  is  bound  to  become  known  to  the  police  and  it'is 
reasonable  to  assume  that  lessons  will  be  learned.  'In`other 
words  the  exclusion  of  evidence  will  be  likely  to  have  an  effect 
on  police  behaviour  whatever  the  court's  intention  may  be. 
Accordingly  it  might  be  argued  that  logic  and  the  need  to 
discourage  improper  police  actions  must  lead  to  the  conclusion 
that  where  the  confession  is  inadmissible,  evidence  of  'a  "ton- 
sequently  discovered  fact  ought  also  tobe  inadmissible.  The 
exclusion  of`an  improperly  obtained  confession  in  order  to 
discourage  improper  police  behaviour  is  inconsistent  with  the 
admission  of  evidence  discovered  in  consequence  of  the 
confession.  Although  initially  attractive,  it  is  submitted  that 
this  argument  is  unsound  since  the  existence  of  the'fact'is  a 
matter  independent  of  the  '  confession, 
4 
The  point  may  be  made  clearer  by  considering  the  possibility 
that,  in  the  course  of  an  inadmissible  confession,  A  admits  to 
having  pawned  the  stolen  property  in  the  shop  run  by  B.  B  is 
seen  by  the  police,  remembers  A  pawning  the  property,  '  which  is 
recovered,  and  in  due  course  he  is  'cited  as  a  witness  against  A. 
An  argument  that  the  prosecution  should  not  be  allowed  to  call  B 
as  a  witness  against  A  because  hie  involvement  was  discovered  as 76 
the  result  of  an  inadmissible  confession  is  self-evidently  unsus- 
tainable  '.  and  in  the  hypothetical  example,  B's  evidence  linking 
A  with  the  property  would  clearly  be  admissible.  Since  B  is 
merely  a  link  in  the  chain.  of  evidence  between  A  and  the 
property,,  there  is,,  it  is  submitted,  no  difference  in,  principle 
between  the  hypothetical,  example  and  the  situation  where  the 
inadmissible.  confession  leads  simply  to  the  discovery  of  the 
property  itself  without  B's  intervention,  the  link  to  A  being 
provided  by,  say,  fingerprints. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  unreliability  is  considered  to  be  the 
reason  for  the  exclusion  of-an-improperly  obtained  confession,  an 
argument  can  be  made  that  while.  there  may  be  a  risk  that  the 
confession  is  unreliable,  no  such  risk  attaches  to  the 
subsequently  discovered  fact.  It  has  already  been  pointed  out 
that  this  is  not  the  basis  on  which  Scote  law  operates,  but  such 
an  argument  would  tend  towards  the  conclusion  that  at  least  so 
much  of-the  confession  as  is  verified  (and  hence-proved  reliable) 
by  the  finding  of  the  fact,  should  be  admitted. 
The  Thomson  Committee  dealt  with  the  issue  briefly  under 
reference  to  jalMerr 
"The  view  that  the  discovery  of  the  article 
renders  any  part  of  the  statement  admissible  has 
been  rejected  in  Scotland.  We  accept  this.  Scots 
law  excludes  evidence  on  the  ground  that  it  has 
been  improperly  obtained  without  consideration  of 77 
its  reliability.  To  allow  evidence  'of  a  statement 
to  be  led  because  it  can  be  shown  to  be  true  might 
encourage  police  irregularity.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  does  not-follow  that  evidence  of  the  discovery 
of  articles  should  be  excluded  merely  because  the 
information  supplied  by  an  accused  which  led  to 
their  discovery,  is  inadmissible. 
We  take  the  view  that  there  is  nothing  improper  in 
'the  police  asking  questions  of  an  accused  person 
after  charge,  for  example  regarding  the  where- 
abouts  of  a  missing  child  or"'stolen  property. 
Indeed  the  police  have  a  duty  to  ask  such 
questions  and  the'public  expect  them  to  do  so. 
Although  the  answers  which  they  receive  will  not 
be  admissible  in  evidence,  the  court  may  allow 
evidence'of  recovery,  --provided: 
(a)`the  prosecution  does  not  disclosed  in  evidence 
the  source  of  -  the  information;  and 
(b)-the  information  wae:  not  obtained  by  methods 
which  the  court  decides  are  unfair.  9 
Unless  the  Thomson  Committee  were  intending  to  restrict  the 
admissibility  of  recovery  solely  to  the  post-charge  questioning 
situation,  ,  the  difficulty  with  this  approach  is  that  it  is 
circular,  Apart  from  post-charge  questioning,  where  any 
resulting  statement  is  inadmissible  no  matter  how  "fair"  the 78 
questioning,  it  is  illogical  to  say  that  the  evidence  is 
admissible  unless  it  was  obtained  by  methods  which  were  unfair, 
since  the  only  basis  on  which  Scots  law  now  excludes  confessions 
is  that  they  were  unfairly  obtained.  If  the  confession  is 
excluded  because  it  has  been  unfairly  obtained,  ex  hypothesi  the 
subsequent  fact  is  also  inadmissible.  This  is  clearly  not  in 
accordance  with  Lord  Cooper's  opinion  in  Chalmers  nor,  it  is 
submitted,  is  it  consistent  with  logic. 
It  is  submitted  that  the  basis  on  which  Scots  law  should  deal 
with  this  matter  is  as  suggested  by  Sheriff  Macphail.  10  He 
argues  convincingly  that  the  issue  should  be  assimilated  to  the 
broader  question  of  illegal  searches  and  seizures,  with  the  issue 
becoming  one  of  judicial  discrestion:  ' 
"If  the  facts  were  discovered  as  a  result  of 
circumstances  particularly  unfair  to  the  accused 
or  an  exceptionally  serious  illegality,  such  as  a 
confession  extracted  by  brutality,  the  judge  would 
be  entitled  to  exclude  the  evidence.  That  would 
then  be  a  particular  application  of  the  general 
discretion  of  the  court  to  admit  or  exclude 
evidence  illegally  or  irregularly  obtained.  " 
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6.9  Procedural  Aspeetg  -'The  Voire  Dire  and  the  Tri  -wi  n-a- 
(i)  The  Present  Law 
One  of  the  characteristic  features  of  procedure  in  England  and 
other  jurisdictions  whose  legal  systems  are  essentially  English 
is  the  use  of  the  trial-within-a-trial  or-voire  dire  to  determine 
the  admissibility  of  disputed  confessions.  -'Although  Lord 
Justice-General  Cooper  and  Lord  Justice-Clerk'Thomson  introduced 
it  into  Scotland,  I  this  foreign  procedure  has  not  really 
flourished  in  the  hostile  northern  climate.  Nevertheless  it 
retains  a  toe-hold  in  Scotland,  and  indeed  one  Working  Group 
recommended  its  extension  to  disputed  identification  parade 
evidence  although  fortunately  no  steps  have  been  taken  to 
implement  the  proposal.  2 
I 
This  section  examines  in  general-outline  the  body  of  juris- 
prudence  which  has  built  up  in  Englana  and-some  of  the  problems 
which  have  been  raised  before  considering  the  arguments  which 
have  been  stated  both  for  and  against  the  procedure. 
In  a  jury  trial  the  question  of  the  admissibility  of=a,  confession 
is  normally  a  matter  for  the  trial  judge  although  the  matter  may 
exceptionally  arise  before  the  examining  Justices  in  the  course 
of  committal  proceedings.  "I  Different  issues  arise  in  summary 
proceedings  and  these  are  considered  later. 81 
Where  the  defence  intend  to  challenge  the  admissibility  of  a 
confession,  they  will  inform  the  prosecution  who  will  not  mention 
the  confession  in  their  opening  speech.  Thereafter  in  normal 
course  the  trial  will-,  proceed  until  the  point  is  reached  at  which 
the  prosecution  wish=to  adduce  evidence  of  the  confession  when 
the  objection  will-normally  be  made.,  °  Occasionally,  it  may  be 
more  convenient  for  the  judge  to  deal  with  the  issue  of  . 
admissibility  at  an  earlier  stage,  for  example  prior-to  opening 
to  the  jury  where  prosecuting  counsel  would  be  unable  to  explain 
his.  case  without  referring  to  the  confession. 
It  may  be  remarked  in  passing  that  the  avoidance  of  complications 
of  this  nature  is  one  of  the  reasons  for  preferring  the  Scottish 
procedure  under  which  there  are  no  opening  speeches.  If  for  some 
reason  it  were  desired  to  challenge  a  confession  in,  advance  of 
trial.  in,  a  Scottish  court  it  would  presumably  be  necessary  to. 
apply  for  a  preliminary  diet  under  Section  76(1)(c)  of  the  1975. 
Act  although  it  is  difficult  to  envisage  such  a  cituation_arising 
as  a  practical  issue. 
Returning  to  Rnglieh:  procedure,  at  whatever  stage  the  matter  is 
raised,,  the-judge  will  conduct  a  trial  on  the  voire  dire  to 
decide  the  question  of  .  admissibility.  This  will  normally  be  done 
in'the  absence  of"tho  jury,  -but  only  at  the  request  or  with  the 
consent  of  the  defence, 82 
No  clear  procedural  rules  appear  to  have  been  laid  down  for  the 
trial-within-a-trial  and  the  normal  rules  of  admissibility  of 
evidence  would  not  appear  to  apply.  After  some  initial 
uncertainty  the  defendant  is,  in  modern  '  practice,  invariably 
regarded  as  a  competent  witness`on`his  own  behalf  at  the  trial- 
within-a-trial,  and  older  cases  to  the  opposite  effect  can  now  be 
regarded  as  wrongly  decided.  6  If  the  defendant'  does  give 
evidence  he  is  required  to  do  so  on  oath  7  and  is  subject  to' 
cross-examination.  -'-The  permitted  extent  ofcross-examination  is 
more  limited  than  it  would  be  at  a  normal  trial,  and  prosecuting 
counsel  may  not  cross-examine  about  matters  not  relevant  to  the 
issue  before  the  judge.  el 
There  is,  at  present,  a  conflict  of  authority  on  whether  the 
defendant  may,  in'  the  course  of  the  trial-within-a-trial,  be 
questioned  as  to  the  truth  of'the  challenged,  statement.  In  B 
-v 
Hammond  (1941)"28  Cr  ApTpp  84  the  defendant  in"  a  murder  case  had 
been  subjected  to  what  appears  from  the  report  to  have  been  a 
fairly  mild  cross-examination  in  the  course  of  which  he  was-asked 
whether-his  confession,  which  he  alleged  had  been  beaten  out  of 
him,  was  true.  -  He  admitted  that  it  was  true  and  later"  still'in 
the  course  of  the  trial-within-a-trial,  also  admitted  to  killing 
the  victim.  The'Courtry°of  Appeal  held  that  the  question  of 
whether  the  statement  was  true  was  "..:  -a  perfectly  natural 
question  to  put  and  was  relevant  to  the  issue  whether  the  story 
which  the  appellant  was  then"attacked'and  ill-used  by  the  police 
was  true  or  false.  "  Humphreys  J  made  an  important,  and,  it  is 83 
submitted,  self-evident,  -point  when  he  observed: 
"If  a  man  says  'I  was  forced  to  tell  the  story,  I 
was  made  to  say  this,  that  and  the  other,  '  it  must 
be  relevant  to  know  whether  he  was  made  to  tell 
the  truth  or  whether  he  was  made  to  say  a  number 
of  thing  which  were  untrue.  " 
Hammo  was  subject'to  criticism,  and,  'it  is  submitted,  misunder- 
standing,  but  nevertheless  it  became  an  accepted  part  of  English 
procedure  that  the  defendant  could  in  appropriatecases  be 
questioned  as  "to  the`truth'of  the  statement  during  the  trial- 
within-a-trial. 
However  in  Wong  Kam-Ming  yR  019801  AG  247.  e  majority  of  the 
Privy  Council  hold  that  Hammond  was  wrongly  decided  with  regard 
to  the  law  of  Hong  Kong  and  in  that  country-a  defendant  should 
not  be  questioned  on  the  voice  dire  as  to  the  truth  or  otherwise 
of  the  statement.  The  sole  object  of  the  voire  dire  was  to 
decide  on  the  voluntariness  of-the  alleged  confession  in 
accordance  with  long-established  principles.  If  the  accused 
denies  the  truth  of  the  confession  or  part  of  it,  this  takes 
thing  no  further  as  far  as  his  credibility  is  concerned.  However 
if  he  admits,  the  truth  of  the  statement  that  suggests  that  he  - 
tends  to  tell  the  truth  which  in  turn  suggests  that  he  is  also 
telling  the  truth  about  police  malpractice.  '  Lord  Hailcham  of 
St,  "Marylebone  dissented  on  this  point  and  argued  that  it  was  not 
possible  to  say  a  priori  that-in  no  circumstances  is  truth  or 84 
falsity  relevant  to  either-the  admissibility'of  the  disputed 
statement  or  the  cradibility  of  prosecution  or  defence  witnesses. 
The  law  has  not  advanced  from  this  position  since  1980  with 
Hammond  still  technically  "un-overruled"  in  English  law  but"-with- 
Wong  Kam-Ming,  strictly  only  a  persuasive  authority  and'weakened 
by  a  powerful  dissent,  now  being-accepted  as  the  authoritative 
statement  of  the  law.  -It  is  not-clear  how,  if  at  all,  'PACE  has- 
affected  this  "unedifying  conflict",  °'°.  -although'  Section  76(2) 
makes  it  clear  (if  that  were  in  fact  necessary)  that  the'truth'of 
the  statement  is  not  relevant-to  admissibility.  11 
At  the  conclusion  of  the  trial-within-a-trial,  the  judge  will 
rule  on  the  admissibility  of  the  disputed-statement.  Thereafter 
the  fury  will  return  and,  unless  the  exclusion  of  the  statement 
leads  to  the  collapse  of  the  prosecution,  the  trial  will  proceed. 
If  the  statement  is-excluded  the  jury  will  learn  nothing  of  the 
matter  (although-they  will  doubtless  have  their  suspicions)-  and 
if  the  Judge  rules  in  favour  of  admission  the  evidence  will  be 
led  again  in  their  presence. 
Whether  or  not  the,  etatemont  has  been  excluded,  the  prosecution 
is  not  permitted  to  lead  as  part  of  its  case  evidence  of  what  the 
defendant  said  on  the  voire  dire.  However  when  the  fudge  has 
ruled  in  favour  of,  admiseion  and  the  accused  gives  evidonce  at' 
the  main  trial,  he  may  be  cross-examined  on  any  discrepancies 85 
between  his  present  evidence  and  what  he  said  on  the  'voir 
dire.  1 
At  common  law  the  use  of  the  voire  dire  procedure-was.  not 
compulsory  and  the  defence  might-prefer,  for  tactical  reasons,  to 
have  the  evidence  led  `once  only  before  the  jury  with  only  a 
single  cross-examination.  '  In  that  event  it  was  open  to  defence 
counsel  to  submit,  when  all  the  evidence  has  boen  heard,  that  the 
judge  should  direct  the  jury  to  disregard  the  confession 
evidence.  'a  It  is  not  clear  whether  this  option  still  survives 
Section  76  of  PACE  and  the-view  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  in  L..;  v 
Sat-8h  mhr  t198§1  Grim  LR  453  that  tha'trial  judge  has  no  power 
to  exclude  a  confession  under  Section  76  once  it  has  been  given 
in  evidence  although  it  has  been  stated  that  such  a  procedure  is 
still  available  in  a  summary  trial.  `14 
If  the  judge  rules  in  favour  of'  admissibility,  defence  counsel. 
may  cross-oxamina  prosecution  witnesses  in  front  of  the  jury  as 
to  the  circumstances  in  which  the  confession  was  obtained.  Is- 
There  may  be  rare  occasions  where,  the  trial  judge  having  ruled 
in  favour  of  admissibility,  further  evidence  emerges  which  causes 
him  to  revise  his  opinion,  he  is  entitled  to  reconsider  his 
earlier  ruling,  I'll  wh 
It  may  happen  that  the  issue  of  admissibility  is  only  raised  for 
the  first  time'while'the  accused  is  giving  evidence  and  in  that 
situation  the  judge  may,  in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion, 86 
require  relevant  prosecution  witnesses  to  be  recalled  for  further 
cross-examination.  17 
When  one  turns  to  summary  procedure,  the  position  becomes,  at 
least  to  Scottish  eyes,  somewhat  ,  surreal.  , 
Since  the  justices  (or 
the  stipendiary  magistrate)  are  the  judges  of  both  fact-and  law 
and  in  effect  act  as  both  judge  and  jury  it-would  seem  patently 
unrealstic  and  wholly  artificial.  to  expect  them￿to.  follow  the 
voire  dire  procedure  which  is  based  entirely  on  the  notion  that 
the  admissibility  of  disputed  evidence  is=a  matter=for  the  trial 
Judge  alone.  The  position  at  common  law  was  unclear  although  it 
would  appear  that  certain  justices  did  try  to  follow  a  form  of 
voire  dire  procedure..  '  ý' 
. 
It  is  surprising  that  it  was  necessary  to  wait  until  as  late  as 
1982  for  an  authoritative  judicial 
,  pronouncement,  and  when  this 
finally  came  in  F.  (Anmeant)  v  Chief  Constable--of  Kent  (19821 
Crim  LR  68?,  it  was  stated  that  the  procedure  was  only  appropriate 
in  cases  tried  before  a  Judge  and  , 
jury.  Incidental  matters,  said 
the  Divisional  Court,  should  be  decided  as  separate  issues  and 
not  as  trials-within-trials  and  there  was  no  need  for  evidence  to 
be  repeated  after  the  issue  of  admissibility  had  been  determined. 
It  was  quite  impossible  to,  lay  down  rules  as  to-when-justices 
should  announce  their  decision  on  admissibility.  Each  case  was 
different  and  it  was  for  the  justices  to  ensure  that  what  was 
done  was  fair  to  both  sides. 87 
Once  again,  however,  PACE  has  intervened  and  it  now  appears  to  be 
the  law  that  justices  should  hold  a  trial  within  a  trial  but  only 
for  the  purpose  of  determining  an  issue  under  Section  76(2) 
which,  it  will  be.  remembered,  requires  that  before  a  challenged 
confession  can  be  given  in-evidence  the  prosecution  must  prove 
beyond  reasonable  doubt  that-it  was  not  obtained  by  oppression  or 
in  consequence  of  anything  said  or.  done  which  was  likely  to 
render  it  unreliable,  '9  This  now  presumably  means,  that  the 
justices  must  hear  the  evidence,  rule  on  admissibility,  and,  if 
they-rule  in  favour,  hear  the  evidence  all  over  again. 
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(ii)  The  rauments 
(a)  England 
English  lawyers  seem-to  be  devoted-to  the  concept,  of  the-voire- 
dire  and  there°is  very  little  English  criticism  of  it.  Any 
perceived  departure  from  orthodoxy  is  liable  to  provoke  strong 
adverse  comments.  '  Such  criticism  as  has  been  directed  at  the 
procedure  has  been  muted,  even  from  normally  outspoken 
commentators  such  as  Professor  Cross,  who  contents  himself  with 
tho  observation  that  "Trials  within  the  trial  are  time  wasting  in 
cases  tried  by  fury  and  something  of  an  unreality  in  cases  tried 
before  magistrates  because  the  question  of  admissibility  has  to 
be  dotermined  by  the  same  tribunal  as  that  which  pronounces  on 
liability.  "  : 2,  His  conclusion,  however,  is  that  the  abolition  of 
the  voire  dire  would  sometimes  entail  the  disclosure  to  the  jury 
of  the  terms  of  an  inadmissible  confession  which  it  would  be 
difficult  for  them  to-disregard,  leading  to  the  need  for.  the 
judge  to,  discharge  the  jury  and  order  a  new  trial.  `  -. 
In  their  otherwise  iconoclastic  Eleventh  Report,  the  Criminal  Law 
Revision  Committee  (by  a  majority)  declined  to  interfere  with  it, 
although  they  did  say  that  they  "should  have  been  glad  to  find  a 
way  of  getting  rid  of  the  need  to  hold  a  trial-within-a-trial  if 
this  were  possible  without  causing  injustice  to  the  accused.  "  11 
The  committee  acknowledged  "undeniably  strong  arguments  based  on 
logic"'  simplicity  and  convenience  in  favour  of  allowing  all 
confessions  to  go  before  the  jury  ...  leaving  it  to  them  to 89 
consider  whether  to  give  less  weight,  or  no  weight  at'all,  to  the 
confession  because  of  the  way  in  which  it  was  obtained.  "  4  and 
referred  with  approval  to  dicta  of  Parke  B.  and  Lord'Campbell° 
C.  J.  in  Baldry  6,  both  of  whom  suggested  that  it  might  be  better 
to  let  all  confessions  go  before  the  jury: 
According  to  the  committee'the  chief  argument  in  favour  of 
adopting  this  course  is  that,  since  the  object  of  the  trial  is  to 
got  at  the  truth,  and  since  a  confession  may  be  true  even  if 
obtained  by  improper  means,  -a  confession  should  never  be 
inadmissible  merely  because  of  the  means  by  which  it  was  obtained 
for  the  result  may  be  that  a  dangerous  murderer  may  have  to  go 
free.  There  were  obvious  advantages  of  simplicity  and 
convenience,  particularly  the  ending  of  the  trial-within-a-trial. 
A  minority  of  the  committee  favoured  the  adoption  of  this  course 
and  would  have  gone  so  far  as  to  discontinue  the  involuntariness 
test.  However  the  majority  while  acknowledging  the`advantagea- 
considered'  that  auch-a  course  was  too  risky  for  two  reasons. 
Firstly  the  effect  on  the  jury  of  an  induced-confession  might  be 
too  great  to  be  undone  by  the-evidence  of  the  way  in  which  it  was 
obtained.  Secondly,  the  removal  of  all  restrictions  on 
admissibility  on  account  of  improper  methods  would  "encourage  the 
police  to  resort  on  occasions  to  at  least  small  improprieties".  $ 
r-^ 
So  the  moat  radical  report  on  criminal  evidence  thio  century 
failed  to  take  the  opportunity  to  rid  English  procedure  of  the 90 
voire  dire  and  it  is  difficult  to  sea  another  opportunity 
presenting  itself  in  the  future  particularly  in-view  of  the 
influential  opinions  expressed  in  favour  of  the  procedure,  -summed 
up  thus  by  Lord  Haiisham: 
"Any  civilised  system  of  criminal  jurisprudence 
must  accord  to'the  judiciary  some  moans  of  - 
excluding  confessions  or  admissions  obtained  by, 
improper  methods  ...  It  is  therefore  of-very  great- 
importance-that  the  courts  should  continue  to 
insist  that-before  extra-judicial  statements  can- 
be  admitted-in  evidence  the  prosecution  must  be 
made  to  prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
statement  was  not  ,  obtained  in'a  manner  which 
should  be  reprobated  and  was  therefore  in  the' 
truest  sense  voluntary.  " 
The  provision  in  Section  76(2)  of  PACE-that  `the 
prosecution  must 
prove  to  the  court  beyond-reasonable  doubt  that  a  confession  was 
not  obtained  by  oppression.  or  in  consequence  of  anything  likely 
to  render  it  unreliable  has  now,  in  effect,  made  the  voire  dire 
procedure  a  statutory  requirement. 
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(b)  Scotland 
The  most  comprehensive  discussion  of  the  trial-within-a-trial  in 
Scotland  is  in  Macphail.  I  The  learned  ,  author  points  out  that. 
although  the  procedure  in  Scotland  "somewhat  resembles"  the 
English  practice,  and  may  have  been  suggested  by  a  consideration 
of  it,  it  may  also  be  seen  as  a  development  of  the  Scottish 
practice  of  hearing  argument  on  an  objection  to  the  admissibility 
of  a  confession  in  the  absence  of  the  Jury  before  the  critical 
evidence  was  led.  Sucha  procedure  wee  unsatisfactory,  often 
requiring  to  be  based  on  disputed  hypotheses  as  to  the  testimony 
which  the  witness  would  be  likely  to  give. 
Sheriff  Macphai1  sets.  out  eight  points  for,  consideration,  which 
are  overwhelmingly  against  the  trial--within-atrial  as  a  feature 
of  Scottish  procedure: 
(1)  The  procedure  leads  to  the  repetition  and  unchallongoable 
reconstruction-of  evidence.  This  is  based-on  the  views  of  Lord 
,  Justice-General-Clyde  in  horp  nv  HIM.  Advacmta  1988  JC  61 
(2)  The  procedure  appears  to  contravene  the  ancient  rule  2.  that 
the  whole  evidence  muot  be  taken  in  the  presence  of  the  Jury.  - 
(3)  The  procedure  does  not  accurately  reflect  any  principle  that 
all  questions  of  admissibility  must  be  determined  by  the  judge 
alone.  If  the  judge  holds,  after  a  trial-within-a-trial  that  the 
confession  is,  or  may  be,  admissible,  he  is  atilt  required,  on 92 
the  basis  of  Chalmers  to  direct  the  jury  to  disregard  it  unless 
they  are  satisfied  that  it  was  made  voluntarily.  Thus,  as 
Sheriff  Macphail  points  out,  the  jury  have  to  decide  the  question 
of  admissibility  for  themselves  and  cannot  be  concerned  solely 
with  the  probative  value  of  the  statement. 
(4)  If  a  relevant  consideration  is  that  a  confession  which  was 
not  made  voluntarily  is  likely  to  be  unreliable,  the  procedure 
appears  to  contravene  the  principle  that  the  reliability  of 
evidence  is  essentially  a  matter  for  the  tribunal  of  fact. 
(5)  The  procedure  is  anomalous  because  it  is  not  generally 
applied  in  situations  where  an  objection  to  admissibility  of 
evidence  other  than  a  confession  is  taken  and  there  is  a  dispute 
as  to  the  preliminary  facts. 
z 
(6)  There  is  a  practical  danger  that  the  jury  will  think  they 
have  been  asked  to  withdraw  because  statements  prejudicial  to  the 
accused  are  about  to  be  made.  Difficult  considerations  arise  if 
the  judge,  having  decided  in  favour  of  admission  then  has  to 
change  his  mind  because  of  further  evidence  led  before  the  jury. 
In  such  a  situation  it  would  be  difficult  for  the  jury,  howevor 
strongly  directed,  to  exclude  the  confession  from  their  minds. 
(7)  Thera  are  unresolved  questions  as  to  the  burden  and  standard 
of  proof  at  a  trial-within-a-trial, 93 
(8)  Zn  view  of  Murphy  v  H.  M.  Advocate  1975  SLT(1I)  17,  and  Balloch 
v  H.  M.  Advocate  1977  JC  23  the  occasions  when  e  judge  will 
exclude  evidence  after  a  trial-within-a-trial  will  be  few  and  the 
procedure  will  simply  lengthen  the  trial  without  any  advantage  to 
the  administration  of  justice. 
Sheriff  Macphail  admits  that  dispensing  with  the  trial-within-a- 
trial  could  involve  the  disclosure  to  the  Jury  of  a  confession 
which  the  judge  might  ultimately  hold  to  be  inadmissible  and  in 
such  circumstances  it  might  be  difficult  for  the  jury  to  dis- 
regard  the  confession  notwithstanding  the  Judge's  direction  that 
they  should  do  so.  This,  of  course,  is  the  crux  of  the  whole 
matter  and  has  been  the  main  reason  for  the  reluctance-to  inter- 
Pere  with  the  procedure  in  England.  He  suggests  that  this 
difficulty  would  not  arise  if  the  Crown  sought  to  adduce 
challengeable  confessions  only  in  cases  where  the  confession  was 
essential  for  conviction.  In  such  a  case,  if  the  judge  finds  the 
confession  to  have  been  inadmissible,  he  will  simply  direct  the 
jury  to  return  a  verdict  of  not  guilty.  He  considers  that  the 
"traditional  fairness  of  the  Crown  Office  in  refraining  from 
adducing  evidence  likely  to  be  held  inadmissible,  would  go  far  to 
mitigate  any  risks  in  the  procedure  adumbrated  in  Thom  ". 
While  Sheriff  Macphail's  faith  in  the  fairness  of  Scottish 
prosecutors  is  touching,  and,  the  writer  would  suggest,  well 
founded,  it  is  respectfully  submitted  that  this  suggestion 
overlooks  the  practical  reality  that  the  Crown  often  do  not  know 94 
in  advance  that  aconfession  is  to  be  challenged,  particularly  in 
cases  where  either  no  judicial  examination  has  been  held  or  the 
accused  has  declined  to  answer  questions.  3  It  may  be  perfectly 
obvious  to  the  prosecutor  that  a  confession  has  been  unfairly 
obtained  and  in  that  situation,  clearly  it  should  not  be  led. 
However  the  defence  are  under  no  obligation  to  disclose  a 
challenge  to  a  confession  in  advance,  challenges  are  frequently 
made  for  the  first  time  at  the  trial  and  spurious  allegations  of 
unfairness  are  matters  of  routine.  Sheriff  Macphail's  suggestion 
puts  an  unfair  burden  on  the  prosecutor.  It  is  submitted  that  it 
would  be  wrong  to  expect  the  prosecutor  to  refrain  from  leading  a 
confession  which  although  not  essential  to  conviction  would 
materially  bolster  the  prospects  of  a  dangerous  criminal  going  to 
prison  simply  in  order  to  avoid  the  hypothetical  possibility  of 
the  jury  not  following  the  Judge's  directione. 
Scots  law  will  require  to  decide  unequivocally  whether  or  not  the 
jury  can  be  trusted  to  follow  the  judge's  directions.  If  it  can, 
the  trial-within-a-trial  is  superfluous,  If  it  cannot,  the 
implications  are  grave  and  much  wider  than  the  issues  being 
discussed  in  this  thesis. 
At  the  end  of  the  day,  it  is  submitted  that  the  most  telling 
argument  against  the  trial-within-a-trial  is  the  simple  fact  that 
in  the  modern  state  of  Scottish  law  it  is  largely  pointless.  As 
Sheriff  Macphail  wrote  in  1976,  "The  procedure  has  been  in 95 
existence  for  over  20  years,  and  the  number  of  cases  in  which  it 
has  resulted  in  evidence  being  excluded'ie  very  few  indeed.  " 
Notes, 
1,20,37  et  seq 
2.  Act  1587  c571  now  repealed, 
3,  The  Thomson  Committee  recommended  that  there  should  be  no  trial-within-a- 
trial  where  the  challenge  was  first  made  at  the  trial  but  their  recommend- 
ations  proceeded  on  the  basis  that  Judicial  examination  would  be  the  note, 
{ 
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Chapter  7  The  e  s.  Scottish 
L2x 
7.1  Introduction 
It  was  an  ancient  rule  of  Scots  law  that  the  testimony  of  a 
single  witness  was  insufficient: 
"Probatioun  allanerlie  be  ane  witness,  is  not 
sufficient  of  the  law;  Quoniam  in  ore  duorum  sut 
trium  staff  omne  verburd'  , 
Hume  describes  the  requirement  for  corroboration  in  the  following 
tenact 
"No  matter  how  trivial  the  offence,  and  how  high 
soever  the  credit  and  character  of  the  witness, 
still  our  law  is  averse  to  rely  on  his  single 
word,  in  any  inquiry  which  may  affect  the  person, 
liberty  or  fame  of  his  neighbour;  and  rather  than 
run  the  risk  of  such  an  error,  a  risk  which  does 
not  hold  when  there  is  a  concurrence  of  testi- 
monies,  it  is  willing  that  the  guilty  should 
escape.  "  2 
The  requirement  of  corroboration  in  the  law  acknowledgsa  the  rick 
posed  by  the  human  fallibility  of  the  fact-finding  process,  a 
risk  which,  It  has  been  pointed  out,  may  in  fact  be  double  -  the 
fallibility  of  the  witness  himself  and  the  fallibilty  of  the 
tribunal  which  holds  the  witness  to  be  credible.  0 97 
Lord  Cameron,  one  of  Scotland's  longest-serving  judges,  frankly 
acknowledged  the  same  point  when  he  wrote: 
"Nothing  is  more  easy  than  to  err  in  the 
assessment  of  the  credibility  or  accuracy  of 
witnesses,  even  after  subjection  to  skilled  cross- 
examination,  and  the  experience  of  years  confirms 
that  view.  "  4 
Although  substantial  inroads  have  been  made  into  this  principle 
in  civil  matters,  it  remains  one  of  the  most  characteristic 
features  of  Scottish  criminal  law  that  crucial  facts  should  be 
corroborated: 
"No  person  can  be  convicted  of  a  crime  or 
statutory  offence,  except  where  the  legislature 
otherwise  directs,  unless  there  is  evidence  of  at 
least  two  witnesses  implicating  the  person  accused 
with  the  commission  of  the  crime  or  offence  with 
which  he  is  charged.  "  Is 
The  reference  to  "two  witnesses"  in  this  celebrated  quotation  is 
perhaps  slightly  misleading  and  the  less  well  known  exposition  in 
Renton  and  Brown  16  is,  it  is  submitted,  more  accurate  and  hence 
preferable:, 
"The  basic  requirement  is  that  the  offence  be 
brought  home  to  the  accused  by  evidence  from  at 
least  two  sources.  The  question  is  not  whether 
each  of  the  several  circumstances  points  by  itself 98 
to  guilt  of  the  charge  libelled,  but  whether  taken 
together  they  are  capable  of  supporting  the 
inference  of  guilt  beyond  reasonable  doubt.  " 
With  the  sole  exception  of  a  recorded  plea  of  guilty,  this 
principle  applies  to  confessions  as  much  as  to  any  other  type  of 
evidence.  In  the  case  of  a  confession,  the  corroboration  must 
come  from  an  independent  source  and  a  confession  is  not  corrob- 
orated  by  being  heard  by  two  or  more  people.  It  is  also  now 
clear  that  a  confession  is  not  corroborated  by  being  repeated 
even  in  different  terms  and  to  different  witnesses.  7  Con- 
versely,  if  the  requisite  corroboration  is  available,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  the  confession  itself  should  be  spoken  to  by  more 
than  one  witness.  0 
This  chapter  explores  the  issue  of  corroboration  of  confessions, 
firstly  in  terms  of  the  general  principles  and  thereafter 
specifically  in  relation  to  the  issue  of  the  "special  knowledge" 
confession,  It  will  be  argued  that  this  latter  doctrine  has 
resulted  in  the  situation  whereby  the  need  for  a  confession  to  be 
corroborated  (in  the  generally  understood  sense  of  that  word)  has 
effectively  been  removed  and  this  is  doubly  dangerous  since  it 
has  taken  place  against  a  background  of  continuing  lip-service  to 
the  conventional  view  of  the  law  and  since  it  has  not  been 
accompanied  by  any  effective  safeguard  for  the  accused  such 
compulsory  tape-recording  of  police  interviews, 99 
Notes, 
1,  Balfour  Practicks  373 
2,  Hume  ii  383 
3,  Anon  Corroboration  of  Evidence  in  Scottish  Criminjl  Lam  1958  SLT  (News)137 
4,  Hammond  v  kiest  j  quoted  in  Macphail  123,02 
5,  Morton  Y  H_M. 
_Advocate 
1938  IC  58  per  L  d-C  Aitchison  p55 
6,  pare  19-52 
7,  It  is  surprising  that  this  point  which  was  first  raised,  but  not  decided,  in 
khan  v  M.  M.  Advocate  (1883)  i  Uhite_SG5  should  have  remained  undecided 
for  a  century  until  Bainbridge  v  Scott  1988  SLT  871 
8,1.1A81  y  H.  M.  Ady2..  8"55  SL 
, 
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7.2  Judicial  CO-nfeuionS 
<i>  Plea  of  Guilty 
In  modern  practice  a  formal,  recorded  plea  of  guilty  which  is 
accepted  by  the  prosecution  is  conclusive  evidence  of  the 
accused's  guilt  and  the  judge  will  proceed  to  sentence  without 
any  further  consideration  of  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence 
against  the  accused.  However  it  was  not  always  so,  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  even  though  the  prisoner  pleaded  guilty  on 
the  reading  of  the  indictment  and  the  plea  was  entered  on  record 
in  the  presence  of  the  full  assize,  this  would  not  authorise  the 
judge  to  award  sentence.  The  charge  had  to  be  remitted  to  a  jury 
who  had  to  return  a  verdict.  The  prisoner  might  retract  his 
confession  before  the  jury  and  they  might  acquit  him  if  they  saw 
fit.  '  This  procedure  was  abolished,  and  the  modern  procedure 
introduced,  by  the  Act  9  Geo.  IV  c.  29  Section  14. 
Mention  should  be  made  of  the  one  known  modern  Scottish  example 
of  a  false  plea  of  guilty,  2  the  extraordinary  case  of  chyle  v 
H  .  M.  Advocate  1976  SLT  125  where  an  innocent  accused  pled  guilty 
with  legal  advice  to  a  serious  charge  of  assault  and  robbery  and 
was  sentenced  to  nine  years  imprisonment.  Boyle,  who  was  a 
deserter  from  the  forces,  was  being  escorted  into  military 
custody  when  he  produced  from  his  pocket  a  newspaper  cutting 
about  the  robbery  and  told  his  military  escort  that  he  had 
committed  the  crime,  They  immediately  returned  him  to  police 
custody  and  he  then  proceeded  to  make  to  the  police  a  "detailed 101 
mmd  circuntitAntia]  c-or  t  itc  "  to  the  chekr~,;,  tG  which  hl  lrttr 
plrarl  guilty, 
rr.  4ofar  as  a  motive  for  Boyle's  bohjviour  could  two  riiccovored  it 
would  app*  3r  that  he  con,..  idnrod  conditions  in  4  civil  pri  :  on 
would  b  butt  or°  than  thorn  In  ar  tlitiry  one  and  he  did  not 
a  cpo  t  too  ion  ;  thy  a  ccrit  nc  . 
The  nino  ya  ar3  m  uzt  have  been  an 
unpleasant  surprise  and  lie  ba-latodty  ruht  to  h  vc  the 
convit;  tion  quashad.  The  report  Ia  l,  argoly  concerned  with  the, 
procedurtal  jzouwc,  and  it  ohou  W  ba  notod  that  the  Crown,  who 
cork  dcd  that  Coyle  was  wholly  innocent.  r  ccoptnd  that  there  had 
trrdop-d  been  miscarriage  of  Justice,  but  it  to  clear  that  at  the 
ort  In;  j  hearing  the  Crown  had  acted  in  good  filth  and  ors  tho 
ap,  s  -ption  that  they  had  6  r+.  f  ttrtcncy  Of  ovidcnco,  something 
which  Lord  Cameron  attributed  to  "o-rre:  rm  In  in  i  ti  ation  and 
i.  rAForrwitlc,  n  which  provi.  dcd  the  proaccutinn  with  r  °)tertal  which  at 
tho-t  it  a  appeared  to  cor-roborfst  et  ho  tt  an  "o  dot  a  Llcd  and 
r.  ircumn,  t  ant  tal  adral  rinn  and  conf  ccnion,  "" 
A3tEiwi  h3  if,  r  unique  c:.  3nn  in  "rotlanct,  rd  r+n  h-rdly  h 
rocard¢  d  as  a  cn  . 
1or  prcrc  !  ent,  it  is  ninvarthrlt^c  of  conaiclerr  bl 
tT,  port?  fcrs  in  that  it  *,  hnw  ,  albett  in  an  o:  trcmo  r.  X  the 
rtin8"Ors  of  blind  r  altan?,,  n  on  the,  avt  anco  of  a  r:  nfosslon. 
A1thvu,,  h  it  rm  y  not  hc;  dire  -t1v  rc  xcýýr  nt  to  th^  pr  ien± 
th.  te  irý  alow,  -,  n  appropriat  o  polrit  to  note  th  a  bizarr  can  "  of 
art  5  Ctf-3e4d  fwbo  pled  pxlf  tv  to  vari.  oer,  *  ct  ar,,  os  of  i  actmt  4nd  other 102 
related  offences  with  a  girl  believed  by  all  concerned,  including 
the  accused  and  the  girl  herself  to  be  his  daughter.  He  was 
later  charged  with  other  offences  relating  to  the  same  girl  but 
by  this  time  science  had  moved  on  and  the  evidence  was  subjected 
to  D.  N.  A.  testing  which  established  conclusively  that  he  could 
not  have  been  the  girl's  father.  The  earlier  conviction  was 
quashed  of  consent.  However,  it  is  submitted  that  this  is  not 
truly  an  example  of  a  false  confession  but  is  rather  a  confession 
tendered  under  essential  error  which,  in  these  particular  circum- 
stances,  could  not  reasonably  have  been  guarded  against. 
Notas 
1.  Huse  it  320;  Burnett  p576,  Sea  also  chapter  6,2  (i)  supra 
2,  The  examples  given  by  Dickson  pp263-265  11380'384  all  relate  to  other 
juriedicitions 
3,  Glasgow  Herald  6  October  1990 
(ii)  Judicial  Declaration 
Generally  the  legal  effect  of  a  confession  in  a  judicial 
declaration  is  similar  to  that  of  an  extra-judicial  confession.  ' 
Although  obviously  a  matter  of  considerable  weight,  a  confession 
in  a  judicial  declaration  has  never  been  regarded  as  conclusive 
evidence  and  requires  to  be  corroborated  by  evidence  from  another 
source.  2  The  mere  proof  of  the  commission  of  the  crime  is 
insufficient  to  provide  corroboration,  there  must  be  some 
evidence  connecting  the  accused  with  the  crime.  3 
It  is  a  question  of  facts  and  circumstances  in  each  case  what 
additional  evidence  will  be  sufficient  to  provide  corroboration 103 
but  a  merely  suspicious  circumstance,  such  as  hiding  from 
apprehension,  is  not  enough.  4 
Dickson  observes  that  prisoners  are  "every  day  convicted  upon 
confessions  in  their  declarations,  corroborated  by  circumstances 
which  throw  considerable  suspicion  upon  them  but  which  would  not 
of  themselves  prove  the  prosecutor's  case.  "  Dickson  considers 
this  just  and  comments  that  "a  false  confession  in  a  declaration 
is  very  rare  and  unlikely,  indeed,  not  many  degrees  less  so  than 
a  false  plea  of  guilty.  "  s  However  he  also  warns  against  the 
possibility  of  the  statement  not  having  been  taken  down  in  the 
prisoner's  precise  words,  its  precise  meaning  thus  being  mis- 
conceived,  and  he  observes  that  an  intentional  mis-statement  is 
not  impossible. 
The  question  of  sufficiency  has  not  yet  arisen  in  connection  with 
the  1980  Act  procedures  but  it  is  thought  that  the  courts  will 
apply  the  genoral  principles  of  corroboration  of  extra  judicial 
confessions. 
Votes, 
1.  Walkers  p29 
2.  Hume  it  324,  Alison  it  578;  Dickson  1339,  Archibild  Dunca  Lq, 
Mac  nie  (1831)  Bell!  Notes  239:  aanaahan  v  H.  M.  Advocate  (1888)  1  While 
3,  Dunlop  and  Others  (1823)  Alison  ii  57$-579  and  authorities  in  previous  note, 
4,  Macdonald  p334,5  . 
DutLJ  t; 
, jet 
Qz31as  (]834)  Bells  Notes  240'.  Sohn  Buchanan  (18371-Sells  Notes  240. 
5,  Dickson  9339,  A  false  plea  of  guilty  can  happen  -  Boyle  v  H.  M.  Advocat 
supra  vol,  2  p152 
6,  Dickson  1376 144 
(iii)  The  Evidence  gf  the  Accused 
In  Drysdale  v  Adair  1947  S  (N)  f3  an  accused  on  trial  for 
assault  admitted  in  evidence  that  he  had  struck  a  blow  but 
explained  that  it  had  been  done  in  self  defence.  The  Sheriff- 
Substitute  took  the  accused's  admission  as  corroboration  of  the 
fact  of  the  assault,  but  rejected  the  evidence  of  self-defence 
and  convicted.  On  appeal  the  High  Court  hold  that  corroboration 
might  be  obtained  from  the  evidence  of  the  accused  without  his 
entire  evidence  being  believed. 
The  report  of  Dryedale  v.  Ad  is  extremely  brief.  However,  a 
much  fuller  report  is  available  of  McArthur 
-v 
Stewart  i95ý.  SiT 
114_  in  which  case  the  High  Court  held  that  where,  in  the  course 
of  giving  evidence  at  his  trial,  the  accused  admits  a  crucial 
fact  which  was  only  spoken  to  by  one  Crown  witness,  his  evidence 
will  provide  the  necessary  corroboration.  '  The  possibility  of  a 
prosecutor  taking  up  a  case  without  sufficient  evidence  in  the 
hope  of  securing  an  admission  from  the  accused-was  deplored 
t 
(rightly>  by  Lord  Carmont. 
This  point  is  probably  less  likely  to  arise  in  practice  today  in 
view  of  the  provisions  of  Sections  140A  and  345A  of  the  1975  Act 
(as  amended  by  the  1980  Act)  which  allow  for  the  making  of  a 
submission  of  "no  case  to  answer.  " 
The  view  has  been  expressed  2  that  an  admission  of  guilt  by  the 
accused  in  the  witness  box  is  conclusive,  but  there  are  no  cases. 105 
Renton  and  Brown  o  state  that  an  admission  on  oath  in  the  witness 
box  must  be  corroborated  by  evidence  from  another  source.  In 
modern  practice  the  question  is  not  likely  to  be  of  much 
practical  importance  since  the  Crown  will,  of  course,  have  had  to 
lead  at  least  sufficient  evidence  to  overcome  a  "no  case  to 
answer"  submission  before  the  question  of  the  accused  going  into 
the  witness  box  will  arise. 
It  in  thought  that  an  admission  of  guilt  in  judicial  proceedings 
other  than  the  accused's  own  trial  would  be  treated  on  the  same 
basis  as  an  extrajudicial  confession  and  hence  would  require 
corroboration  in  accordance  with  the  normal  principles. 
Notes 
1,  This  point  also  arose,  inconclusively,  in  tiln  v  Uhaley  1975  SLT(N)  75 
Z,  Lord  Cameron  Scottish  Practice  in  Relation  to  Adwfs;  iors  and  Confessions  by 
Persons  Suspected  or  Accused  of  Crime  1975  SLT  265, 
7.3  Extra-judicial  Conf^s,  ons 
(U  Ties  Genera  Principles 
(a)  The  Views,  of  Dickson  and  Qther  Writers 
It  has  long  been  the  law  in  Scotland,  unlike  England,  that  an 
extra-judicial  confession  is  not  of  itself  full  proof  of  guilt 
and  must  be  corroborated  by  other  evidence,  either  direct  or 
circumstantial,  throwing  suspicion  on  the  prisoner.  '  It  is 
impossible,  given  the  infinite  variety  of  forms  which  such 
confessions  can  take,  to  lay  down  with  any  precision  the  amount 
of  corroborative  evidence  required.  There  are  many  situations 
where  the  matter  is  self-evident;  thus  a  clear  confession 106 
supported  by  the  recovery  of  a  sum  of  money  in  the  possession  of 
the  previously  destitute  accused,  2  or  the  finding  of  the  accused 
standing  over  the  body  of  his  victim  with  the  murder  weapon  lying 
nearby.  3  In  these  and  many  other  situations  there  can  be  little 
doubt  about  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence.  Equally,  where  all 
that  is  proved  is  the  confession  and  the  commission  of  the  crime, 
this  is  insufficient,  since  proof  of  the  crime  merely  establishes 
that  it  was  committed  by  someone  and  does  not  corroborate  the 
accused's  confession  that  he  committed  it. 
However,  cases  are  often  less  straightforward  than  thin, 
particularly  where  the  confession  is  not  supported  by  real 
evidence,  and  as  Dickson  puts  it,  "it  must  lie  with  the  fury  in 
each  case  to  say  whether,  looking  to  the  terms  of  the  confession, 
the  channel  through  which  it  comes,  and  the  corroboratfing 
evidence,  they  are  satisfied  that  the  prisoner  is  guilty.  "  15 
Dickson  "I  offers  some  pointers  to  the  assessment  of  the  probative 
value  of  oral  admissions  and  confessions,  to  which,  it  is 
submitted,  modern  courts  should  pay  more  heed  than  sometimes 
appears  to  be  given. 
The  jury  ought  always  to  be  satisfied  of  the  opportunity  for 
observation,  the  accuracy  and  memory  and  the  veracity  of  the 
witness  before  they  attach  any  weight  to  his  evidence.  Dickson 
quotes  with  approval  the  following  dictum  of  Baron  Parke: 
"It  very  frequently  happens  not  only  that  the 107 
witness  has  misunderstood  what  the  party  has  said, 
but  that  by  unintentionally  altering  a  few  of  the 
expressions  really  used,  he  gives  an  effect  to  the 
statement  completely  at  variance  with  what  the 
party  really  did  Say.  **  7 
Only  part  of  the  statement  may  have  been  heard,  and  important 
qualifications  unnoticed  or  forgotten.  The  accused  and  the 
witness  may  have  attached  different  meanings  to  an  ambiguous  or 
inaccurate  expression.  In  Dickson  also  stresses  the  need  for  the 
the  witness  to  repeat  the  accused's  words  verbatim  rather  than 
his  own  inference  from  them  and  cites  an  unreported  case  '  in 
which  the  accused  was  indicted  for  theft  of  a  shawl.  A  police 
officer  deponed  that  the  accused  "confessed"  but  under  cross- 
examination  conceded  that  all  she  had  said  was  that  she  "had 
taken  the  shawl".  The  accused  was  acquitted  on  the  basis  that 
she  lacked  theftuous  intent. 
Dickson  is  unequivocal  in  his  views  on  'the  danger  of  fabricated 
confessions.  Given  recent  events  in  England  the  passage  is  worth 
quoting  in  full  for  its  prophetic  ringt 
"Evidence  of  oral  admissions  is  also  easily 
fabricated,  and  the  chance  of  detecting  its 
untruth  is  small;  for  when  all  a  witness  speaks  to 
is  an  independent  statement,  his  falsehood  is 
almost  beyond  the  reach  of  cross  examination,  and 
is  seldom  contradictory  to  the  proved  circum- 108 
stances  attending  the  crime.  Peculiar  caution  is 
always  necessary  when  the  person  repeating  the 
supposed  confession  is  an  officer  engaged  in  the 
pursuit  of  criminals  for  such  persons  are  apt  to 
be  biassed  witnesses,  and  to  attribute  a  guilty 
meaning  to  ambiguous,  and  even  to  harmless  acts 
and  words,  of  persons  whom  they  apprehend.  "  I° 
However,  Dickson  goes  on  to  lay  the  foundation  for  the  modern 
view  of  confessions  when  he  observes: 
"Extra-judicial  confessions  ...  (if  distinctly 
proved),  are  usually  entitled  to  much  weight,  and 
strong  corroborative  evidence  will  not  be  required 
to  complete  the  proof  of  guilt.  The  peculiar 
value  of  confessional  evidence  lies  in  its 
furnishing  the  best  proof  of  the  intention  which 
constitutes  the  essence  of  most  crimes.  "  11 
No  subsequent  writer  has  treated  the  subject  of  the  probative 
value  of  confessions  in  as  much  depth  as  Dickson  and  he  views 
still  retain  the  highest  authority.  However,  the  third  edition 
of  Renton  and  Brown  contains  the  succinct  and  apposite  comment: 
"It  may  also  be  suggested  that  suspicion  must 
always  attach  to  a  statement  in  the  absence  of 
which  the  accused  would  have  had  a  reasonable 
chance  of  being  acquitted.  "  12 109 
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(b)  The  Gasas 
It  is  surprising  how  little  case  law  there  was  on  sufficiency 
until  comparatively  recently.  '  The  clearest,  and  still  the  most 
authoritative,  case  on  the  point  is  Conno  ly  v  H.  M.  Advocate 
_1958 
SLT  72  Although  Connor  contains  elements  of  what  would 
today  be  regarded  as  a  special  knowledge  confession,  that  issue 
would  have  to  wait  until  Manuel  v  H.  M.  Advocate__1958  . TC  Al  for 
full  consideration  from  the  High  Court  and  Conno_lly  is  primarily 
an  authority  on  general  principles. 
The  circumstances  in  molly￿  were  straightforward.  The  accused 
was  seen  by  some  civilians  to  be  sitting  in  a  car,  late  at  night, 
apparently  Just  hanging  around.  The  civilians  were  suspicious 
and  reported  the  matter  to  the  police.  The  accused  was  taken  to 
the  police  station  (on  what  basis  is  not  clear)  and  the  police 
returned  to  the  car  and  stood  by  it  until  two  men,  White  and 
Thomson,  came  round  the  corner  from  a  street  called  Rosefteid 
Avenue.  On  seeing  the  police  White  made  off  and  Thomson  spoke  to 
the  officers  for  a  few  moments  before  also  taking  to  his  heels. 
Later  the  same  night  a  quantity  of  stolen  goods  was  found  in  a 
house  in  Rosefieid  Avenue,  In  the  police  station  Connolly  made  a 
statement,  described  as  "circumstantial  and  detailed",  describing 
how  he  and  Thomson  had  broken  into  a  shop  and  transported  the 
stolen  property  to  the  house  in  Rosefield  Avenue.  He  was 
convicted  after  trial  and  appealed.  The  High  Court,  Lord 
4 III 
Justice-Clerk  Thomson,  Lord  Partick  and  Lord  Mackintosh,  rejected 
the  appeal. 
Lord  Thomson  set  out  the  general  principles  of  the  law  in  what 
remains  their  classic  statement: 
"It  is  a  fundamental  rule  of  our  criminal  law  that 
no  one  can  be  convicted  on  the  evidence  of  one 
witness  and  that  there  must  be  testimony 
incriminating  the  accused  derived  from  two 
separate  sources.  It  is  consistent  with  that 
rule,  though  whether  it  is  derived  from  it  is  not 
certain,  that  no  accused  can  be  convicted  on  his 
own  confession  alone.  A  confession  of  guilt  - 
short  of  a  formal  plea  of  guilty  -  is  not  enough. 
There  must  be  evidence  from  some  other  source 
which  incriminates  the  accused.  If  all  that  the 
Crown  can  produce  is  evidence  -  however  complete, 
and  exhaustive  -  that  a  crime  has  been  committed 
together  with  evidence,  however  credible,  that  the 
accused  confessed  to  having  committed  it,  the 
Crown  must  fail.  There  must  be  something 
incriminatory  of  the  accused  spoken  to  by  someone 
other  than  the-accused. 
While  it  is  necessary  that  there  should  be 
evidence  from  two  independent  sources,  the  weight 
to  be  attached  to  each  source  may  vary.  If  Ono 112 
source  is  unimpeachable,  the  standard  required  of 
the  other  may  be  lower  then  if  the  first  source 
carries  less  weight,  It  is  the  conjunction  of  the 
testimonies  which  is  important.  " 
His  Lordship  side-stepped  the  question  of  the  special  knowledge 
issue  and  stated  that  he  found  corroboration  in  the  circum- 
stances,  viz  the  presence  of  the  accused  in  the  car,  alone  for  an 
hour  in  the  vicinity  of  the  place  where  the  stolen  goods  were 
found  at  a  time  which  would  fit  in  with  the  theft  and  the  conduct 
of  White  and  Thomson  when  they  saw  the  police.  According  to  his 
Lordship,  while  this  was  not  very  strong  evidence,  when  it  was 
put  alongside  the  confession,  the  two  in  combination  were 
"irre  ist  able.  " 
Lords  Patrick  and  Mackintosh  both  delivered  judgments  but  neither 
adds  much  to  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk's  statcmant  of  the  law,  Lord 
Mackintosh  did,  however,  make  it  clear  that  "the  corroborating 
evidence  does  not  require  to  be  so  strong  ac  would  suffice  to 
prove  the  case  without  the  confession.  " 
Lord  Justice-Clerk  Thomson  again  presided  over  the  High  Court 
when  their  Lordships  dealt  with  cinrieir  y  Clark  1953  S!  T  307. 
This  road  traffic  case  marks  the  first  appearance  of  the  High 
Court's  frequently  repeated  view  that  the  corroborative  evidence 
need  only  "afford  a  sufficient  independent  check  of  [an) 
unequivocal  admission"  in  order  to  satisfy  the  requirements  of 113 
the  law.  Lord  Thomson`s  judgment  is  also  of  interest  in  that  it 
shows,  quite  overtly,  his  Lordship  calling  in  question  the 
requirement  for  a  confession  to  be  corroborated  at  all: 
"There  is  a  rule  in  our  law  -a  somewhat  archaic 
rule  -  the  merit  of  which  under  modern  conditions 
is  not  always  obvious,  at  all  events  where  the 
admission  is  beyond  suspicion  -  that  short  of  a 
solemn  plea  of  guilt,  an  admission  of  guilt  by  an 
accused  is  not  conclusive  against  him  unless  it  is 
corroborated  by  something  beyond  the  actual 
admission.  One  reason  for  this  rule  is  to  ensure 
that  there  is  nothing  phoney  or  quixotic  about  the 
confession.  What  is  required  in  the  way  of 
independent  evidence  In  order  to  elide  such  a  risk 
must  depend  on  the  facts  of  the  case,  and  in 
particular  the  nature  and  character  of  the 
confession  and  the  circumstances  under  which  it  is 
made,  11 
Insofar  as  "phoney  and  quixotic"  means  anything  at  all,  it 
appears  that  his  Lordship  was  considering  the  possibility  of  a 
confession  by  a  person  who  had  not  committed  the  crime,  a  false 
confessor.  The  importance  of  the  requirement  for  corroboration 
as  a  protection  for  the  accused  against  a  fabricated  confession 
does  not  appear  to  have  occurred  to  his  Lordship.  Admittedly  it 
was  to  be  some  years  before  "verballing"  by  the  police  became  a 114 
perceived  problem,  but  his  Lordthip'a  obiter  commontc  show  how 
far  the  pendulum  had  swung  since  Dickson's  time. 
Subsequant  to  Sinclair  v  Clark  there  has  been  a  series  of  road 
traffic  cases  concerning  corroboration  of  the  accused's  admission 
of  driving  in  which  the  High  Court  have  repeatedly  stated  their 
view  that  very  little  is  required  to  corroborate  an  "unequivocal 
admission.  "  ý3 
Sinclair  v  Clark  has  also  been  cited  many  times  outwith  the 
context  of  road  traffic  law,  notably  in  Hartley  v  ILM.  Adyrcate 
1,979 
sSLT  26  4  where  the  accused's  confession  was  clearly 
unequivocal  and  was  held  to  require  very  little  corroboration. 
Although  Connolly  was  not  cited  in  Herds,,  it  is  noteworthy 
that  in  the  latter  case  Lord  Grieve,  who  of  the  three  judges 
considers  the  question  of  sufficiency  most  fully,  referred  to  the 
requirement  of  corroboration  being  met  by  "something  [which]  must 
point  to  the  accused  as  the  perpetrator  of  the  crime  to  which  he 
has  confessed",  a  considerably  lower  standard  than  Lord  Justice- 
Clerk  Thomson's  statement  in  Connolly  that  there  had  to  be 
evidence  from  two  sources  which  incriminated  the  accused. 
In  Lord  Dunpark's  opinion  confession  evidence  has  a  special 
status. 
"The  standard  of  corroboration  of  an  unequivocal 
confession  of  guilt  iss  in  my  opinion,  different 
from  thn  standard  to  be  applied  when  Leoking 115 
corroboration  of  a  Crown  eye-witness  at  a  criminal, 
trial  or  of  the  evidence  of  a  pursuer  or  defender 
in  a  civil  case.  The  reason  for  the  different 
standard  is  that,  unlike  such  other  evidence  the 
confession  of  guilt  by  an  accused  person  is 
prejudicial  to  his  own  interets  and  may,  there- 
fore,  initially  be  assumed  to  be  true.  Accord- 
ingly,  one  is  not  then  looking  for  extrinsic 
evidence  which  is  consistent  with  his  confession 
of  guilt.  If  therefore,  a  jury  is  satisfied  that 
a  confession  of  guilt  was  freely  made  and 
unequivocal  in  its  terms,  corroboration  of  that 
confession  may  be  found  in  evidence  fjbm  another 
source  or  sources  which  point  to  the  truth  of  the 
confession.  " 
TudhoRe  v  Aalaleish  1986  SCCR  559  differs  from  Sinclair  v  Clerk 
and  its  successors  in  that  the  admission  was  not  "unequivocal", 
In  this  case  the  accused  was  charged  with  a  number  of  road 
traffic  offences  relating  to  an  accident  in  which  her  car  had 
allegedly  collided  with  a  parked  vehicle  and  made  off  from  the 
scene.  When  the  police  arrived  at  the  accused's  house,  appar- 
ently  fairly  soon  after  the  accident,  they  found  that  her,  car  was 
parked  outside  showing  signs  of  recent  accident  damage  (although 
nothing  that  could  be  related  to  the  parked  vehicle)  and  with  the 
engine  still  warm.  Under  Section  166  of  the  Road  Traffic  Act 
1972  police  asked  the  accused  who  had  been  driving  the  car  when 116 
it  was  involved  in  a  road  traffic  accident,  to  which  she  replied, 
"I  was  driving  it  a  short  time  ago". 
The  Sheriff  acquitted  on  the  basis  that  the  Crown  had  failed  to 
set  up  either  an  accident  involving  the  accused  or  an  admission 
by  her  and  on  appeal  his  decision  was  upheld,  the  High  Court 
observing  "  ...  the  respondent  was  ...  asked  who  had  been  driving 
the  vehicle  when  it  was  involved  in  a  road  traffic  accident,  her 
reply  was  not  that  she  had  been  driving  when  an  accident  had 
occurred  but  that  she  had  been  driving  the  vehicle  a  short  time 
ago.  In  our  opinion  that  statement  cannot  be  regarded  as  a  clear 
and  unequivocal  statement  to  the  effect  that  she  was  the  driver 
at  the  relevant  time.  " 
In  Alton  v  If.  M.  Advocate  1987  SCOR  252  a  the  accused  was  indicted 
for  murder  following  a  stabbing  in  a  nightclub.  The  case  against 
him  was  heavily  dependent  on  two  statements  which  it  was  alleged 
he  had  made  and  which  amounted  to  implied  admissions.  These  were 
firstly  a  remark  to  police  officers,  the  day  after  he  had  been 
cautioned  and  charged,  "Ach,  look  I  gave  the  knife  to  a  man.  It's 
destroyed.  "  and  secondly  a  statement  to  a  civilian  witness 
shortly  after  the  incident  to  the  effect  that  he  (Alton)  had 
"chibbed  some  guy".  There  was  other  circumstantial  evidence 
against  him,  particularly  from  a  witness,  Hart,  who  spoke  to 
seeing  Aiton  stab  somebody,  although  he  could  not  identify  the 
victim,  but  the  statements  were  the  mainstay  of  the  prosecution 
case.  In  no  sense  could  either  of  these  statements  be  classified 117 
as  an  "unequivocal  admission"  of  the  murder  with  which  he  was 
charged  but  nevertheless  the  Crown  case  was  presented  on  the 
basis  that  they  were  the  starting  point  of  the  evidence  and  the 
question  was  whether  there  was  enough  to  corroborate  them,  rather 
than  the  possibly  more  obvious  question  of  whether  the  statements 
could  corroborate  Hart's  eyewitness  account.  The  conviction  was 
upheld  on  appeal. 
In  Crowe  y  Mnc?  b  i1  1987  SLT  rfl)  316  the  point  in  issue  wawa 
whether  the  Crown  had  demonstrated  that  the  accused  had  knowledge 
and  control,  and  hence  possession,  of  a  piece  of  cannabis  found 
in  his  prison  cell.  The  cannabis  was  found  in  the  ashtray 
appropriate  to  the  accused's  bed  and  when  cautioned  and  charged 
by  the  police  with  possessing  cannabis  he  replied  "It  wasn't 
exactly  in  my  possession.  It  was  under  my  ashtray.  There  is  a 
difference.  "  He  was  convicted  after  trial  and  the  conviction  was 
upheld  on  appeal. 
Sinclair  y  Tudho.  pe  1937  SCCR  69C  is  one  of  the  very  few  cases 
where  the  Nigh  Court  have  overturned  a  conviction  based  on 
confession  evidence,  although  in  thie  case  the  Crown  failed  on 
the  basis  that  they  had  not  proved  that  the  crime  libelled  had 
occurred.  The  accused  was  found  by  police  officers  in  Miller 
Street,  Glasgow  concealing  something  in  the  front  of  his  anorak 
and  looking  about  in  a  suspicious  manner.  He  was  stopped  and 
found  to  be  in  possession  of  three  diaries.  Under  caution  he 
said  "Aye,  A.  K.  I  stole  them  out  of  Nash's  at  Miller  Street.  " II8 
The  only  evidence  to  connect  the  diaries  to  Nash's  was  evidence 
that  they  were  similar  to  ones  stocked  there.  There  was  no 
evidence  that  any  theft  of  diaries,  let  alone  the  actual  ones 
recovered  had  taken  place.  In  the  circumstances  it  is  hardly 
surprising  that  the  conviction  was  quashed,  although  the  High 
Court  did  comment  on  how  near  the  Crown  had  come  to  success  and 
implied  that  things  might  have  been  different  if  the  accused  had 
been  seen  to  come  out  of  Nash's  or  if  there  had  been  evidence 
that  the  diaries  were  unlikely  to  have  been  obtained  anywhere 
other  than  in  Nash's. 
Sinclair.  v  Clark  was  again  considered  in  Greenshields  v  14,  M, 
Advocate  1289  SCCR  637  the  main  importance  of  which  lies  in  the 
fact  that  it  is  the  first  case  to  deal  in  any  real  depth  with  the 
question  of  an  unclear  and  equivocal  confession.  0 
Greenshields  was  indicted  for  a  grisly  murder  which  also  involved 
the  dismembering  and  burning  of  the  victim's  body.  He  was 
cautioned  and  charged  with  murder  and  with  attempting  to  pervert 
the  course  of  justice  by  dismembering  the  body.  He  replied  "You 
don't  think  I  did  it  myself  do  you;  but  I'm  telling  you  nothing 
about  it  until  I  see  my  lawyer.  "  At  his  trial  the  Crown  relied 
on  this  statement  as  a  confession  to  murder  and  sought  corrob- 
oration  in  the  finding  of  blood  stains,  certain  other  comments  by 
the  accused  and  evidence  of  his  behaviour  when  interviewed  by  the 
police.  However  the  statement  to  the  police  was  critical  in 
providing  a  sufficiency  of  evidence.  One  factor  which 119 
complicated  the  issue  was  the  point,  ably  argued  by  defence 
counsel,  that  the  reply  could  have  related  to  either  murder  or 
attempting  to  pervert  the  course  of  justice  or  to  both  7  and  it 
could  have  been  consistent  with  the  accused  admitting  that  he 
assisted  in  the  disposal  of  the  body  but  no  more. 
While  the  appeal  court  agreed  that  the  statement  could  not  be 
regarded  as  a  clear  and  unequivocal  admission,  the  crucial 
question  was  whether  the  jury  were  entitled  to  regard  it  as  an 
implied  or  equivocal  admission-of  murder.  The  Lord  Justice-Clerk 
put  it  thus: 
"It  is  not  only  clear  and  unequivocal  admissions 
which  have  evidential  value.  It  has  often  been 
said  that  if  there  is  a  clear  and  unequivocal 
admission  of  guilt,  then  very  little  evidence  in 
corroboration  of  such  an  admission  is  required. 
That  is  not  to  say,  however,  that  something  lets 
than  a  clear  and  unequivocal  admission  is  of  no 
value.  The  first  question  must  have  been  for  the 
jury  to  determine  whether  the  reply  consistuted  an 
admission  at  aal,,  and  if  so  an  admission  of  what. 
If  the  reply  was  capable  of  being  treated  as  an 
admission,  then  the  amount  of  evidence  needed  to 
corroborate  that  admission  would  depend  on  the 
circumstances  of  the  case.  ...  On  the  assumption 
that  the  reply  was  made,  it  was  for  the  jury  to 
determine  whether  the  reply  which  the  appellant 120 
made  related  to  the  attempt  to  pervert  the  course 
of  justice  only  or  whether  it  was  a  reply  to  the 
principal  charge  which  was  undoubtedly  a  charge  of 
murder.  " 
Although  the  trial  had  proceeded,  and  the  trial  judge  had 
directed  the  jury,  on  the  basis  that  if  the  jury  accepted  the 
police  evidence  it  was  open  to  them  to  interpret  it  as  an  implied 
admission  and  then  seek  corroboration  in  the  rest  of  the 
evidence,  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk  was  of  the  view  that  this  was 
not  the  only  way,  or  even  the  best  way,  in  which  the  case  could 
have  been  presented.  In  his  Lordship's  view,  the  case  was  really 
one  of  circumstantial  evidence  with  the  alleged  reply  as  a 
critical  ingredients 
"LOlnce  it  is  recognised  that  there  was  never  any 
question  of  the  reply  being  treated  as  an 
unequivocal  or  clear  admission,  and  that  the  jury 
were  left  to  determine  whether  they  were  satisfied 
that  It  constituted  an  implied  admission,  the  sole 
question  in  the  case  became  one  of  sufficiency  of 
evidence.  I  regard  the  case  as  a  classic  one  of 
circumstantial  evidence;  each  of  the  matters 
relied  upon  Individually  may  establish  very 
little,  but  in  conjunction  with  one  another,  the 
facts  were  in  my  opinion  clearly  sufficient  to 
entitle  the  jury  to  convict  the  appellant  of  this 
charge.  " 121 
The  appeal  court  did  not  say  that  the  trial  Judge  was  wrong,  and 
thus  there  would  appear  to  be  two  possible  approaches  to  an 
equivocal  admission.  Firstly  the  jury  could  be  directed  to  look 
at  the  statement  on  its  own,  decide  whether  it  is  to  be  inter- 
preted  as  a  confession,  and  if  so  to  what,  and  thereafter  to  seek 
corroboration  in  the  other  evidence.  The  problem  with  this 
approach,  as  Sheriff  Gordon  points  out  in  his  commentary,  is  the 
difficulty  of  separating  the  question  of  sufficiency  of  evidence 
from  the  question  of  weight  of  evidence  since  the  corroboration 
needed  for  an  equivocal  confession  is  presumably  greater  than 
that  required  for  an  unegivacal  one.  The  alternative  approach, 
favoured  by  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk,  Is  for  the  Jury  to  regard  the 
evidence  as  a  whole  and  simply  treat  the  reply  as  one  source  of 
evidence,  an  approach  which  certainly  has  the  merit  of  simp- 
licity,  and,  it  is  submitted,  the  further  merit  of  removing  from 
the  confession  the  special  status  which  is  so  often  inapprop- 
riately  attached  to  it. 
In  summary  therefore,  the  law  is  settled  in  the  case  of  the 
unegivocal  confession.  However,  although  G  e?  e  d3  has  been 
the  first  case  to  address  the  question  of  the  equivocal  con- 
fession,  the  possibility  of  the  two  different  approaches  means 
that  it  cannot  at  this  stage  be  regarded  as  settling  the  law  and 
it  will  be  necessary  to  await  further  decisions  before  it  becomes 
possible  to  identify  any  trends.  0 122 
Finally  in  McCougan  v  IL  M.  Advocate  1991  SCCR  49  a  case  of  child 
sex  abuse,  it  was  held  of  consent  by  the  crown  that  the  accused's 
demeanour  and  reactions  when  confronted  both  by  the  child's 
parents  and  the  police  could  not  be  founded  on  as  providing 
corroboration  of  his  admissions,  the  logic  of  this  presumably 
being  that  the  reaction  emanated  from  the  same  source  as  the 
admissions. 
Notes 
1,  The  most  important  of  the  earlier  cases  are  summarised  in  Macdonald  p334 
2.  Although  this  case  was  reported  in  1958  it  was  actually  decided  in  1955, 
3,  The  other  cases  in  the  series  are  Torrance  X  Than  1970  JC  ;  Ledhi  y  Skeen 
(1278)  SCCR  Su;  pl.  197;  äilßv  Fitzgerald  (1978)  SCOR  Suppt.  20S;  McDonald  v 
Smith  (1978)  SCCR  Suppl.  219;  McNa  Culligan  (1978)  SCCR  Suppi.  222  and 
Lockhart  v  Crockett  1966  SCOR  6.,  None  of  them  contribute  anything 
material  to  the  development  of  the  law  and  they  are  not  discussed 
individually,  See  also  Sinclair  v  MacLeod  1964  JD  19  where  in  special 
circumstances  a  conviction  was  overturned  despite  an  unequivocal  admission 
in  response  to  a  police  requirement.  1 
4,  Discussed  in  relation  to  admissibility  at  vol,  1  p418  supra,  Sae  also  Keane 
v  Horn  (1979)  SCCR  Suroi  225 
S.  Discussed  in  relation  to  admissibility  at  vol,  1  p449  supra 
6.  The  statement  in  Tudhoae  v  Osloleisy  was,  in  effect,  held  not  to  amount  to 
a  confession  at  all, 
7.  In  the  writer's  experience  it  is  by  no  means  uncommon  for  the  police  further 
to  confuse  an  already  complicated  issue  by  an  unnecessary  proliferation  of 
charges, 
8.  In  Beattie  v  Scott  1990  SCCR  296  the  defence  conceded  that  the  confession 
was  unequivocal  and  the  point  therefore  did  not  arise, 123 
(ii)  Circumstances  Peculiarly  Within  the  Knowledge  of  the 
cUS  d 
In  relation  to  matters  such  as  driving  without  a  licence  or 
insurance  or  operating  an  unlicensed  television  set  and  the  like, 
it  is  sufficient  for  conviction  for  the  Crown,  in  the  absence  of 
contrary  evidence,  to  lead  evidence  of  an  uncorroborated 
admission  by  the  accused  that  he  was  unlicensed  or  uninsured. 
In  such  cases  it  is  sufficient  for  the  Crown  to  demonstrate  prima 
facie  the  absence  of  entitlement  to  carry  on  the  activity  in 
question,  the  possession  of  a  licence  or  an  insurance  certificate 
being  facts  peculiarly  within  the  accused's  knowledge. 
Notes 
1,  Milne  v  Whaley  197S  SLT(N)  79  approving  John  v  Humphreys  C19551_1_1  ýLR  325. 
and  (jay  v  Tc  je  112731  RI  j??;  Irving  v  Tudh  Pr, 
(iii)  "Special  Knowledge" 
(a) 
, 
Introducttpn  The  Views  of  Allison 
The  discussion  so  far  has  shown  how  little  additional  evidence  is 
required  to  corroborate  an  unequivocal  confession.  Nevertheless, 
although  the  amount  of  evidence  is  slight,  it  must  still  come 
from  outwith  the  terms  of  the  confession  itself.  Parallel  to  the 
development  of  the  general  principles,  the  courts  have  developed 
the  concept  of  what  has  colloquially  become  known  as  the  "special 
knowledge"  confession,  the  basis  of  which  is  that  the  confession 
itself  contains  information  which  could  only  be  known  to  the 
perpetrator  of  the  crime. 124 
The  first  writer  to  articulate  this  principle  was  Alison  who 
wrote: 
"Confessions  ...  come  with  most  effect  when  they 
are  connected,  as  is  very  frequently  the  case, 
with  some  articles  of  real  evidence,  which  put  it 
beyond  a  doubt  that  the  statement  given  is  in  the 
main  true.  Thus,  if  a  person  is  apprehended  on  a 
charge  of  theft,  and  he  teils  the  officer  who 
seized  him,  that  if.  he  will  go  to  such  a  place, 
and  look  under  such  a  bush,  he  will  find  the 
stolen  goods;  or  he  is  charged  with  murder  or 
assault,  and  he  says  he  threw  the  bloody  weapon 
inte  such  a  pool,  in  such  a  river,  and  it  is  there 
searched  for  and  found;  without  doubt,  these  are 
such  strong  confirmations  of  the  truth  of  the 
confession,  as  renders  it  of  itself  sufficient,  if 
the  corpus  is  established  aliunde,  to  convict  the 
prisoner. 
It  will  be  argued  that  the  way  in  which  the  Scottish  courts  have 
interpreted  this  statement  of  the  law  has  caused  it  to  become 
separated  from  its  base  to  the  point  where  Alison  would  have 
difficulty  recognising  his  own  principle  but  before  doing  so  it 
is  pertinent  to  highlight  some  of  the  main  elements  which  make  up 
the  principle  as  Alison  saw  it. 125 
Firstly,  "real  evidence"  has  been  defined  by  Dickson  as  "evidence 
derived  from  things"  2  and  is  used  by  the  Walkers  "to  include 
both  a  thing,  which  may  be  a  human  being,  any  features  of  the 
thing  which  are  significant,  and  the  inferences  to  be  drawn  from 
the  existence  of  the  thing  or  from  its  significant  features.  " 
It  is  submitted  that  it  is  clear  from  the  context  that  when 
Alison  articulated  the  principle  has  was  thinking  solely  in  terms 
of  the  finding  of  physical,  corporeal  objects  which  had 
evidential  value  in  themselves. 
Secondly,  it  is  submitted  that  it  is  implicit  in  Alison'e 
statement,  that  the  finding  of  the  real  evidence  should  come 
about  as  the  result  of  the  confession,  in  other  words  that  the 
details  in  the  confession  should  be  unknown  to  anyone  other  than 
the  criminal. 
Thirdly,  the  corpus  must  be  established  aliunda  In  other  words 
there  must  be  full  legal  proof  of  the  commission  of  the  crime. 
There  is  a  surprising  absence  of  authority  on  this  point,  but  it 
is  submitted  that  this  requires  the  crucial  facts  of  the  crime  to 
be  corroborated.  Thus,  to  take  the  typical  example  of  theft  by 
housebreaking,  if  the  accused's  confession  contains  "special 
knowledge"  in  relation  to  the  modus  operandi  of  the  housebreaking 
and  the  property  stolen  this  can  be  corroborated  by  the  evidence 
of  the  householder.  However  if  the  confession  only  mentions  the 
modus  and  is  silent  as  to  the  property  taken,  the  householder's 
evidence  as  to  what  was  stolen  must  receive  corroboration  from 126 
another  source  4  otherwise  the  court  would  only  be  entitled  to 
convict  of  housebreaking  with  intent  to  steal.  S 
Notes 
1,  Alison  it  580 
2,  Dickson  1815 
3,  üalkers  p440  4416 
4,  eg  recovery  or  the  evidence  of  ,&  second  witness  who  can  Speak  to  the 
presence  of  the  stolen  property  in  the  house  before  the  cries 
5,  This  point  is  not  uncommonly  overlooked  in  practice, 127 
(b)  The  First  Cases 
As  already  mentioned,  the  question  of  "special  knowledge"  arose 
in  Connolly  but  the  High  Court  found  it  unnecessary  to  decide  it. 
Thus  the  first  judicial  consideration  of  Alison's  principle  came 
in  t  nuel  v  H.  H.  Advocate  1958  IC  41.  This  case  has  already  been 
discussed  at  length  in  the  context  of  admissibility.  '  The 
application  of  Alison's  principle  to  the  circumstances  of  this 
case  has  been  described  as  a  "vivid  example  of  what  appears  to  be 
sound  common  sense,  "  2a  sentiment  with  which  the  writer 
wholeheartedly  concurs.  It  will  be  remembered  that  as  the 
result  of  Manuel's  confessions  to  the  police,  the  grave  of  Isobel 
Cooke  was  uncovered  and  one  of  her  shoes  was  found.  Later  as  the 
result  of  a  separate  confession  two  guns  were  recovered  from  the 
River'Clyde.  It  would  have  been  impossible  for  anyone  other  than 
the  perpetrator  of  the  crimes  concerned  to  have  known  where  these 
items  of  real  evidence  were  to  be  found.  -  Lord  Justice-General 
Clyde  quoted  the  passage  from  Alison  with  approval  and  commented 
that  it  "might  have  been  written  for  this  case". 
Following  Manuel  the  principle  was  next  applied  in  Allen  v 
Hamilton  1972  SLT  (N)  2  where  the  accused  in  addition  to  making 
an  unequivocal  admission  took  the  police  to  the  post  office  where 
he  had  cashed  a  quantity  of  stolen  savings  stamps.  The  stamps 
were  duly  recovered  from  the  postmaster  who  knew  the  accused  and 
could  identify  him,  as  having  cashed  the  stamps  earlier  that  day. 
The  most  important  point  about  the  case,  however,  is  that  there  . 128 
was  no  evidence  other  than  the  accused'-s  confession  that  the 
stamps  had  been  stolen  since  their  rightful  owner  was  unable  to 
give  evidence  for  medical  reasons.  Prima  facie  this  would  appear 
to  offend  against  Alison's  statement  that  the  corpus  must  be 
established  aliunde  Nevertheless  the  accused  was  convicted.  On 
appeal  the  defence  argued  that  the  Crown  had  failed  to  prove  the 
commission  of  a  crime.  The  Crown  argued  that  the  accused's 
confession  was  corroborated  by  his  possession  of  the  stamps.  It 
is  a  matter  of  regret  that  the  report  is  brief,  and  indeed  that 
the  High  Court  did  not  issue  written  opinions  and  in  the  absence 
of  further  information  it  is  impossible  to  say  whether  this  case 
still  represents  a  sound  statement  of  the  law.  It  is  certainly 
difficult  to  see  any  distinction  in  principle  between  Allen  M 
Hamilton  as  it  is  reported  and  Sinclair  v  Zud  one  where,  it 
will  be  remembered,  the  accused  was  arrested  in  possession  of 
diaries  which  he  admitted  to  having  stolen  from  a  particular  shop 
but  where  the  High  Court  upheld  a  defence  argument  that  there  was 
no  proof  of  a  crime  having  been  committed. 
An  attempt  to  turn  a  simple  admission  of  guilt  into  a  special 
knowledge  confession  failed  in  Walker  Y  Smith  1975  SLT  (U)  g5. 
In  this  case  an  unsuccessful  attempt  had  been  made  to  break  into 
a  school.  Three  panes  of  glass  had  been  broken  in  a  door  and  one 
of  the  two  bolts  securing  it  had  been  withdrawn,  the  other  still 
being  in  place,  When  the  accused  was  seen  by  the  police  he  said 
"Aye  you're  quite  right.  It  was  me.  Nobody  else  was  there.  " 
When  cautioned  and  charged  he  replied  "I  didnae  get  in  because  I 4 
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was  disturbed.  "  Walker  was  convicted  after  trial,  the  Sheriff 
taking  the  view  that  the  partial  unbolting  of  the  door  showed 
that  the  would-be  housebreaker  was  disturbed.  Since  there  was  no 
evidence  from  the  Janitor  or  anyone  else  that  they  had  disturbed 
the  accused,  the  High  Court  had  little  difficulty  in  overturning 
the  conviction  and  pointing  out  that  the  condition  of  the  door 
was  "utterly  neutral". 
Notes 
i,  Supra  chapter  5,3  ix 
2,0,  Brookens  6udidlord,  "  A  Yarning  1999  JLSS  449 
3.  Supra  7.3  (i)  (b) 
(c)  Smith  YAM,  Advocate  an.  tSc  es  gar' 
The  case  which  can,  in  many  ways,  be  regarded  as  the  beginning  of 
the  modern  view  of  special  knowledge  confessions,  and  which  put 
paid  to  any  notion  that  the  details  in  the  confession  should  only 
be  known  to  the  accuced,  is  Smith  v  f1.  M.  Advocate  (1978)  SCCR 
Suppl,  20L,  In  this  case,  which  Is  a  fairly  routine  example  of 
its  type,  the  accused  was  indicted  on  twenty  one  charges  of 
housebreaking  and  convicted  of  fourteen.  The  incriminating 
evidence  against  him  consisted  solely  of  statements  allegedly 
made  to  the  police. 
The  accused  was  taken  to  the  police  etation  to  assist  with 
enquiries  into  a  series  of  housebreakings  and  there,  in  the  time 
honoured  manner,  announced  "I  want  to  get  the  whole  thing  off  my 
chest".  He  was  then  cautioned  and  went  on  to  say  "Look,  I've 
done  about  20  or  30  houses  with  that  man.  I  can  chow  you  some  of 130 
them.  "  There  was  some  dubiety  as  to  whether  he  was  allowed  to 
look  at  a  list  of  reported  housebreakings  held  by  the  police,  but 
thereafter  he  took  officers  on  a  guided  tour  of  the  houses  which 
he  claimed  to  have  broken  into  and  in  each  case  gave  an  account 
in  "more  or  less  detail"  as  to  how  the  job  had  been  done  and  as 
to  some.  of  the  things  which  had  been  taken  away. 
The  most  remarkable  feature  of  this  case  is  the  brevity,  almost 
approaching  perfunctoriness,  with  which  the  High  Court  dealt  with 
the  issues  raised.  There  is  no  consideration  of  authority  or 
principle  and,  in  particular,  no  consideration  of  the  fact  that 
the  "knowledge"  displayed  by  Smith  was  available  to  the  police 
and  that  come  of  this  might  have  been  passed  on  when  Smith  was 
allowed  to  look  at  the  crime  reports: 
It  is  perfectly  clear  that  a  confession  can 
receive  corroboration  if  there  is  not  only  proof 
of  the  commission  of  the  crime  to  which  it  relates 
but  proof  aliunde  of  the  truth  of  the  contents  of 
the  confession,  eg  if  the  confession  was  made  at 
the  time  when  only  the  thief  or  the  houbebreaker 
could  have  known  what  happened  in  the  various 
episodes.  This  is  eminently  a  case  in  which  proof 
of  the  contents  of  the  confession  was  ample  or  at 
least  sufficient.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that 
the  confessions  were  made  to  circumstances  in 
which  the  accused  had  not  been  charged  with  any 
particular  crime,  They  were  made  at  a  time  when 131 
all  that  the  applicant  knew  was  that  the  police 
were  making  enquiries  into  a  series  of  house- 
breakings  in  that  area.  The  particular  house- 
breakings  were  not  identified  to  the  applicant  nor 
did  he  have  at  that  time  any  particulars  of  the 
articles  stolen  in  the  crimes.  ... 
Now  whether 
or  not  ...  and  it  is  open  to  question  and  was  a 
matter  before  the  jury,  he  was  allowed  to  glance 
at  the  list  of  reported  housebreakings  kept  in  the 
police  office,  what  it  certainly  true  is  that 
thereafter  he  took  the  police  in  a  police  car  and 
guided  them  to  the  houses  ...  .  Now  in  these 
circumstances,  having  regard  to  the  way  in  which 
this  transaction  developed  there  is  not  the 
slightest  doubt  that  the  evidence  of  the  house- 
holders  confirming  the  truth  of  the  contents  of 
the  confession,  implicating  the  appollant  as  the 
perpetrator  of  housebreakingn  which  he  himself 
Identified  to  the  police,  was  sufficient  to  sot  up 
the  truth  of  his  confessions. 
This  is  hardly  satisfactory.  Although  the  report  is  brief  and 
includes  no  details  of  the  evidence  or  the  arguments,  it  appears 
that  the  accused  only  made  the  general  admissions  quoted  above 
before  he  got  to  the  police  station.  Thereafter  it  appears  that 
he  might  have  been  shown  the  police  list  of  reported  houoe- 
breakinge  before  he  went  out  in  the  police  car,  which  was  when 132 
the  real  special  knowledge  admissions  were  allegedly  made. 
Surely  the  possibility  of  the  accused  having  been  influenced  (to 
put  it  no  higher)  by  the  behaviour  of  the  police  merits  more  than 
the  comment  that  it  was  "a  matter  before  the  jury"? 
Regrettably  this  decision  set  the  trend  for  the  following  cases. 
once  again  in  Wilson  v  McAughey  !  982  SCOR  39B  the  opinion  is 
brief  and  lacking  in  any  real  consideration  of  precedent,  the 
Sheriff's  note  being  appreciably  longer,  although  at  least 
Connglly_  and  Manus  do  receive  an  honourable  mention.  In 
Mchughy,  the  accused  was  charged  with  vandalising  a  mechanical 
shovel  by  starting  its  engine  and  driving  it  into  the  River 
Clyde,  The  machine,  which  had  been  parked  and  secured  on  dry 
land,  was  found  submerged  in  the  River  Clyde  with  a  broken  window 
and  a  flat  piece  of  metal  in  the  ignition.  When  cautioned  and 
charged  he  replied  "How  did  you  know  it  was  me?  I  smashed  the 
window  of  the  digger.  I  put  a  piece  of  wire  into  the  keyhole. 
When  I  turned  it,  it  started  up  and  started  moving.  I  didn't 
know  how  to  stop  it.  I  jumped  out  before  it  went  into  the  water. 
I  stood  and  watched  it  go  under  the  water.  " 
The  Sheriff  relied  on  Qonnol1.,  and  Mnnual  to  conclude  that  there 
was  insufficient  corroboration  and  acquitted  the  accused  on  a 
defence  submission  of  no  case  to  answer.  The  Crown  had  proposed 
an  adjustment  to  the  draft  stated  case  "that  the  perpetrator 
alone  could  have  known  that  the  windows  were  sufficiently  large 
through  which  to  climb  into  the  cab;  that  the  machine  could  not 133 
be  started  with  a  piece  of  wire  rather  than  an  ignition  key;  that 
the  machine  went  under  the  water  -  not  towards,  but  under  the 
water  and  that  the  machine  was  parked  near  a  'coup'  or  'rubbish 
tip'"  but  the  Sheriff  refused  to  accept  it  because  these  factors 
were  not  exclusively  and  solely  within  the  knowledge  of  the 
accused.  On  appeal  the  High  Court  overturned  the  acqutttals 
"The  law  in  the  situation  here  could  bo  summarised 
in  the  phrase  that  the  respondent  could  not  have 
been  able  to  make  the  statement  which  he  did  if  he 
had  not  been  present  at  the  time  when  the  offence 
libelled  had  been  committed.  " 
Their  Lordehips  considered  that  the  finding  of  the  broken  window, 
the  method  of  ctarting,  the  fact  that  the  machine  trundled  into 
the  water  and  the  fact  that  it  wont  under  the  water  all  corrob- 
orated  the  accused's  incriminating  statement,  because  had  he  not 
been  present  he  would  not  have  been  able  to  make  reference  to 
these  "very  ctgnificant  factors".  I 
I 
The  main  point  of  interest  in  IU  Qn  vc  uue￿ 
, 
irx  the  dictum 
that  the  confossion  is  corroborated  if  the  accused  could  not  havo 
made  it  if  he  "had  not  been  present  at  the  time  when  the  offence 
..  *  had  been  committed".  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  thin  in  no  more 
than  a  slip  of  the  judicial  tongue  2  since  it  to  a  clearly  ectab- 
lished  rule  of  law  that  mere  presence  at  the  ceene  of  a  crime 
does  not,  in  the  absence  of  special  duty,  result  in  reoponc- 
ibility  for  that  crime.  '3  It  is  one  thing  to  cay  that  the  accused 134 
could  only  have  made  the  statement  if  he  had  committed  the 
offence  but  it  is  quite  another  thing  to  say  that  a  statement  is 
sufficient  to  convict  an  accused  if  it  merely  indicates  his 
presence  at  the  scene. 
In  McAvoy  vNM.  Advocate  1983  SLT  16  special  knowledge  was  only 
one  of  several  issues  raised  and  the  case  rather  stands  apart 
from  the  main  canon  of  cases  on  special  knowledge.  However,  Lord 
Hunter  made  an  important  observation  on  the  weight  of  evidence 
when  he  said: 
"I  would  only  add  that  it  is  not,  in  my  opinion, 
necessarily  fatal  to  the  ratio  of  tConnoily  and 
i,  ))  that  persons  other  than  the  accused  had 
become  aware  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  used 
as  corroboration  before  the  confession  itself  had 
been  made.  This  however  does  not  mean  to  say  that 
passage  of  time  between  the  date  of  the  crime  and 
the  date  of  a  detailed  confession  is  of  no  moment, 
since  such  a  delay  might  in  some  circumstances 
make  it  more  likely  that  an  accused  person  had 
acquired  hie  knowledge  of  detail  not  as  a 
perpetrator  of  the  crime  or  offence  but  as  a 
recipient  of  information  from  other  sources.  " 
Notes 
I,  The  writer  hopes  he  will  not  be  thought  too  cynical  if  he  observes  that  it 
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4,  Sheriff  Macphail  (523,302)  diplomatically  observes  that  dicta  of  this  nature 
"should  not  be  taken  out  of  context'. 
(d)  Statements  Partially  G  ncýsistent  and  Partially  Inconsistent 
Gilmour  vH  .  M.  Advocate  19  2  SGCR  590  has  already  been  discussed 
in  the  context  of  admissibility.  '  However  it  is  also  important 
as  the  first  authority  on  the  question  of  a  statement  containing 
admissions  which  are  partly  consistent  and  partly  inconsistent 
with  the  facts.  Gilmour,  who  was  charged  with  rape  and  murder, 
had  made  two  confessions  to  the  police  admitting  killing  the 
victim,  but  which  differed  from  the  known  facts  in  several 
important  details.  One  of  the  senior  police  officers  involved  in 
the  case  was  of  the  view  that  the  first  statement,  which  embraced 
the  drawing  of  a  sketch  of  the  locus,  contained  so  many  dis- 
crepancies  that  it  did  not  form  a  basis  for  cautioning  and 
charging  Gilmour  and  he  ordered  his  release  from  custody.  The 
second  statement  was  essentially  a  repetition  of  the  first  made 
to  different  police  officers.  The  discrepancies  were  undoubtedly 
substantial  and  were,  naturally,  fully  exploited  by  defence 
counsel,  and  the  trial  judge  himself  observed  that  the  corro- 
borative  sources  were  few.  Regrettably  the  report  does  not 
specify  fully  what  the  discrepancies  were  and  the  trial  judge  did 
not  go  into  them  in  detail,  but  oven  some  of  the  matters  which 
the  trial  judge  regarded  as  points  of  similarity  contained  much 
that  was  in  fact  inconsistent,  particularly  Gilmour's  claim  to 
have  hit  the  victim  several  times  on  the  head  with  a  branch  which 
was  inconsistent  with  the  medical  evidence. 136 
After  rehearsing  the  points  of  similarity,  the  trial  judge 
directed  the  jury: 
"Now  these  ladies  and  gentlemen  are  the  details 
which  you  might  think  corroborate  the  statomont, 
if  you  ever  reach  the  stage  of  accepting  it  as  a 
voluntary  statement  and  believing  it  to  be  true. 
And  as  for  the  discrepancies,  you  must  consider 
whether  these  discrepancies'  and  the  discrepancies 
in  what  he  said  Lin  the  first  statement]  were  due 
to  the  statement  being  fabricated,  that  is  made 
up,  or  whether  they  are  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
accused  was  the  murderer  but  that  he  was  in  such  a 
state  of  panic,  having  been  caught  unawares  by  a 
young  girl  who  found  him  masturbating  by  the  side 
of  the  path,  that  he  didn't  know  how  far  from  the 
path  they  ended  up,  he  didn't  know  how  far  they 
had  travelled,  and  he  didn't  know  what  he  used  to 
strangle  the  girl.  " 
On  appeal,  the  trial  judge's  decision  to  rehearse  the  points  of 
indentity  and  not  the  points  of  discrepancy  was  criticised  by 
defence  counsel.  However  the  High  Court  did  not  agrees 
"In  our  opinion  that  was  not  a  valid  criticism. 
It  is  not  the  function  of  the  judge  to  rehearse 
every  piece  of  evidence  in  his  charge  to  the  jury 
which  in  our  procedure  dons  not  call  for  a  review 
of  all  the  evidence.  " 137 
Their  Lordships  then  set  out  how  the  trial  court  should  approach 
the  matter; 
"When  looking  for  points  of  corroboration 
attention  has  to  be  focussed  on  those  parts  of  the 
evidence  which  are  said  to  provide  that  corrob- 
oration.  If  there  is  an  absence  of  a  point  or 
points  which  have  a  significance  then  the  jury  can 
take  these  into  account  when  deciding  whether  or 
not  the  points  of  proffered  corroboration  should 
be  accepted,  and,  if  accepted,  what  weight  should 
be  attached  to  them.  ...  Once  [the  statements] 
were  accepted,  the  crucial  question  was  whether 
the  points  of  identity  were  sufficiently 
satisfactory  in  the  jury's  mind  to  constitute  the 
required  corroboration.  It  was  to  these  matters 
that  the  Judge  gave  detailed  and  individual 
attention.  In  our  opinion  that  was  a  line  to  take 
which  in  the  circumstances  cannot  be  faulted, 
The  High  Court  went  on  to  make  it  clear  that  there  was  no 
question  of  anything  as  crude  as  numerical  superiority  entering 
into  considerations 
"The  argument  seemed  to  be  that  as  there  were  more 
points  of  discrepancy  than  there  were  of  identity 
the  jury  could  not  reasonable  proceed  on  the 
points  of  identity.  Counsel  started  off  by 
talking  of  balance 
...  but  eventually  conceded 138 
that  this  was  not  the  proper  approach.  Manifestly 
it  is  not  a  matter  of  a  numerical  mathematical 
equation  or  balance.  Where  a  statement  contains 
points  of  identity  and  points  of  discrepancy, 
then,  as  previously  indicated,  it  is  for  the  Jury 
to  decide  whether  they  are  going  to  accept  and 
proceed  upon  the  points  of  identity,  and  if  they 
do  so  the  only  question  then  is  whether  theca 
points  are  sufficient  in  law  to  constitute 
corroboration  of  the  admission  of  guilt.  In  the 
instant  case  the  points  of  identity,  if  accepted, 
were  clearly  sufficient  in  law,  and  the  judge  very 
properly  left  the  issue  to  the  jury.  The  verdict 
indicates  how  the  jury  responded,  " 
Thus  the  position  is  that  where  there  are  both  consistencies  and 
inconsistencies  between  the  confession  and  facts,  the  Jury  have 
to  decide  whether  they  are  satisfied  that  the  confession  is 
sufficiently  corroborated.  This  presumes,  of  course,  that  the 
consistencies  are  in  themselves  sufficient  to  provide  corrob- 
oration,  although,  if  they  are  not,  the  case  will  presumably  fall 
on  a  submission  of  no  case  to  answer  and  never  reach  the  jury. 
Notes 
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(e)  Decision? 
The  case  of  Annan  v  Bain  §nd  Hamill  1986  SCOR  60  ahowo  just  how 
little  is  required  to  justify  the  application  of  the  "special 
knowledge"  tag  to  a  confession.  The  circumstances  were'straight- 
forward.  A  white  Ford  Capri  motor  vehicle  was  stolen  in 
Livingstone  and  some  twelve  hours  later  soma  civilians  saw  it'In 
Glasgow  in  suspicious  circumstances.  The  civilians  attempted  to 
detain  the  occupants  of  the  car  while  the  police  were  coming  but 
the  driver  made  off  and  was  apparently  never  traced.  Bain  and 
Hamill,  who  had  only  been  passangere,  also  left  the  car  shortly 
before  the  arrival  of  the  police,  but  they  were  detained  a  short 
time  later  less  than  half  a  mile  away.  On  detention,  Bain  stated 
under  caution  "It's  a  fair  cop,  we  stole  the  white  car.  "  Hamill 
replied  "We  tried  but  got  caught,  fair  enough".  After  they  were 
identified  by  the  civilians  they  were  cautioned  and  charged  with 
stealing  the  car,  Bain  replying  "We  stole  it"  and  Hamill  replying 
"He's  right". 
In  the  Sheriff  Court  it  does  not  appear  to  have  occurred  either 
to  the  pleaders  or  the  Sheriff  himself  that  the  alleged 
admissions  to  the  police  could  be  construed  as  containing 
"special  knowledge",  The  Crown  presented  the  case  on  the  basis 
that  the  admissions  were  corroborated  by  the  recent  possession  of 
the  stolen  vehicle.  The  defence  argued  that  there  was  nothing  to 
corroborate  the  admissions  since  there  was  no  evidence  that  Bain 
and  Hamill  had  been  present  t4har*  the  vehicle  was  stolen,  and 140 
under  reference  to  Hi2son  v  Tudhope.  '  no  inference  of  guilt 
could  be  drawn  from  the  fact  that  they  were  only  prevent  in  the 
vehicle  as  passengers.  Although  he  was  well  aware  that  very 
little  by  way  of  corroboration  of  the  incriminating  admissions 
would  be  required  to  justify  a  conviction,  Sheriff  Macphail  took 
the  view  that  the  evidence  relied  on  by  the  Crown  did  not 
corroborate  the  admissions  because  it  did  not  point  to  the  guilt 
of  the  accused.  Accordingly  he  upheld  a  submission  of  no  case  to 
answer.  The  prosecutor  appealed. 
The  High  Court  overturned  the  Sheriff  and  in  so  doing  said: 
Now  with  respect  to  the  Sheriff,  he  has  wholly 
misconceived  what  the  evidence  was.  In  the  first 
place  the  Sheriff  was  exercised  to  discover 
whether  there  was  corroboration  for  the  confession 
of  Bain  that  he  was  a  party  to  the  theft  and 
whether  there  was  corroboration  for  the  confession 
of  Hamill  that  he  was  a  party  to  the  theft.  What 
he  did  not  observe  was  that  in  the  presence  of  the 
other  they  both  volunteered  the  information  that 
they  together  had  stolen  the  white  car.  The 
confession  accordingly  contained  within  it  know- 
ledge  of  theft  which  could  only  be  held  by  the 
thieves  because  at  that  stage  nothing  had  been 
said  to  them  to  indicate  that  the  police  were  in 
the  least  bit  interested  in  the  theft  of  a  car  or, 
if  they  were,  that  the  car  was  a  white  one,  2  so 141 
that  at  the  very  outset,  apart  from  the  fact  of 
the  confessions  ...  'demonstrated  knowledge  of  the 
particular  theft  which  was  amply  established,  the 
statemont  by  Hamill  that  he  and  Bain  committed  the 
theft  corroborated  Bain's  confession  that  he  had 
been  a  party  to  the  theft,  and  by  the  same  token 
the  statement  of  Bain  that  he  and  Hamill  had 
carried  out  the  theft  corroborated  Hamill's 
admission,  11  In  addition  to  that  evidence,  which 
was  quite  sufficient,  there  was  evidence  to 
demonstrate  that  the  confessions  were  true.  That 
evidence  is  amply  provided  by  proof  of  the  theft 
itself  coupled  with  proof  which  linked  and 
associated  the  two  men  with  the  motor  car  before 
the  police  became  interested  in  the  affair  at 
all.  11 
Once  again  this  case  demonstrates  the  cursory  approach  of  the 
High  Court  to  matters  of  this  nature,  with  no  consideration  of 
authority  or  principle,  and  the  addition  in  this  case  of  the 
extraordinary  statement,  placed  in  italics,  that  the  confessions 
of  two  accused  can  be  mutually  corroborative.  This  is,  as 
Sheriff  Gordon  points  out  in  hic  commentary,  contrary  to  both 
principle  and  authority.  As  evidence  against  Hamill,  Bain's 
statement  is  hearsay  and  thus  inadmissible.  What  is  admiscible 
evidence  against  Hamill  Is  his  reaction  to  gain's  statement, 
which  in  this  case  was  explicit  assent.  4  The  lack  of 
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intellectual  rigour  shown  in  this  case  is,  to  put  it  no  higher, 
unfortunate. 
That  having  been  said,  it  must  be  conceded  that,  if  one  accepts 
that  the  reference  to  the  "white  car"  amounts  to  special  know- 
ledge,  21  Sheriff  Macphail  was  wrong  to  uphold  the  submission  of 
no  case  to  answer.  Indeed  on  this  basis  the  case  contains  more 
than  a  bare  sufficiency  of  evidence,  since  there  was  eyewitness 
identification  of  the  accused  as  having  been  present  at  the 
stolen  vehicle,  However,  it  is  submitted  that  one  of  the  most 
significant  factors  in  this  unfortunate  case  is  the  fact  that 
until  the  High  Court  raised  the  question  of  special  knowledge  it 
had  not  ocurred  to  anyone,  and  in  particular  it  had  not  occurred 
to  Sheriff  Macphail  whose  ability  as  a  legal  scholar  is  well 
known. 
Notes 
1,1993  SCCR  247 
2,  If  this  is  factually  accurate  one  is  left  wondering  what  the  police  did  say 
to  Bain  and  Hamill  when  they  detained  them,  Logically  there  must  have  been 
a  conversation  of  some  sort,  Section  2f4)  of  the  1984  Act  requires  a 
constable  at  the  time  when  he  detains  a  person  to  'inform  the  person  of  his 
suspicion,  of  the  general  nature  of  the  offence  which  he  suspects  has  been 
or  is  being  committed  and  of  the  reason  for  the  detention,  ' 
3,  Author's  italics  '1 
4,  This  point  is  fully  discussed  under  'Implied  Confessions  and  Admissions'  at 
chapter  6,6  supra 
5,  Sheriff  Gordon  does  not,  Sea  his  commentary  at  p63 
M  Co￿nfes5t4p  Contajnjng  Dotalls  Widely  [{Drwr), 
The  cases  previously  discussed  chow  how  far  and  how  rapidly  the 
concept  of  "special  knowledge"  had  departed  from  the  Alieonian 
notion  that  the  information  contained  in  the  confession  should 
only  be  known  to  the  perpetrator  of  the  crime.  However,  in  all 143 
the  cases  to  date  the  information  given,  although  not  exclusively 
within  the  knowledge  of  the  perpetrator,  could  be  described  as 
being  of  limited  circulation,  in  the  sense  that,  apart  from  the 
perpetrator,  it  was  only  known  to  the  police  and  a  few  indiv- 
iduals  directly  affected  by  the  crimes.  As  already  mentioned, 
McAvoy  v  HJ&  Advocate  had  contained  a  broad  hint  from  Lord 
Hunter  as  to  the  view  which  would  be  likely  to  be  taken  when  the 
High  Court  required  to  decide  the  issue  of  a  confession  con- 
taining  information  which  was  widely  known. 
The  opportunity  came  in  what  became  known  in  Glasgow  as  the 
"bluebell  Woods  Murder"  -  Wilson  e  Murray  vr  voce  9 
SCR  217.  This  case  related  to  the  attempted  rape  and  brutal 
murder  of  the  half-sister  of  the  accused  Murray  whose  body,  naked 
apart  from  socks,  had  been  found  by  a  group  of  children  at  the 
bottom  of  a  steep  slope  below  a  footpath.  There  were  no 
immediate  suspects  and  police  inquiries,  although  intensive,  were 
initially  unsuccessful.  Many  people,  including  the  two  accuced, 
were  interviewed,  house-to-house  inquiries  were  made  and  at  one 
point  the  assistance  of  the  local  radio  station,  Radio  Clyde,  was 
obtained.  In  the  course  of  the  broadcast  it  was  discloacd  that 
the  victim  had  been  strangled  with  her  own  bracstere. 
The  murder  had  taken  place  on  22nd  May  t986  and  on  15th  June 
Murray  was  taken  to  Drumchapel  police  office  in  connection  with 
an  unrelated  matter.  Quite  by  coincidence,  around  the  time  that 
Murray  was  taken  to  Drumchapel,  Wilson  went  voluntarily  to 144 
Clydebank  police  station  to  discuss  his  earlier  statement.  (The 
police  know  that  he  and  Murray  had  been  in  the  area  around  the 
material  time).  Both  of  them,  quite  independently,  and  in 
separate  police  stations  then  proceeded  to  make  confessions  each 
of  which  was,  according  to  the  Lord  Justice-General,  "a  detailed 
confession  of  guilt  of  the  murder  which,  subject  to  quite 
insignificant  differences  of  detail,  was  identical  [with  the 
other].  11 
The  story  which  emerged  was  that  the  accused  had  been  in  the 
woods  engaging  in  a  homosexual  act  together  when  the  victim 
happened  on  the  scene  and  saw  what  was  going  on.  They  were 
terrified  that  she  would  report  the  matter  to  her  parents,  and, 
as  the  Lord  Justice  General  put  it,  "proceeded  to  make  sure  that 
she  would  be  unable  to  do  that.  "  The  details  of  the  statements 
tallied  closely  with  what  had  been  found  at  the  scene  of  the 
crime  particularly  in  regard  to  the  position  of  the  deceased's 
anorak  and  Murray  also  drew  a  sketch  of  the  position  of  the  body. 
Apart  from  the  confessions  there  was  no  Incriminating  evidence 
against  either  accused  and,  as  Sheriff  Gordon  points  out  in  his 
commentary,  some  of  the  most  striking  dotailc  of  the  confessions 
were  not  capable  of  being  corroborated  by  independent  evidence  of 
their  accuracy.  The  trial  judge,  Lord  Robertson,  charged  the 
jury  as  follows: 
"tTNN  order  to  corroborate  a  co-called  acif- 
corroborating  confession  '  it  is  not  necessary  to 
prove  that  only  the  perpetrator  of  the  crime  could 145 
have  known  all  the  details  in  the  confession.  It 
is  for  the  Jury  to  decide  if  the  only  reasonable 
explanation  of  the  accused's  knowledge  of  these 
details  is  that  he  was  the  perpetrator.  Now  it  is 
sufficient  to  provide  the  necessary  corroboration 
that  the  accused  gave  evidence  in  his  confession 
of  knowledge  of  details  which  otherwise  he'had  no 
reason  to  be  aware  of.  The  question  therefore  for 
the  jury  is  really  this.,  do  these  confessions  .. 
convince  you  that,  quite  apart  from  the  account 
given  by  the  accused,  they  must  have  boon  there  at 
the  perpetration  of  the  crime  in  order  to  give 
that  account?  ... 
tilt  is  entirely  for  you  to  say 
whether  you  think,  if  these  statements-are 
accepted  as  having  been  given,  could  these  accused 
have  given  these  statements  unless  they  had  been 
there  and'had  known  what  the  details  of  the  crime 
were.  That  is  the  test  and  you  will  have  to  apply 
your  minds  to  that  if  you  get  to  that  stage,  " 
On  appeal,  defence  counsel  conceded  that  Lord  Roberteon'o 
direction  to  the  jury  could  not  be  criticised,  but  it  was  argued 
that  having  regard  to  the  widespread  knowledge  of  the  details  of 
the  murder  the  case  should  not  have  been  allowed  to  go  to  the 
Jury.  In  dismissing  the  appeal  the  Lord  Justice-General  quoted 
with  approval  Lord  Hunter's  dictum  to  McAvoX  and  went  on: 
"In  our  opinion  the  trial  judge  would  not  have 146 
been  entitled  in  this  case  to  sustain  a  motion 
that  there  was  no  case  to  answer.  There  was  in 
law  quite  sufficient  evidence  capable  of  providing 
corroboration  of  these  remarkable,  almost 
identical  confessions  made  by  each  appellant  in 
separate  police  stations  ...  .  Each  provided  an 
identical  and  powerful  motive  for  the  dreadful 
crime,  and  was  redolent  of  having  been  made  by 
someone  who  had  been  present  when  the  crime  was 
committed.  The  evidence  of  the  coincidence 
between  the  details  of  the  killing  which  each 
confession  disclosed,  and  what  was  found  after  the 
event,  was  sufficient  in  law  for  corroborative 
purposes  if  the  jury  were  prepared  to  find  that 
the  accurate  knowledge  of  the  crime  revealed  in 
the  statements  of  each  appellant  (sic)  was  his  own 
knowledge  as  one  of  the  perpetrators.  It  was  not 
t 
for  the  trial  judge  to  evaluate  the  weight  which 
should  be  given  to  the  circumstance  that  by  15th 
Tune  1986  many  people  knew  or  had  heard  of  many  of 
the  datals  of  the  crime.  That  was  essentially  a 
matter  for  the  jury  to  consider  under  the  proper 
directions  which  were  given  and  that,  indeed,  it 
precisely  what  Lord  Hunter  had  in  mind  when  he 
said  what  he  did  in  (c.,  oy-  »' 147 
W11  ".  n  moved  Sheriff  Gordon  to  review  the  changes  in  the  law 
since  Alison's  time  2  and  to  warn  against  the  inherent  dangers  of 
the  way  the  law  was  developing.  He  pointed  out  that  Alison's 
rule  was  probably.  limited  to  cases  where  the  accused  told  the 
police  things  they  didn't  know  and  where  corroboration  was  found 
in  the  fact  that  the  police  subsequently  went  looking  for  an  item 
of  real  evidence  which  they  found  where  the  accused  said  it  was. 
"A  limitation  to  such  cases  or  at  least  to  knowledge  of  facto 
unknown  to  the  police,  "  argues  Sheriff  Gordon,  "would  operate  as 
a  safeguard  against  the  possibility  of  the  police,  consciously  or 
otherwise,  putting  words  into  a  suspect's  mouth,  and  such  a 
restriction  might  have  been  expected  in  a  legal  system  as 
suspicious  of  confessions  to  the  police  as  was  the  Scots  system 
in  the  1950s.  "  However,  he  points  out  that  there  is  a  parallel 
between  the  modern  view  of  the  sufficiency  of  confession 
evidence,  is  that  it  is  essentially  a  matter  for  the  Jury,  and 
the  modern  view  of  the  admissibility  of  auch  evidence  is  that  it 
is  for  the  jury  to  decide  the  issue  of  fairness, 
Sheriff  Gordon  goes  on  to  make  the  point,  so  often  overlooked  by 
journalists  and  others  who  might  be  though  to  know  better,  3  that 
it  is  "a  little  misleading  to  say  that  a  person  cannot  be  con- 
victed  of  a  crime  in  Scotland  on  the  basis  only  of  a  confession 
made  by  him  to  the  police.  He  can  be  virtually  so  convicted, 
providing  only  that  the  confession  is  sufficiently  detailed  to 
satisfy  a  jury  that  it  is  reliable,  and  provided  that  the  fact 
that  the  crime  was  committed  by  someone  is  independently,  proved. 148 
...  A  jury  are  entitled  to  treat  a  circumstantial  confession  as 
corroborated  by  proof  of  the  correctness  of  the  circumstances  it 
contains,  whether  or  not  these  circumstances  were  previously 
known  to  the  police  or  indeed  were  common  knowledge,  and  even  if 
it  contains  other  circumstances  which  are  proved  to  be  false.  " 
After  commenting  that  the  amount  of  evidence  required  to 
corroborate  a  confession  is  less  that  that  required  to 
corroborate  an  independent  witness,  Sheriff  Gordon  concludes,  "A 
system  which  was  once  very  suspicious  of  confessions  in  now 
coming  close  to  the  ancient  view  that  a  confession  is  'the  queen 
of  proofs'". 
Notes 
1.  The  writer  has  consciously  eschewed  the  use  of  this  expression  which  is 
theoretically  (if  not  factually)  inept, 
2.  Commentary  to  the  report  at  p223 
3,  Mirtleld  (p204)  appears  to  be  about  to  fall  into  this  trap,  but  at  p206  he 
observes,  under  reference  to  Hartley  v  Hj.  -Advocate  that  there  "seems  to  be 
a  tendency  in  the  Scottish  cases  to  diminish  the  weight  required  for  the 
supporting  evidence  almost  to  vanishing  point,  *  At  least  English  Academics, 
seem  to  be  realising  the  true  situation  -  see  eg  R.  Pattanden  Shu1d 
Confessions  be  Corroborated?  (1991)  107  LQR  317  -  even  if  it  still  eludes 
the  Sunday  Post  which,  as  late  as  lot  December  1991,  produced  a  truly  awful 
piece  claiming  that  the  Guildford  Four,  Birmingham  Six  and  Tottenham  Three 
"couldn't  have  been  convicted"  In  Scotland, 149 
Cg)  Thy  sý  rý'  äi  ".  1..  '  c'.  tl.  r*ýýp  tý 
Cjjj  was  -I  olio  iod  by:  Pi:  r￿  can  .j  _VR  OK 
Which  thv-accused  was  charged  with  armed  robbery,  at  rn  taur.  a  t 
crises  in  Glangow.  known,  as  "Dino'  s".  This  case  has  already 
.;  been  m  ntioned  in  the  context  of  admissi.  bi.  lity.  -It.  apps.  arc  tat 
under  caution  the  d  said  to  can  t¬efl  -you 
right  now,  we  did  iwro'  ct,,.:  ,  Týt  r  ät  ter,  having  been  c  tuticned  and 
charged  h  .  re  lied  "  ve-already  told,  you  that  ;  did, 
-tha 
With  Benny  and  -Bruce.  'Mar'ie,  and  Kenny'  c  ruirY,  Watted, 
,n  ^the  -coi  ,« 
MacDonald  was  tried=along  with  two  accuned.  4on-noth  Ross;  and 
iruc0  Murray  x  who  were  both  convicted  of  -the  charge  _  relating  to 
fein:  '  a.  On  apf&  it  was  -arguad  that  the  lle  ed  'admissions  did 
not  disclose  special  knowledge, 
_'1`he- 
High  Court  disagreed,  an  t'  the 
Lord  Sustice-Clark:  said. 
cri,  these  treu  l2st$  tti  I  am  Cif  the  opinion  that. 
the  Jury-were  entitled  to  conclud  that  the 
appellant'  c,  reply  to,  caution  :  arid::  charge  showed 
that,  he  was  aware-of  the.  fnvolvenent  of,  hi  p- 
ccu  ed  in  the  crime,  "and  thus  had  opecia1lknoW..  ý. 
_. 
ledge.  In  my  opinion  such  special 
, 
knowled  p  could  :. 
amount  'to  suf  f  i.  ctent  -corroboration.  ",.. 
One  wonders-  what  -  the'  po  i'tion  would  be  in  i  Wr  r.  ea  ,  , 
f_  th 
jury  acquitted 
. 
the  co-accuse  boxt  Avietcd'tiaeIraker  WAN,, 
confession.  Presumably  the  conviction-.  would.  have:.  to,.  be  quashed 
since'  the  facts  necessary  for  the:,  proof  of  t.  h&:  cpccial  't<n,,  Je 150 
would  not  have  been  established.  '  Even  more  intriguingly,  what 
would  happen  if  one  co-accused  were  convicted  and  one  acquitted? 
Would  the  High  Court  attempt  to  apply  the  ratio  of  Q  Lrgour?  The 
answers  to  these  questions  must,  at  this  rsage,  remain 
speculative. 
In  the  instant  case  the  first  admission  (and  indeed  the  second 
one  also)  was  quite  unequivocal  and  this  undoubtedly  influenced 
the  decision.  Nonetheless  it  is  submitted,  with  respect,  that 
IagDonnld  strains  the  concept  of  "special  knowledge"  to  breaking 
point.  The  statement  contains  no  information  whatever  about  the 
commission  of  the  crime.  If  it  had  contained  some  verifiable 
information  anout  the  parts  played  by  the  co-accused,  the 
position  would  clearly  have  been  different,  but  the  bald  naming 
of  them  is,  it  is  submitted,  no  more  special  than  a  simple 
confession  to  the  crime. 
In  dovat  a$L  SCj, 
_821 
the  accused  was  charged  with 
two  charges  of  vandalising  motor  vehicle.,  a  motor  car  on  21 
January  1987,  and  a  motor  van  on  29  January  1987.  The  damage  had 
been  caused  by  the  application  of  paint  stripper  to  the  bodywork. 
Bainbridge  was  jean  by  the  police  on  14  February  1987  and 
interviewed  under  caution.  They  told  him  that  there  were  two 
vehicles  involved,  that  they  had  both  been  parked  outside  the 
4  same  restaurant  and  that  paint  stripper  had  caused  the  damage. 
The  accused  replied  "Aye,  I  damaged  the  car  and  the  van.  I  don't 
like  them.  I  gat  a  bottle  of  paint  stripper  from  Pricefighters 151 
in  Denny.  I  did  the  car  first  and  went  back  and  did  the  van 
later.  I  put  the  paint  stripper  in  the  bucket  in  the  house. 
just  threw  the  stuff  over  the  motors  and  ran  away.  " 
The  issue  for  the  High  Court  was  confused  by  the  fact  that  the 
Sheriff  had  been  persuaded,  wrongly,  to  treat  a  second  confession 
to  the  owner  of  the  vehicles  as  corroborative  of  the  confession 
to  the  police.  2.  However,  when  they  came  to  consider  the  issue  of 
special  knowledge,  the  High  Court  had  no  doubts 
"The  appellant  had  special  knowledge  that  a  car 
had  been  damaged  and  that  later  a  van  had  been 
damaged.  The  question  for  us  is  whether  proof  of 
the  accuracy  of  the  appellant's  knowledge  of  the 
sequence  of  events  and  of  the  nature  of  the 
vehicles  concerned  is  sufficient  to  provide  the 
corroboration  which  the  confession  required.  ... 
The  Sheriff  plainly  took  the  view  that  the  only 
reasonable  explanation  for  the  appellant's  special 
knowledge  which  we  have  identified  to  that  he  was 
the  perpetrator  of  the  two  acts  of  vandalism  which 
led  to  his  conviction.  ... 
Me  reject  the 
proposition  that  there  was  insufficient  evidence 
on  which  the  conviction  can  be  supported.  " 
The  situation  in  Moron  YH  . 
H.  Advocata  1992SCCR  40  was  unusual 
in  that  the  statement  made  by  the  accused  was  not  an  admission 
that  he  himself  had  committed  the  murder,  but  a  claim  that 152 
another  man  called  Morrison  had  done  so  and  had  then  told  the 
accused  about  it.  The  accused's  statement  revealed  a  consid- 
erable  amount  of  circumstantial  detail,  which  he  claimed  to  have 
obtained  from  Morrison.  Unfortunately  for  the  accused,  Morrison 
turned  out  to  have  been  in  custody  on  the  date  of  the  murder  and 
the  Crown  successfully  founded  on  the  accused's  statement  as 
displaying  special  knowledge  of  the  commission  of  the  crime. 
c  vo  and  Wilson  were  considered  in  Woodland  v--Hamilton  1990 
SCOR  15ß.  In  this  case  Woodland  was  charged  along  with  a  man 
called  Halliday  with  breaking  into  a  house  and  stealing  a  number 
of  items  including  a  video  recorder.  When  interviewed  under 
caution  by  the  police  he  said  "Aye,  Johnny  Halliday  told  me  you 
got  him  and  that  he  said  he  told  the  truth  so  I'll  be  honest  and 
tell  you.  The  video  went  to  Kevin  Boyle.  The  suitcase  was 
dumped.  It's  the  only  housebreaking  I've  ever  done.  "  There  was 
second  admission  following  caution  and  charge  but  it  was  a  simple 
confession,  The  Sheriff  found  as  a  fact  that  the  police  had  not 
mentioned  Boyle's  name  to  the  accused  before  he  made  this  state- 
ment.  At  the  trial  Boyle  admitted  having  been  in  possession  of 
the  video  but  denied  that  he  had  obtained  it  from  the  accused. 
The  Sheriff  was  clearly  less  than  impressed  with  hic  evidence  but 
convicted  Woodland  on  the  basis  that  his  admission  was  corrob- 
orated  by  the  fact  that  Boyle  was  the  resetter  of  the  video 
recorder.  Halliday  was  acquitted. 153 
An  unusually  constituted  High  Court  rather  surprisingly  over- 
turned  the  conviction.  Their  Lordships  accepted  that  the  test  to 
be  applied  was  whether  the  only  reasonable  explanation  of  the 
accused's  knowledge  was  the  fact  that  he  was  the  perpetrator. 
However  the  reference  to  Boyle  as  the  resetter  came  after  a 
sentence  in  which  the  accused  said  he  had  been  in  conversation 
with  Halliday  and  that  Halliday  had  given  him  at  least  some 
information: 
"It  is  therefore  possible  that  the  appellant  may 
have  obtained  the  name  of  Boyle  from  Halliday. 
Had  there  been  evidence  from  Halliday  to  the 
effect  that  he  had  given  no  such  information  to 
the  appellant  then  it  might  well  be  said  that  the 
only  reasonable  explanation  of  the  appellant's 
knowledge  was  that  he  was  the  perpetrator.  As  it 
is  however  the  appellant  could  have  become  aware 
of  Boyle's  involvement  even  though  he  himself  was 
not  the  perpetrator  of  the  crime.  This  is 
particularly  so  having  regard  to  the  lapse  of 
nearly  eleven  months  between  the  date  of  the  crime 
and  the  data  of  the  confession.  " 
Woodland  v  Hamilton  can  probably  be  treated  as  a  decision  on  itc 
own  facts. 
Any  hope  that  Woodland  marked  the  beginning  of  a  reappraisal  of 
the  application  of  the  "special  knowledge"  rule  was  dached  by 154 
Hutchison  v  Valentine  1  9ý  0  SCOR  569.  This  case  is  certainly  the 
most  extreme  example  to  date  of  the  application  of  the  rule  and 
involves  circumstances  which,  it  is  submitted,  make  ,a  mockery  of 
the  idea  that  a  confession  requires  any  corroboration  at  all,  at 
least  if  the  word  "corroboration"  is  used  in  its  normal  accepted 
sense. 
Hutchison  was  charged  with  breaking  into  a  hotel  room  and  steal- 
ing  a  television  set  which  had  been  recovered  abandoned  in  a  car 
park,  He  was  interviewed  under  caution  by  the  police  and  advised 
by  them  that  a  room  in  the  particular  hotel  had  been  broken  into. 
He  then  said  "I  done  it  on  my  ain.  I  canna  really  mind  where 
aboot  in  the  hotel  I  got  it.  I  was  drunk.  I  dumped  it.  " 
The  Sheriff  hold  that  the  confession  was  unequivocal  and  there 
was  just  sufficient  other  evidence  to  corroborate  it  although  he 
did  not  address  specifically  the  issue  of  special  knowledge. 
On  appeal  the  High  Court  upheld  the  conviction  but  on  the  basic 
that  the  reference  to  "it"  showed  that  the  accused  was  aware  that 
only  one  object  was  involved  and  the  reference  to  "dumping"  was 
consistent  with  the  recovery  of  the  television  in  the  car  park: 
"The  proper  starting  point  in  a  case  of  this  kind 
is  the  confession.  It  contains  within  it  certain 
elements  which  require  to  be  contrasted  with  what 
the  appellant  was  told  when  he  was  interviewed  by 
the  police  officers.  According  to  the  finding  the 155 
information  which  he  was  given  was  oimply  that  a 
room  had  been  broken  into  in  the  hotel  the 
previous  night  or  the  following  morning.  In  reply 
to  that  information  he  stated  that  he  had  done  it, 
and  he  also  made  remarks  which  indicated  that  he 
was  aware  that  a  single  piece  of  property  had  been 
taken  from  the  room.  We  take  that  from  the 
reference  to  being  unable  to  remember  where  in  the 
hotel  he  got  "it"  and  to  dumping  "it".  There  is 
also  the  point  in  the  confession  that  whatever  had 
been  taken  from  the  room  had  been  abandoned  at 
some  point  by  the  thief.  It  is  a  reasonable 
inference  therefore  from  what  was  said  that  the 
appellant,  unlike  somebody  who  was  not  aware  of 
any  of  the  details  of  the  crime,  knew  perfectly 
well  that  what  the  police  officers  were  talking 
about  was  a  housebreaking  which  had  resulted  in  a 
single  piece  of  property  being  taken  from  the  room 
and  being  left  somewhere  by  the  thief  rather  than 
carried  away  by  him  for  his  own  purposes  to  come 
other  place.  .,. 
It  was  said  that  the  reference  to  "dumping"  the 
article  is  co  generic  and  lacking  in  information 
that  it  was  not  capable  of  being  corroborated  by 
the  finding  of  the  television  receiver  in  the  car 
parking  area.  We  disagree  with  this  oubmicnion, 156 
because  we  think  that,  on  a  reasonable  con- 
struction  of  the  word  "dumping"  together  with  the 
information  we  have  about  the  recovery  of  the 
television  and  the  place  where  it  was  recovered, 
there  is  a  consistency  between  the  facts  and  the 
confession.  " 
Sheriff  Gordon,  no  enthusiast  for  the  special  knowledge 
confession,  refrains  from  comment  on  this  case,  but  the  writer 
submits  that  it  is  wrongly  decided  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  it 
will  be  reconsidered  by  a  fuller  bench  at  the  first  available 
opportunity.  It  must  be  doubted  whether  a  "confession"  made  by 
an  accused  who  was,  on  his  own  admission,  so  drunk  that  he  was 
unable  properly  to  remember  what  he  did,  containing  nothing  by 
way  of  significant  detail  and  uncorroborated  by  any  independent 
evidence  is  a  proper  basis  on  which  to  find  a  cane  proved  beyond 
reasonable  doubt.  As  recently  as  1977,  the  Thomson  Committee 
commented 
"The  greatest  safeguard  against  a  miscarriage  of 
justice  is  -  and  should  continue  to  be  -  the  rule 
of  law  that  the  Crown  must  prove  its  case  beyond 
reasonable  doubt  on  corroborated  evidence"  a 
It  is  submitted  that  Hutc  iso  v  Valentino  offends  against  this 
rule  of  law  and  this  is  especially  to  be  regretted  since  it  was 
decided  in  the  period  following  the  release  of  the  "Guildford 157 
Four"  when  the  dangers  of  relying  uncritically  on  uncorroborated 
confessions  should  have  been  particularly  apparent. 
As  one  experienced  solicitor,  puts  itt 
"It  is  easy  to  see  the  attraction  of  the  law  as 
now  applied,  To  follow  the  narrow  view,  as  in 
Manuel,  would  undoubtedly  mean  that  more  "thin" 
cases  would  be  thrown  out  "on  a  technicality" 
owing  to  lack  of  corroboration,  but  the  plus  side 
would  be  that  the  kind  of  abomination  which 
occurred  in  the  Guildford  case  would  be  more 
difficult  to  sustain.  Effectively  the  broadening 
of  the  class  of  self-corroborating  admissions  can 
result,  in  real  terms,  in  there  being  no 
corroboration  at  all,  particularly  if  corrob- 
oration  is  to  be  found  in  apparent  knowledge  by 
the  accused  of  matters  which  are  also  within  the 
knowledge  of  police  officers  under  pressure  to 
solve  crimes  and  bring  villains  to  justice.  If 
those  police  officers  are  ready  to  help  the 
process  along  by  fabricating  confessions  based  of 
their  (as  opposed  to  the  accused's)  knowledge  of 
events,  then  the  accused  is  in  a  very  dangerous 
position,  his  conviction  or  acquittal  depending 
not  upon  questions  of  legal  argument  but  upon 
factors  entirely  within  the  province  of  the  jury  - 
fifteen  men  and  women  capable  of  being  lied  to  and 158 
misled  by  any  witness  prepared,  for  whatever 
reason,  to  undertake  that  course.  "  4 
The  writer  wichen  to  make  it  clear  that  he  is  not  suggesting  that 
the  police  in  Hutchison  v  Valentine  (or  any  of  the  other  cases 
presently  under  discussion)  fabricated  or  touched  up  the  alleged 
confessions,  but  the  common  thread  running  through  all  the  cases 
is  an  uncritical  acceptance  of  police  veracity  and  objectivity 
and  English  and  Northern  Irish  experienco  has  shown  what  can 
happen  when  the  trust  reposed  in  the  police  is  abused. 
While  Scotland  has  had  its  share  of  well-publicised  miscarriages 
of  justice,  none  of  them  have  so  far  been  proved  to  involve 
confessions,  although  it  is  currently  being  claimed  that  at  least 
one  individual  is  presently  languishing  in  prison  as  the  result 
of  just  such  a  miscarriage.  40  However  the  issue  in  that 
particular  case  has  at  least  as  much  to  do  with  the  fact  that  a 
witness  who  provided  corroboration  of  the  confession  has  now 
retracted  his  evidence  as  it  has  to  do  with  the  confession 
itself. 
Nevertheless  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  this  absence  of 
confession-based  scandal  is  anything  other  than  fortuitous  and  on 
the  present  state  of  the  law  only  the  most  naive  could  believe 
that  Timothy  Evans  or  the  "Guildford  Four"  would  be  acquitted  if 
they  were  tried  in  Scotland  today.  Their  only  real  hope  would  be 159 
the  increasing  reluctance  of  juries  to  convict  on  evidence  coming 
solely  from  police  officers.  6 
Notes 
1,  c!  d  n&v  H  alts  Ll.  Q90  SCCR  JS  discussed  At  vol,  2  p152 
2.  See  vol,  2  p48  supra 
3,  Third  Report  (Cmnd  7006)  pare  1,09 
4,0,  Brookens  64ildfcrd,  4  a'arnlx'  1989  JLSS  448 
4a  A,  Grosskurth  Scotland's  Pitfalls  (1991)  Legal  Action  7,  Some  of  the 
factual  errors  in  this  article  are  laughable 
5.  See  article  by  Murray  Ritchie  in  the  Glasgow  Herald  June  25  1990,  Glanville 
Williams  and  Adrian  Zuckerman  have  noted  the  same  position  in  England, 
particularly  with  regard  to  "verbals"  -  see  respectively  119791  Crim  LR  6  at 
14  and  The  Principles  of  Crisina!  Evidence  p3G 160 
7.4  The  English  Position  A  Comparative  Note 
U)  Gees 
Although  it  has  been  said  '  that  in  English  law  "corroboration" 
is  not  a  technical  term  and  simply  means  "confirmation"  or 
"support,  "  English  law  tends  to  use  the  term  in  a  somewhat 
narrower  sense  than  Scots  law.  Corroboration  in  the  English 
sense  must  emanate  from  a  source  independent  of  the  witness  to  be 
corroborated  and  must  implicate  the  accused  in  a  material 
particular,  and,  as  Cross  points  out,  it  follows  that  not  all 
evidence  which  might,  as  a  matter  of  common  sense,  be  thought  to 
confirm  or  support  the  testimony  of  a  witness  will  necessarily 
satisfy  such  a  requirement.  2 
The  general  rule  of  English  law  is  that  the  court  may  act  on  the 
uncorroborated  testimony  of  one  witness,  and  such  requirements  as 
there  are  concerning  a  plurality  of  witnesses,  or  some  other 
confirmation  of  individual  testimony,  are  exceptional.  However 
it  does  not  follow  that  an  English  court  must  act  upon  the 
evidence  of  one  witness  even  if  it  is  unshaken  in  cross- 
examination  or  in  no  other  way  discredited. 
There  are  a  few  insignificant  statutory  cases  where  either  actual 
corroboration  is  required,  or  the  judge  must  warn  the  jury  of  the 
dangers  of  convicting  in  its  absence  4  but  generally  in  no  case 
is  corroboration  positively  necessary  as  a  matter  of  law. 
Equally,  in  no  case  is  a  fudge  precluded  from  warning  the  jury 161 
that  it  is  unsafe  to  act  on  certain  evidence  unless  it  is 
corroborated,  since  he  has  a  general  discretion  to  comment  on  the 
evidence  and  the  reliability  of  the  witnesses.  At  common  law 
there  are  two  classes  of  cases,  namely  where  the  Crown  case  rests 
on  the  evidence  of  accomplices  and  on  the  evidence  of  the 
complainant  in  a  sexual  assault,  6  where  the  judge  must  give  the 
jury  a  "full"  warning  on  the  danger  of  acting  on  uncorroborated 
evidence. 
However,  the  rules  relating  to  warnings  to  juries  "have  degen- 
erated  into  a  web  of  technicalities  which  often  impede  justice"  15 
and  a  "shambles"  and  a  conviction  may  be  quashed  where  there  is 
in  fact  ample  corroborative  evidence  but  the  judge  has  not  given 
the  jury  a  warning  in  appropriate  terms.  0  Conversely,  as  long 
as  the  necessary  warning  is  given,  a  conviction  based  on 
uncorroborated  evidence  will  not  be  quashed  merely  on  the  ground 
that  there  is  only  one  source  of  evidence. 
Given  the  excessive  technicality  with  which  the  law  is  now 
burdened  it  is  hardly  surprising  that  there  is  a  conspicuous  lack 
of  enthusiasm  in  England  for  any  extension  of  the  pre  cent  rules 
of  corroboration  into  new  areas,  11  Certain  of  the  existing 
requirements,  notably  those  relating  to  sexual  offences,  are  the 
subject  of  criticism  and  are  likely  to  be  modified,  if  not 
removed  altogether  and,  a  recent  working  Paper  by  the  Law 
Commission  10  looks  set  to  lead  the  way  for  the  removal  of  most 
of  the  existing  corroboration  requirements. 162 
Apart  from  the  relatively  insignificant  case  of  Section  77  of 
PACE,  there  has  never  been  any  rule  in  England  requiring  either 
that  a  confession  should  be  corroborated  or  that  a  judge  should 
warn  a  jury  of  the  danger  of  convicting  in  a  case  depending 
solely  on  the  evidence  of  an  uncorroborated  confession.  It  has 
been  settled  law  at  least  since  1789  that  a  person  may  be 
convicted  on  the  basis  solely  of  his  confession  and  without 
corroboration  of  its  contents  "  and  despite  occasional  calls  in 
the  press,  both  legal  and  lay,  for  change,  no  body  of  any  real 
influence  has  sought  to  alter  this  position. 
In  one  case,  Sykes  (1912)  8  Cr  App  R  223,  which  incidentally  has 
some  points  of  resemblance  to  Wilson  and  Murret/  vHM  Advocate, 
it  was  asserted  that  the  need  to  convict  an  uncorroborated 
confessions  would  seldom  arise.  In  this  case,  the  Commissioner 
had  directed  the  jury  in  the  following  terms: 
"A  man  may  be  convicted  on  his  own  confession 
alone;  there  is  no  law  against  it.  The  law  is 
that  if  a  man  makes  a  full  and  voluntary 
confession  which  is  direct  and  positive,  and  is 
properly  proved,  a  jury  may,  if  they  think  fit, 
convict  him  of  any  crime  upon  it,  But  seldom,  if 
ever,  the  necessity  arises,  because  confessions 
can  always  be  tested  and  examined,  first  by  the 
police,  and  then  by  you  and  us  in  court,  and  the 
first  question  you  ask  when  you  are  examining  the 
confession  of  a  man  is,  is  there  anything  outside 163 
it  to  show  it  was  true?  is  it  corroborated?  are 
the  statements  made  in  it  of  fact  so  far  as  we  can 
test  them  true?  was  the  prisoner  a  man  who  had  the 
opportunity  of  committing  the  murder?  is  his  con- 
fession  possible'?  is  it  consistent  with  other 
facts  which  have  been  ascertained  and  which  have 
been,  as  in  this  case,  proved  before  us?  " 
This  direction  was  approved  by  the  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  and 
Ridley  r  added. 
"It  was  said  that  the  murder  was  the  talk  of  the 
countryside,  and  it  might  well  be  that  a  man  under 
the  influence  of  insanity  or  a  morbid  desire  for 
notoriety  would  accused  himself  of  such  a  crime. 
I  agree  that  this  is  so,  but  it  was  a  question  for 
the  Jury,  and  they  ought  to  see  whether  it  was 
properly  corroborated  by  facts,  and  so  they  were 
directed.  We  think  that  this  point  of  the  case 
was  quite  sufficiently  left  to  the  jury  and  the 
Court  thinks  that  there  is  no  reason  for  giving 
leave  to  appeal.  " 
A  similar  point  was  made  by  the  then  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions,  Sir  Norman  Skelhorn  when  giving  evidence  about  the 
prosecution  process  to  the  Fisher  Inquiry: 
"Well  if  there  was  any  indication  that  [the  police 
had  not  looked  for  supporting  evidence),  and  if 164 
the  indications  were  that  they  had  and  it  was  not 
obtainable,  then  I  would  have  thought  that  In  such 
a  case  it  was  very  probable  that  there  would  be  no 
prosecution.  " 
And  later: 
"On  the  other  hand,  one  can  get,  of  course,  even 
such  a  confession  in  circumstances  in  which  one 
says  'Well  I  think  it'  s  safe'.  I  mean,  one 
element  to  start  with,  is  that  is  this  a 
confession  made  when  the  police  go  to  him,  or  is 
this  a  case  of  a.  man  who  comes  along  and  says  '1 
think  I  should  tell  you  I  killed  someone  or  other 
at  such  and  such  a  place,  '  and  so  on.  12  Wall  that 
is  a  starting  point.  It  makes  a  fairly  big 
difference  when  one  is  looking  at  it.  So  that  I 
would  not  make  a  sort  of  too  great  a  general- 
ication  on  it  ,  but  certainly  one  would  look  with 
very  great  care  at  a  completely  not  only  uncorrob- 
orated  confession,  but  a  confession  with 
absolutely  nothing  to  support  it  at  all,  in  saying 
'Well  it  is  still  right  and  safe  to  go  on  on  this 
confession  just  as  it  stands.  "  113 
Thus  the  English  position  scorns  to  be  that  although,  with  one 
partial  exception,  the  law  does  not  positively  require  a 
confession  to  be  corroborated  (in  the  narrower  English  sonse),  it 165 
is  unlikely,  although  by  no  means  impossible,  that  a  prosecution 
will  be  mounted  solely  on  the  basis  of  an  uncorroborated 
confession.  In  such  a  case  it  is  open  to  the  trial  judge  to  warn 
the  jury  about  the  dangers  of  such  evidence  and  to  direct  them 
that  they  should  seek  confirmation  in  other  evidence. 
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(ii)  Supporting  e  Respect  C  cs  g 
(b)  The  Fisher  Report 
There  has  been  occasional  discussion  in  England  of  the  desir- 
ability  of  a  formal  requirement  for  supporting  evidence  for 
confessions,  the  main  examples  being  the  Fisher  Report  and  the 
RCCP.  As  previously  discussed,  '  Sir  Henry  Fisher  recommended 
that  in  four  situations  no  person  should  be  convicted  on  the 
evidence  of  a  confession  unless  it  was  supported  by  other 
independent  evidence.  These  situations  all  involved  the  police 
and  were  (1)  a  confession  obtained  in  breach  of  the  Judges  Rules, 166 
(2)  a  confession  by  a  child  or  young 
questioned  without  the  presence  of  a 
confession  by  a  mentally  handicapped 
questioned  without  the  presence  of  a 
an  oral  confession  in  a  police  static 
was  not  available. 
person 
parent 
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parent 
an  of  w 
who  had  been 
or  guardian,  (3)  a 
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hich  a  tape  recording 
Fisher  also  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  police  should  always 
look  for  evidence  to  support  a  confession.  Interestingly  he 
preferred  to  use  the  term  "supporting  evidence"  rather  than 
"corroboration",  the  English  use  of  the  latter  term  being 
somewhat  narrower  than  what  he  had  in  mind.  In  Sir  Henry's  view, 
"supporting  evidence"  would  include  evidence  which  would 
constitute  corroboration  under  English  law,  is  independent 
testimony  which  affects  the  prisoner  by  tending  to  connect  him 
with  the  crime.  However,  he  also  envisaged  "supporting  evidence" 
including  any  evidence  which  tends  to  show  that  the  confession  is 
true,  whether  or  not  it  emanates  from  the  confessor  "or  even  from 
the  confession  itself",  2  Although  he  referred  with  approval  to 
Scottish  law,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  most  eminent 
English  legal  scholar  did  not  regard  a  special  knowledge 
confession  as  being  corroborated  in  the  English  sense,  Mirfieid 
comments  3  that  it  seems  unlikely  that  Sir  Henry  Fisher  intended 
English  law  to  differ  from  the  Connoily/  a  aal  view  in  Scotland. 
Mirfield  argues  that  although  Fisher  does  not  specify  the  precise 
width  of  the  definition  of  "supporting  evidence,  "  it  should  be 
defined  to  require  that  some  Incriminating  fact  be  supported. 167 
Sir  Henry  also  expressed  the  view  that  where  the  prosecution  was 
based  on  a  confession  the  police  report  should  always  include  a 
reference  to  the  steps  taken  to  obtain  supporting  evidence,  any 
supporting  evidence  found,  in  appropriate  cases  the  fact  that  no 
supporting  evidence  was  found,  and  any  evidence  tending  to 
contradict  the  confession,  whether  or  not  that  evidence  was 
admissible  in  court. 
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(b)  The  Royal  commission  on-Criminal 
The  RCCP  unequivocally  rejected  the  nation  that  confessions 
should  be  supported  by  other  evidence: 
"However  we  do  not  accept  the  suggestion  that  a 
person  should  never  be  convicted  upon  his 
confession  alone  uncorroborated  by  any  other 
evidence.  To  do  so  would,  unless  the  criteria  for 
prosecution  were  changed,  mean  that  those  who  were 
willing  to  confess  and  to  plead  guilty  could  not 
even  be  charged  unless  or  until  other  evidence  of 
their  guilt  had  been  secured.  That  has  such 
considerable  implications  for  the  resource  and 
organisational  aspects  of  the  pre-trial  procedure 
and  the  right  of  the  accused  to  a  speedy  disposal 
as  to  be  altogether  too  drastic  a  way  of  removing 
the  risk  of  false  confessions.  People  do  confess 168 
to  offences  and  are  convicted,  oometimea  on  a  plea 
of  guilty,  where  there  is  no  other  material 
evidence.  We  do  not  consider  that  it  would  be  in 
the  interests  of  justice  to  introduce  rules  of 
evidence  which  would  have  the  effect  of  precluding 
this.  But  where  the  evidence  against  the  accused 
is  his  own  confession,  all  concerned  with  the 
prosecution,  the  police,  the  prosecuting  agency, 
and  the  court,  should,  as  a  matter  of  practice, 
seek  every  means  of  checking  the  validity  of  that 
confession.  "  ' 
To  this,  and  to  Sir  Henry  Fisher's  suggestions,  it  can  be 
objected  that  police  officers  prepared  to  fabricate  or  touch  up  a 
confession  in  the  first  place  are  hardly  likely  to  trouble 
themselves  to  search  for  evidence  which  might  prove  the 
confession  false,  and  the  circumstances  of  the  Confait  case 
showed  how  easy  it  was  for  major  discrepancies  in  evidence  to  be 
overlooked  by  the  prosecuting  authorities  due  to  a  combination  of 
overwork  (on  the  part  of  the  DPP's  staff)  and  simple  failure  to 
understand  the  implications  of  the  situation  (on  the  part  of 
prosecuting  counsel).  2 
However,  the  RCCP  did  recommend  something  very  close  to  a 
corroboration  warning  where  a  confession  had  been  obtained  in 
breach  of  the  proposed  code  of  practice  on  questioning  of 
suspects: 169 
"But  since  reliability  is  the  primary  purpose  of 
the  code  of  practice  for  interviewing  suspects, 
the  reliability  of  confessions  obtained  in  its 
breach  must  be  open  to  question,  and  it  would  not, 
therefore,  be  right  for  statement  evidence 
obtained  in  breach  of  the  code  to  be  accepted 
uncritically  and  without  comment  by  the  criminal 
courts.  ...  The  judge  should  point  out  to  the  jury 
or  the  magistrates  be  advised  of  the  dangers 
involved  in  acting  upon  a  statement  whose 
reliability  can  be  affected  by  breach  of  the  code. 
They  should  be  informed  that  under  pressure  a 
person  may  make  an  incriminating  statement  that  is 
not  true,  that  the  code  has  been  introduced  to 
control  police  behaviour  and  minimise  the  rink  of 
an  untrue  statement  being  made  and  that  if  they 
are  satisfied  that  a  breach  of  the  code  has 
occurred  it  can  be  dangerous  to  act  upon  any 
statement  made;  accordingly  they  should  look  for 
independent  support  for  it  before  relying  upon  it, 
The  effect  of  that  warning  would  be  that  whore  a 
breach  of  the.  code  has  occurred,  senior  officers, 
and  those  responsible  for  advising  on  the 
prosecution,  will  need  to  consider  the 
availability  of  other  evidence  before  deciding 
whether  it  is  proper  to  permit  the  prosecution  to 
proceed,  "  3 170 
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2,  Fisher  Report  paras  2,29,2,39,2,40  and  2,52 
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(c)  The  Law  Commission 
For  the  sake  of  completeness,  reference  is  made  to  the  Law 
Commission's  Working  Paper  on  Corroboration  in  Criminal  Trials. 
This  paper  does  not  address  itself  to  the  undesireability  of 
convicting  solely  on  uncorroborated  confession  evidence.  The 
reason,  which  one  commentator  finds  unconvincing,  2  is  that  there 
is  no  common  ground  between  the  problems  posed  by  confession 
evidence  and  those  addressed  by  the  present  corroboration  rules, 
which  are  formulated  to  deal  with  unreliable  prosecution 
witnesses.  As  the  same  commentator  observes,  "To  this  it  might 
be  objected  that  half  the  problem  with  confession  evidence  is 
exactly  one  of  credibility  of  prosecution  witnesses,  in  so  far  as 
police  officers  may  invent  or  enhance  statements,  and  the  other 
half  is  the  closely  related  difficulty  of  whether  to  believe  what 
the  accused  said  when  he  was  undre  extreme  psychological  pressure 
in  the  police  station,  or  to  prefer  what  he  now  says  in  court.  "  "I 
It  would  appear  that  English  law  will  require  to  await  the  rocult 
of  the  May  inquiry  4  for  the  next  major  pronouncement  on  this 
issue. 
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(iii)  The  FvreRtton  -  Section  77  of  PACE  1 
The  Judges'  Rules  and  Administative  Directions  had  contained  in 
Directions  4  and  4A  special  provisions  for  the  interrogation  of 
children  and  young  persons.  The  essence  of  Direction  4  was  that 
a  child  or  young  person  should  be  interviewed  in  the  presence  of 
a  parent  or  other  non-police  adult  "as  far  as  practicable.  "  As  a 
result  of  the  Confait  case  Direction  4A  was  added  in  1976  and 
made  similar  provision  for  the  interviewing  of  persons  believed 
by  the  interviewing  officers  to  be  mentally  handicapped,  In 
addition  the  police  were  required  to  take  particular  care  in 
putting  questions  to  such  persons  and  in  accepting  answers  from 
them  as  reliable.  The  police  were  also  required  to  reek 
verification  of  the  facts  admitted  and  to  obtain  corroboration  of 
them. 
The  RCCP,  whose  appointment  was,  in  no  small  measure,  due  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  Confait  case,  considered  the  issue  of  the 
additional  protection  required  by  juveniles  and  the  mentally 
handicapped.  2  They  recommended  that  the  police  should  give 
especial  attention  to  testing  the  reliability  of  statements  made 
by  persons  in  these  categories,  3A  minority  of  the  Commission 
had  considered  that  any  breach  of  the  rules  for  the  special 
protection  of  these  vulnerable  groups  should  lead  to  automatic 
exclusion  of  the  confession.  The  majority,  however,  disagreed, 
finding  such  an  approach  inconsistent  with  the  Commission's 
general  opposition  to  a  firm  exclusionary  rule.  Protection  was 172 
to  be  achieved  by  on  the  spot  supervision  and  the  use  of  the 
police  disciplinary  code.  However  there  was  a  unanimous 
recommendation  that  the  jury  or  the  magistrates  should  have  their 
attention  drawn  specifically  to  the  possible  unreliability  of 
evidence  obtained  from  a  juvenile  or  a  mentally  handicapped 
person  in  the  absence  (justified  or  not)  of  an  adult.  4 
The  only  legislation  6  which  followed'an  this  recommendation  is 
Section  77  of  PACE,  a  late  government  addition  to  the  Bill, 
which  makes  a  unique  provision  for  a  special  warning  Is  in  the 
case  of  a  confession  made  by  a  "mentally  handicapped"  accused 
outwith  the  presence  of  an  "independent  person,  "  to  essentially  a 
non-police  adult.  Section  77(1)  provides  that  where  the  court  is 
satisfied  (a)  that  the  accused  is  "mentally  handicapped",  and  (b) 
that  the  confession  was  not  made  in  the  presence  of  an  "indo- 
pendent  person,  "  the  jury  must  be  warned  that  there  is  special 
need  for  caution  before  convicting  the  accused  in  reliance  on  the 
confession  and  they  must  be  told  that  the  unreliability  arises 
because  of  his  mental  handicap  and  because  of  the  absence  of  the 
independent  person,  No  doubt  mindful  of  the  mesa  of  the  general 
law  on  corroboration  warnings,  it  is  specifically  provided  that 
no  particular  form  of  words  need  be  used.  Section  77(2)  makes 
corresponding  provisions  for  summary  trials. 
"Mentally  handicapped"  Is  defined  in  section  77(3)  as  involving 
"a  state  of  arrested  or  incomplete  development  of  mind  which 
includes  significant  impairment  of  intelligence  and  social 173 
functioning.  "  As  Mirfield  points  out  in  the  course  of  a  critical 
discussion  of  Section  77,7  this  definition  excludes  the  mentally 
ill.  However  the  terms  of  Section  77  are  in  addition  to  the 
possibility  of  exclusion  for  unreliability  under  Section  76(2)  or 
unfairness  under  Section  76(1)  or  in  exercise  of  the  court's 
general  discretion  under  Section  82(3).  Therefore,  although  it 
would  certainly  have  been  preferable  to  make  specific  provision 
for  all  mentally  ill  or  handicapped  accused,  there  can  be  little 
doubt  of  the  Court's  power  to  safeguard  the  mentally  ill  within 
the  ambit  of  PACE. 
The  writer  respectfully  agrees  with  Dr  Mirfiold  that  the  failure 
of  the  legislature  to  bring  juveniles  within  the  ambit  of  Section 
77  is  hard  to  understand,  particularly  since  Section  77  would 
appear  to  owe  its  existence  at  least  indirectly  to  the  Confait 
case.  As  Dr  Mirfieid  puts  it  "What  sense  is  there  in  making 
special  provision  for  an  adult  with  a  mental  age  of  10,  but  none 
for  a  10  year  old?  " 
Be  that  as  it  may,  the  terms  of  the  section  are  clear  and  it 
therefore  remains  possible,  at  least  in  theory,  for  an  English 
court  to  convict  on  the  uncorroborated  evidence  of  a  confession 
obtained  solely  In  the  presence  of  police  officers  from  a  person 
who  is  a  juvenile,  or  mentally  ill,  or,  for  that  matter,  mentally 
handicapped,  although  at  least  in  the  latter  case  the  jury  is,  as 
a  matter  of  law,  required  to  be  told  of  the  potential  dangers. 174 
So  far  there  appears  only  to  have  been  one  decided  case  dealing 
expressly  with  a  failure  by  a  trial  judge  to  give  a  jury  an 
adequate  Section  77  warning.  6  In  quashing  the  conviction,  the 
Court  of  Appeal  commented  that  the  warning  was  "an  essential  part 
of  a  fair  summing  up.  " 
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that  because  of  the  risk  of  unreliable  evidence,  it  is  also  important  to 
obtain  corroboration  of  any  facts  admitted  whenever  possible, 
6,  Although  not  an  actual  corroboration  warning 
7,  p165,  Zander  suggests  this  may  have  been  a  simple  oversight 
8, 175 
Chapter  8  The  Accuracy  Of  The  Record 
8.1  '  Introduction 
One  of  the  most  intractable  problems  inherent  in  confession 
evidence  is  the  question  of  the  accuracy  of  the  record  of  the 
confession.  Many  of  the  difficulties  stem  from  the  fact  that  the 
majority  of  confessions  are-made  in  police  stations  with  only  the 
accused  and  the  police  present  and  either  side  may  have  an 
interest  in  telling  something  other  than  the  whole  truth.  The 
issue  has  rarely  been  focussed  as  succinctly  as  it  was  by  the 
Bennett  Committee  which  investigated  the  interrogation  practices 
of  the'Royal  Ulster  Constabulary  in  the  lato  19740; 
"In  addition  to  the  obvious  danger  that  the 
private  nature  of  the  interview  process  may 
encourage  abuse,  a  further  important  consequence 
Is  that  arguments  about  interrogation  methods  ,,. 
are  always  conducted  in  retrospect.  No-one 
outside  the  police  service  is  able  to  adjudicate 
on  what  methods  should  be  used  in  the  individual 
case,  or  to  observe  whether  misconduct  is  or  is 
not-taking  place;  all  they  can  do  is  argue  about 
it  afterwards.  Retrospective  argument  as  a  means 
of  getting  at  the  truth  has  obvious  limitations.  "' 
This  chapter  is  concerned  with  the  moano  which  may  be  adopted  to 
serve  the  triple  purposes  of  protecting  the  interacts  of  the 
suspects,  -protecting  the  police  from  false  allegations,  and- 176 
providing  an  accurate  record  of  what  took  place  to  assist  the 
courts  to  reach  the  best  possible  decision  on  the  issues  of 
admissibility  and  sufficiency  discussed  in  the  previous  chapters. 
As  Mirfield  puts  its 
"Though  the  search  for  the  truth  is,  by  no  means, 
an  absolute  goal  of  the  law  and  procedure 
governing  criminal  cases,  if  no  countervailing 
principle  or  policy  decisively  intervenes,  it  must 
always  be  better  to  arrange  trial  and  pre-trial 
procedures  such  that  the  likelihood  of  findings 
made  by  the  trier  of  fact  being  correct  is 
increased;  other  things  being  equal  we  had  better 
have  the  truth.  "  2 
It  should  be  made  clear  that  the  problems  posed  by  "false 
confessors",  those  eccentric  or  disturbed  individuals  who 
"confess"  to  crimes  of  which  they  could  not  possibly  be  guilty, 
are  outwith  the  scope  of  this  work  as  are  the  psychological 
aspects  of  police  interrogation  techniques,  which  are  sometimes 
claimed  to  lead  to  innocent  persons  confessing  to  crimes  which 
they  have  not  committed.  Similarly  this  chapter  is  not  concerned 
with  judicial  examination,  which  has  its  own  rules  for  ensuring 
an  accurate  record. 
Confession  evidence  attracts  a  very  high  status  in  the  eyes  of 
the  courts  both  north  and  south  of  the  Border,  but,  as  has 
already  been  pointed  out,  it  is  all  too  easy  for  an  unscrupulous 177 
police  officer  to  fabricate  a  false  confession  3  or  "touch  up"  a 
genuine  one  to  make  it  more  convincing,  for  example  by  adding  in 
some  "special  knowledge".  Dickson's  views  on  this  point  are 
particularly  striking.  4 
On  the  other  hand  the  accused  has  an  obvious  interest  in  denying 
what  he  is  alleged  to  have  said;  oral  evidence  of  what  took  place 
between  the  accused  and  the  police  is  often  fiercely  disputed  and 
such  disputes,  apart  from  wasting  scarce  court  time,  6  frequently 
involve  quite  unwarranted  attacks  on  the  integrity  of  the  police- 
men  concerned.  Matters  such  as  accent,  tone  of  voice  or  the 
context  in  which  certain  things  were  said  may  also  be  of  import- 
ance  in  deciding  the  admissibility  or  sufficiency  of  a  con- 
fession.  0  Mendacity  apart,  the  possibility  of  an  honest  mistake 
or  a  lapse  of  memory  cannot  be  discounted,  problems  which  are,  of 
course,  by  no  means  exclusive  to  confession  evidence.  However, 
one  unique  feature  of  confession  evidence  is  identified  by 
Mirfieid: 
"91)t  is  normally  acquired  by  officials  aware,  at 
the  time  they  acquire  it,  that  it  is  very  likely 
to  be  presented  before  a  court.  It  is  possible 
for  these  officials  to  take  steps  to  ensure  that 
the  record  is  both  accurate  and  reliable  and  (it 
is)  possible  for  the  law  to  require  or  encourage 
them  to  take  such  stehe.  11  ' 178 
An  accurate  record  of  what  transpired  between  the  accused  and  the 
police  will  assist  in  determining  whether  the  accused  confessed 
at  all,  and,  if  co,  under  what  circumstances  and  in  what  terms. 
In  other  words  an  accurate  record  will  materially  assist  a  court 
in  deciding  the  difficult  issues  of  fact  and  law  to  which 
confession  evidence  so  often  gives  rise. 
Possible  ways  of  improving  the  accuracy  of  the  record  will  be 
considered  under  three  broad  headings,  viz,  improving  the 
accuracy  of  the  written  record,  recording  by  mechanical  means  and 
introducing  an  impartial  third  party. 
Motes 
1,  Report  of  the  Coieitte  of  Inquiry  into  Polire  Interrogation  Procedure,  in 
Northern  Ireland  Cmnd  7497  (HMSO,  1979)  Para  165 
2,  Mirfield  p3 
3,  It  is  rare  that  the  situation  is  as  blatant  as  it  was  in  Ly  berts.,.  t19.  ä1 
2  All  ER  340  where  the  Crown  declined  to  lead  evidence  of  statements 
allegedly  made  by  an  accused  who  had  been  deaf  and  dumb  since  birth, 
4,  §1377  and  378  quoted  in  chapter  7,3  (i)(a)  supra 
5,  The  RCCP  considered  that  the  waste  was  not  as  great  as  commonly  supposed  - 
Report  Para  4.7,  While  this  may  well  have  been  the  case,  a  substantial 
amount  of  time  undoubtedly  was  wasted,  For  a  startling  example  see  ELy. 
Turner  (1975)  61  Cr  App 
.. 
$1. 
6.  One  of  the  writer's  colleagues  tells  (with  great  glee)  of  a  Metropolitan 
police  officer  who  had  arrested  in  London  a  Glaswegian  accused  on  a  warrant 
for  theft  of  a  large  quantity  of  soft  drinks  and  who  informed  Glasgow 
Sheriff  Court  that  the  accused  had  replied  "it's  a  fair  cop  guv,  I  stole  the 
pop.  0 
7,  Loc  cit  note  2  supra 179 
8.2  The  Written  Record 
(i)  Written  Statements 
Traditionally  Scottish  law  has  relied  for  proof  of  the  accused's 
words  on  oral  evidence  from  police  officers,  frequently  using 
their  notebooks  as  aides-memoire.  '  Written  statements  by 
accused  persons  are  extremely  rare,  apart  from  post-charge 
"voluntary  statements.  "  2  In  current  practice  an  accused's  post- 
charge  statement  will  be  reduced  to  writing  either  by  the  accused 
himself  or,  much  more  commonly,  by  two  officers  unconnected  with 
I 
the  case,  and  signed  by  the  accused.  It  will  contain  an 
acknowledgement  of  the  caution  and  the  offer  of  legal  advice  and 
a  statement  that  the  accused  has  either  read  over  the  statement 
or  had  it  read  over  to  him.  The  signed  statement  will  then  be 
lodged  as  a  production  and  spoken  to  by  the  officers  who  took  it. 
The  origins  of  this  practice  are  uncertain,  although  it  was 
probably  derived  from  the  declaration.  Until  the  practice  became 
established,  judges  (as  already  noted)  tended  to  regard  police 
interrogation  as  a  usurpation  of  the  function  of  judicial 
examination,  an  idea  which  took  a  long  time  to  die  out. 
As  recently  as  1925  Lewis  wrote: 
"Confessions  made  by  an  accused  person  after  hn 
has  been  charged,  which  have  been  reduced  to 
writing  by  or  at  the  instance  of  official  persons, 
may  be  regarded  as  inadmissible  as  being  in 180 
reality  declarations  of  an  Inadmissible  natura  in 
respect  of  their  irregularity.  "  3 
Even  more  recently,  in  1966,  Lord  Kilbrandon  was  still  arguing 
that  after  charge  only  a  statement  made  before  a  magistrate  was 
admissible.  '1 
It  may  also  be  that  the  modern  Scottish  practice  was  at  least 
partly  influenced  by  the  Judges'  Rules  in  England,  but  in  any 
event  it  to  now  of  such  universal  application  that  it  can  be 
regarded  as  being  beyond  challenge  and  has  been  approved  by 
judicial  comment.  6  On  the  other  hand  there  is  no  reported  case 
where  evidence  of  a  post-charge  statement  has  been  held 
inadmissible  because  the  normal  practice  was  not  followed.  There 
are  in  fact  only  two  cases  directly  in  point. 
Firstly  Hamilton  v  H,  M  Advocate  1980  JC  66  is  against  the  idea 
of  the  written  statement  being  anything  more  than  a  simple 
written  record  of  what  the  accused  said.  It  had  been  argued  that 
where  the  Crown  per  incurlam  failed  to  produce  the  written 
statement,  the  oral  evidence  of  the  police  officers  as  to  what 
the  accused  had  said  was  inadmissible  as-not  being  the  "best 
evidence".  This  argument  received  short  thrift  from  Lord 
Justice-Clerk  Wheatley: 
"This  submission  proceeds  on  a  misconception, 
When  the  statement  was  made  it  was  made  orally  to 
the  interviewing  officers.  Their  appraisement  of 181 
the  statement  was  what  they  individually  hoard. 
What  was  said  by  the  applicant  was  then  committed 
to  writing  by  one  of  them  and  eventually  read  over 
to  the  applicant  and  signed  by  him  as  correct. 
But  what  the  officers  heard  was  primary  not 
secondary  evidence.  The  different  methods  by 
which  the  officers  could  speak  to  what  was  said  by 
the  applicant  at  the  time  attach  to  the  relia- 
bility  and  not  to  the  competency  of  the  evidence. 
Committing  the  statement  to  writing  and  getting  an 
accused  to  sign  it  as  accurate  may  forestall  a 
challenge  to  the  accuracy  of  what  is,  recorded  as 
having  been  said  by  him,  but  that  does  not  render 
incompetent  the  possibly  more  vulnerable  recoll- 
ection  of  what  was  actually  said. 
Secondly  cordiner  v  H.  M.  Advocate  1991  SCOR  652  is  clear 
authority  for  the  proposition  that  the  normal  practice  is  simply 
practice  and  not  rules  of  law  and  a  voluntary  statement  does  not 
become  inadmissible  merely  because  it  was  not  taken  by  an 
independent  officer.  In  this  case  the  accused  had  asked  to  speak 
with  one  of  the  investigating  policemen  who  want  on  to  record  his 
voluntary  statement.  Such  a  doparture  from  normal  practice 
simply  becomes  an  aspect  of  fairness.  Cordiner  can  also  be 
regarded  as  authority  for  the  proposition  that  where  the 
voluntary  statement  has  been  both  tape-recorded  and  hand  written, 182 
it  is  unnecessary  to  produce  the  handwritten  statement  as  well  as 
the  tape. 
Although  a  written  and  signed  statement  is  much  more  difficult  to 
challenge  than  a  policeman's  simple  oral  evidence,  a  point 
acknowledged  by  Lord  Wheatley,  such  methods  of  recording 
confessions  have  their  limitations.  The  absence  of  research  into 
Scottish  police  interviewing  has  already  been  noted,  and  in  the 
absence  of  research  one  simply  does  not  know  what  happens  in 
Scottish  police  stations,  particularly  as,  in  Lord  Devlin's 
words,  it  is  the  general  habit  of  the  police  never  to  admit  the 
slightest  departure  from  correctness.  However  the  writer's 
experience  as  a'prosecutor  leads  him  to  think  that  Professor 
Glanville  Williams'  description  of  the  pro-PACE  situation  in 
England  may  well  by  equally  applicable  in  Scotiands 
"The  statement  reads  as  though  it  was  volunteered 
by  the  suspect;  but  in  part  it  may  have  consisted 
of  a  monosyllabic  answer  to  a  leading  question 
asked  by  the  officer,  with  one  or  more  subordinate 
clauses.  Since  the  statement  does  not  distinguish 
between  question  and  answer,  the  reader  cannot 
tell  what  facts  were  suggested  to  the  person 
making  the  statement  by  the  way  in  which  the 
question  was  worded.  If  the  question  was  a 
complex  one,  the  suspect  may  not  have  underntood 
it;  but  this  possibility  cannot  be  assessed 
because  the  question  itself  is  not  recorded,  And 183 
the  written  word  does  not  reproduce  the  inflection 
of  the  voice  upon  which  meaning  may  depend.  One 
cannot  even  be  sure  that  the  officer  understood 
what  the  suspect  said,  or  that  the  suspect 
understood  the  written  statement  when  he  read 
through  it  or  had  it  read  to  him.  His  signature 
is  no  guarantee  that  the  statement  exactly 
represents  what  he  said  or  wished  to  say.  "  6 
The  same  point  was  put  slightly  differently  by  the  Thomson 
Committee., 
"An  unfortunate  result  of  the  present  state  of  the 
law  is  that  the  police  may  be  tempted  to  take 
answers  given  to  questioning  over  a  period,  put 
them  together  into  a  single  statement,  and  present 
that  to  the  court  as  a  spontaneous  voluntary' 
statement.  Some  of  us  with  experience  of  these 
matters  have  seen  so-called  voluntary  statements 
which  covered  so  precisely  the  disparate  points  of 
the  police  case  as  to  make  their  spontaneity 
highly  suspect.  7  But  in  disputes  in  court  as  to 
the  circumstances  in  which  a  statement  was  made  it 
is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  a  judge  to 
reject  the  statement  as  inadmissible  on  the 
grounds  that  the  police  account  of  the 
circumstances  to  untrue,  "  13 184 
Lord  Devlin  also  hit  one  of  the  many  nails  in  this  issue  on  the 
head  when,  in  an  observation  approved  by  the  Thomson  Committee, 
he  said.  - 
"Lawyer-like  tendencies  flourish  to  an  even 
greater  extent  among  the  police  than  they  do  at 
the  bar  or  on  the  Bench.  The  police  have 
sometimes  seemed  to  treat  the  Judges'  Rules  as  if 
they  were  a  drill  manual  and  to  be  unwilling  to 
admit  the  slightest  deviation  from  the  text. 
Rather  than  become  engaged  in  a  discussion  about 
whether  a  question  was  or  was  not  necessary  to 
remove  an  ambiguity,  some  police  witnesses  seem  to 
have  preferred  stoutly  to  deny  that  they  asked  any 
questions  at  all  and  even  to  maintain  that  they 
hardly  opened  their  mouths.  Consequently 
statements  have  sometimes  been  put  in  evidence 
which  have  been  said  to  be  the  prisoner's  own 
unaided  work  as  taken  down  by  the  police  officer 
and  in  which  the  prisoner  has  recounted  in  the 
stately  language  of  the  police  station  (where,  for 
example,  people  never  eat  but  partake  of 
refreshment  and  never  quarrel  but  indulge  in 
altercations)  the  tale  of  his  misdeeds.  " 
The  Thomson  Committoels'proposals  for  the  taking  of  voluntary 
statements  'C'  were  made  in  the  context  of  their  proposal  that 
virtually  all  communications  between  police  and  suspect  or 185 
accused  should  be  tape  recorded,  and  as  such  they  wore  not 
particularly  radical  and  largely  endorsed  existing  practice.  The 
statement  was  to  be  preceded  by  a  caution  and  an  offer  of  an 
interview  with  a  solicitor,  it  was  to  be  recorded  in  a  document 
written  either  by  the  accused  himself  or  the  police  as  his 
dictation,  the  document  was  to  contain  a  signed  acknowledgment  by 
the  accused  of  his  right  to  silence  and  the  fact  that  he  had 
either  seen  a  solicitor  or  decided.  not  to  see  one,  the  last  page 
was  to  conclude  with  an  acknowledgment  signed  by  the  accused  that 
he  had  read  the  document  over  and  did  not  wish  to  add  to  it  or 
alter  it  and  it  was  to  be  signed  by  one  witness.  ''  The  police 
were  not  to  interrupt  or  ask  questions  other  than  what  was 
necessary  for  clarification  andtany  questions  were  to  be  inserted 
in  the  record  of  the  statement. 
In  England  the  RCCP  also  endorsed  the  existing  practice,  which  at 
that  time  was  governed  by  the  Rule  IV  of  the  Judges'  Rules.  They 
noted  that  the  accuracy  of  written  voluntary  statements  made 
under  caution  did  not  seem  often  to  be  challenged  and  they 
declined  to  support  any  change  that  might  diminish  their  use. 
Current  post-PACE  English  procedure  is  not  far  removed  from  the 
Scottish,  13  Paragraph  12  and  Annexe  D  of  the  Code  of  Practice  on 
Detention,  Treatment  and  Questioning  14  eat  out  the  requirements, 
although  if  the  preceding  interview  has  been  contemporaneously 
noted  and  the  record  signed  by  the  interviewee,  or  if  the 
interview  has  been  tape-recorded,  there  is  normally  no  need  for  a 186 
statement  under  caution,  which  should  only  be  taken  at  the 
express  request  of  the  person  concerned.  It  should  also  be 
remembered  that  PACE  procceds  generally  on  the  assumption  that 
suspects  will  have  legal  advice  while  in  custody, 
If  a  statement  is  to  be  taken,  the  suspect  should  always  be 
invited  to  write  it  himself,  He  should  write  and  sign  that  he 
makes  the  statement  of  his  own  free  will,  he  acknowledges  his 
right  of  silence  and  he  is  aware  that  the  statement  may  be  given 
in  evidence.  If  the  statement  is  to  be  written  by  a  police 
officer,  the  suspect  must  signify  in  writing  that  he  wishes  this 
to  be  done.  The  suspect  should  be  allowed  to  write  the  statement 
without  prompting  by  the  police  except  that  an  officer  "may 
indicate  to  him  which  matters  are  material  or  question  any 
ambiguity  in  the  statement.  " 
Where  a  policeman  is  writing  the  statement  he  muWt  take  down  the 
exact  words  spoken.  As  Zander  comments,  "faithful  compliance 
with  this  admonition  would  transform  the  taking  of  statements  as 
it  has  been  done  in  the  past  since  it  plainly  prohibits  the  very 
understandable  practice  of  police  officers  putting  suspects' 
statements  into  a  coherent  tidy  form.  "  However,  the  policeman 
may  ask  questions  which  are  "necessary"  such  questions  and  the 
answers  given  being  recorded  contemporaneously.  At  the 
conclusion,  the  suspect  should  read  the  statement  and  make  any 
corrections  he  wishes.  He  should  then  sign  that  he  has  done  so, 187 
that  the  statement  is  true  and  that  he  has  made  it  of  hic  own 
free  will. 
Notes 
1,  In  Scottish  law  a  police  officer's  notebook,  unless  lodged  as  a  production 
in  its  own  right,  is  confidential  to  the  officer  and  if  he  does  not  refer  to 
it  the  defence  have  no  right  to  see  it  -  Hin  been  dv  Auld  1926  JC  A. 
Police  officers'  notebooks  are  discussed  further  infra, 
2,  The  Thomson  Committee  (pars  7,14)  recommended  a  procedure  for  taking  pre- 
charge  statements  and  suggested  that  such  a  statement  should  be  taken  by  the 
investigating  officer,  They  expressed  no  views  on  the  appropriate  person  to 
take  the  traditional  post-charge  voluntary  statement, 
3,  Lewis  p322,  founded  on  1sQbe.  3..  Cu1h_bert  ORAL  1  Bronn  311  and  Alexandjt 
Hendry  and  Janes  Craighead  518571  2  Irv.  618 
4,  In  Andrews  (ed)  the  Accused  p65 
5,  See  Tange  y  ý, 
ýAývocate_199"CR 
313 
6,  The  Authentication  of  Statements  to  the  Police  [1979]  Crim  LR  6 
7,  The  writer  was  once  presented  with  what  purported  to  be  a  voluntary 
statement  by  a  semi-literate  glue-sniffer  who  had  managed  to  remember  the 
location,  colour,  make  and  year  letter  of  no  fewer  than  12  cars  he  was 
alleged  to  have  violated,  Even  more  amazingly  he  had  remembered  them  in 
exact  chronological  ordert 
8,  Para  7,11 
9.  The  Criminal  Prosecution  in  England  p39 
10,  Para  7,17 
11,  In  practice  the  police  (at  least  in  Strathclyde)  have  adhered  to  the 
previous  procedure  of  having  one  officer  take  the  statement  in  the  presence 
of  another,  the  statement  being  signed  by  both, 
12,  Report  Para  4,9 
13,  See  generally  Zander  p168 
14,  References  are  to  the  1990  revision  of  the  Code  which  comes  into  force  on 
1st  January  1991 188 
(ii)  Notes  and  Notebooks 
As  previously  mentioned,  Scots  law  has  generally  proceeded  on  the 
basis  that  the  primary  evidence  of  what  the  accused  said  is  the 
oral  evidence  of  the  police  officer  who  heard  it  anj  Scots  law 
has  never  accorded  any  special  legal  status  to  written  statements 
or  notes  of  interviews.  I  In  the  case  of  notes  in  a  police, 
officer's  notebook,  there  is,  compared  to  England,  a  notable  lack 
of  case  law,  but  the  accepted  view  is  that  such  notes  merely 
become  part  of  the  officer's  oral  testimony.  2  While  a  written, 
signed  statement  will  normally  be  lodged  as  a  production,  it  is 
generally  not  the  practice  to  lodge  a  policeman's  notebook, 
although  there  is  no  reason  why,  in  an  appropriate  case,  this 
should  not  be  done.  Apart  from  such  unusual  situations,  the 
"familiar  practice  in  both  solemn  and  summary  procedure  is  that 
the  policeman's  notebook  is  not  lodged,  he  is  allowed  to  refer  to 
any  entry  which  he  made  contemporaneously  with  the  events  to 
which  he  is  speaking,  and  the  defence  advocate  may  inspect  the 
entry  if  he  wishes  to  do  so.  "  4 
It  is  not  normal  practice  in  Scotland  for  the  accused  to  be 
shown,  far  less  asked  to  sign,  notes  in  a  policeman's  notebook 
and  although  officers  are  frequently  asked  in  court  whether  the 
note  was  made  at  the  time,  and  generally  reply  in  the  affirm- 
ative,  the  issue  is  rarely  explored  in  depth.  It  would,  in  any 
event,  be  extremely  difficult  to  prove  otherwise  and  there  would 
not  appear  to  be  any  reported  Scottish  case  in  which  a  police 189 
officer  has  been  refused  permission  to  refresh  his  memory  from 
his  notes  because  they  were  not  contemporaneous.  The  rule 
requiring  contemporaneous  noting  is  generally  applied  on  the 
common-sense  basis  that  the  notes  should  have  been  made  as  soon 
as  practicable  after  the  making  of  the  statement  but  again  there 
are  no  cases.  It  is  thought  that,  were  the  matter  to  arise,  the 
Scottish  courts  would  take  the  same  view  as  the  (English)  Court 
of  Appeal  did  in  Attorney  's  ee<  of  1979) 
(1979)  69  Crim  App  R 
__41L 
which  approved  Archbold's  views  that 
"...  a  witness  may  refresh  his  memory  by  reference 
to  any  writing  made  or  verified  by  himself 
concerning,  and  contemporaneously  with,  the  facts 
to  which  he  testifies.  'Contemporaneously'  is  a 
somewhat  misleading  word  in  the  context  of  the, 
memory  refreshing  rule.  It  1e  sufficient  for  the 
purposes  of  the  rule,  if  the  writing  was  made  or 
verified  as  a  time  when  the  facts  were  still  fresh 
in  the  witness's  memory.  " 
In  Scottish  practice  it  is  by  no  meens'unknown  for  one  police 
officer  simply  to  check  and  sign  the  notes  in  his  colleague's 
notebook,  a  practice  which,  however  undesirable  it  may  be,  does 
not  appear  to  have  attracted  any  reported  judicial-disapproval.  a 
Leaving  aside  the  differences  consequent  upon  tape  recording, 
which  will  be  discussed  later,  Scottish  procedure  in  relation  to 
the  recording  of  interviews  with  cuspecto  is  still  in  a  compar- 190 
atively  undeveloped  state,  a  fact  which  is  probably  a  function  of 
Scots  Law's  historic  attachment  to  viva  voce  evidence.  The 
present  position  is  broadly  similar  to  the  pro-FACE  situation  in 
England  and  subject  to  the  same  criticisms.  6  Verbatim 
contemporaneous  records,  although  not  unknown,  are  rare,  prepar- 
ation  of  notes  after  the  event  is  the  rule  rather  than  the 
exception,  suspects  seldom  see  what  goes  into  the  notebook,  and 
falsification  is  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  establish  in 
court,  Above  all  there  is  a  total  absence  of  any  enforceable 
legal  requirement  that  record  of  interviews  be  kept  in  any 
particular  format,  or  indeed  that  interviews  be  recorded  at  all. 
In  England  the  recording  of  interviews,  unlike  the  taking  of 
statements,  has  been  radically  affected  by  PACE.  The  RCCP  had 
based  their  proposals  for  improving  the  accuracy  of  the  written 
record  on  the  promise  that  "where  prepared  questionnaires  can  be 
used  or  contemporaneous  verbatim  notes  taken  there  are  fewer 
difficulties  over  challenges  at  trial  to  the  police  record  of  the 
interview.  "  7  Where  it  was  not  possible  to  take  a  verbatim 
record  or  full  contemporaneous  notes  "the  product  of  the 
questioning  ...  should  be  presented  to  the  court  as  what  it  in:  a 
minute  of  the  salient  relevant  points  made  at  the  interview.  "  h° 
If  no  contemporaneous  record  had  been  made,  it  should  be  the 
practice  for  the  interviewing  officer  to  note  down,  in  the 
suspect's  presence  and  for  his  signature,  the  main  relevant 
points  made  during  the  interview,  including  denials  as  well  as 
admissions  or  damaging  statements.  9 191 
The  interviewing  of  suspects  is  now  governed  by  paragraph  11  of 
the  Code  of  Practice  For  The  Detention,  Treatment  and  Questioning 
of  Persons  by  Police  Officers  ("Code  C")  14  and  detailed  rules 
for  the  keeping  of  records  of  interviews  are  cat  out  in 
subparagraphs  11.5  to  11.13.11 
Although  the  Code  presupposes  interviewing  at  the  police  station 
as  the  norm,  the  basic  requirement  now  is  that  "an  accurate 
record  must  be  made  of  each  interview  with  a  person  suspected  of 
an  offence  whether  or  not  the  interview  takes  place  at  a  police 
station.  "  Records  must  be  made  either  on  special  forms  provided 
or  in  the  officer's  notebook. 
Broadly  stated,  the  record  must  be  made  during  the  course  of  the 
interview,  unless  it  is  impracticable  or  would  interfere  with  the 
conduct  of  the  interview,  and  it  must  "constitute  either  a 
verbatim  record  of  what  has  been  said,  or  failing  this,  an 
account  of  the  interview  which  adequately  and  accurately 
summarises  it.  "  If  an  interview  record  is  not  made  contempor- 
aneously,  it  must  be  made  as  coon  as  practicable  after  its 
completion  and  the  reason  for  not  completing  the  record  in  the 
course  of  the  interview  must  be  recorded  in  the  officer's 
notebook. 
Unless  it  is  impracticable,  the  ihterviawco  should  be  given  the 
opportunity  to  read  the  record  and  sign  it  as  correct  or  indicate 
the  respects  in  which  he  considers  it  inaccurate.  Any  solicitor 192 
or  "appropriate  adult"  present  at  the  interview  should  also  be 
give  an  opportunity  to  read  and  sign  the  record.  There  are 
provisions  for  dealing  with  suspects  who  cannot  read  or  refuse  to 
cooperate. 
A  new  provision  in  the  revised  Code  closes  a  loophole  and 
requires  that  a  record  should  also  be  made  of  any  comments  made 
by  a  suspect  outwith  the  context  of  an  interview  but  which  are 
relevant  to  the  offence.  Where  practicable  the  suspect  should  be 
given  the  opportunity  to  read  the  record  and  sign  it  as  correct 
or  indicate  the  respects  in  which  it  is  inaccurate. 
Given  the  record  of  the  English  courts  in  enforcing  the  Judges' 
Rules,  the  robustness  with  which  they  have  enforced  compliance 
with  the  recording  provisions  under  PACE  must  have  come  as  an 
unpleasant  shock  to  the  police.  The  case  of  R.  v  Canale  11990)  2 
All  ER  187  is  a  striking  example,  not  only  of  the  breathtaking 
arrogance  with  which  the  police  cocked  a  snook  at  a  whole  range 
of  requirements  of  the  Code,  but  also  of  the  forcefulness  of  the 
Court  of  Appeal's  opinion. 
In  C  nalg  the  defendant  had  been  convicted  and  sentenced  to  six 
years  for  conspiracy  to  rob.  He  had  been  interviewed  four  times 
by  the  police  and  at  the  first  and  third  interviews  no  contempor- 
aneous  record  was  made,  nor  was  a  subsequent  record  made.  The 
second  and  fourth  interviews  were  contemporaneously  recorded,  but 
the  second  one  in  particular  consisted  largely  of  the  accused 193 
repeating  admissions  allegedly  made  at  first  one.  The  officers 
concerned  had  simply  noted  as  the  reason  for  not  making  a 
contemporaneous  record  the  initials  "B.  W.  "  which  they  later 
explained  stood  for  "best  way".  This  did  not  impress  Lord  Lane 
CJ: 
"In  the  officers'  view  the  reason  for  failing  to 
record  the  interview  contemporaneously  was  that 
the  best  way  was  not  to  record  the  interview 
contemporaneously,  which  of  course  is  not  a  reason 
at  all.  In  the  view  of  this  court,  it  demon- 
strates  a  lamentable  attitude  to  the  1984  Act  and 
the  Codes  made  thereunder.  " 
Such  records  as  had  been  kept  had  been  neither-on  the  prescribed 
forms  nor  in  the  officers'  pocketbooks,  one  officer  astonishingly 
attempting  to  explain  this,  by  saying  that  he  had  left  his  note- 
book  at  home  when  he  changed  his  clothes  and  the  other  claiming 
not  to  have  received  a  notebook  since  his  transfer  to  the  Flying 
Squad  a  fortnight  earlier.  (In  the  writer's  opinion,  the  more 
fact  that  the  police  could  seriously  advance  auch  excuses  shows 
how  right  the  courts  have  been  to  take  the  tough  line  that  they 
have.  > 
Lord  Lane  was  unequivocal  in  his  views  on  both  the  general  iccuo 
and  the  behaviour  of  the  police  in  the  instant  case.  - 
"This  case  is  the  latest  in  a  number  of  decisions 
emphasising  the  importance  of  the  1984  Act,  if, 194 
which  we  find  hard  to  believe,  police  officers 
still  do  not  appreciate  the  importance  of  that  Act 
and  the  accompanying  Codes,  then  it  is  time  that 
they  did,  The  Codes  of  Practice,  and  in 
particular  Code  C  relating  to  interviewe  and 
questioning  of  suspects,  are  particularly, 
important. 
In  the  instant  case  the  police  officers  seem  to 
have  displayed  a  disregard  of  those  rules  and,  In 
light  of  the  initials  "S.  W.  "  and  what  they  stood 
for,  we  feel  compelled  to  say  that  that  was  a 
cynical  disregard  of  the  rules.  The  explanation 
put  forward 
...  is  that  in  these  preliminary 
conversations,  namely  interviews  i  and  3  they  were 
endeavouring  to  tidy  up  a  mass  of  information 
.. 
[and]  wished  to  put  the  matter  in  apple  pie  order 
before  the  contemporaneously  recorded  interview 
took  place,  so  it  would  be  easier  for  the  jury  to 
follow  the  eventual  statements  which  would  be 
exhibits  before  the  jury,  Whether  that  is  true, 
we  beg  leave  to  doubt.  " 
His  Lordship  reaffirmed  the  earlier  decision  of  K,  t  at  9a 
3  All  FR  598  and  reminded  the  police  that  contemporaneous  noting 
had  a  twofold  purposes 
"IT)ho  importance  of  contemporaneous  noting  of 195 
interviews  can  scarcely  be  overemphasised.  The 
object  is  twofold.,  not  merely  is  it  to  ensure  so 
far  as  possible  that  the  suspect's  remarks  are 
accurately  recorded  and  that  he  has  an  opportunity 
when  he  goes  through  the  contemporaneous  note 
afterards  of  checking  each  answer  and  initialling 
each  answer,  but  likewise  it  is  a  protection  for 
the  police,  to  ensure  so  far  as  possible  that  it 
cannot  be  suggested  that  they  induced  the  suspect 
to  confess  by  improper  approaches  or  improper 
promises.  If  the  contemporaneous  note  is  not 
made,  then  each  of  those  two  laudable  objects  is 
apt  to  be  stultified.  " 
In  the  instant  case  the  trial  judgo  had  been  deprived  of  material 
which  should  have  been  before  him  when  he  was  deciding  the  issue 
of  admissibility,  and  once  he  had  decided  to  admit  the  otate- 
monts,  the  jury  also  were  deprived  of  evidence  which  should  have 
been  available  to  them. 
While  Scots  law  likes  to  think  that  its  genius  it  its  flexibility 
and  its  preference  for  broad  concepts  such  as  "fairness  to  the 
accused"  rather  than  the  minutiae  of  technical  rules  of  admiss- 
ibility,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  English  courts  are  now  taking 
a  much  more  robust  attitude  to  enforcing  upon  a  reluctant  police 
compliance  with  the  requirements  for  the  protection  of  the 
suspect.  It  may  be  that  at  the  moment  their  attitude  is  almost 196 
over-onthusiastic,  but  it  is  clearly  appropriate  that  the  police 
should  be  given,  beyond  a  shadow  of  a  doubt,  the  clearest 
possible  message  that  a  policeman  is,  as  much  as  anyone  else, 
subject  to  the  requirements  of  the  law  and  attempts  to  evade  the 
requirements  will  not  be  tolerated.  If  this  is  not  done,  the 
PACE  codes,  which,  after  all,  are  at  least  indirectly  the  result 
of  scandals  such  as  Confaft,  will  simply  end  up  in  the  same 
lamentable  state  as  the  Judges  Rules. 
Given  the  extremely  high  status  which  the  courts  in  Scotland 
accord  to  confessions,  and  the  almost  complete  erosion  of  the 
requirement  of  corroboration,  it  is  submitted  that  Scots  law 
should  pay  a  great  deal  more  attention  to  the  way  in  which  non- 
tape  recorded  interviews  are  recorded  by  the  police.  In  this 
respect,  it  is  submitted  that,  for  once,  Scots  law  should  look 
south  of  the  Border.  Although  the  English  Court  of  Appeal  has 
perhaps  gone  slightly  too  far,  the  Scots  courts  could,  with 
advantage,  adopt  a  much  more  critical  attitude  towards  police 
record-keeping  than  they  hitherto  have  dons. 
Motes, 
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8.3  Re  ord  n  by  s  pe  and  Video 
(i)  Intro  uct  on  and  Early  History 
Nowadays  it  may  seem  self-evident  that  a  tape  recording,  or 
possibly  a  video  recording,  of  what  took  place  between  the  police 
and  the  suspect  will  offer  standards  of  accuracy  and  completeness 
which  cannot  be  matched  by  any  form  of  written  record.  Even 
contemporaneous  noting  cannot  compete  since  the  tone  or  inflexion 
of  the  suspects's  voice  cannot  be  captured  on  paper  and  such 
records  are  not  particularly  difficult  to  falsify.  In  addition, 
contemporaneous  noting  interrupts  the  flow  of  the  interview  and 
this  may  deprive  the  police  of  an  important  psychological 
advantage.  The  authors  of  one  of  the  main  post-PACE  studies  of 
police  interrogation  found  that  in  most  interviewe  some  40%  of 
the  time  was  occupied  by  silence  due  to  the  need  for  the  "scribe" 
to  catch  up,  and  contemporanoeus  note  taking  "created  a  bizarre 
and  wearisome  atmosphere  which  stressed  the  interrogators  as  much 
as  the  suspects.  "  It  is  surprising  that  against  this  background 
they  also  found  that  there  was  no  marked  effect  on  the  overall 
admission  rate.  I 
Tentative  ctepa  towards  the  recording  of  police  interviews  were 
being  taken  in  America  in  the  194Qe  2  It  may  well  be  that  the 
Americans  harboured  fewer  illusions  about  the  capacity  of  their 
police  to  indulge  in  questionable  and  occasionally  downright 
illegal  practices  and  in  1942  the  American  Law  Institute  in  their 
Model  Code  of  Evidence  commentedt 199 
"In  some  Instances  confessions  taken  by  the  police 
have  been  recorded  by  a  sound  film.  To  impose  a 
requirement  on  the  police  that  they  should  take  no 
confession  unless  recorded  is  believed  to  be 
practicable,  effective  and  desireable.  ... 
Certainly  wherever  it  is  practicable  to  supply  and 
use  the  necessary  equipment  in  a  reasonably 
efficient  manner  it  should  be  done  and  the  courts 
should  encourage  such  procedure  in  any  legitimate 
manner.  " 
4ý 
It  is  also  noteworthy  that  there  is  a  reported  American  example 
of  the  filming  of  an  interview  as  early  as  1948.4 
The  idea  that  recordings  might  play  a  part  in  the  police 
investigation  seems  to  have  crossed  the  Atlantic  in  the  early 
1950s  and  the  first  discussion  in  Britain  was  in  an  article  by 
T.  B.  Radley  in  the  Criminal  Law  Review  in  1954.6Tho  author,  who 
appears  to  be  well-qualified  technically,  deals  with  both 
mechanical  recording  (le  by  means  similar  to  old-fashioned 
gramophone  records)  and  "magnetic"  fie  tape)  recording.  He  goes 
into  considerable  technical  detail  about  how  recordings  might  be 
falsified,  although  it  has  to  be  said  that  his  views  of  the 
dangers  were  probably  exaggerated  even  at  the  time,  and  sub- 
sequent  developments  such  as  the  superimposition  of  time  signals, 
the  invention  of  the  cassette  tape  and  the  development  of  twin- 
dock  recorders  have  eliminated  most  of  the  grounds  for  his  fears. 200 
However,  Radley  was  the  first  British  commentator  to  identify  the 
need  for  independent  custody  of  the  tapes  as  a  safeguard  against 
tampering: 
The  essence  of  any  safeguard  which  is  at  once 
real  and  understandable  seems  to  lie  in  physically 
guarding  the  tape  as  soon  as  a  recording  has  been 
made  on  it;  and  making  sure  that  it  is  under  guard 
until  it  is  needed  for  a  lawful  occasion.  " 
On  the  state  of  knowledge  as  it  was  in  1954,  Radley's  conclusion 
was  that  it  was  unsafe  for  the  recorded  confession  to  replace  the 
written  one,  but  he  recognised  the  value  of  recording  in  its 
ability  to  capture  matters  which,  even  if  the  writer  of  a  written 
statement  wished  to  record  them,  could  not  be  captured  on  papers 
"A  written  confession  can  never  contain  exactly 
all  that  was  said,  A  recorded  confession, 
neglecting  forgery,  does,  It  would  contain  the 
questions  of  the  police  as  well  as  the  answers  to 
them,  and  every  intake  of  breath  and  casual  cough 
to  boot.  It  might  be  awkward  for  either  side  on 
occasion;  but  at  least  it  would  be  the  truth  and 
nothing  but  the  truth  -  neglecting  forgery. 
CA)  recording  does  contain  a  whole  range  of 
material  which  is  beyond  the  reach  of  words  as 
written  down.  ...  A  recording  retains  the  way 
things  are  said.  " 201 
For  long  one  of  the  strongest  advocate  of  tape  recording  of 
police  interviews  was  Glanville  Williams,  and  he  did  not  restict 
his  advocacy  solely  to  confessions., 
"More  legal  attention  should  be  paid  to  the  first 
statement  made  by  the  witness  to  the  police;  and 
the  making  of  the  statement  should  be  tape-  or 
wire-recorded  wherever  possible.  A  confession 
made  to  the  police,  if  tape  recorded  and  then 
sealed,  might  well  have  greater  probative  force 
than  a  version  written  by  the  hand  of  the 
policeman.  "  6 
Williams  was  to  return  to  thid  theme  several  times  in  the  follow- 
ing  years  and  indeed  as  early  as  1959  he  was  advocating  the  use 
by  the  police  of  pocket  tape  recorders.  He  added  to  Radley's 
view  that  tapes  should  be  guarded  until  required  by  suggesting 
that  they  might  be  sealed  and  deposited  with  an  independent  third 
party  such  as  the  clerk  of  the  court,  (a  suggestion  which, 
interestingly,  had  been  made  to  him  by  a  senior  police  officer) 
and  he  also  prophesied  the  twin-deck  tape  recorder.  7 
In  1960  Justice  published  a  report  on  preliminary  Investigation 
of  Offences  in  the  course  of  which  they  commented  that  while  it 
was  easy  for  an  experienced  sound  engineer  to  alter  a  recording 
and  there  were  no  perfect  safeguards,  "a  close  watch  should  be 
kept  on  technical  developments  in  tape-recording  which  may  lead 
to  a  satisfactory  safeguard  against  falsification.  "  They 202 
suggested  as  an  experiment  the  installation  of  ,  tape  recorders  in 
police  cars  so  as  to  record  statements  made  by  witnesses  on  the 
spot  in  motoring  cases,  0 
One  commentator  9  observed  that  the  it  was  difficult  to  see  why 
the  danger  of  tampering  should  be  such  a  formidable  objection  to 
tape-recording  and  drew  an  analogy  with  photographs,  which,  he 
argued,  were  equally  susceptible  to  falsification  but  if  properly 
proved  were  readily  accepted  by  the  courts. 
Although  taping  of  police  interviews  was  still  a  long  way  off,  by 
the  early  1960  the  courts  were  beginning  to  have  some  experience 
of  the  evidential  use  of  tape-recording  in  other  contexts  and 
although  there  were  difficulties,  notably  in  the  use  of  tran- 
scripts,  the  tapes  themselves  were  generally  admitted  in 
evidence.  10  The  first,  and  for  many  years  the  only,  Scottish 
case  involving  a  tape  was  Hones  mnd  Lavery  v  ILK  A  vgcate  1.960 
IC  104. 
In  this  case  a  blackmail  victim  was  fitted  with  a  concealed 
microphone  and  transmitter  prior  to  meeting  the  blackmailer  in 
Glasgow  Central  Station.  Police  Officers  in  a  room  in  the., 
station  had  a  receiver,  loudspeaker  and  tape  recorder  and  other 
officers  were  able  to  watch  the  conversation  take  place  although 
they  could  not  hear  it.  The  conversation  was  transmitted  from 
the  microphone  to  the  receiver,  to  the  loudspeaker  and  ultimately 
to  the  tape-recorder.  At  the  trial  evidence  was  led  from  a 203 
police  officer  who  heard  the  conversation  coming  over  the 
loudspeaker.  The  tape  recording  was  indistinct  and,  as  might  be 
expected,  contained  a  lot  of  extraneous  noise  so  in  order  to 
provide  an  intelligible  account  of  the  conversation,  the  tape  was 
played  over  several  times  to  a  stenographer  who  made  a  shorthand 
record  of  what  she  heard  and  then  prepared  a  transcript,  which 
Lord  Justice-General  Clyde  later  described  as  "really  more  in  the 
nature  of  a  reconstruction  by  her  of  what  the  conversation,  in 
her  view,  must  have  been.  " 
At  the  trial  the  tape  w,  ws  played  without  objection,  but  objection 
was  taken  to  the  evidence  of  the  police  officer  who  had  heard  the 
conversation  on  the  basis  that  the  tape  was  the  primary  evidence 
and  his  evidence  was  therefore  incompetent.  Objection  was  also 
taken  to  the  evidence  of  the  stenographer  and  her  transcript 
which  she  proposed  to  read  out.  The  objection  to  the  police 
officer  was  decisively  rejected  by  the  trial,  judge  and  his 
decision  was  upheld  on  appeal;  lie  also  allowed  the  evidence  of 
the  stenographer  and  her  transcript  although  with  much  more 
hesitation. 
On  appeal  to  the  High  Court,  the  Lord  Juotice-General  oxprosoly 
reserved  his  decision  on  the  competency  of  the  girl'o  evidence, 
although  he  accepted  that  there  were  practical  reasons  for 
admitting  it,  not  least  the  fact  that  the  tape  would  otherwise 
have  had  to  be  played  over  several  times  in  the  court.  Lord 
Carmont  simply  concurred  which  presumably  means  that  he  shared 204 
Lord  Clyde's  reservation.  The  third  judge,  Lord  Sorn,  was  much 
more  positive: 
"I  would  like  first  to  consider  whether  the  course 
adopted  by  the  prosecution  of  getting  someone  to 
decipher  the  recording  and  present  the  result  to 
the  jury  was  a  reasonable  course  and  one  that  was 
fair  to  the  accused.  I  think  it  was  both 
reasonable  and  fair.  What  would  have  been  the 
alternative?  It  would  presumably  have  been  to 
play  the  recording  to  the  jury  over  and  over 
again,  until  all  the  members  of  the  jury  were 
satisfied  that  they  had  extracted  all  that  they 
were  capable  of  extracting  from  it.  This  would 
have  caused  an  interruption  of  indefinite  duration 
in  the  proceedings...  .  It  seems  to  me  much 
better  that  the  Jury  should  be  presented  with  a 
reliable  version  of  the  conversation  -  though,  of 
course,  they  should  be  made  to  understand  that  the 
recording  itself  was  the  true  evidence.  Then,  so 
long  as  the  recording  and  the  transcription  are 
made  productions  in  the  case,  as  they  were  here, 
this  is  quite  fair  to  the  accused.  His  advisers 
can  see  beforehand  the  version  which  the 
prosecution  is  to  put  forward  and  I  have  no  doubt 
that  the  defence  would  be  given  facilities  to 
check  that  version  against  the  recording.  " 205 
One  issue  which  had  exercised  the  court  was  the  question  of  the 
stenographer's  qualifications  to  act  as  an  expert  witness.  She 
had  admitted  that  she  had  never  done  anything  of  this  nature 
before  and  indeed  it  appeared  that  there  was  no  person  available 
who  had  done  anything  similar.  Lord  Sorn  adopted  the  novel  view 
that  in  the  circumstances  the  stenographer  had  become  in  effect 
an  ad  hoc  expert: 
"Miss  McIntyre  was  certainly  not  an  expert  in  the 
sense  of  bringing  some  pre-existing  qualification 
to  her  task,  because  she  frankly  admitted  that  she 
had  never  done  anything  of  this  kind  before.  She 
could  write  shorthand  but  she  had  no  experience  of 
listening  to  and  deciphering  recordings.  But  is 
it  true  to  say  that  she  was  doing  something,  or 
expressing  an  opinion  about  something,  which  the 
jury  could  equally  well  have  done,  or  formed  an 
opinion  about  themselves?  Given  the  same 
opportunity  as  Miss  McIntyre  it  may  be  true  to  say 
that  the  Jury  would  have  been  as  well  placed  as 
she  -  but  they  did  not  have  the  same  opportunity. 
They  did  not  play  the  recording  over  and  over 
again  and  make  a  special  study  of  it  ...  .  Miss 
McIntyre  had  had  an  opportunity  which  was  denied 
to  them.  She  did  thus  bring  a  special  experience 
to  her  evidence  and  it  might  be  said  that  in  the 
course  of  carrying  out  her  task,  she  had  acquired 
a  certain  expertise  in  the  thing  she  was  doing. 206 
...  IT)here  is  no  rigid  rule  that  only  witnesses 
possesing  some  technical  qualification  can  be 
allowed  to  expound  their  understanding  of  any 
particular  item  of  evidence.  Expositions  of  this 
kind  are  often  given,  subject  to  the  control  of 
the  presiding  Judge  as  to  whether  the  person 
giving  the  exposition  (without  possessing  some 
expert  qualification)  is  equipped  to  do  so,  and  as 
to  whether  it  is  fair  to  the  accused  that  the 
exposition  should  be  given" 
However  the  High  Court  made  it  clear  that,  in  the  future, 
evidence  on  the  interpretation  of  tape-recordings  should  if 
passible  be  given  by  persons  who  had  expert  qualifications. 
The  most  important  decision  of  the  period  in  England  was  Rv 
Masud  Ali,  vAs  f  ussninC  95]  E  'R  where  the 
English  Court  of  Criminal  Appeal  considered  Hoves  and  I,  nvery  and 
took  the  point  that  there  was  no  difference  in  principle  between 
a  tape-recording  and  a  photograph.  Although  their  Lordships 
declined  to  lay  down  an  exhaustive  set  of  rules,  they  did  hold 
that  a  tape-recording  was  admissible  provided  its  accuracy  could 
be  proved,  the  voices  properly  identified  and  the  evidence  was 
otherwise  relevant  and  admissible. 
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(ii)  The  Encl1sh  Proposals 
The  first  official  consideration  of  the  tape-recording  of  police 
interviews  in  England  and  Wales  was  by  a  Working  Party  under  the 
chairmanship  of  the  then  Inspector  of  Constabulary  in  1965.  ' 
This  body  considered  that  the  taping  of  interviews  in  police 
stations  "would  result  in  less  crime  being  detected,  and  fewer 
criminals  being  convicted,  without  having  any  countervailing 
advantages.  "  Senior  police  officers  were  to  cling,  limpet-like, 
to  this  view  for  twenty  years  until  the  Issue  was  eventually 
forced  by  the  recommendations  of  the  RCCP. 
Seven  years  later,  the  CLRC  split  on  the  issue.  Given  their 
recommendations  on  the  restriction  of  the  right  to  silence,  the 
accuracy  of  the  record  was  clearly  a  crucial  matter.  The 
majority  recommended  that  experiments  into  the  use  of  tape- 
recording  by  the  police  should  be  carried  out  to  see  whether 
technical  difficulties  could  be  overcome  and  whether  recorders 
made  a  sufficiently  valuable  contribution  to  the  ascertainment  of 
the  truth  without  seriously  impairing  police  efficiency.  Among 
reasons  for  this  view  the  majority  cited  the  fear  of  the  police 
that  criminals  (ic)  would  refuse  to  answer  questions  on  tape  and 
the  fear  that  the  courts  might  come  to  regard  evidence  of  an 
interrogation  which  had  not  been  recorded  as  "inferior". 
Technical  problems  and  difficulties  over  editing  out  inadmissible 
material  were  also  mentioned,  2 209 
However  a  minority  of  three,  including  Professor  Williams,  took 
the  view  that  statutory  provision  should  be  made  for  the 
compulsory  use  of  tape  recorders  at  police  stations  in  the  larger 
centres  of  population,  and  no  steps  to  restrict  the  right  to 
silence  should  be  taken  until  this  was  done.  The  minority  argued 
inter  alia  that  such  a  provision  would  deter,  if  not  eliminate, 
"third  degree"  methods,  would  help  to  prevent  the  fabrication  of 
confessions,  would  reduce  the  potential  for  conflict  as  to  what 
actually  happened,  and  would  generally  assist  in  reducing  the 
scope  for  error  or  malpracice  by  the  police.  3 
0 
The  response  of  the  government  to  these  proposals  was  to 
establish  a  committee  to'consider  the  feasibility  of  an 
experiment.  The  Hyde  Committee,  which  reported  in  1976, 
identified  the  arguments  for  and  against  tape-recording,  which 
were  later  picked  up  by  the  RCCP.  In  favour  of  taping  were  the 
following: 
(1)  what  transpires  during  an  interrogation  is  frequently  vital 
to  a  case  subsequently  brought  against  the  man  questioned.  It  is 
very  important  that  the  court  should  have  the  beat  possible 
account  of  what  took  place.  A  tape-recording  is  of  more 
assistance  than  any  written  record  which  must  be  prepared  after 
an  interrogation,  because  it  gives  the  precise  words  used  -  and 
there  is  the  additional  advantage  that  a  tape-recording  will  chow 
the  inflections  of  tone  and  voice, 
(2)  Tape-recording  would  deter,  if  not  prevent,  the  use  of  any 
unfair  questioning  methods  by  the  police.  Conversely  it  would 210 
reduce  if  not  remove  the  risk  of  untrue  and  unfair  allegations 
being  made  against  police  officers  responsible  for  conducting 
interviews. 
(3)  Tape-recording  would  provide  a  means  of  resolving  disputes 
about  what  took  place  during  an  interview,  and  thus  reduce  the 
time  at  present  spent  by  the  courts  in  "trials-within-trials".  4 
Against  taping  were  the  followings 
(1)  Criminal  investigations  might  be  hampered  if  interrogations 
were  tape-recorded.  In  particular  the  use  of  a  tape-recorder 
might  adversely  affect  the  willingness  of  a  suspect  to  make 
admissions  and  his  willingness  to  pass  information  about  other 
persons  involved  in  criminal  activities.  , 
(2)  If  the  use  of  tape-recorders  became  standard,  evidence  of  an 
interrogation  not  tape-recorded  might  be  regarded  as  inferior  and 
of  loss  weight,  even  though  it  might  have  been  quite  impract- 
icable  to  tape-record. 
(3)  Contrary  to  argument  3  above,  the  use  of  tape-recorders 
might  lead  to  more  "trials-within-trials".  For  example  there 
might  be  disputes  about  what  the  suspect  had  said  (if  the 
recording  was  not  clear);  or  allegations  of  tampering  with  the 
recording;  or  the  clever  criminal,  knowing  that  his  remarks  were 
being  recorded,  might  make  untrue  allegations  -  perhaps  of 
bribery  or  assault  -  against  the  interviewing  officer.  s 
Although  it  identified  the  arguments,  the  Hyde  Committee  was 
scrupulous  in  confining  itself  to  the  feasibility  of  a  tape- 211 
recording  experiment  rather  that  the  desireability  thereof,  and 
their  report  recommended  a  limited  experiment,  which  in  their 
view  had  to  involve  real  cases  which  went  to  court.  They 
suggested  that  the  experiment  should  exclude  interviews  in 
connection  with  summary  offences  and  interviews  with  juveniles 
unless  the  case  was  likely  to  be  heard  in  an  adult  court.  The 
question  of  transcribing  tapes  and  reducing  them  to  a  form  which 
could  conveniently  be  used  in  court  exercised  the  Committee  at 
length  and  in  view  of  the  likely  requirement  for  transcripts, 
they  considered  that  initially  the  experiment  should  be  limited 
to  the  taking  of  statements.  '- 
Despite  this,  and  the  unequivocal  advocacy  of  Sir  Henry  Fisher,  ' 
who  pointed  out  that  the  difficulties  could  be  overestimated, 
there  seemed  to  be  little  enthusiasm  for  even  so  limited  an 
experiment.  0  Even  though  one  was  eventually  announced,  'it  never 
in  fact  took  place  because  matters  were  overtaken  by  the 
appointment  of  the  RCCP  who  carried  out  their  own  experiment. 
Among  other  things  the  RCCP'e  research  suggested  that  there  was 
less  force  than  generally  supposed  in  the  commonly  stated 
objections  that  the  presence  of  a  tape  recorder  would  hamper 
investigations  and  enable  false  allegations  of  inducement  or 
violence  to  be  fabricated.  They  also  noted  the  experience  and 
views  of  investigators  in  the  United  States  that  the  advantages 
of  having  admissions  on  tape  greatly  outweighed  the  drawbacks.  A 
pertinent,  and  previously  overlooked,  point  was  made  in  that 212 
"while  the  presence  of  a  recorder  inhibits  some  suspects  from 
talking  this  cannot  constitute  a  weighty  objection  since  the 
suspect  has  a  right  not  to  answer  questions.  "  10 
Research  also  suggested  that  the  problem  of  tampering  had  been 
exaggerated,  particularly  given  the  development  of  the  cassette 
recorder,  whose  tapes,  unlike  the  open-reel  type,  were  not 
susceptible  to  undetected  tampering  except  with  access  to 
expensive  and  sophisticated  equipment  whose  operation  would  be 
beyond  the  capability  of  anyone  without  technical  knowledge.  11 
The  RCCP  clearly  endorsed  tape  recording,  although  they  suggested 
that  until  experience  had  been  gained  it  should  be  restricted  to 
the  taking  of  statements  and  summaries.  12  However  they  were  of 
the  opinion  that  "the  time  for  further  experiments  to  test  feasi- 
bility  is  past.  "  In  their  opinion,  tape  recording  could  have 
started  immediately  on  the  basis  of'administrative  guidance  from 
the  Home  Office.  113 
On  the  other  side  of  the  coin,  the  RCCP  rejected  the  suggestion 
that  there  should  be  automatic  exclusion  of  evidence  of  non-tape 
recorded  summaries  or  statements,  although  an  officer  who  had  not 
taped  in  circumstances  where  that  might  have  been  expected  should 
be  required  to  explain  why.  14 
Although  the  RCCP  had  expreceed  the  view  that  the  time  for 
experiments  as  to  feasibility  was  past,  field  trials  were  clearly 213 
going  to  be  necessary.  The  trials  eventually  carried  out  were  on 
a  much  wider  scale  than  the  RCCP  had  envisaged  and  took  in  the 
whole  interview  in  the  police  station.  The  field  trials  were  an 
unqualified  success  and  showed  that  most  of  the  fears  expressed 
by  the  police  were  unfounded  and  also  that  the  concerns  expressed 
by  the  Hyde  Committee  and  the  RCCP  about  the  cost  of  transcribing 
tapes  had  been  unduly  pessimistic.  15 
The  historic  antipathy  of  the  higher  ranks  of  the  police  to  tape- 
recording  Once  prompted  Glanville  Wi1liame  to  remark  that 
"One  cannot  help  wondering  whether  the  real 
objection  ...  is  their  fear  of  the  consequences  of 
public  inspection  of  what  happens  in  the 
interviewing  of  suspcts.  "  1*1 
If  this  was  an  accurate  assessment,  the  actual  experience  of 
tape-recording  has  shown  how  wrong  the  police  were.  The  Second 
Interim  Report  in  particular  shows  that  the  results  of  taping 
were  almost  wholly  beneficial  and  the  outlook  is  optimistic.  ". 
In  marked  contrast  to  the  hoary  chestnut  about  taping  having  an 
adverse  effect  on  the  availability  of  information  and 
intelligence,  taped  interviews  led  to  an  improvement  in  the  total 
information  gleaned  from  Interviews  In  connection  with  serious 
cases  and  there  was  no  evidence  that  suspects  were  more 
restrained  in  mentioning  third  parties  on  tape.  overall,  once 
they  were  actually  given  the  opportunity,  officers  appeared  to 
welcome  the  change  to  taped  interviewing  and  to  perceive  it  as 214 
assisting  rather  than  hindering  their  work  through  the  provision 
of  an  objective  record  of  the  interview. 
The  police  themselves  have  now  come  to  embrace  tape-recording,  if 
not  exactly  with  enthusiasm,  then  certainly  with  something  more 
than  the  grudging  acceptance  of  the  inevitable.  Police  paranoia 
about  "electronic  surveillance"  has  also  been  swept  aside. 
Professor  John  Baldwin,  who  had  been  one  of  the  RCCP's 
researchers,  and  whose  work,  he  considered,  had  been  hampered  by 
police  hostility  has  recently  written: 
"It  is  now  obvious  to  all  concerned  that,  where 
disputes  arise  as  to  the  veracity  of  an  interview 
record,  or  allegations  are  made  against  the 
officer  conducting  the  interview,  the  courts  are 
in  a  weak  position  to  determine  which  party  is 
telling  the  truth.  The  enthusiastic  acceptance  on 
the  part  of  the  police  of  the  need  for  tape 
recording  to  resolve  difficulties  of  this  kind 
represents  in  itself  a  dramatic  conversion  and  one 
that  would  scarcely  have  been  predicted  a  decade 
ago.  ...  How  was  it  that  police  officers,  after  20 
years  of  resistance  to  the  idea  of  tape  recording, 
culminating  in  a  determined  effort  to  thwart  even 
the  experiments  of  a  Royal  Commission,  could  be 
persuaded  to  use  the  machines  on  a  routine  basis 
with  scarcely  a  murmur  of  dissent?  The  answer  to 
this  question  lies  in  the  dawning  realisation 215 
that,  if  suspects  are  interviewed  with  fairness 
and  propriety,  then  police  officers  have  very 
little  to  fear  from  having  the  interview  recorded. 
It  may  indeed  be  the  case  that  they  will  emerge  as 
the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  exercise.  "  10 
The  modern  police  view  is  probably  well  represented  by  the 
following  comment  from  a  Detective  Inspector: 
"They've  been  trying  tape  recorders  out  and  we're 
getting  so  many  guilty  pleas  from  them,  it's 
unbelievable.  Solicitors  who  begged  and  begged 
for  tape  recorders  because  we  were  "verballing" 
everybody  now  realise  that  that's  the  worst  thing 
they  could  have  asked  for,  because  blokes  do  cough 
jobs.  It's  like  boasting.  You  got  murderers  and 
sex  people,  they  can't  stop  talking  about  it  once 
they  start.  I  think  once  we  get  tape-recorded 
interviews  nationally,  it  will  be  much  better,  If 
you  put  the  right  questions  to  somebody,  they  will 
talk.  11  15, 
At  the  court  stage  the  evidence  was  generally  tentative,  but 
there  were  signs  that  a  higher  proportion  of  defendants  were 
pleading  guilty,  20  there  were  sign  that  trials  were  slightly 
shorter  and  there  were  fewer  trials-within-trials. 
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16,  The  Authentication  of  Statements  to  the  Police  [19791  Crim  LR  6  at  p22 
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(iii)  The  PACE  Schem 
Section  60  of  PACE  laid  on  the  Home  Secretary  a  duty  to  issue  a 
Code  of  Practice  for  the  tape-recording  of  interviews  with 
suspects  and  this  was  approved  by  Parliament  in  July  1988,  coming 
into  force  on  the  29th  of  that  month  and  forming  Code  E.  Tape- 
recording  is  being  brought  in  gradually  from  area  to  area  under 
the  supervision  of  a  National  Steering  Committee,  with  the 
government's  stated  intention  being  for  it  to  become  standard 
police  practice  throughout  England  and  Wales  by  1991. 
Code  E  requires  that  all  interviews  with  persons  suspected  of 
offences  triable  on  indictment  (or  either  way)  must  be  tape- 
recorded,  although  interviews  with  terrorist  suspects  are 
excluded.  Despite  the  exclusion,  there  is  a  limited  experiment 
in  London  and  Merseyside  to  tape-record  summaries  of  interviews 
with  terrorists.  '  Tape-recording  also  does  not  apply  to 
interviews  with  someone  who  comes  to  the  police  station  as  a 
volunteer  until  such  time  as  he  becomes  a  suspect.  However 
taping  is  supposed  to  commence  after  the  person  has  been 
cautioned. 
The  custody  officer  may  authorise  the  interviewing  officer  not  to 
record  if  the  equipment  is  not  working,  or  no  suitable  room  is 
available  and  there  are  reasonable  grounds  for  thinking  that  the 
interview  should  not  be  delayed.  Non-recording  may  also  be 218 
authorised  if  it  is  clear  from  the  outset  that  no  prosecution 
will  result. 
The  whole  of  the  interview  is  to  be  recorded  including  the  taking 
and  reading  back  of  any  statement.  Recording  is  to  be  done 
openly,  with  a  master  tape  being  unwrapped,  placed  in  the  tape- 
recorder  and  sealed  after  use  all  in  the  suspect's  presence.  2 
(A  second  tape  will  be  used  as  the  working  copy,  and  if  the 
machine  in  use  does  not  have  a  second  deck,  the  working  copy  is 
to  be  made  in  the  suspect's  presence.  )  The  suspect  is  also  to  be 
told  that  the  interview  is  to  be  recorded.  The  interviewing 
officer  will,  on  tape,  state  his  name,  rank  and  that  of  any  other 
officer  present,  the  date  and  time  of  the  interview,  and  then 
caution  the  suspect.  If  the  suspect  objects  to  being  recorded, 
his  objections  should  themselves  be  recorded  before  the  machine 
is  switched  off.  A  written  record  of  the  rest  of  the  interview 
should  be  made,  but  if  the  officer  thinks  that  he  can  reasonably 
continue  to  tape  despite  the  suspect's  objections,  he  may  do  so, 
although  a  Note  to  the  Code  reminds  him  that  this  decision  may 
attract  adverse  comment  in  court,  a 
If  a  break  is  taken,  that  fact  should  be  recorded  on  tape, 
together  with  the  time.  If  the  suspect  leaves  the  room;  the  tape 
has  to  be  removed  from  the  machine  and  sealed,  but  if  he  remains 
in  the  room,  the  machine  can  simply.  be  switched  off.  Once  the 
interview  resumes,  the  time  requires  to  be  etated'again. 219 
At  the  end  of  the  interview  the  time  requires  to  be  recorded  and 
the  master  tape  sealed.  The  suspect  has  to  be  asked  to  sign  the 
label  and  must  be  given  a  notice  explaining  the  use  to  which  the 
tape  will  be  put  and  arrangements  for  access  to  it. 
If  the  suspect  wishes  to  make  a  written  statement  this  should  be 
taken  while  the  tape  is  running. 
If  criminal  proceedings  follow,  the  interviewing  officer  should 
make  and  sign  a  written  record  of  the  interview  and  he  may  listen 
to  the  tape  to  refresh  his  memory.  The  written  record  need  not 
be  a  full  contemporaneous  note,  but  should  be  a  balanced  account 
of  the  interview  including  any  points  made  for  the  suspect  and 
any  key  parts  should  be  in  direct  speech'  The  primary  purpose  of, 
the  written  record  is  to  enable  the  prosecutor  to  make  an 
informed  decision  about  the  case,  and  indeed  prosecutors  expect 
to  rely  on  the  written  record,  so  keeping  to  a  minimum  the  number 
of  occasions  on  which  the  Crown  Prosecution  Service  have  to 
listen  to  a  tape  or  read  a  whole  transcript,  If  the  defence 
accept  the  written  record,  it  will  also  be  used  for  the  conduct 
of  the  case  in  court. 
The  field  trials  had  established  that  the  demand  for  transcripts 
was  not  nearly  as  great  as  had  previously  been  supposed,  tran- 
scripts  being  requested  by  the  prosecution  in  only  some  six  to 
eight  per  cent  of  cases  and  only  a  handful  of  them  being  longer 
than  ten  pages.  4  If  the  police  transcribe  a  tape  they  will 220 
provide  the  transcript  to  the  C.  P.  S.  who  will  in  turn  provide  a 
copy  to  the  defence.  If  the  defence  wish  to  transcribe  a  tape 
the  police  should  provide  them  with  a  copy  of  the  tape  and  they 
will  then  make  their  own  arrangements  to  have  it  transcribed.  In 
order  to  save  time  and  money  each  side  is  supposed  to  provide  to 
the  other  a  copy  of  any  transcript  they  have  had  made:  ,  It  is  in 
the  spirit  of  the  tape  recording  arrangements  that  the  content  of 
the  record  of  the  taped  interview  should  be  agreed  between  the 
prosecution  and  the  defence  before  the  case  comes  to  court.  "  Is 
However  if  agreement  cannot  be  reached  the  issue  will  be  resolved 
by  playing  the  tape  at  the  trial.  r, 
Somewhat  surprisingly,  and  in  contrast  to  the  Scottish  scheme, 
the  tape  is  retained  by  the  police  until  committal  for  trial,  and 
during  this  period  it  falls  to  be  treated  as  any  other  exhibit. 
Any  editing  of  a  tape,  to  exclude  inadmissible  or  "sensitive" 
material  should  be  done  under  the  supervision  of  the  C.  P.  S. 
The  Court  of  Appeal  have  laid  down  guidelines  for  the  uco  of  the 
tape  in  court  °  which  provide  inter  alia  for  the  interviewing 
officer  or  any  other  officer  who  was  present  to  produce  and  prove 
the  tape,  including  any  challenge  to  its  accuracy.  There  is  no 
need  to  play  the  tape  if  the  transcript  is  agreed.  If  the  tape 
is  to  be  played  it  is  a  matter  for  the  judge  whether  the  Jury 
should  have  a  transcript  while  the  tape  is  being  played.  However 
the  Court  of  Appeal  noted  that  in  their  experience  "a  'transcript 221 
is  usually  of  very  considerable  value  to  the  Jury  to  follow  the 
evidence  and  to  take  to  the  jury  room  when  they  retire.  " 
Notes 
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(iv)  The  Scottish  Proposals 
Although  the  English  position  has  been  considered  first, 
primarily  because  of  the  greater  availability  of  material, 
Scotland  actually  led  the  way  in  the  introduction  of  tape- 
recording  of  police  interviews, 
The  issue  was  first  discussed  by  the  Thomson  Committee  '  who 
recommended  that  the  interrogation  of  suspects  in  police  stations 
should  be  recorded  on  tape  "in  order  to  provide  a  safeguard  for 
parsons  being  interrogated  in  the  privacy  of  a  police  station  and 
also  to  protect  the  police  against  unjustified  allegations.  "  The 
Committee  also  recommended  that  voluntary  statements  should  be 
tape-recorded,  Evan  the  strongest  English-advocates  of  taping 
had  acknowledged  that  there  would  require  to  be  exceptions  to 
deal  with  mechanical  failures  and  other  unusual  events,  but 
Thomson  took  by  far  the  most  extreme  position  on  admissibility  of 
any  of  the  bodies  who  made  recommendations  on  taping: 
"We.  realise  that  all  or  part  of  a  police  interr- 
ogation  may  not  be  recorded  through  failure  of  a 
tape-recorder.  The  question  arises  whether  or  not 
an  account  of  any  unrecorded  interrogation  given 
by  a  police  officer  from  memory  and  notes  made  at 
the  time  of  immediately  afterwards,  should  be 
admissible  in  evidence.  We  consider  that  it 
should  not  be  admissihlo,  as  we  foal  strongly  that 
particularly  accurato  rocording  of  interrogation 223 
in  a  police  station  is  essential  as  a  safeguard  to 
all  the  persons  concerned.  The  same  consider- 
ations  do  not  apply  to  a  voluntary  statement 
which,  although  recorded  on  tape,  will  also  be 
recorded  in  a  written  document  authenticated  by 
the  accused.  Such  a  statement  should  be 
admissible  in  evidence,  even  though  the  tape- 
recorder  has  failed.  "  2 
The  Thomson  Committee  did  not  concern  themselves  particularly 
with  feasibility,  although  they  did  carry  out  a  small  practical 
experiment  which  proved  technically  satisfactory,  and  they  noted 
that  both  the  availability  of  more  sophisticated  equipment  and 
better  training  for  police  officers  would  improve  matters  even 
further.  Tampering  with  tapes  was  considered  unlikely,  but  to 
reduce  the  possibility  the  tape  was  to  be  coaled  and  placed  in 
the  custody  of  the  Procurator  Fiscal  as  aoon  as  possible  after 
the  interrogation.  3 
A  Working  Party  was  established  in  1978  under  the  chairmanship  of 
Mr  G.  P.  H.  Aitken  to  supervise  the  setting  up  and  operation  of  a 
research  study  into  the  tape-recording  of  police  interviews  with: 
suspects.  The  study  itself  began  in  May  1980  with  the 
establishment  of  experimental  schemes  in  Dundee  and  Falkirki 
later  the  experiment  was  extended  to-Aberdeen  and  Glasgow, 
Monitoring  was  undertaken  between  the  date  of  inception  of  the 
experiment  and  31  December  1983.  Tape  recording  was  initially 224 
restricted  to  CID  investigations  in  cases  which  were  thought  by 
the  police  to  justify  prosecution  in  the  Sheriff  or  High  Court 
and  where  the  suspect  was  aged  16  or  over.  4 
An  interim  research  report  was  produced  covering  the  first 
twenty-four  months  of  the  experiment  0  and  as  the  first  U.  K. 
study  of  tape  recording  of  police  interrogations  it  naturally 
attracted  some  interest,  This  early  research  indicated  that  only 
a  minimal  number  of  suspects  refused  to  be  taped  and  oven  fewer 
attempted  to  fake  maltreatment  or  assault  by  the  police.  However 
as  far  as  the  behaviour  of  the  police  was  concerned,  the  figures 
showed  that  there  had  been  a  dramatic  effect  on  both  the  length 
and  the  content  of  interviews.  There  was  a  dramatic  rime, 
particularly  in  Falkirk,  of  suspects  who  made  statements  before 
arriving  at  the  police  station  and  there  were  delays  between  the 
suspect  arriving  at  the  police  station  and  the  tape-recorder 
being  activated. 
That  tape-recording,  particularly  in  Dundee,  got  off  to  a  shaky 
start  was  due  in  no  small  measure  to  the  decision  by  Lord  Jauncey 
in  F,  M.  Advocate  v  McFadden.  unreported  AT;  Cum  1980  to  which 
reference  has  already  been  made.  0  In  this  case  a  whole  interview 
was  hold  inadmissible  on  the  grounds  of  cross-examination,  even 
though  his  Lordship  found  parts  of  it  to  be  entirely  fair  to  the 
accused.  It  was  to  be  come  three  years  before  the  issue  was 
settled  and  McFadden  overruled,  " 225 
In  an  article  discussing  the  interim  report  two  English 
commentators  observed: 
"The  SHHD  Report  assumes  that  suspects  increas- 
ingly  exercised  their  right  to  silence  when  being 
tape-recorded.  It  is  more  likely  that  the  police 
extracted  most  of  the  information  they  wanted  in 
the  pre-interrogation  interview  (non-taped)  and 
thus  conducted  themselves  in  the  formal  (taped) 
interview  in  ouch  a  way  that  their  questions  were 
designed  not  to  elicit  answers.  .  ý. 
It  emerges  that  police  acceptance  of  public 
scrutiny  of  their  activities  is  low  and,  more 
importantly,  that  they  have  found  ways  of 
disguising  this  attitude  in  the  context  of  tape- 
recording.  What  has  happened  is  that  the  police 
have  managed  to  give  the  appearance  of  accepting 
taping  by  recording  an  acceptable  number  of 
interviews.  fc"ade  taught  the  police  the  lesson 
that  there  were  real  dangers  in  recording  the 
traditional  interrogation.  What  is  recorded 
therefore  is  what  is  acceptable  to  the  courts  and 
what  would  pass  public  scrutiny.  ...  Interviews 
have  been  taped;  interrogations  have  continued  to 
take  place  in  secret.  "  '0 226 
The  Working  Group  finally  reported  in  1985  and  at  the  same  time 
published  the  full  results  of  the  monitoring  exercise.  9  The 
research  evidence  showed  that  tape-recording  had  had  a 
substantial  effect  on  the  way  the  police  both  prepared  for  and 
carried  out  interviews,  By  the  time  the  full  picture  was  known, 
the  police  in  Dundee  had  settled  down  to  be  perhaps  the  most 
scrupulous  of  the  four  groups  of  officers  in  complying  with  the 
requirements  of  the  scheme  and  they  were  beginning  to  come  to  the 
view  that  once  they  had  adjusted  to  it  it  was  possible  to  operate 
tape-recording  successfully  and  with  a  minimum  of  inconvenience, 
a  view  which  was  also,  to  a  lesser  extent,  held  in  Aberdeen.  . 
However  officers  In  Falkirk  and  Glasgow  remained  suspicious  of 
tape-recording  and  admitted  to  devices  to  avoid  it,  10  While  it 
has  to  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  bulk  of  the  research  was  carried 
out  before  McFadden  was  overruled,  the  tenor  of  the  evidence 
gathered  showed  that  the  police,  while  acknowledging  the 
potential  for  reducing  attacks  on  their  credibility,  were 
generally  hostile  to  tape-recording  and  the  most  favourable 
response  to  its  extension  was  likely  to  be  grudging  acceptance. 
Nevertheless  the  Working  Party  took  the  view  that  the  experiment 
had  proved  the  technical  feasibility  of  tape-recording  and  the 
debate  had  reached  the  stage  where  the  introduction  of  a  national 
scheme  was  inevitable.  The  ultimate  objective  was  seen  as  the 
tape-recording  of  all  interviews  in  police  stations,  but  having 
regard  to  the  practical  and  financial  problems  involved,  it  was 
recommended  that  the  categories  of  interviewe  to  be  taped  should 227 
remain  as  they  had  been  during  the  experiment.  Introduction 
throughout  Scotland  should  be  phased  on  a  geographical  basic  and 
national  guidelines  should  be  drawn  up,  although  legislation  was 
not  considered  necessary.  11 
Following  a  period  of  consultation,  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
Scotland  announced  in  a  written  answer  12  that  he  was  asking 
Chief  Constables  throughout  Scotland  to  begin  the  necessary 
preliminary  work  on  buildings,  equipment  and  training  with  a  view 
to  a  rolling  programme  of  implementation  beginning  on  1  April 
1988.  The  Secretary  of  state  also  announced  that  suspects  under 
the  age  of  16  were  to  be  brought  within  the  scope  of  tape- 
recording. 
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(v)  The  Scottish  Scheme  I 
Apart  from  the  inclusion  of  suspects  under  16,  the  final  Scottish 
tape-recording  scheme  differs  little  from  the  experimental  one. 
Tape-recording  only  applies  to  CID  interviews  in  a  police 
station,  where  the  offence  is  deemed  serious  enough  to  warrant 
prosecution  in  the  Sheriff  or  High  Court.  2  Three  categories  of 
persons  are  to  be  tape-recorded,,  viz  (a)  those  who  have  signed 
voluntary  attendance  forms;  (b)  those  who  have  been  detained 
under  Section  2  of  the  1980  Act;  and  (c)  those  who  have  been 
arrested.  An  accused  person  who  is  in  custody  for  one  offence 
may  be  interviewed  in  the  course  of  investigation  of  others  for 
which  he  is  a  suspect. 
Tape-recording  has  had  no  effect  on  the  rules  of  admissibility 
and  the  overriding  requirement  of  fairness  in  maintained,  If 
there  in  any  doubt  about  whether  tape  recording  is  appropriate, 
the  requirement  of  fairness  should  lead  the  police  to  conclude  in 
favour  of  taping.  It  is,  of  course,  also  open  to  the  police  to 
tape-record  interviews  of  persons  outwith  the  scheme  if  they  wish 
although  this  should  not  use  up  machine  time  at  the  expense  of 
other  more  carious  cases.  In  the  writer'  experience,  certain 
police  officers  in  Strathclyde  will  sometimes  tape-record  a 
witness  in  a  major  enquiry.  if  they  anticipate  the  possibility  of 
the  witness  being  reluctant  at  a  later  stage  and  this  seems  good 
practice. 229 
Where  tape  recording  is  not  practicable,  for  example  because  no 
tape  recorder  is  available  or  there  has  been  a  mechanical 
failure,  statements  should  be  noted  in  note-books  in  the  usual 
way,  along  with  an  explanation  of  the  circumstances,  since  the 
officer  may  be  required  to  justify  in  court  his  decision  not  to 
tape-record.  If  initially  no  recording  can  be  made  but  one  later 
becomes  possible,  there  is  no  reason  why  comments  or  answers 
previously  made  cannot  be  put  to  the  suspect  on  tape  and  the 
police  are  advised  that  such  a  practice  might  be  "helpful  and/or 
deaireab]e.  " 
Fars  about  tampering  are  overcome  by  the  provision  of  sophis- 
ticated  twin-deck  cassette  recorders  with  each  of  the  two  tapes 
carrying  two  tracks  one  of  which  records  the  interview  and  the 
other  the  time  signal. 
Tape-recording  is  to  be  done  overtly.  Before  commencing  the 
interview  the  seals  on  the  tapes  are  to  be  broken  in  the  presence 
of  the  suspect  and  one  tape  placed  in  each  machine.  Thereafter 
the  interviewing  officer  is  to  state  the  time  and  date,  identify 
himself  (including  rank  and  force),  state  the  location  where  the 
interview  is  taking  place  and  name  any  other  perconc  in  the  room. 
The  suspect  will  then  be  asked  to  identify  himself  and  once  he 
has  done  so  he  will  be  cautioned. 
The  suspect  should  be  allowed  to  make  as  full  a  reply  to  the 
caution  as  he  wishes.  If  he  indicates  that,  rather  than 230 
answering  questions,  he  wiehee  to  give  an  account  in  his  own 
words  he  should  be  allowed  to  do  so. 
If  a  suspect  refuses  to  be  recorded,  the  refusal  should,  if 
possible,  be  tape-recorded.  If  this  is  not  possible,  the  police 
officers  should  note  the  refusal  in  their  notebooks  and  the 
suspect  should  be  invited  to  sign  the  notebooks  to  confirm  his 
unwillingness  to  be  tape-recorded.  If  the  suspect  indicates  that 
he  is  willing  to  answer  questions,  but  not  while  being  recorded, 
the  interviewing  officer  should  point  out  to  him  that  the 
recording  is  designed  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  suspect  and 
that  any  answers  given  remain  subject  to  caution.  However  if  the 
suspect  persists  in  his  refusal,  the  tape-recorded  interview 
should  be  concluded. 
Similarly,  if  a  suspect  in  the  course  of  an  interview  states  that 
he  is  not  prepared  to  continue  answering  questions  on  tape,  the 
police  should  try  to  persuade  him  to  allow  the  tape-recorder  to 
remain  switched  on,  He  should  be  told  that  he  will  have  an 
opportunity  to  give  any  information  he  wishes  un-recorded  after 
the  tape  has  been  switched  off  at  the  end  of  the  Interview,, 
However  if  the  suspect  is  adamant,  the  taped  interview  should  be 
concluded  immediately. 
The  caution  and  charge  and  any  resulting  reply  should  be  tape- 
recorded  and  thereafter  no  further  questions  should  be  put  to  the 
suspect.  If  he  wishes  to  make  a  voluntary  statement,  he  chould ßäi 
be  afforded  the  opportunity  to  do  so  on  tape.  If  he  prefers  to 
write  it  out,  the  tape  should  be  left  running  while  he  writes  it, 
and  thereafter  he  can  either  have  it  read  over  to  him  or  read  it 
out  himself.  The  normal  rules  for  the  taking  of  a  voluntary 
statement  are  to  be  followed  even  though  the  proceedings  are 
being  tape-recorded. 
If  it  is  decided  to  interrupt  the  interview,  it  should  be 
concluded  and  the  tape  sealed,  unless  it  is  anticipated  that  the 
break  will  be  short,  for  example  a  visit  to  the  lavatory.  In  the 
latter  case,  the  tape  can  be  left  running  and  an  explanation 
given  for  the  break  in  the  interview.  There  is  no  equivalent  of 
the  English  requirement  for  the  tape  to  be  removed  from  the 
machine  if  the  suspect  leaves  the  room. 
Before  the  recorder  is  switched  off,  the  interviewing  officer 
should  again  state  the  time,  day  and  date,  details  of,  those 
individuals  present  in  the  room  and  the  location  of  the 
interview.  Thereafter  both  tapes  should  be  removed  from  the 
machine,  placed  in  their  cases.  One  of  the  tapes  in  to  be  sealed 
in  the  sight  of  the  suspect,  with  a  label  signed  by  him  and  both 
the  interviewing  officers,  and  forwarded  to  the  Procurator  Fiscal 
as  soon  as  possible.  The  other  tape  remains  with  the  police. 
Only  the  Fiscal  or  a  designated  member  of  his  staff  is  permitted 
to  break  the  seal.  If  no  report  is  made  to  the  Fiscal,  the 
sealed  tape  is  to  be  kept  by  the  police  in  a  lockfast  place 
separate  from  the  police  copy. 232 
Where  judicial  examination  is  anticipated,  the  police  should  make 
a  note  of  the  relevant  questions  and  answers,  and  this  should 
accompany  the  report  to  the  Procurator  Fiscal.  The  suspect's 
answers  must  be  reported  verbatim  although  the  questions  may  be 
paraphrased. 
If  the  recording  equipment  malfunctions,  the  interviewing  officer 
should  try  to  record  on  tape  the  reasons  why  the  interview  is 
being  terminated  and  bring  it'to  an  end,  as  nearly  as  possible  in 
accordance  with  the  normal  practice.  If  another  machine  is 
available,  the  interview  may  resume  using  it  with  a  new  tape. 
Where  there  is  no  alternative,  the  officer  may  resume  the 
interview  off  tape,  but  he  should  be  prepared  to  justify  his 
decision  in  court. 
At  the  end  of  the  interview  the  police  should  ensure  that  the 
police  copy  of  the  tape  has  voice  recording,  and  if  it  is  found 
to  be  blank,  that  should  be  reported  to  the  Fiscal.  The 
intorviewing  officers  will  then  have  to  provide  such  account  of 
the  interview  as  they  can  from  notes  and  memory. 
Defence  solicitors  (and  unrepresented  accused  persons)  are  only 
permitted  to  listen  to  the  tape  in  the  office  of  the  Procurator 
Fiscal  and  they  are  not  allowed  to  receive  a  copy  of  the  tape 
either  on  loan  or  for  retention  and  they  are  not  allowed  to  make 
a  copy. 233 
Unlike  the  position  in  England,  the  police  in  Scotland  have  no 
responsibility  for  the  transcription  of  interview  tapes,  which 
lies  with  the  Procurator  Fiscal.  If  the  Fiscal  decides  to 
transcribe  the  tape  and  to  use  the  transcript  in  evidence,  a  copy 
may  be  served  on  the  accused  not  less  than  fourteen  days  before 
the  trial  and  if  the  accused  does  not  challenge  its  accuracy,  it 
becomes  admissible  and  sufficient  evidence  of  the  making  of  the 
transcript  and  its  accuracy  and  does  not  require  to  be  spoken  to 
by  witnesses.  3  If  the  accused  does  challenge  the  accuracy  of  the 
transcript,  and  the  transcriber  has  to  be  called  to  give 
evidence,  his  (or  more  likely  her)  evidence  is  sufficient  of  the 
making  of  the  transcript  and  its  accuracy.  4 
There  has  only  been  one  subsequent  reported  case  in  which  tape 
recording  has  been  an  issue  in  its  own  right.  This  was  the  odd 
and  rather  worrying  cae  of  oc  te  1921  SCCR 
?  3.  The  circumstances  were  that  Tunnicliffe  had  been 
apprehended  in  Colchester  and  interviewed  on  tape  there.  In 
addition  to  clear  admissions  of  tho  crimes  with  which  he  was 
indicted,  the  taped  interview  contained  references  to  crimes  in 
England  which  were,  of  course,  not  before  the  Scottish  jury. 
The  prosecution  sought  to  make  use  of  what  would  appear  to  have 
been  an  English  transcript  which  had  been  edited  so  as  to 
contain  only  references  to  the  charges  on  the  indictment.  The 
defence  apparently  sought  to  allege  that  the  entire  Colchester 
interview  had  been  unfair  and  as  a  preliminary  to  this  objected 234 
to  the  edited  transcript,  which  objection  the  Sheriff  upheld, 
Thereafter  the  Procurator  Fiscal  sought  to  play  the  whole  of  the 
tape  and  despite  defence  objections  the  Sheriff  allowed  this  to 
be  done  leaving  the  question  of  prejudice  to  be  dealt  with  in  his 
charge  to  the  jury.  Having  been  convicted,  the  accused  appealed. 
At  the  appeal,  the  crown,  in  the  person  of  the  Lord  Advocate, 
indicated  that  it  was  not  proposing  to  support  the  conviction  and 
the  appeal  was  accordingly  allowed,  The  fact  that  the  interview 
had  been  conducted  in  England  in  accordance  with  English  practice 
was  clearly  a  major  complication,  and  one  of  the  main  reasons  for 
the  Lord  Advocate's  position,  but  the  High  Court  made  certain 
further  observations  of  more  general  application  which  are  a 
great  deal  less  than  helpful.  Although  their  Lordships  accepted 
that  "in  principle  there  is  nothing  objectionable  to  editing  a 
transcript  if  it  is  capable  of  being  co  edited,  "  they  went  on  to 
say: 
It  is  not  impossible,  we  should  have  thought,  for 
a  tape  to  be  edited  in  such  a  way  that  all  those 
passages  which  could  result  in  prejudice  to  the 
accused  are  excluded  when  the  tape  is  played  in 
precisely  the  same  way  as  passages  are  excluded 
from  the  verbatim  written  record  which  is  lodged 
as  a  production.  " 
One  cannot  help  but  wonder  if  their  Lordchtps  thouShtthrough  the 
possible  implications  of  thiG  statement  or  if  they  fully 235 
appreciated  the  possible  consequences.  The  whole  purpose  of  tape 
recording  is  to  provide  an  accurate  and  complete  record  of  the 
interview  and  to  suggest  that  the  tape  might  be  tampered  with  is 
to  drive  the  proverbial  coach  and  pair-through  one  of  the  most 
important  innovations  in  the  protection  of  the  accused.  It  is 
one  thing  to  edit  a  transcript  while  preserving  the  tape  intact 
but  it  is  entirely  another  matter  to  suggest  that  (presumably) 
the  prosecution  should  tamper  with  an  important  piece  of  evidence 
in  order  to  anticipate  a  possible  decision  of  the  trial  court.  It 
may  be  that  all  that  their  Lordships  were  suggesting  was  that  the 
tape  should  be  played  through  before  the  trial  on  a  machine  with 
a  counter  and  the  appropriate  numbers  before  and  after  the, 
offending  passage  noted  so  that  the  tape  could  be  played  up  to 
the  appropriate  point  and  then  run  past  the  inadmissible  section, 
but  if  this  was  what  they  intended,  why  did  they  not  simply  say 
so? 
It  is  to  be  hoped  that 
. runic  ffe  is  a  dccioion  on  its  own 
facts,  and  in  particular  on  the  English  aspect,  and  does  not  set 
a  precedent  for  the  generality  of  Scottish  tape  recorded  inter- 
views. 
Notes 
1,  This  decription  is  based  on  the  Memorandum  of  Guidance  issued  by  the  SHHO  in 
April  1988 
2,  In  Glasgow  this  also  includes  the  Stipendiary  Magistrate's  Court 
3,  Criminal  Justice  (Scotland)  Act  1987  Sections  60(1)  and  Cß(2) 
4,  ibid  Section  60(4) 236 
(vi)  Video  Recording 
Although  tape-recording  is  undoubtedly  a  great  step  forwards  in 
providing  for  an  accurate  record,  it  is  sometimes  suggested  that 
video  recording  would  be  even  better  since  it  enables  the 
demeanour  of  the  suspect  to  be  observed  and  it  can  assist  even 
more  than  the  tape  in  protecting  the  police  from  false  alleg- 
ations  of  violence  or  threats  thereof. 
Apart  from  video  recordings  made  by  the  police  themselves,  video 
tapes  from  security  cameras  and  the  like  are  routinely  played  in 
British  courts,  the  paucity  of  reported  cases  suggesting  that  few 
problems  are  encountered,  and  recordings  made  by  television 
companies  have  been  admitted  in  Scotland.  ' 
As  a  matter  of  technology  there  appears  to  be  no  reason  why  video 
recording  of  police  interviews  could  not  be  introduced  in 
Scotland  tomorrow.  The  police  (certainly  in  Strathclyde)  already 
make  use  of  video  cameras  for  matters  such  as  recording  the  locuo 
of  a  crime,  The  Scottish  courts  have  not  so  far  pronounced  on 
such  practices,  but  in  one  English  cace  the  use  of  video 
recordings  as  an  alternative  to  maps  and  sketches  was  approved 
although  the  judge  commented  that  such  recordings  should  be  made 
as  soon  as  possible  after  the  event  and  every  effort  should  be 
made  to  ensure  that  the  recording  accurately  represented  the 
scene  as  it  was  at  the  material  time.  2  An  increasing  number  of 
police  traffic  patrol  cars  are  being  fitted  with  video  camerae 237 
for  the  purpose  of  recording  aberrant  driving  and  the  writer  was 
recently  shown  a  video  of  a  vehicle  pursuit  on  the  Glasgow  Inner 
Ring  Road  which  depicted  the  incident  far  more  graphically  than 
any  verbal  description  could  ever  have  done. 
A  Canadian  experiment  into  video  recording  in  the  police  station 
with  each  officer  being  issued  with  his  own  tapes  as  a  form  of 
electronic  notebook  has  yielded  encouraging  preliminary  results 
and  in  particular  has  shown  that,  like  tape-recording,  video 
recording  does  not  inhibit  suspects  from  making  confessions  and 
admissions,  and  very  few  suspects  decline  to  be  inteviewed  on 
tape.  It  also  showed,  if  that  were  necessary,  that  there  was  no 
evidence  that  costly  professional  camera  crews  or  other  technical 
assistance  was  necessarly  to  produce  a  clear  and  reliable  record 
of  the  interview,  0 
I 
There  is  also  an  English  experiment  under  way,  perhaps  ironically 
Involving  the  scandal-hit  West  Midlands  Police, 
In  Hong  Kong  and  certain  other  Jurisdictions  there  is  an  eotab- 
lished  practice  in  grave  crimes  of  video  recording  a  confession 
in  the  form  of  a  re-enactment  of  the  crime.  0  In  T  tr 
R.  1988]  3  WLR  672.  the  defendant  had  been  convicted  of  murder. 
He  had  made  a  full  confession  to  the  police  giving  a  great  deal 
of  circumstantial  information  and  taking  them  to  the  place  where 
he  had  disposed  ofproperty  stolen  from  the  victim.  Two  days 
later  the  police  asked  the  accused  if  he  would  be  willing  to  go 238 
back  to  the  scene  and  re-enact  the  way  in  which  the  killing  had 
occurred  with  a  policewoman  playing  the  part  of  the  victim.  He 
was  reminded  that  he  was  still  under  caution  and  that  he  did  not 
need  to  comply  with  the  request.  He  also  agreed  to  the  re- 
enactment  being  video  recorded  and  in  fact  gave  a  running 
commentary  on  his  own  movements,  translations  of  which  were 
available  for  the  non-Chinese  speaking  members  of  the  jury.  When 
the  matter  came  before  the  Judicial  Committee  of  the  Privy 
Council,  Lord  Griffiths  described  the  recording  as  "a  visual 
confirmation  of  the  earlier  oral  confession". 
At  the  trial  the  only  challenge  to  the  admissibility  of  the  video 
recording  appears  to  have  been  an  the  basis  of  oppression  by  the 
police.  The  judge  ruled  in  favour  of  admitting  the  evidence  and 
when  the  accused  later  came  to  testify,  he  gave  a  very  different 
version  from  what  was  shown  in  the  video  recording.  He  sought  to 
explain  the  latter  away  by  saying  that  he  only  did  what  the 
police  had  told  him  to.  However  there  was  nothing  in  the 
recording  to  suggest  that  the  police  were  directing  matters  and 
his  explanation  was  clearly  disbelieved. 
Before  the  Privy  Council  it  was  argued  that  such  a  reconstruction 
should,  as  a  matter  of  principle,  never  be  admitted  although  the 
defence  had  to  concede  that  a  video  recording  of  the  confession 
to  the  police  would  have  been  admissible  and  if  in  the  course  of 
a  recorded  confession  the  accused  had  been  asked  to  demonstrate 
how  he  committed  the  crimp  uning  a  dummy  or  poccibly  a  police 239 
officer  that  too  would  be  admissible.  The  Privy  Council 
cautiously  approved  the  practice: 
The  truth  is  that  if  an  accused  has  himself 
voluntarily  agreed  to  demonstrate  how  he  committed 
a  crime  it  is  very  much  more  difficult  for  him  to 
escape  from  the  visual  record  of  his  confession 
than  it  is  to  challenge  an  oral  confession  with 
the  familiar  suggestions  that  he  was  misunderstood 
or  misrecorded  or  had  words  put  into  his  mouth. 
Provided  an  accused  is  given  a  proper  warning  that 
he  need  not  take  part  in  the  video  recording  and 
agrees  to  do  so  voluntarily  the  video  film  is  in 
principle  admissible  in  evidence  as  a  confession 
and  will  in  some  cases  prove  to  be  most  valuable 
evidence  of  guilt. 
To  mcet  the  suggestion  that  lack  of  acting  skill 
may  result  in  ceriouc  distortion  of  a  fair 
demonstration  by  the  accused  the  video  recording 
should  be  shown  to  the  accused  an  soon  as 
practicable  after  it  has  been  completed  and  he 
should  be  given  the  opportunity  to  make  and  have 
recorded  any  comments  he  wishes  about  the  film. 
If  the  accused  says  the  film  does  not  chow  what  he 
meant  to  demonstrate  there  will  then  be  a 
contemporary  record  of  his  criticizm  which  the 
Judge  and  Jury  can  take  into  account  when 240 
assessing  the  value  of  the  film  as  evidence  of  hie 
confession.  " 
This  practice,  interesting  as  it  is,  is  unlikely  to  become  part 
of  Scottish  procedure  in  view  of  the  requirement  to  caution  and 
charge  as  soon  as  possible  and  the  inadmissibility  of  evidence 
obtained  by  questioning  thereafter.  However,  it,  is  suggested 
that  the  police  could,  with  advantage,  consider  video  recording 
the  actions  of  an  accused  person  who  voluntarily  takes  them  out 
of  the  police  station  for  the  purpose  of  showing  them  houses  into 
which  he  has  broken,  where  he  has  discarded  a  weapon,  or  the 
like.  Such  evidence  is  frequently  attacked  on  the  basis  that  the 
police  know  all  along  the  address  of  the  premises  or  the  place  of 
concealment  and  the  locus  visit  was  merely  o  charade.  A  video 
recording  would  go  a  long  way  towards  proving  where  the  truth 
lies. 
Returning  to  the  police  station,  the  main  objection  to  the  video 
taping  of  police  interviews  appears  to  be  financial.  As  part  of 
their  research  for  the  RCCP,  Barnes  and  Webster  carried  out  a 
small  experiment  which  was  techincally  problem-free,  but  too 
limited  to  permit  the  drawing  of  conclusions  as  to  practic- 
ability.  They  calculated  that  capital  costs  for  video  recording 
would  be  in  the  order  of  three  times  those  for  tape-recording, 
and  annual  costs  approximately  two  and  a  half  timos  as  high.  0 241 
The  RCCP  accepted  that  video  recording  offered  advantages  over 
even  taping,  and  commented  that  the  advantages  "may  in  due  course 
be  though  great  enough  to  warrant  the  use  of  video  recordings 
here,  and  we  would  not  want  to  discourage  the  police  from  using 
video  when  they  felt  the  circumstances  warrant  it.  "  *7  Although 
they  did  not  recommend  its  introduction  "at  present"  the  RCCP 
considered  that  the  possibility  should  be  kept  under  review  and 
subordinate  legislation  should  be  drafted  in  such  a  way  as  to 
leave  the  possibility  open. 
Interestingly,  Lord  justice-Clerk  Ross  has  recently  called  for 
the  Introduction  of  video  recording  and  his  call  has  also  been 
endorsed  by  the  Scottish  Police  Federation.  ° 
Apropos  the  West  Midlands  experiment  Professor  John  Baldwin  has 
comment  eci; 
"One  does  not  need  research  to  demonstrate  the 
value  of  monitoring  interviews  conducted  inside 
police  stations  with  suspects.  Yet  the  fact  that 
police  forces  are  prepared  to  open  up  to  outsiders 
their  internal  methods  and  procedures  represents 
in  itself  a  significant  advance,  and  it  is  hoped 
that,  as  a  consequence  of  this,  the  research  will 
shed  light  on  the  general  question  whether  the 
interviewing  procedures  that  are  adopted  are  fair 
and  produce  an  accurate  record  of  interview  of  use 
to  the  courts.  "  '9 242 
While  the  present  writer  would  enthusiastically  endorse  a 
Scottish  experiment  along  the  lines  of  the  West  Midlands  one,  the 
advantages  that  the  video  recording  of  interviews  in  police 
stations  would  offer  over  tape-recording  may  turn  out  to  be  not 
so  overwhelming  or  decisive  as  to  Justify  its  wholesale 
introduction  at  this  stage.  It  may  become  otherwise  in  the 
future,  particularly  if  there  is  ever  a  case  where  a  tape  is 
interfered  with.  Meantime  as  Mirfleid  puts  it,  "For  the  present, 
it  seems  clear  that  we  should,  in  effect,  not  expect  to  run  until 
we  have  learned  to  walk.  " 
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8.4  Ihr  terroget  in  Before-  MAo-istratns 
From  time  to  time  the  idea  has  been  advanced  that  the  police 
should  interrogate  suspects  before  a  magistrate  or  other  suitably 
qualified  independent  referee.  Such  a  system  has  operated  in 
India  for  many  years  whereby  the  police  have  wide  ranging  powers 
to  question  suspects  but  the  answers  given  are  inadmissible  in 
evidence,  a  ban  which  also  applies  to  confessions  unless  made 
before  a  magistrate  in  the  absence  of  the  police,  ' 
The  first  suggestion  that  such  a  scheme  should  be  considered  in 
England  appears  to  have  arisen  in  1928  as  the  result  of  the  Lees- 
Smith  report  regarding  the  interrogation  by  the  Metropolitan 
Police  of  Miss  Irene  Savidge.  a  Miss  Savidge,  who  was  a  potential 
witness  to  a  charge  of  perjury  against  two  police  officers,  was 
taken  from  work  to  Scotland  Yard  and  there  questioned  alone  and 
at  length  by  a  male  chief  Inspector  in  the  presence  of  'a  male 
sergeant.  She  alleged  that  in  the  course  of  the  questioning 
indecent  and  offensive  comments  had  been  made  to  her,  she  had 
been  terrorised  and  her  statement  had  been  distorted.  Mr  Leos- 
Smith,  concluded  inter  alia  that  she  "war.  asked  a  number  of 
questions  that  ought  not  to  have  been  asked,  and  that  certain  of 
her  replies  were  forced  into  a  form  that  misrepresented  what  she 
wanted  to  say.  "  He  wont  on  later  to  add  "What  happened  to  Miss 
Savidgo  can  easily  happen  to  any  man  or  woman  in  her  position. 
Great  perils  to  private  citizenn  and  to  civil  liberty  have  been 
revealed  by  her  experience.  " 244 
As  the  result  of  the  evidence  which  had  been  heard  by  his 
inquiry,  Mr  Lees-Smith  suggested  a  total  of  fifteen  questions  as 
to  the  system  followed  at  Scotland  Yard.  The  first  two  were: 
1.  Are  the  police  the  proper  authorities  to  take 
statements  in  the  case  of  percons  who  are 
suspected  or  in  custody  and  of  witnesses  whose 
personal  character  or  interests  are  involved? 
2.  Statements  taken  at  Scotland  Yard  or  at  police 
stations,  whether  of  persons  who  are  suspected  or 
in  custody  or  of  witnesses,  are  almost  always 
taken  privately  with  no  one  also  present  except 
the  police  and  the  person  making  the  statement. 
Is  there  sufficient  security  that  the  person 
making  the  statement  is  guarded  from  all  improper 
pressure?  "  4 
Around  this  time  the  Royal  Commission  on  the  Police  5  was  also 
asking  its  witnesses  whether  they  could  suggest  any  authority, 
other  than  the  police,  to  whom  the  taking  of  statements  from 
persons  who  are  suspected  or  in  custody  could  properly  or  more 
advantageously  be  entrusted.  The  majority  of  the  witnesses 
favoured  the  status  quo  although  there  was  support  for  the  idea 
that  in  unusual  cases,  such  as  a  charge  against  the  police,  or  if 
the  victim  of  the  offence  was  a  policeman,  it  was  a  better 
alternative  that  statements  should  be  taken  by  a  magistrate. 245 
In  more  recent  years  one  notable  proponent  of  such  a  scheme  has 
been  the  organisation  Justice.  6  They  have  advocated  that  the 
police  should  be  empowered  to  bring  a  suspect  before  a  magistrate 
and  there  conduct  a  full  and  searching  interrogation,  which  would 
be  recorded  on  tape  and  the  result  of  which  would  be  admissible 
in  evidence.  No  other  written  or  oral  statement  would  be 
admitted  with  the  exception  of  tape-recorded  statements  made  on 
arrest  or  before  arrival  at  the  police  station,  In  the  scheme  as 
conceived  by  Justice  the  suspect  would  be  informed  of  a  duty  to 
answer  questions  and  that  adverse  inferences  might  be  drawn  from 
his  silence  and  he  would  have  the  right  to  legal  representation. 
The  suspect  would  also  have  a  right  at  his  own  request  to  be 
taken  before  a  magistrate  to  volunteer  an  explanation. 
Such  a  scheme  is  immediately  open  to  the  objection  that  it 
infringes  the  right  to  ailonco  but  as  Mirfiold  has  pointed  out, 
to  introduce  such  a  scheme  without  attenuation  of  the  right  to 
silence  would  probably  be  thought  unacceptable  as  failing  to 
achieve  a  proper  balance  between  the  need  to  protect  the  suspect 
and  the  need  to  allow  the  police  to  question  nuspocts 
effectively. 
In  England  neither  the  CLRC  nor  the  RCCP  favoured  such  a  schema. 
The  CLRC  considered  7  that  such  a  procedure  would  he  no'more 
likely  than  the  existing  one  to  ensure  that  the  person 
interrogated  would  tell  the  truth  and  they  also  considered  that 246 
there  would  be  practical  problems  in  arranging  immediate 
availability  of  magistrates. 
The  RCCP  also  considered  the  practical  difficulties  of  a  scheme 
for  interrogation  before  magistrates  and  on  a  practical  basis 
alone  considered  that  this  approach  should  not  be  further 
pursued.  0  Practicalities  apart,  the  RCCP  (who,  as  has  already 
been  shown,  took  a  very  different  view  of  the  right  to  silence 
from  the  CLRC)  considered  that  the  idea  was  objectionable  on 
grounds  of  principle  as  well.  In  their  view,  to  require  a 
suspect  to  speak,  even  with  legal  advice  and  under  the  protection 
of  the  court,  was  inconsistent  with  the  very  nature'of  the 
accusatorial  system,  They  were  clear  in  their  opinion  that  "the 
burden  of  proof  should  not  and  cannot  be  altered  in  this  way 
without  turning  pre-trial  and  trial  procedures  into  inquisitorial 
procedures.  "  9  In  addition  they  identified  the  important  point 
that  such  a  procedure  could  jeopardise  the  independence  of  the 
magistracy,  who  should  "be  seen  to  be  independent  of  the  police.  " 
The  RCCP  also  considered  the  possibility  of  using  solicitors  as 
independent  monitors  of  interviews  and  rejected  the  idea  on 
resource  grounds  and  the  possible  conflict  of  roless,  for  the 
solicitor.  'I  Likewico  the  idea  of  using  some  tort  of  specially 
created  service  to  provide  the  function  was  rejected  on  various 
grounds  including  the  difficulty  of  finding  people  to  do  "a 
tedious  job  to  be  done  in  very  uncongenial  surroundings"  and 247 
doubts  as  to  how  long  the,  public  perception  of  independence  would 
last.  11 
Scotc  law  with  its  historic  procedure  of  Judicial  examination, 
greater  restrictions  on  questioning,  shorter  times  in  police 
custody  and  independent  prosecution  system,  has  not  had  the  came 
need  for  the  introduction  of  an  independent  element  into  police 
questioning.  The  Thomson  Committee  only  considered  the  matter  in 
relation  to  formal  post-charge  statements,  and  then  only  briefly: 
"There  is  much  to  be  said  for  requiring  such 
statements  to  be  made  before  the  sheriff  both  on 
grounds  of  history  and  of  reliability,  and  some  of 
us  were  at  one  tim.  o  inclined  to  support  such  a 
requirement.  However,  taking  account  of  the 
practical  difficulties  involved  we  recommend  that 
such  statements  made  to  police  officers  should 
continue  to  be  admissible  in  ovidonce  ...  .  11  17 
It  seems  highly  unlikely  that  any  steps  will  be  taken  towards  the 
introduction  of  independent  third  parties  either  north  or  south 
of  the  Border.  Tape-recording  i3  clearly  hero  to  stay  and  video 
recording  a  possible  future  development.  Provided  the  police  do 
not  find  ways  of  circumventing  the  safeguards  there  is,  simply  not 
the  same  need  for  the  introduction  of  an  independent  element  when 
the  recording  of  the  interrogation  is  available  for  playing  at 
the  trial.  An  accurate  record  of  the  interrogation  is  now 248 
available  for  a  small  fraction  of  the  cost  of  independent 
monitoring  by  s  human  being. 
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Chapter  9  Northern  Ireland  -  The  Response  To  An  Exceptional 
Situation 
9.1  Introduction 
This  chapter  examines  in  general  outline  how  the  law  relating  to 
confessions  and  the  right  to  silence  in  Northern  Ireland  has  been 
affected  by  the  response  of  the  British  government  to  the  problem 
of  terrorism  in  the  Province. 
"Terrorism  is  the  scourge  of  our  time.  The 
terrorist  uses,  or  abuses,  the  privileges  of  a 
democratic  society  in  order  to  undermine  and 
destroy  that  society.  What  does  a  civilised  mart 
do  when  faced  with  an  uncivilised  man?  The 
dilemma  or  paradox  for  democracy  arises.  when  the 
security  of  the  realm  is  threatened,  the  life  and 
safety  and  integrity  of  innocent  people  are 
threatened,  and  it  becomes  reluctantly  necessary 
to  suspend  or  reduce  civil  liberties  by  special 
legislation.  The  rule  of  law  is  always  a  balance 
between  competing  intorsto.  But  without  law  and 
order,  freedoms  and  civil  libcrtio  become 
meaningless,  they  cannot  even  exist.  "  I 
A  detailed  consideration  of  the  historical  and  political 
background  to  the  current,  apparently  insoluble,  problems  of 
Northern  Ireland  is  thankfully  outwith  the  ecopt  of  this  work. 250 
Suffice  it  to  say  that  since  the  late  1960o,  and  in  particular 
since  1969,  Northern  Ireland  has  suffered  from  terrorist  violence 
far  worse  than  anything  seen  anywhere  also  in  Europe.  The 
"Ulster  Problem"  is  nothing  now,  being  in  effect  the  latest 
version  of  the  "Irish  Question"  which  has  dogged  British  politics 
for  three  centuries,  but  the  level  of  violence  and  the 
sophistication  of  the  paramilitary  forces,  particularly  the 
Provisional  Irish  Republican  Army,  were  well  beyond  previous 
experience  even  though  Ireland,  both  north  and  south  of  the 
border,  has  a  long  history  of  emergency  legislation  and  special 
powers  going  back  as  far  as  1775. 
The  root  cause  of  the  situation  is  an  unresolved  dispute  over  the 
legitimacy  of  the  government  of  Northern  Ireland  leading  to 
"military"  activity  by  the  I.  R.  A.  who  seek  to  expel  the  British 
from  the  six  counties  which  comprise  Ulster  and  create  a  united 
Ireland,  a  prospect  which  is  utterly  rejected  by  the  majority 
Protestant  population  of  the  Province.  The  writer  accepts  that 
this  is  a  gross  over-simplification  of  the  position  and 
disregards  several  important  factors  such  as  the  oppression  of 
the  Roman  Catholic  minority  in  Ulster  and  the  dental  of  their 
civil  rights,  but  in  mitigation  he  pleads  that  the  purpose  of  the 
present  discussion  is  to  look  at  the  way  in  which  the  response  to 
terrorism  has  resulted  in  a  legal  situation  substantially 
different  in  principle  and  effect  from  the  rant  of  the  United 
Kingdom.  For  this  purpose  the  existence  of  terrorism  is  accepted 
as  a  fact  and  the  writer  is  content  to  leave  the  hintorical  and 251 
political  aspects  to  those  more  qualified  than  he  to  expound 
them.  a 
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9.2  Lego  Background  Prior  to  1973 
Successive  British  governments  have  consistently  refused,  at 
least  overtly,  to  treat  terrorists  as  anything  other  than  common 
criminals  and  in  particular  they  have  attempted  to  deal  with 
terrorism,  whether  Irish  or  otherwise,  by  the  ordinary  laws  of 
the  land  supplemented  where  necessary  by  special  powers.  '  Prior 
to  1973  these  powers  were  contained  in  the  Civil  Authorities 
(Special  Powers)  Act  (Northern  Ireland)  1922-33,  commonly  known 
as  the  "Special  Powers  Act",  and  various  regul4tionc  made  under 
it.  The  Act  and  its  associated  regulations  conferred  wide  powers 
of  arrest,  questioning,  search,  detention  and  internment  on  the 
police  and  army  and  gave  the  (Northern  Irish)  Minister  of  Home 
Affairs  almost  unrestricted  powers  to  make  regulations  with  the 
force  of  law. 
Of  most  interest  in  the  present  context  is  Regulation  10  which 
provided: 
"Any  officer  of  the 
the  preservation  of 
order,  may  authoris, 
and  detention  for  ,a 
hours  of  any  person 
interrogation.  " 
Royal  Ulster  Constabulary,  for 
peace  and  maintainance  of 
a  the  arrest  without  warrant 
period  of  not  more  than  48 
for  the  purpose  of 
Apart  from  the  Special  Powers  Act,  criminal  law  and  procedure  in 
Northern  Ireland  was  broadly  similar  to  the  English  modal,  with 253 
few  significant  differences,  although  an  accused  in  Northern 
Ireland  did  not  obtain  the  right  to  give  evidence  in  his  own 
defence  until  1930.  A  system  of  public  prosecution  had  existed 
since  1801  and  little  use  was  made  of  lay  Justices  of  the  Peace 
who  had  no  jurisdiction  to  try  cases.  A  system  of  professional 
stipendiary  magistrates,  generally  known  as  "Resident 
Magistrates"  has  existed  since  the  early  nineteenth  century.  2 
While  the  above-quoted  regulation  provided  a  specific  power  of 
detention  for  questioning,  the  Special  Powers  Act  had  no  effect 
on  the  admissibility  of  confessions,  The  Northern  Irish  courts 
generally  continued  to  follow  the  English  common  law  which  had 
been  the  law  in  Ireland  before  partition.  $  As  far  as  confessions 
were  concerned  the  courts  applied  the  exclusionary  rule  based  on 
the  test  of  voluntariness  and  the  absence  of  "fear  of  prejudice 
or  hope  of  advantage  exercised  or  held  out  by  a  person  in 
authority"  as  set  out  in  Ibrahim  vR".  It  is  noteworthy  that 
any  commentary  on  the  Northern  Irish  law  of  admissiblity  up  to 
the  late  1960s  will  consist  almost  exclusively  of  English 
authority  with  very  little  native  gloss.  0 
As  far  as  discretionary  exclusion  was  concerned,  the  Northern 
Irish  courts  clearly  regarded  themselves  as  having  a  discretion 
to  exclude  confessions,  0  although  the  1912/18  Judges  Rules  had  a 
somewhat  odd  status,  being  acted  upon  without  apparently  being 
formally  adopted  7  and  when  the  1964  Rules  were  promulgated  the 
Northern  Irish  judges  took  the  view  "that  it  would  be  a  mistake 254 
to  adopt  the  Judges  Rules  or  an  amended  version  of  them  without 
the  fullest  consideration  and  ...  suggested  that  the  introduction 
of  now  Rules  should  not  be  a  hurried  procedure.  "  0  Their 
Lordships  certainly  could  not  be  accused  of  being  in  a  hurry 
since  it  was  to  be  1976  before  the  1964  Rules  were  adoptedt  In 
one  case  in  1973  '  this  led  to  the  slightly  weird  situation  of 
the  judge  considering  the  English  1964  Rules,  which  specifically 
permitted  questioning  of  a  person  in  custody,  in  order  to  decide 
whether  the  1912/18  Rules,  which  were  ambiguous  on  this  point, 
had  been  infringed.  The  eventual  common  sense  conclusion  was 
that  it  would  be  difficult  "to  hold  that  something  which  was  not 
considered  prejudicial  or  unjust  in  England  was  so  in  this 
jurisdiction.  " 
In  the  late  1960  and  early  1970s'the  Northern  Irish  courts 
continued  to  pursue  a  stringent  approach  to  the  admicsiblity  of 
confession  evidence  and  they  refused  to'maýe  any  concession  to 
the  security  situation.  This  issue,  the 
divergence 
between  the 
courts'  rigid  adherence  to  the  common  law  and  the  perceived 
realities  of  the  security  situation,  really  began  to  coma  to  a 
head  following  the  establishment  by  the  security  forces  of  spec- 
ialised  interrogation  contras,  notably  Castlereagh  and  Holywood. 
The  clearest  statement  of  judicial  attitudes  to  the  general 
admissiblity  of  confessions  in  a  non-terrorist  context  wau  O, 
Corr  C19681  Ni.  193.  a  domestic  murder.  In  the  course  of  police 
inquiries,  the  appellant  was  asked  to  visit  the  police  station 255 
where  he  was  interviewed  over  a  period  of  about  six  hours  at  the 
end  of  which  period  he  was  cautioned  and  made  a  formal  statement. 
(At  the  trial  no  challenge  was  raised  to  this  statement).  Corr 
was  released  at  that  stage  but  was  asked  to  visit  a  different 
police  station  the  following  day  where  he  was  again  interviewed, 
this  time  over  a  period  of  some  twelve  hours,  At  the  end  of  this 
second  period  he  made  a  further  statement  which  was  tantamount  to 
a  confession.  At  the  trial  objection  was  taken  to  the  second 
statement  on  the  basis  that  it.  was  not  voluntary  although  there 
was  no  suggestion  that  the  police  had  made  threats  or  promises  or 
engaged  in  searching  interrogation  or  oppressive  cross 
examination. 
The  objection,  and  ultimately  the  one  of  the  grounds  of  appeal, 
was  that  the  police  had  asked  certain  questions  and  made  certain 
comments  to  an  accused  person  who  was  in  custody  requiring 
answers  "so  that  he  was  deprived  of  the  free  and  voluntary 
agency"  of  refusing  to  answer  them.  As  a  result,  it  was  argued, 
the  statement  should  either  have  been  hold  to  have  been 
involuntary  and  hence  inadmissible  or  should  have  been  rejected 
by  the  trial  Judge  in  exercise  of  his  discretion  since  there  had 
been  a  breach  of  Rule  3  of  the  (1912/18)  Judges  Rules  which  was 
generally  regarded  as  forbidding  the  questioning  of  a  person  in 
custody.  1° 
In  the  event  the  court  hold  that  the  statement  was  correctly 
admitted,  but  Lord  MacDermott  L.  C.  I.  was  prepared  to  advance  the 256 
grounds  of  exclusion  beyond  the  old  "threat  or  promise  by  a 
person  in  authority"  rule: 
"The  rule  of  law  described  by  Lord  Sumner  cannot 
have  been  intended  to  apply  to  all  statements 
which  are  alleged  not  to  be  voluntary,  for  it 
relates  solely  to  the  conduct  of  persons  in 
authority;  and  it  is  plain  also  .,.  that  he  did 
not  intend  his  words  to  apply  necessarily  to  the 
questioning  by  a  person  in  authority  of  a  suspect 
in  custody.  ...  As  Lord  Sumner  indicated,  the  rule 
he  stated  is  one  of  policy  rather  than  logic, 
being  directed  ýo  the  control  of  those,  such  as 
the  police,  who  are  in  a  position  of  power  and 
authority.  But  ... 
it  would  be  verging  on  the 
irrational  to  limit  it  also  to  instances  of 
threats  or  inducement's  inspiring  fear  or  hope  so 
as  to  exclude  other  forms  of  conduct  by  the  same 
class  which  might  be  no  lees  capable  of  eroding 
the  will  of  the  suspect  concerned.  The  effect  of 
a  vigorous  cross-examination  ...  on  one  who  to  not 
free  to  get  away  from  his  questioner  may,  in 
certain  circumstances,  be  to  arouse  hope  of 
release  or  fear  of  further  detention  or  other 
prejudicial  result  in  the  mind  of  the  suspect, 
according  to  whether  or  not  he  makes  answers  or 
keeps  silent.  But  it  may  also  act  more  direclty 
by  subjecting  the  person  questioned  to  a  degree  of 257 
pressure  which  saps  his  will  and  makes  him  talk. 
We  think  such  pressure  may  well  lie  within  the 
principle  of  the  rule  enunciated  by  Lord  Sumner, 
although  not  within  its  express  terms,  and  may 
thus  suffice  to  make  statements  obtained  by  it 
inadmissible  in  point  of  law.  " 
Lord  MacDermott  repeated  and  somewhat  amplified  his  comments  in 
an  address  to  the  Bentham  Club  in  1968  11  but  it  was  to  be  1972 
before  the  question  of  the  admissiblity  of  a  statement  obtained 
from  a  terrorist  suspect  in  an  interrogation  contra  arose,  The 
case  concerned  was  Roman  unroporrtted  Pelfast  City 
Commission  May  10  1972.12  In  this  case  McGonigal  J.  had  to 
determine  the  admissiblity  of  a  statement  made  by  the  accused 
while  in  custody  in  Holywood  detention  centre.  Hie  Lordship 
rejected  an  allegation  of  physical  ill-treatment  but  then 
proceeded  to  exclude  the  statement  on  the  ground  of  oppression, 
apparently  the  first  time  a  statement  had  been  so  excluded  in 
either  England  or  Northern  Ireland. 
The  accused  had  been  detained  in  Holywood  for  about  28  hours 
where  he  was  interrogated  for  four  separate  periods  ranging  from 
25  to  100  minutes.  When  not  being  questioned  he  was  made  to  sit 
in  a  cubicle,  facing  a  wall,  on  a  chair  which  was  itself  placed 
facing  the  wall.  It  was  this  factor  which  the  Judge-found 
"oppressive"  rather  than  the  length  of  the  interrogation.  In 
particular  the  accused  was  on  one  occasion  left  sitting  in  the 258 
chair  from  mid-afternoon  until  shortly  after  midnight  when  he  was 
questioned  for  an  hour  before  being  returned  to  the  cubicle  for  a 
further  nine  hours  ("with  what  sleep  and  food  I  know  not"  as  his 
Lordship  put  it)  before  being  questioned  yet  again, 
McGoniga]  J.  specifically  discounted  any  question  of  the  courts 
creating  special  rules  of  admissiblity  for  terrorist  cases: 
"I  am  not  concerned  in  this  case  with  the  rights 
or  wrongs  of  interrogation  of-subversive  agents  or 
the  battle  against  subversive  activities.  I  am 
concerned  with  the  admissibility  of  this  statement 
and  the  application  of  the  legal  principles  con- 
cerned  in  a  criminal  case=  even  if  one  which  has  a 
subversive  flavour.  What  may  be  permissible  and 
necessary  for  the  protection  of  the  public  in  a 
fight  against  subversion  -  and  I  pass  no  judgmont 
one  way  or  the  other  on  that  ...  may  be  oppressive 
within  the  principles  covering  the  admissibility 
of  statements  in  the  criminal  courts  and  it  is 
that  test  which  has  to  be  applied  here.  It  may 
seem  that  there  is  a  conflict  between  public 
interests  but  if  so  it  is  not  for  me  to  resolve. 
I  can  only  apply  the  law  as  it  is  laid  down,  " 
Shortly  after  Garg8n  another  case  arising  from  Holywood  detention 
centre  came  before  Lord  Lowry  L.  G.  J.  in  R.  v  Flynn  and  Leonard 
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two  sets  of  statements  had  been  made,  the  first  immediately  after 
interrogation  at  the  centre  and  the  second  at  a  later  time. 
His  Lordship  took  the  view  that 
The  detention  centre  has  been  set  up,  as  it 
seems,  for  the  special  purpose  of  gathering 
intelligence  about  subversive  and  terrorist 
activities,  and  the  object  of  those  conducting  it 
it  to  extract  information  from  the  persons  who  are 
brought  there  for  the  purpose  of  being 
interrogated.  -Cautions  are  not  issued.  Several 
interrogations  may  take  place  and  they  may  take 
place  in  the  course  of  one  day  ...  the 
interrogation  set  up  was  officially  organised  and 
operated  in  order  to  obtain  information  and  in  the 
case  of  these  two  tdefendantsl  effectively  did 
conduce  towards  the  obtaining  of  information  from 
persons  who  would  otherwise  have  boon  less  willing 
to  give  it.  " 
The  first  sets  of  statements  were  accordingly  involuntary  and 
inadmissible  and  in  reaching  this  conclucion  his  Mordchip  also 
draw  an  interesting  distinction  between  "oppra  ive  conduct"  and 
"oppressive  circumstances",  the  former  involving  "something  wrong 
on  the  part  of  those  in  authority"  (as  in  q  r,  )  and  the  latter, 
as  in  the  present  case  implying  "the  creation  of  a  set-up  which 260 
makes  it  more  likely  that  those  who  did  not  wish  to  speak  will 
eventually  do  so.  " 
The  second  set  of  statements  were  also  ruled  inadmissible  because 
the  Crown  had  faied  to  prove  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
influence  of  the  earlier  circumstances  had  been  dissipated  before 
they  were  made. 
Like  McGonigal  J.,  Lord  Lowry  made  it  clear  that  the  courts  were 
not  prepared  to  make  any  concession  to  the  emergency  situation: 
"Whatever  the  history  of  the  test  (of  admics- 
iblity]  ...  may  be  ...  it  is  not  open  to  the  court 
to  substitute  a  different  test  based  on  some 
alternative  conception  of  fairness  or  on  the 
probability  or,  it  may  be  in  some  cases,  the  near 
certainty,  that  the  admissions  are  true.  To  do 
that  would  be  to  abandon  the  rule  of  law  and  to 
mould  the  pattern  of  criminal  justice  to  suit 
individual  circumstances.  "  11 
As  the  result  of  these  and  other  decisions  55  other  cases  were 
abandoned  by  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  between  January 
1972  and  April  1973  6n  the  ground  that  confessions  obtained  in 
such  circumstances  were  unlikely  to  be  held  admissible.  '& 
Notes 
1,  Review  of  the  Operation  of  the  Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act 
)979  Land  9222  (1984)  papa  33,  Hereinafter  "Baker  Report" 
2,  K  Boyle  et  al  Law  and  State  (London,  1975)  p168 261 
3,  RY  Mary  Johnston  (1864)-15  it  CLR  60 
4,112143  AC  discussed  supra  p 
5,  eg  A,  E,  Comerton  Confessions  in  the  Criminal  Law  (1964)  15  NILQ  166;  Lord 
MacDermott  rho  Interrogation  of  Suspects  in  Custody  (1968)  21  Current  Legal 
Problems  I  at  14; 
6,  RM  Murphy  01965)  N1  13ß 
7,  Lord  MacDermott  op  tit  note  5  supra  at  p14;  0,  S,  Greer  Ad'auissrbllity  of 
Confessions  and  the  Coiaun  Law  in  Times  of  Esargency  [19733  NILf1  199  at  209 
n64 
8,0,  S,,  Greer  op  cit  note  7  supra 
9.  Rv  Clarke  11973LNLA 
10,  supra 
11,  Lord  MacOermott  op  cit  note  5  supra 
12,  The  references  to  and  quotations  from  this  case  come  from  D,  S,  Greer  op  cit 
note  7  supra 
13,  This  case  is  apparently  reported  in  the  Northern  Ireland  Judicial  Bulletin 
to  which  the  writer  has  no  access,  The  references  and  quotations  are  once 
again  taken  fron  0,5,  Greer  op  tit  note  7  supra 
14,  In  commenting  on  this  case,  0,5,  Greer  makes  the  pertinent  point  that  the 
leading  English  case  on  illegally  obtained  evidence,  j  ma  v  $ý,  J,  j.  Q,  zA 
ill,  arose  from  the  emergency  in  Kenya  and  there  was  nothing  in  the  advice 
of  the  Privy  Council  to  suggest  that  there  should  be  "special"  rules  for 
"special"  circumstances, 
15,  H,  C,  Deb,  Vol  855  col  388  (17  April  1973) 262 
9.3  Detention.  Internment  and  Associated  Abi  ss 
(i)  The  Legal  Basis  for  Detention  and  Internm 
_nt 
Reference  has  previously  been  made  to  the  power  available  to  the 
police  and  army-under  the  Special  Powers  Act  to  arrest  and  detain 
virtually  anybody  for  up  to  48  hours  for  the  purpose  of 
interrogation.  '- 
In  addition  to  this  power,  the  Northern  Ireland  government  had 
draconian  powers  under  the  Special  Powers  Act  to  arrest  and 
detain  without  trial  (i.  e.  intern)  any  person  who  was  suspected 
of  acting,  having  acted  or  being  about  to  act  "in  a  manner 
prejudicial  to  the  preservation  of  the  peace  or  maintainance  of 
order.  "  The  final  responsibility  for  making  an  internment  order 
lay  with  the  Minister  of  Home  Affairs  who  was  entitled  to  order 
the  continued  detention  of  any  person  so  suspected  where  it 
appeared  to  him  to  be  expedient  for  securing  the  preservation  of 
peace  and  the  maintainance  of  order.  2 
This  power  was  used  from  time  to  time  but  before  the  outbreak  of 
the  troubles  in  1969  it  had  not  been  used  on  any  appreciable 
scale  since  1962.  However  following  the  outbreak  of  carious 
large  scale  violence  there  was  considerable  pressure  on  the 
Stormont  government  to  use  internment  and  it  was  brought  in, 
apparently  against  the  wishes  of  the  army,  in  August  1971.  There 
was  a  large-scale  round-up  of  persons  who  were  suspected 
(sometimes  on  rather  dubious  intelligence)  of  subversive 263 
activities.  The  political  and  military  effects  seem  to  have  been 
largely  counter-productive,  aithought  these  issues  are  outwith 
the  scope  of  this  work,  but  the  most  important  point  is  that  the 
operations  of  the  security  forces,  particularly'  that  on  9th 
August  1971,  threw  into  graphic  relief  exactly  what  could  happen 
when  normal  legal  controls  on  arrest,  search  and  interrogation 
were  removed.  These  issues  are  discussed  further  below. 
When  direct  rule  was  introduced  in  March  1972,  the  Westminster 
government  initially  hoped  to  phase  out  internment  while  seeking 
a  political  solution,  but  once  the  truce  with  the  I.  R.  A.  coll- 
apsed  it  became  apparent  that  this  objective  was  impractical  in 
the  short  term.  Although  a  substantial  number  of  existing 
detainees  were  released,  it  was  decided  to  introduce  a  now  system 
of  detention  without  trial  and  in  particular  to  replace  the 
executive  power  of  the  (now  abolished)  Minister  of  Home  Affairs 
under  the  Special  Powers  Act  with  a  system  of  judicial 
determination.  Under  the  new  regime,  detention  without  trial  was 
portrayed  not  as  a  weapon  of  government  against  readily 
identifiable  enemies  of  the  state  (as  it  had  been  by  the 
Unionists),  but  rather  as  a  means  of  dealing  with  suspected 
terrorists  who  could  not  adequately  be  dealt  with  in  the  ordinary 
courts  whether  by  reason  of  the  intimidation  of  witnesses  or  the 
inadmissiblity  of  evidence,  0' 
This  now  approach  led  to  the  passing  of  the  Detention  of 
Terrorists  Order  1972,  shortly  to  be  incorporated-into  the 264 
Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1973.  The  details  of 
the  system  introduced  by  the  1972  Order  are  not  directly  relevant 
to  this  work,  and  in  any  event  internment  ended  in  1975,  but 
broadly  stated  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Northern  Ireland  or  one 
of  his  ministerial  deputies  had  to  make  an  "interim  custody 
order"  which  authorised  the  detention  for  a  period  of  twenty 
eight  days  of  a  person  "suspected  of  having  been  concerned  in  the 
commission  or  attempted  commission  of  any  act  of  terrorism  or  in 
the  direction,  organisation  or  training  of  persons  for  the 
purpose  of  terrorism.  " 
Thereafter  the  case  was  heard  by  a  judicially  qualified 
Commissioner  who  had  to  hold  a  formal  hearing  and  had  to  be 
satisfied  not  only  that  the  suspect  had  been  "concerned  in  the 
commission  or  attempted  commission  of  any  act  of  terrorism  or  in 
the  direction,  organisation  or  training  of  persons  for  the 
purpose  of  terrorism"  but  also  that  his  detention  "was  necessary 
for  the  protection  of  the  public".  If  he  was  so  satisfied,  the 
Commissioner  would  make  a  detention  order.  There  were  provisione 
for  appeal  and  review  of  such  orders  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
could  order  the  release  at  any  time  of  a  person  subject  to  either 
an  interim  custody  order  or  a  detention  order. 
The  procedure  introduced  by  the  1972  Order  was  much  less  open  to 
criticism  than  the  powers  of  simple  executive  action  available 
under  the  Special  Powers  Act.  In  effect  in  each  case  a  charge  of 
what  amounted  to  criminal  conduct  had  to  be  established  to  tho 265 
satisfaction  of"a  judicial  Commissioner  at  a  formal  hearing 
though  without  any  restriction  on  the  admissibility  of  evidence. 
It  has  been  stated  °  that  the  way  in  which  the  1972  system 
operated  in  practice  emphasised  the  "military  security"  nature  of 
the  detention  process  in  contrast  to  the  normal  procedures  for 
judicial  prosecution. 
Notes 
1,  supra 
2,  K,  Boyle  at  at  lam  and  State  ppSa-58 
3.  Boyle  op  cit  note  2  supra  p58  et  seq 
4,  Boyle  op  cit  note2  supra  p61 
(ii)  "Interrogation  Depth"  -  The-Compton  and  -Parker  e  is 
The  removal  of  the  normal  legal  controls  on  the  exercise  of 
powers  of  arrest,  search  and  interrogation  inherent  in  the 
process  of  internment  meant  that  the  Army  and  the  police  were 
free  to  organise  their  security  operations  virtually  as  they 
pleased.  As  Boyle  et  al  put  it  "the  policies  and  practice  of  the 
various  branches  of  the  police  and  army  were  accordingly  guided 
and  controlled  more  by  their  own  internal  constraints  and  values 
than  by  the  provisions  of  the  law.  " 
The  dangers  of  this  situation  became  terribly  apparent  following 
the  large-scale  swoop  on  suspected  terrorists  on  9th  August  1971. 
Boyle  at  al  comment  that  prior  to  the  introduction  of  internment 
there  had  been  "no  more  than  the  occasional  allegation  of 
improper  conduct"  made  against  the  R.  U.  C.,  but  following  this 
operation  "there  was  a  flood  of  complaints  against  the  security 266 
forces  of  torture  and  brutality  in  the  treatment  of  many  of  those 
arrested  and  in  particular  those  taken  to  a  special  interrogation 
centre  established  at  Holywood  Barracks  in  Belfast.  "  The 
complaints  reached  the  stage  where  the  British  government 
appointed  a  Committee  of  Inquiry  headed  by  Sir  Edmund  Compton  to 
investigate  them.  01 
Compton's  inquiries  established  that  the  initial  arrests  had  been 
made  by  parties  of  soldiers  early  in  the  morning  of  9th  August. 
The  persons  arrested  were  taken  to  one  of  three  regional  holding 
centres  where  their  identities  were  confirmed  and  they  were 
interviewed  by  officers  of  the  R.  U.  G.  special  branch  after  which 
It  was  decided  whether  they  should  be  released  or  further 
detained.  A  limited  number  of  those  selected  for  detention  were 
subjected  to  "interrogation  in  depth"  and  this  was  where  most  of 
the  complaints  arose.  The  complaints  related  to  ancillary 
matters  rather  than  the  actual  Interrogation  itself,  and  in 
particular  to  what  became  known  as  the  "five  techniques"  i.  e. 
wall-standing,  hooding,  noise,  bread  and  water  diet  and  sleep 
deprivation. 
Although  it  never  became  clear  who  organized  and  directed  the 
system  of  interrogation  in  depth,  it  was  apparent  that  both  the 
army  and  the  R.  U.  C.  were'  involved.  The  Parker  Committee,  who,  ar, 
will  be  discussed  later,  also  investigated  interrogation 
procedures  noted; 
"One  of  the  unsatisfactory  features  ...  has  boon 267 
the  fact  that  no  rules  or  guidelines  have  been 
laid  down  to  restrict  the  degree  to  which  these 
techniques  can  properly  be  applied,  Indeed  it 
cannot  be  assumed  that  any  U.  K.  minister  has  ever 
had  the  full  nature  of  these  particular  techniques 
brought  to  his  attention,  and,  consequently,  that 
he  has  ever  specifically  authorised  their  use,  "4 
The  government  provided  Compton  with  a  note  of  policy  in  relation 
to  interrogation  methods  5  which  explained  that  the  techniques 
then  in  use  had  been  employed  in  many  previous  internal  security 
operations  since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  and  had  most 
recently  been  revised  following  a  report  on  the  Aden  situation. 
The  rules  stated  that  "Subjects  are  to  be  treated  humanely  but 
with  strict  discipline"  and  they  expressly  forbade  "violence  to 
life  and  person,  in  particular  mutilation,  cruel  treatment  and 
torture.  "  Also  forbidden  were  "outrages  upon  personal  dignity,  in 
particular  humiliating  and  degrading  treatment.  "  However  the 
note  also  contained  the  government's  view  that; 
"The  precise  application  of  these  general  rules  in 
particular  circumstances  is  inevitably  to  some 
extent  a  matter  of  judgment  on  the  part  of  those 
immediately  responsible  for  the  operations  in 
, 
question.  Intelligence  it  the  key  to  successful 
operations  against  terrorists;  and  the  key  to 
intelligence  is  information  regarding  their 
operations  their  dispositions  and  their  plans. 266 
When  combatting  a  terrorist  campaign  time  is  of 
the  essence;  information  must  be  sought  while  it 
is  still  fresh  so  that  it  may  be  used  as  quickly 
as  possible  to  effect  the  capture  of  persons,  arms 
and  explosives  and  thereby  save  the  lives  of 
members  of  the  security  forces  and  of  the  civil 
population. 
Information  can  be  obtained  more  rapidly  if  the 
person  being  interrogated  is  subjected  to  strict 
discipline  and  isolation,  with  a  restricted  diet= 
but  violence  or  humiliating  treatment  ,.,  are 
forbidden,  ...  11 
Compton  established  that  the  security  forces  had  used  the  "five 
techniques"  to  disorientate  those  being  questioned  and  so  to 
break  down  their  resistance.  Detainees  were  indeed  required  on 
occasions  to  wear  black  hoods,  were  exposed  to  continuous, 
monotonous  noise,  were  deprived  of  food  and  sloop  and  wore 
required  to  stand  against  a  wall  with  their  hands  raised  against 
it  sometimes  for  lengthy  periods. 
Compton  drew  a  somewhat  arcane  distinction  between  on  the  one 
hand  "brutality",  which  is  described  as  "an  inhuman  or  savage 
form  of  cruelty,  and  that  cruelty  implies  a  disposition  to 
inflict  suffering,  coupled  with  indifference  to,  or  pleasure  in, 
the  victim's  pain",  and  on  the  other  hand  "physical  ill- 269 
treatment".  6  The  conclusion  was  that  the  detainees  had  been 
subject  to  "physical  ill-treatment"  (but  not  to  "brutality"), 
although  in  the  case  of  "wall  standing"  the  ill-treatment  lay  in 
the  action  taken  to  enforce  the  posture  rather  than  the  posture 
itself,  7 
Compton's  remit  was  purely  factual  and  his  Committee  was  not 
called  on  to  consider  the  legality  of  the  techniques  and 
following  their  report  a  further  committee,  this  time  of  Privy 
Counsellors,  was  appointed  under  Lord  Parker  to  consider  whether 
interrogation  in  depth  should  be  allowed  to  continue.  a 
The  Parker  Report  is  a  fascinating  document  principally  becausb 
of  the  powerful  dissenting  minority  report  by  Lord  Gardiner.  The 
Committee  was  unable  to  reach  agreement  on  the  main  issue  of 
policy  before  it,  It  was  generally  agreed  that  some  of  the 
practices  described  by  Compton  might  well  be  unlawful,  but  the 
majority  view  of  the  Committee  was  that  the  security  situation 
demanded  tough  interrogation  techniques  and  subject  to  proper 
safeguards  for  those  being  interrogated 
"There  is  no  reason  to  rule  out.  these  techniques 
on  moral  grounds  and  ...  it  is  possible  to  operate 
them  in  a  manner  consistent  with  the  highest 
standards  of  out  society.  "  9 
Perhaps  surprisingly,  '  and  certainly  to  the  credit  of  the 
Westminster  government,  it  was  Lord  Gardiner'c  powerful 270 
dissenting  view  which  was  to  prevail.  His  Lordship  argued  that 
the  use  of  hooding,  wall-standing,  deprivation  of  diet  and 
deprivation  of  sleep  were  civilly  and  criminally  illegal  under 
domestic  law  and  nothing  in  any  existing  law  (including  the 
regulations  under  the  Special  Powers  Act)  extended  ordinary 
police  powers  of  interrogation  or  did  anything  to  validate  the 
procedures.  "That  being  so,  "  concluded  his  Lordship 
unequivocally,  "No  Army  Directive  and  no  Minister  could  lawfully 
or  validly  have  authorised  the  use  of  the  procedures.  Only 
Parliament  can  alter  the  law.  The  procedures  were  and  are 
illegal.  "  "I 
Lord  Gardiner  was  also  extremely  sceptical  of  the  claim  that  the 
use  of  the  techniques  had  led  to  the  obtaining  of  intelligence 
information  which  would  not  have  been  obtained,  or  not  obtained 
so  quickly,  by  other  means.  He  pointed  to  experience  during  the 
Second  World  War  when  prisoners  were  treated  with  kindness  and 
courtesy  but  nevertheless  much  intelligence  information  was 
gathered,  often  very  quickly,  by  interrogation,  the  cross- 
referencing  of  information  and  the  use  of  microphones  and  "stool 
pigeons.  "  11 
In  Lord  Gardiners  opinion,  the  real  question  for  the  Parker 
Committee  was  whether  they  should  recommend  that  Parliament 
"Should  enact  legislation  making  lawful  in 
emergency  conditiono  the  i11-treatment  by  the 
police,  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  information, 271 
of  suspects  who  are  believed  to  have  such 
information,  and,  if  so,  providing  for  what  degree 
of  ill-treatment  and  subject  to  what  limitations 
and  safeguards.  "  '2 
Not  surprisingly,  his  Lordship  was  not  in  favour  of  such  a 
recommendation  and  he  put  forward  several  reasons  against  it 
including  lack  of  moral  justification,  difficulties  in  setting 
fixed  limits  on  the  amount  of  noise,  wall-standing  or  whatever 
and  the  effect  on  the  reputation  of  Great  Britain  in  the 
international  community.  Two  of  his  Lordship's  reasons  deserve 
to  be  set  out  in  fulls 
"(2)  If  it  is  to  be  made  legal  to  employ  methods 
not  now  legal  against  a  man  whom  the  police 
believe  to  have,  but  who-may  not  have,  information 
which  the  police  desire  to  obtain,  I,  like  many  of 
our  witnesses,  have  searched  for,  but  been  unable 
to  find,  either  in  logic  or  in  morals,  any  limit 
to  the  degree  of  ill-treatment  to  be  legalised. 
The  only  logical  limit  ...  would  appear  to  be 
whatever  degree  of  ill-treatment  proves  to  be 
necessary  to  got  the  information  out  of  him,  which 
would  include,  if  necessary,  extreme  torture, 
... 
(4)  It  appears  to  me  that  the  recommendations  ... 
(of  the  majority)  ...  necessarily  envisage  one  of 
two  courses. 272 
One  is  that  parliament  should  enact  legislation 
enabling  a  minister  in  a  time  of  civil  emergency 
...  to  fix  the  limits  of  permissible  degrees  of 
ill-treatment  to  be  employed  when  interrogating 
suspects  and  that  such  limits  should  then  be  kept 
secret. 
I  should  respectfully  object  to  this,  first 
because  the  Minister  would  have  just  as  much 
difficulty  as  Parliament  would  have  in  fixing  the 
limits  of  ill-treatment  and,  secondly,  because  I 
view  with  abhorrence  any  proposal  that  a  Minister 
should  in  effect  be  empowered  to  make  secret  laws; 
it  would  mean  that  United  Kingdom  citizens  would 
have  no  right  to  know  what  the  law  was  about 
police  powers  of  interrogation. 
The  other  course  is  that  a  Minister  should  fix 
such  secret  limits  without  the  authority  of 
Parliament,  that  is  to  say  illegally,  and  then,  if 
found  out,  ask  Parliament  for  an  Act  of  Indemnity. 
I  should  respectfully  object  even  more  to  this 
because  it  would  in  my  view  be  a  flagrant  breach 
of  the  whole  basis  of  the  Rule  of  Law  and  of  the 
principles  of  democratic  government.  "  13 273 
As  already  stated,  the  government  eventually  adopted  Lord 
Gardiner's  view  rather  than  that  of  the  majority  and  in  1972  it 
was  announced  that  no  further  use  of  the  "five  techniques"  would 
be  permitted.  14  This,  coupled  with  new  procedures  for  frequent 
medical  examinations  of  those  under  interrogation,  had  the  effect 
of  bringing  about  a  marked  reduction  in  the  direct  physical  ill- 
treatment  of  suspects  which  had  undoubtedly  occurred  in  1971  and 
1972. 
Some  three  years  later  Lord  Gardiner  himself  chaired  a  committee 
which  reviewed  the  working  of  the  Northern  Ireland  (Emergency 
Provisions)  Act  1973  in  the  context  of  civil  liberties.  's  That 
Committee  noted: 
"[B]ut  violence  has  in  the  pact  provoked  a  violent 
response,  The  adoption  of  methods  of 
interrogation  "in  depth"  which  involved  forms  of 
ill-treatment  that  are  described  in  the  Compton 
Report  did  not  last  for  long.  Following  the 
report  of  the  Parker  Committee  in  1972  these 
methods  were  declared  unlawful  and  were  stopped  by 
the  British  Government;  but  the  resentment  caused 
was  intense,  widespread  and  persistent,  " 
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(iii)  The  ro  e  a-  The  United  Kingdom 
The  United  Kingdom  was  one  of  the  original  signatories  to  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  which  was  promulgated  in  1950 
with  a  view  to  protecting  the  human  rights  and  fundamental 
freedoms  of  everyone  within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  of  the 
signatory  states.  Two  organs  are  provided  to  enforce  the 
convention,  the  European  Commission  on  Human  Rights  and  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights  which  for  the  remainder  of  this 
section  will  be  referred  to  as  the  "Commission"  and  the  "Court" 
respectively. 
For  the  purpose  of  the  present  discussion,  the  most  important 
Article  of  the  Convention  is  Article  3  which  provides: 
"No  one  shall  be  subjected  to  torture  or  to 
inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  or  punishment,  " 
Article  15  of  the  Convention  permits  member  states  to  derogate 
from  certain  of  the  rights  and  freedoms  which  it  provides  if 
there  is  a  public  emergency  which  threatens  the  life  of  the 
nation.  Among  the  first  derogations  from  the  Conventions  was  a 
notice  from  the  United  Kingdom  in  respect  of  Northern  Ireland  on 
27  June  1957  which  was  to  remain  in  force  until  withdrawn  in 
1984.1 
The  right  of  derogation  is  not  absolute.  Even  where  notice  of 
derogation  is  given,  it  is  clear  that  the  Commission  and  the 276 
Court  consider  themselves  entitled  and  empowered  to  review  the 
right  of  the  state  to  derogate  from  protected  rights  in  the  first 
place  and  to  determine,  given  that  derogation  is  held  to  have 
been  permissible,  whether  the  state  has  taken  such  measures  only 
to  the  extent  strictly  required  by  the  exigencies  of  the 
situation.  In  addition,  Article  15  prohibits  derogation  from 
certain  Articles,  including  Article  3,  under  any  circumstances. 
The  procedure  for  enforcing  the  Convention  is  fairly  straight- 
forward.  Under  Article  24  one  state  may  refer  to  the  Commission 
any  alleged  breach  of  the  Convention  by  another  state.  2  There 
are  formidable  procedural  hurdles  to  be  overcome,  including  the 
need  to  ensure  that  all  domestic  remedies  have  boon  exhausted, 
but  if  it  overcomes  these  hurdles,  the  referral  will  be 
considered  and  investigated  by  the  Commission  with  a  view  to 
effecting  a  friendly  settlement.  If  an  amicable  solution  cannot 
be  reached,  the  Commission  will  prepare  a  report  in  which  it  will 
establish  the  facts  and  express  its  views  whether  the  facto  found 
disclose  a  breach  of  the  Convention.  The  report  will  be  sent  to 
the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of  Europe  and  to  the 
states  concerned.  Within  three  months  of  the  Commission  adopting 
its  report,  the  Commission  itself  or  either  of  the  states 
concerned  may  refer  the  matter  to  the  Court  for  judgment  which  is 
final  and  binding.  3  If  there  is  no  referral  to  the  Court,  the 
Committee  of  Ministers  may  decide,  by  ,a  two-thirds  majority, 
whether  there  has  been  a  violation  of  the-Convention  and  what 277 
steps  the  state  concerned  must  take.  This  decision  is  also 
binding. 
While  these  procedures  are  legally  straightforward,  and  generally 
effective  in  enforcing  the  Convention,  they  are  extremely  time 
consuming.  The  litigation  with  which  this  section  is  concerned, 
Ireland  v  The  United  Kingdom  began  with  the  filing  of  charges  in 
December  1971,  the  Commission  adopted  its  report  in  January  1976, 
the  case  was  referred  to  the  Court  by  the  Irish  government  in 
March  1976  and  the  Court  delivered  its  judgment  in  January  1978, 
the  process  thus  having  taken  six  years  and  one  month.  4 
The  Irish  application  related  to  a  number  of  matters,  but  the 
issue  of  concern  to  the  present  discussion  is  the  allegation  that 
detainees  in  Northern  Ireland  were  subject  to  torture  or  inhuman 
or  degrading  treatment  contrary  to  Article  3.  The  Commission's 
report  is  vast,  even  the  summarised  version  running  to  over  200 
pages  of  English  text,  more  than  half  of  which  concern  this 
allegation.  11 
The  Irish  allegation  related  not  only  to  the  use  of  the  "five 
techniques"  but  also  to  other  forms  of  ill-treatment  at  various 
army  and  police  centres,  principally  physical  violence,  special 
exercises  and  other  forms  of  distressing  treatment.  The  British 
government  admitted  the  use  of  the  "five  techniques"  but  the 
other  forms  of  ill-treatment  were  the  subject  of  factual  dispute. 
One  issue  which  loomed  large  in  the  Commission's  report,  although 278 
it  is  peripheral  to  the  present  discussion,  was  the  question  of 
whether  there  was  an  "administativ©  practice"  of  inhuman 
treatment  by  the  British  government.  Since  the  use  of  the  "five 
techniques"  was  admitted,  there  was  clearly  such  a  practice  in 
respect  of  them,  but  in  relation  to  the  other  forms  of  ill- 
treatment  it  was  necessary  for  the  Commission  to  decide  whether 
such  a  practice  existed.  This  obviously  caused  some  difficulty 
but  the  eventual  conclusion  was  that  such  a  practice  did  exist  in 
respect  of  the  other  forms  of  ill-treatment.  - 
The  Irish  government  submitted  written  evidence  of  228  cases  of 
alleged  ill-treatment,  16  of  which  were  ultimately  examined  in 
detail  by  the  Commission  as  "illustrative"  cases  and  specific 
findings  were  reached  only  in  respect  of  these  cases.  The 
Commission  heard  119  witnesses,  of  whom  no  fewer  than  100  related 
to  the  Article  3  issue.  In  general  it  uphold  the  major 
allegations  made  by  the  Irish  government  and  it  concluded,  inter 
alia,  that: 
(a)  the  combined  use  in  1971  of  the  "five 
techniques"  as  an  aid  to  the  interrogation  of 
fourteen  persons  amounted  to  a  practice  of  inhuman 
treatment  and  torture  to  breach  of  Article  3; 
(b)  ten  other  persons  had  suffered  inhuman 
treatment  contrary  to  Article  3  and  there  had  been 
in  1971  at  Palace  Barracks,  Holywood,  near  Belfast 
a  practice  in  connection  with  the  interrogation  of 279 
prisoners  which  was  inhuman  treatment  in  breach  of 
Article  3. 
The  Commission  started  from  a  notion  of  "inhuman  treatment"  which 
included  "at  least  such  treatment  as  deliberately  causes  severe 
suffering,  mental  or  physical,  which,  in  the  particular  situation 
is  unjustifiable.  "  Torture  was  defined  as  "inhuman  treatment 
which  has  a  purpose  such  as  the  obtaining  of  information  or 
confessions  or  the  infliction  of  punishment"  while  degrading 
treatment  was  treatment  which  was  "grossly  humiliating  or  drives 
an  individual  to  act  against  his  will  or  conscience.  "  Non- 
physical  torture  was  "the  infliction  of  mental  suffering  by 
creating  a  state  of  anguish  and  stress  by  means  other  than  bodily 
assault.  " 
The  Commission  expressly  rejected  the  view  of  the  majority  of  the 
Parker  Committee  that  there  might  be  circumstances  which  would 
justify  conduct  which  violated  Article  3.7  The  Commission 
stated  ex  officio  that  it 
"finds  it  necessary  to  state  clearly  that  it  did 
not  have  in  mind  the  possibility  that  there  could 
be  a  justification  for  any  treatment  in  breach  of 
Article  3  ...  The  prohibition  under  Article  3  of 
the  Convention  is  an  absolute  one  and  ...  there 
can  never  be  under  the  Convention  or  under 
international  laws  a  Justification  for  acts  in 
breach  of  that  provision,  "  El 280 
The  case  eventually  reached  the  Court  in  1976  but  judgment  was 
not  issued  until  18  January  1978,9  Before  the  Court,  the  British 
government  did  not  contest  the  Commission's  opinion  on  the  two 
finding  in  relation  to  Article  3  and  also  gave  an  unqualified 
undertaking  that  the  "five  techniques"  would  not  in  any 
circumstances  be  reintroduced  as  an  aid  to  interrogation. 
Although  the  Court  took  note  of  the  undertaking,  and  the  breaches 
of  Article  3  were  not  contested,  nonetheless  it  held  that  a 
ruling  should  be  given. 
The  Court  noted  firstly  that  the  "five  techniques"  were  applied 
in  combination  and  with  premeditation  and  for  hours  at  a  stretch, 
and  caused,  if  not  actual  bodily  injury,  at  least  intense 
physical  and  mental  suffering  and  led  to  acute  psychiatric 
disturbances  during  interrogation.  Secondly  the  Court  noted 
that  the  techniques  were  such  as  to  arouse  in  the  victims 
feelings  of  fear,  anguish  and  inferiority  capable  of  debasing  and 
humiliating  them  and  possibly  breaking  their  physical  or  moral 
resistance. 
In  relation  to  the  general  issues  the  Court  hold: 
Cl)  by  sixteen  votes  to  one  that  recourse  to  the  "five 
techniques"  amounted  to  a  practice  of  inhuman  and  degrading 
treatment; 
(ii)  by  thirteen  votes  to  four  that  the  use  of  the  techniques  did 
not  constitute  a  practice  of  torture  since  they  did  not  occasion 281 
suffering  of  the  particular  intensity  and  cruelty  implied  by  the 
word  torture. 
As  to  Palace  Barracks,  the  Court  considered  that  the  evidence 
before  it  disclosed  that,  in  the  autumn  of  1971,  quite  a  large 
number  of  persons  held  in  custody  there  had  been  subjected  by 
members  of  the  Royal  Ulster  Constabulary  to  violence  (for  example 
kicking  and  beating)  which  led  to  intense  suffering  and  to 
physical  injury  that  on  occasion  was  substantial.  The  Court 
held: 
Q)  unanimously,  that  there  had  existed  at  Palace  Barracks  in  the 
autumn-of  1971  a  practice  of  inhuman  treatment; 
(ii)  by  fourteen  votes  to  three  that  the  said  practice  was  not 
one  of  torture  since  the  severity  of  the  suffering  capable  of 
being  caused  by  the  acts  complained  of.  did  not  attain  the 
particular  level  inherent  in  the  notion  of  torture; 
(iii)  unanimously,  that  it  was  not  established  that  the  practice 
continued  beyond  the  autumn  of  1971. 
The  Court  described  the  treatment  of  detainees  at  Ballykinlor 
military  camp  in  August  1971,  which  included  the  compulsory 
performance  of  painful  exercises,  as  a  discreditable  and 
reprehensible  practice;  however,  it  hold,  by  fifteen  votes  to 
two,  that  this  practice  did  not  infringe  Article  3. 
The  Court  also  considered  that  the  information  before  it 
suggested  that  there  must  have  been  individual  cacec  of  violation 282 
of  article  3  in  various  other  places  in  northern  Ireland,  It 
concluded,  however,  by  fifteen  votes  to  two  that  no  practice  in 
breach  of  Article  3  was  established  as  regards  such  places. 
Finally,  the  Court  held  unanimously  that  it  could  not  direct,  as 
the  Irish  government  had  requested,  the  United  Kingdom  to 
institute  criminal  or  disciplinary  proceedings  against  those  who 
had  committed,  condoned  or  tolerated  the  breaches  of  Article  3 
found  by  the  Court. 
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Provisions)  Acts  1973  and  1.978 
Despite  the  previously  described  changes  in  procedure,  internment 
was  considered  to  be  undesireable  in  principle  and  the  government 
was  still  anxious  to  use  it  as  little  as  possible.  There  was  a 
definite  danger  that  internment  could  replace  the  normal  legal 
process  entirely  as  the  means  of  dealing  with  terrorist  suspects. 
A  Commission  was  accordingly  set  up  in  1972  under  Lord  Diplock  to 
consider  "What  arrangements  for  the  administration  of  justice  in 
Northern  Ireland  could  be  made  in  order  to  deal  more  effectively 
with,  terrorist  organisations  by  bringing  to  book,  otherwise  than 
by  internment  by  the  Executive,  individuals  involved  in  terrorist 
activities,  particularly  those  who  plan  and  direct,  but  do  not 
necessarily  take  part  in,  terrorist  acts;  and  to  make 
recommendations.  "  ' 
To  an  extent  the  Diplock  Commission's  work  was  overtaken  by 
events  when  the  Detention  of  Terroristo  Order  1972  was  passed, 
but  nevertheless  they  carried  on  and  produced  their  report  in  the 
remarkably  short  period  of  two  months.  Their  speed  has  been 
criticised  as  "undue  haste"  2  and  although  they  took  evidence 
from  various  persons  concerned  with  the  administration  of  justice 
in  Northern  Ireland,  there  in  no  doubt  that  the  Diplock 
Commission's  report  was  rightly  criticised  in  parliament  and 
elsewhere  as  lacking  factual  evidence  to  juetify  the  radical 
changes  which  were  proposed.  When  taxed  with  this  point  in  the 284 
House  of  Lards,  Lord  Diplock's  response  showed,  for  a  Judge,  a 
somewhat  curt  approach  to  the  question  of  proofs 
"When  I  see  a  fire  starting,  and  indeed  we  saw  a 
fire  starting  then,  I  send  for  the  fire  brigade, 
not  a  statistician,  "  2ok 
This  is  not,  of  course,  to  say  either  that  such  evidence  did  not 
exist  or  that  the  changes  to  which  the  Diplock  Report  led  were 
not  necessary  or  appropriate.  To  a  considerable  extent  the 
Gardiner  Committee  which  reported  in  1975  justified  Diplock's 
views  ex  post  facto  and  the  Baker  Report  of  1984  contained  a 
chilling  description  of  two  specific  incidents  involving 
intimidation  of  juries.  In  one  case  a  juror  described  as  "large 
and  powerful"  was  in  such  a  state  aftqr  a  night  of  telephone 
threats  that  he  was  reduced  to  begging  in  tears  to  be  excused. 
The  trial  Judge  was  forced  to  excuoe  the  whole  jury,  In  another 
case,  involving  a  Loyalist,  the  intimidation  was  more  subtle  and 
involved  the  intermittent  beating  of  a  Lambeg  drum  at  coma 
distance  from  the  court  but  sufficiently  loudly  to'bo  heard  by 
the  Jury.  21 
The  Diplock  Commission  laid  much  stresc  on  the  danger  of  intim- 
idation,  principally  of  potential  witnesses,  but  alto  of  jurors, 
and  took  the  view  that  until  the  fear  of  intimidation  could  be 
removed  and  the  safety  of  witnesses  and  their  familiec 
guaranteed,  the  use  of  some  extra-judicial  process  for  the 
detention  of  terrorists  could  not  be  dispensed  with.  4  However 285 
they  made  various  far-reaching  recommendations  -for  changes  in  the 
criminal  process  to  enable  at  least  come  of  the  cases  presently 
being  dealt  with  by  internment  to  come  before  the  ordinary 
courts.  The  Commission  were  at  pains  to  point  out  that  their 
proposals  were  only  intended  to  take  effect  only  for  a  limited 
class  of  crimes  and  only  so  long  as  the  emergency  situation 
lasted.  Their  proposals  were  not  intended  to  affect  the  general 
criminal  law  of  Northern  Ireland. 
The  Diplock  Commission  began  by  identifying  a  number  of  crimes 
commonly  committed  by  members  of  terrorist  organisations,  which 
they  called  the  "Scheduled  Offences".  r-  When  a  scheduled  offence 
was  tried  on  indictment,  the  trial  should  be  before  a  judge 
sitting  alone  without  a  jury.  When  they  turned  specifically  to 
the  issue  of  confessions,  7  the  Commission  reviewed  the  existing 
law  and  implicitly  criticised  the  decision  in  R  vFlynn  and 
Leonard': 
"Although  not  strictly  rules  of  law  but  rules  of 
general  guidance  from  which  the  Judge  who  tries  a 
case  has  a  discretion  to  depart,  [the  Judges' 
Rules]  appear  to  have  been  applied  in  Northern 
Ireland  with  considerable  rigidity  as  if  they  were 
a  statutory  requirement  from  which  no  departure  is 
permissible.  In  a  recent  decision  the  court  ,,. 
has  ruled  that,  the  more  creation  by  the 
authorities  of  any  'set  up  which  makes  it  more 
likely  that  those  who  did  not  wish  to  speak  will 286 
eventually  do  so',  renders  involuntary  and 
therefore  inadmissible  in  a  court  of  law  any 
confession  subsequently  made  even  though  the 
actual  statement  sought  to  be  relied  upon  was  made 
in  writing  after  the  accused  had  been  expressly 
cautioned  and  notwithstanding  that  its  contents 
are  such  that  no  man  who  was  not  guilty  could  have 
had  knowledge  of  the  facts  that  it  discloses.  " 
Professor  Greer  has  pointed  out  that  this  criticism  is 
misconceived  and  confuses  two  separate  issues  -  the  question  of 
mandatory  exclusion  of  an  involuntary  statement  and  the  question 
of  exclusionary  discretion  where  there  has'been  a  breach  of  the 
Judges  Rules.  The  latter  issue  was  not  before  the  court  in 
either  O$  or  Elyn￿r  end  LeonsEd. 
In  another  implicit  criticism  of  the  courts  the  Diplock 
Commission  went  on  10 
The  whole  technique  of  skilled  interrogation  is 
to  build  up  an  atmosphere  in  which  the  initial 
desire  to  remain  silent  Is  replaced  by  an  urge  to 
confide  in  the  questioner.  This  does  not  involve 
cruel  or  degrading  treatment.  Such  treatment  in 
regarded  by  those  responsible  for  gathering 
intelligence  as  counter-productive  at  any  rate  in 
Northern  Ireland,  in  that  it  hinders  the  creation 
of  the  rapport  between  the  person  questioned  and 287 
his  questioner  ahich  makes  him  feel  the  need  to 
unburden  himself.  But  as  the  rules  as  to 
admissiblity  of  confession  have  been  interpreted 
in  Northern  Ireland  the  more  fact  that  the 
technique  of  questioning  As  dosignod  to  produce  a 
psychological  atmosphere  favourable,  to  the 
creation  of  this  rapport  is  sufficient  to  rule  out 
as  evidence  ...  anything  which  the  accused  has 
said  thereafter.  " 
At  this  time  the  European  Commission  had  barely  begun  its 
consideration  in  Ireland  v  United  Kingdom  and  the  speed  with 
which  the  Diplock  Commission  produced  its  report  precluded  any 
detailed  consideration  of  the  implications  of  what  they  were 
saying,  but  coming  as  they  did  about  a  year  after  the  Compton 
Report  had  confirmed  the  ability  and  willingnecs  of  the  security 
forces  to  mistreat  prisoners  at  least  occasionally,  these 
comments  were  more  than  a  little  disingenuous.  The  best  that  the 
Diplock  Commission  could  come  up  with  was  the  limp  observation 
that  they  "would  not  condone"  the  practices  described  by  Compton 
or  Parker.  The  conclusion,  however,  was  inevitable  'It 
"We  consider  that  the  detailed  technical  ,  rules  and 
practice  as  to  the  admiaaihility  of  inculpatory 
statements  by  the  accused  as  they  are  currently 
applied  in  Northern  Ireland  are  hampering  the 
course  of  justice  in  the  case  of  terrorist  crimes 
and  compelling  the  authoritioc  responsible  for 288 
public  order  and  safety  to  resort  to  detention  in 
a  significant  number  of  cases  which  could 
otherwise  be  dealt  with  both  effectively  and 
fairly  by  trial  in  a  court  of  law,  " 
In  place  of  the  "current  technical  rules,  practices  and  judicial 
discretions"  as  to  the  admissibility  of  confessions  the  Diplock 
Commission  proposed  a  "simple  legislative  provision"  based  on  the 
terms  of  Article  3  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights 
which,  it  will  be  remembered,  forbids  torture  or  inhuman  or 
degrading  treatment  or  punishment. 
They  did  so  for  two  reasons: 
"It  is  a  simple  concept  which  we  do  not  think  the 
Judiciary  in  Northern  Ireland  would  find  it 
difficult  to  apply  in  practice.  It  would  not 
render  inadmissible  statements  obtained  as  a 
result  of  building  up  a  psychological  atmosphere 
in  which  the  natural  desire  of  the  person  being 
questioned  to  remain  silent  is  replaced  by  an  urge 
to  confide  in  the  queotioner,  or  statements 
preceded  by  promises  of  favours  or  indications  of 
the  consequences  which  might  follow  if  the  person 
questioned  persisted  in  refusing  to  answer.  " 
The  test  of  "torture  or  irrhuman  or  degrading  treatment"  was, 
along  with  the  concept  of  "Scheduled  Offences"  and  the  abolition 289 
of  juries  for  their  trial,  enacted  into  legislation  by  the 
Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1973,  This  Act  also 
repealed  the  Special  Powers  Act  which  had  long  been  demanded  by 
the  minority  community  and  civil  liberties  groups.  The  1973  Act 
and  certain  other  emergency  legislation  was  consolidated  into  the 
Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1978.  Section  6  of 
the  1973  Act,  which  later  became  Section  8  of  the  1978  Act, 
provided: 
6{1)  In  any  criminal  proceedings  for  a  scheduled 
offence,  or  two  or  more  offences  which  are  or 
include  scheduled  offences,  a  statement  made  by 
the  accused  may  be  given  in  evidence  by  the 
prosecution  in  so  far  as 
(a)  it  is  relevant  to  any  matter  in  tccue  in  the 
proceedings,  and 
(b)  it  is  not  excluded  by  the  court  in  pursuance 
of  subsection  (2)  below. 
(2)  If  in  any  such  proceedings  where  the 
prosecution  proposes  to  give  in  evidence  a 
statement  made  by  the  accused,  prima  facie 
evidence  is  adduced  that-the  accused  was  subjected 
to  torture  or  to  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  in 
order  to  induce  him  to  make  the  statement,  the 
court  shall,  unless  the  prosecution  catiefies-it 
that  the  statement  was  not  so  obtained 
(a)  exclude  the  statement,  or 
(b)  if  the  statement  has  been  received  in 290 
evidence  either  - 
(1)  continue  the  trial  disregarding  the 
statement;  or 
(ii)  direct  that  the  trial  shall  be  restarted 
before  a  differently  constituted  court  (before 
which  the  statement  in  question  shall  be 
inadmissible). 
(3)  This  section  does  not  apply  to  a  summary 
trial.  12 
Section  7  of  the  1973  Act  (Section  9  of  the  1978  Act)  included  a 
provision  which  effectively,  if  not  absolutely,  shifted  the  onus 
of  proof  in  relation  to  possession  of  a  "proscribed  article,  " 
essentially  explosives,  firearms  and  ammunition.  Where  the 
prosecution  proved  that  the  accused  and  the  article  concerned 
were  both  present  in  any  premises,  or  the  article  was  in  premises 
of  which  the  accused  was  the  occupier  or  which  he  "habitually 
used  otherwise  that  as  a  member  of  the  public,  "  the  court  might 
accept  that  as  sufficient  evidence  of  the  accused's  possession  of 
the  article  "unless  it  is  further  proved  that  he  did  not  at  that 
time  know  of  its  presence  in  the  premises  in  question,  or  if  he 
did  know,  that  he  had  no  control  over  it,  " 
Part  II  of  the  Act  provided  wide-ranging  powers  of  arrest  on 
suspicion  13  and  search  and  Section  16  (Section  18  of  the  1978 
Act)  explicitly  limited  the  right  to  silence: 
16(1)  Any  member  of  Her  Majesty's  forces  on  duty 291 
or  any  constable  may  stop  and  question  any  person 
for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining  that  person's 
identity  and  movements  and  what  he  knows  con- 
cerning  any  recent  explosion  or  any  other  trecent) 
incident  endangering  life  or  concerning  any  person 
killed  or  injured  in  any  such  explosion  or 
incident. 
(2)  Any  person  who  fails  to  stop  when  required 
to  do  so  under  this  section  or  who  refuses  to 
answer  or  fails  to  answer  to  the  best  of  his 
knowledge  and  ability,  any  question  addressed  to 
him  under  this  section,  shall  be  liable  on  summary 
conviction  to  ...  a  fine  ...  .  1,4 
This  section  has  been  the  subject  of  a  surprising  lack  of 
reported  judicial  comment  although  the  view  has  been  expressed 
that  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  conforms  to  Article  5  of  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights.  'r-  It  has  also  been  pointed 
out  that  it  is  not  necessarily  limited  to  matters  of  terrorism 
since  an  "incident  endangering  life"  could  refer  to  a  car 
accident.  16  There  would  not  appear  to  be  any  requirement  of 
suspicion,  let  alone  reasonable  suspicion,  before  the  power  can 
be  exercised.  There  is  no  definition  of  "recent"  and  between 
1973  and  1987  it  was  only  explosions  which  had  to  be  "recent", 
the  qualification  being  added  in  respect  of  other  incidents  by 
the  Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Proviciont)  Act  1987.  There  Ic 292 
no  time  limit  on  the  period  during  which  the  person  stopped  may 
be  questioned,  nor  is  there  any  indication  as  to  the  amount  of 
detail  which  the  person  is  required  to  give. 
In  1975  the  Gardiner  Committee  reviewed  the  operation  of  the  1973 
Act  and  apart  from  recommending  a  few  comparatively  minor  changes 
they  generally  took  the  view  that  it  was  working  well.  By  the 
time  of  the  Gardiner  Report  the  courts  had  begun  to  interpret 
Section  6  and,  as  will  be  discussed  later,  they  had  taken  the 
view  that,  contrary  to  the  recommendation  of  the  Diplock  Report, 
Section  6  had  not  deprived  them  of  their  discretion  to  exclude 
confessions  in  the  interests  of  justice.  Gardiner  recommended 
that  there  should  be  an  express  statutory  provision  preserving 
judicial  discretion,  "  but,  while  no  steps  were  taken  to  curtail 
the  courts'  use  of  discretionary  exclusion,  it  was  to  be  1987 
before  a  provision  explicitly  preserving  it  was  enacted. 
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9.5  e  Police_&busegi  --Amnesty  rnt2rriational  and  the 
Bennett  Report 
(i)  Interrogation  Centres  Amnesty  International  Misplon 
The  difficulties  in  following  the  normal  procedures  of  policing 
and  detection  in  Northern  Ireland  in  the  mid  and  late  1970s  were 
acute.  Apart  from  the  previously  discussed  problems  of 
intimidation  of  potential  witnesses,  the  examination  of  a  locus 
and  the  collection  of  forensic  evidence  'were  frequently 
impossible.  This  might  be  due  to  the  total  destruction  of  the 
potential  evidence,  but  it  could  equally  be  due  to  booby-trapping 
and  other  risks  to  the  lives  of  security  personnel  auch  as 
hostile  crowds.  At  other  times  a  number  of  terrorist  outrages 
were  arranged  to  swamp  the  resources  of  the  security  cervices.  ' 
Following  the  ending  of  internment  in  1975  the  R.  U,  C.  came  under 
intense  political  pressure  to  apprehend  and  secure  convictions  of 
suspected  terrorists.  A  decision  was  made  to  construct  two 
special  interrogation  centres,  one  at  Gough  in  Armagh  and  one  at 
Castlereagh  in  Belfast.  Both  were  opened  in  1977  and  their 
opening  coincided  with  a  major  increase  in  the  number  of 
complaints  relating  to  police  interrogation. 
From  their  earliest  inception  a  majority  of  those  prosecuted  for 
scheduled  offences  before  the  Diplock  Courts  have  been  convicted 
wholly  or  mainly  on  the  basis  of  confessions  made  during  the 
course  of  police  interrogation.  For  example  between  January  and 
June  1978  568  persons  were  prosecuted  for  scheduled  offences  of 295 
whom  411  (72%)  pled  guilty.  3  Of  the  remainder  121  were 
convicted  after  trial  and  36  were  acquitted.  The  Director  of 
Public  Prosecutions  informed  the  Bennett  Committee  that  in  75-8O% 
of  these  cases  the  prosecution  case  depended  wholly  or  mainly  on 
the  confession  of  the  accused.  4  There  was  little  firm 
information  for  earlier  years  but  it  was  suggested  that  the 
proportion  had  increased  from  about  65%  in  1976  and  75%  in  1977.  k; 
Those  figures  only  related  to  those  who  were,  firstly,  charged  by 
the  police  and,  secondly,  against  whom  the  Director  of  Public 
Prosecution  considered  that  there  was  sufficient  admissible 
evidence  to  justify  prosecution.  Many  more  people  were 
interrogated  than  were  charged  by  the  police  and  according  to  the 
Bennett  Committee,  between  September  1977  and  August  1978  only 
37%  of  those  interrogated  at  Castlereagh  and  24%  of  those 
interrogated  at  Gough  and  a  further  contra  at  Strand  Road 
Londonderry  were  actually  charged  with  any  offence.  As  Boyle  at 
al  put  it,  it  follows  either  that  very  large  numbers  of  innocent 
people  were  being  subjected  to  prolonged  interrogation  or  that 
prolonged  interrogation  failed  in  a  substantial  number  of  cases 
to  produce  a  confession  from  those  who  had  something  to  confess.,  " 
Despite  the  pious  sentiments  expressed  by  the  Diplock  Committee, 
complaints  of  police  brutality  during  interrogation  continued  to 
be  made  and  as  already  noted  increased  eubstantially  after  the 
opening  of  the  interrogation  centres.  Shortly  put,  it  was 
beginning  to  look  as  if  the  R.  U.  G.  was  ill-treating  suspects  in 296 
order  to  extract  confessions  from  them,  confessions  which  were 
then  leading  to  almost  inevitable  conviction  before  the  Diplock 
Courts.  In  addition  it  was  apparent  that  even  when  a  suspect 
made  a  confession  at  an  early  stage,  interrogation  was 
continuing,  often  for  the  full  three  day  detention  period  and 
detectives  were  using  these  further  interrogation  sessions  as  a 
means  of  eliciting  information  about  general  terrorist 
organisation  and  activities.  7 
By  April  1977  police  doctors,  who  regularly  examined  prisoners  at 
the  stage  when  they  were  being  charged  at  police  stations,  became 
sufficiently  concerned  at  the  bruising,  contusions,  abrasions  and 
other  injuries  (mental  as  well  as  physical>  which  they  were 
seeing  that  they  wrote  to  the  Police  Authority  bringing  the 
matter  formally  to  their  notice.  The  police,  not  surprisingly, 
denied  the  allegations  and  in  turn  alleged  that  many  of  the 
injuries  were  self-inflicted  for  the  specific  purpose  of 
discrediting  them.  There  were  further  exchanges  between  the 
doctors  and  the  authorities  with  particular  concern  being 
expressed  about  the  condition  of  prisoners  who  had  passed  through 
Castlereagh  police  station  but  no  official  action  was  taken.  As 
the  Bennett  Committee  put  it,  "when  denials  of  ill-treatment  of 
prisoners  were  made  by  the  police,  some  of  the  medical  officers 
who  had  examined  prisoners,  and  found  injuries',  had  reason  to 
fear  for  their  reputation,  "  8  Ultimately  the  chief  medical 
officer  at  Gough  police  station,  Dr  Irwin,  was  sufficiently 
concerned  by  the  injuries  and  the  lack  of  action  by  the 297 
authorities  that  he  "went  public,  "  as  a  result  of  which  he  was 
later  forced  to  resign. 
The  issue  attracted  the  attention  of  the  media  and  various 
television  and  press  reports  added  to  the  disquiet.  In  November 
1977  a  group  of  some  thirty  solicitors  who  regularly  handled 
cases  before  the  Diplock  courts  decided  to  form  a  group  for  the 
purpose  of  collating  evidence  of  alleged  brutality,  They  wrote 
to  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Northern  Ireland  stating  their  view 
that: 
"...  ill  treatment  of  suspects  by  police  officers, 
with  the  object  of  obtaining  confessions,  is  now 
common  practice,  and  that  this  most  often,  but  not 
always,  takes  place  at  Castlereagh  R.  U.  C.  station 
and  other  police  stations  throughout  Northern 
Ireland.  "  10 
A  mission  from  Amnesty  International  visited  Northern  Ireland 
between  28  November  and  6  December  1977.  They  considered 
evidence  relating  to  78  persons  who  alleged  maltreatment  by 
R.  U.  C.  personnel,  principally  at  Castireagh,  and  invariably  by 
plain  clothes  detectives.  Most  of  the  78  had  been  arrested  under 
the  Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1973  although 
some  had  been  subject  to  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  (Temporary 
Provisions)  Act  1976.  Generally  Amnesty  International  found  the 
allegation  against  the  police  to  be  established  and  they 
concluded  that  "maltreatment  of  suspected  terrorists  by  the 298 
R.  U.  C.  has  taken  place  with  sufficient  frequency  to  warrant  the 
establishing  of  a  public  inquiry  to  investigate  it.  " 
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(ii)  The  Bennett  committee 
The  idea  of  a  public  inquiry  did  not  find  favour  with  the  Britich 
government  but  it  was  clear  that  the  Amnesty  International  report 
could  not  be  ignored.  A  Committee  of  Inquiry  was  therefore 
established  under  Mr  Justice  Bennett  Inter  alia  "to  examine 
police  procedures  and  practice  in  Northern  Ireland  relating  to 
the  interrogation  of  persons  suspected  of  scheduled  offences.  " 
It  was,  however,  made  clear  to  the  Bennett  Committee  that  they 
were  not  to  inquire  into  individual  allegations  of  maltreatment. 
The  Bennett  Committee  produced  an  excellent  report  which  included 
a  comprehensive  review  of  the  law  and  which  was  undoubtedly  the 
most  impressive  of  the  reports  relating  to  Northern  Ireland 
reviewed  in  this  work.  The  Sennett  Committee  was  scrupulously 
fair  in  its  assessment  of  the  difficulties  under  which  the  R.  U.  C. 
were  operating  and  the  reasons  for  the  reliance  on  admissions.  ' 
They  were  also  careful  to  remind  their  readers  that  police 
questioning  is  a  normal  part  of  procedure  in  other  parts  of  the 
United  Kingdom  and  that  admissions  and  confessions  constituted  a 
significant  element  in  a  high  proportion  of  cases  in  England  and 
Wales.  - 
Howover,  despite  the  exclusion  of  individual  allegations  of 
maltreatment  they  took  careful  note  of  a  considerable  body  of 
medical  evidence  before  commenting  that  whatever  the  explanation, 
there  were  "injuries  which  were  not  coif-inflicted  and  were 300 
sustained  during  the  period  of  detention  at  a  police  office.  "3 
Despite  the  measured  language  the  Committee's  view  was 
unequivocal: 
"What  we  have  found  reinforces  the  concern  shown 
by  the  doctors  and  the  Police  Authority,  and 
demonstrates  the  need  for  an  improvement  in  the 
supervision  and  control  of  interrogation.  More- 
over  we  cannot  blind  ourselves  to  the  possibility 
that  if,  as  we  have  found  on  the  basis  of  medical 
evidence,  ill-treatment  causing  injury  could 
occur,  so  could  ill-treatment  which  leaves  no 
marks.  ...  What  is  aimed  at  is  a  system  in  which  a 
prisoner  who  walks  into  a  police  office  unhurt  and 
unmarked  shall  be  unhurt  and  unmarked  when  he 
leaves  that  office.  "  4 
The  Committee  noted  that  there  was  no  code  of  conduct,  for  police 
officers  engaged  in  the  interviewing  of  prisoners  and  there  was  a 
considerable  need  for  such  a  code  which,  in  their  view  should  be 
enforceable  as  a  matter  of  police  discipline.  They  referred  to  a 
case  where  a  prisoner  (who  in  the  event  was  not  the  subject  of 
criminal  proceedings)  had  been  repeatedly  interviewed,  apparently 
on  the  decision  of  a  junior  officer,  during  a  period  of  come  21 
hours  after  which  has  was  only  allowed  216  hours  sloop,  He  had 
become  so  disturbed  that  he  had  slashed  his  wrist  and  butted  his 
head  against  a  radiator  causing  injury  to  his  forehead. 301 
The  Committee  were  aware  of  the  difficulty  which  could"be  posed 
by  hard  and  fast  rules  but  in  a  masterpiece  of  understatement 
observed  that  they: 
"[Could)  not  contemplate  with  approval  a  situation 
in  which  the  zeal,  and  the  apparently  uncontrolled 
discretion,  of  an  individual  officer  can  lead  a 
prisoner  to  contemplate  self-destruction  or  to 
undertake  self-mutilation.  There  must  surely  be 
doubts  about  the  truth  of  any  statements  made  in 
circumstances  such  as  these.  "  11 
Although  they  stopped  short  of  attempting  to  set  out  a 
comprehensive  code  of  conduct,  the  Bennett  Committee  made  a 
lengthy  series  of  recommendations  and  suggestions  for  matters  to 
be  dealt  with  in  such  code.  The  recommendations  included  the 
prohibition  of  various  forms.  of  degrading  treatment  such  as 
ordering  a  prisoner  to  strip,  adopt  an  unnatural  posture  or  carry 
out  unnecessary  physically  exhausting  action  as  well  as  the  use 
of  obscenities,  insults,  and  threats  of  various  types  including 
physical  force,  abandonment  in  a  hostile  area  and  sexual 
misbehaviour. 
In  relation  to  the  timing  and  duration  of  interview-,,  Bennett 
recommended  that  no  single  interview  should  go  on  longer  than  the 
period  between  normal  meal  times  and  prisoners  should  be  allowed 
a  break  for  meals;  except  in  the  case  of  urgent  operational 
reasons  an  interview  should  not  commence  after  midnight:  not  more 302 
than  two  officers  should  interview  one  prisoner  at  one  time  and 
not  more  than  three  teams  of  two  officers  should  be  concerned 
with  interviewing  one  prisoner.  7 
The  Bennett  Committee  also  considered  in  some  detail  the  various 
options  and  possibilities  for  independent  supervision.  In  their 
evidence  to  the  Committee,  the  Police  Authority  for  Northern 
Ireland  had  raised  the  possibility  of  civilian  supervisors  whose 
main  duty  would  be  to  ensure  that  the  police  followed  the  rules 
laid  down  in  relation  to  interviewing  suspects.  Like  the  RCCP, 
the  Bennett  Committee  rejected  this  idea  on  various  grounds, 
although  not  without  hesitation.  The  grounds  for  rejection 
included  the  difficulty  of  finding  suitable  people  to  do  the  job, 
the  difficulty  in  establishing  the  relationship  between  the 
civilian  supervisors  and  the  police  and  the  fact  that  "a  body  of 
officials  working  day  by  day  in  cooperation,  as  the  public  would 
see  them,  with  the  police,  would  quickly  come  to  be  tarred  with 
the  same  brush  in  the  minds  of  critical  members  of  the 
community.  "  8  Related  proposals  to  extend  the  functions  of  the 
Boards  of  Visitors  of  H.  M.  Prisons  in  Northern  Ireland  and  the 
role  of  medical  officers  were  also  rejected, 
The  Bennett  Committee  also  considered  the  question  of  tape 
recording  and  although  there  were  unable  to  advance  the  arguments 
appreciably  beyond,  the  debate  in  the  rest  of  Britain,  they 
pointed  out  some  of  the  particular  problems  which  tape  recording 
would  present  in  Northern  Ireland.  Although  there  was  not  a 303 
problem  with  interviews  on  the  way  to  the  police  station,  since 
such  interviews  simply  did  not  happen,  interviews  at  police 
stations  were  likely  to  be  much  longer  than  anything  seen 
elsewhere,  particularly  since  the  suspect  might  be  detained  for  a 
period  of  several  days.  This  was  considered  likely  to  lead  to 
problems  with  the  bulk  of  the  records  and  the  Immensity  of  the 
task  of  producing  and  editing  transcripts. 
The  Committee  also  pointed  out  that  the  main  purpose  of  tape 
recording  was  to  provide  a  reliable  record,  whereas  the  main 
issue  before  them  was  the  need  to  prevent  prisoners  being  ill- 
treated.  This  threw  into  prominence  the  arguments  about  who 
should  be  allowed  to  switch  the  machine  on  and  off  and  what 
protection  could  be  found  against  the  faking  of  incidents  by 
suspects.  The  fact  that  in  Northern  Ireland  so  much  reliance  was 
being  placed  on  confessions  increased  the  need  for  a  reliable 
record,  but  on  the  other  hand  it  also  increased  the  need  to 
ensure  that  the  presence  of  the  tape-recorder  did  not  render  the 
interrogation  process  ineffective; 
"We  have  felt  bound,  however,  to  give  special 
prominence  to  the  peculiar  features  of  police 
interrogation  in  Northern  Ireland 
...  and  in 
particular  the  fact  that  persons  known  to  have 
given  information  to  the  police  are  likely 
...  to 
suffer  victimisation  by  the  paramilitary  organ- 
Isationo  as  a  result.  This  applies  both  to 
information  about  the  suspect's  own  part  in  crime 304 
and,  even  more,  to  information  about  others' 
involvement  in  terrorist  activity,  In  view  of 
this,  we  believe  that  the  fact  that  a  permanent 
and  reproducible  record  was  being  made,  which  the 
suspect  could  not  later  disown,  would  increase  his 
reluctance  to  speak  to  a  greater  degree  than  else- 
where.  ...  Once  a  copy  of  the  tape  passed  out  of 
the  hands  of  the  police,  it  would  be  impossible  to 
be  sure  into  whose  hands  it  might  fall,  In 
Northern  Ireland,  a  risk  to  lives  and  security 
would  ensue,  bearing  in  mind  that  interrogation 
there  is  intended,  and  likely,  to  reveal 
intelligence  about  the  activities  of  terrorist 
organisations.  " 
For  these  reasons  the  Bennett  Committee  considered  that  Northern 
Ireland  was  not  the  beet  place  to  begin  a  system  of  tape 
recording.  However  they  were  strongly  in  favour  of  an  experiment 
with  tape  recording  elsewhere,  and  recommended  that  the  matter  be 
reconsidered  in  Northern  Ireland  once  the  experimental  results 
were  known.  10 
The  Committee  also  rejected  video  rocording,  concluding  that  it 
would  not  offer  any  substantial  advantages  by  comparison  with  the 
unrccorded  visual  observation  of  interviowc.  11 305 
In  the  view  of  the  Bennett  Committee,  there  was  no  real 
alternative  to  the  police  themselves  taking  the  necessary  steps 
to  ensure  that  maltreatment  did  not  occur.  Various  steps  in  this 
direction  had  already  been  taken  by  the  time  of  the  Bennett 
Report,  but  there  was  room  for  further  improvement,  12  Bennett 
came  to  the  same  conclusion  as  Amnesty  International,  namely  that 
the  uniformed  branch  of  the  R.  U.  C.  was  not  implicated  in  the 
allegations  of  brutality,  and  from  this  starting  point  made 
several  recommendations  generally  directed  towards  giving 
uniformed  officers  responsibility  for  ensuring  the  welfare  of 
suspects. 
Inter  alia  Bennett  recommended  that  it  should  be  made  "entirely 
plain"  to  the  uniformed  inspectors  that  their  responsibility  for 
the  welfare  of  prisonere  extended  to  the  interview  room,  and  that 
if  necessary  they  should  enter  the  interview  room  and  stop  the 
interview  if  a  breach  of  the  law  or  force  instructions  was  taking 
place  or  if  it  seemed  reasonably  likely  that  events  in  the 
interview  room  were  leading  to  such  a  breach.  Bennett  also 
recommended  the  installation  of  spyholes  in  the  doors  of  all 
police  interview  rooms  in  the  Province  and  the  installation  of 
closed  circuit  television  facilities  in  all  interview  rooms  used 
for  the  interrogation  of  terrorist  suspects  and  other  persons 
arrested  for  scheduled  offences.  Any  interference  with  the 
effective  operation  of  the  closed  circuit  television  apparatus 
was  recommended  to  be  a  disciplinary  offence.  Monitoring  screens 
were  to  be  provided  for  the  senior  uniformed  officer  and  should 306 
also  be  availbie  to  the  senior  detective  officer  in  charge  of 
intervlew3.10 
Further  recommendations  were  made  to  strengthen  the  role  of  the 
medical  officers,  and  in  particular  it  was  recommended  that 
medical  officers  should  see  all  terrorist  suspects  and  persons 
suspected  of  scheduled  offences  during  each  period  of  24  hours 
and  should  offer  them  the  opportunity  of  medical  examination.  1 
As  far  as  access  to  legal  advice  was  concerned,  the  Bennett 
Committee  found  that  solicitors  were  invariably  refused  access  to 
terrorist  suspects,,  ,a  position  which  they  considered  unjust- 
ifiable.  They  recommended  that  prisoners  should  have  an 
unconditional  right  of  access  to  a  solicitor  after  48  hours  and 
every  48  hours  thereafter,  although  solicitors  should  not  be 
permitted  to  be  present  at  interviews.  18  Although  moot  of  the 
Bennett  recommendations  were  accepted,  this  one  was  only 
partially  Implemented  with  the  government  Insisting  that  the 
police  should  have  the  right  to  be  present  at  any  interview 
between  a  suspect  and  his  solicitor,  a  condition  which  most 
solicitors  found  unacceptable.  'f- 
One  of  the  reasons  why  most  of  the  Bennett  Committee's 
recommendations  were  accepted  was  that  they  could  be  implemented 
by  administrative  means  and  did  not  require  legislation  and 
following  the  Bennett  Report,  the  number  of  complaints  concerning 
physical  abuse  of  suspects  dropped  dramatically,  17  although 307 
doubts  have  recently  been  expressed  about  the  continuing 
effectiveness  of  the  Bennett  "regime".  10  It  has  also  been 
suggested  that  since  the  Bennett  recommendations  made  the 
extraction  of  confessions  much  more  difficult,  the  policy  of 
securing  convictions  on  confessions  alone  lost  its  viability  and 
thus  led  to  the  evolution  of  the  "supergrass"  system,  which  was, 
in  turn,  to  become  discredited.  1-1 
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9.6  Judicta?  Decissions  1973-1984 
Q)  "Torture  or  Inhuman  or.  DDegrading  Treatment 
It  will  be  apparent  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that  during  the 
1970s  interrogation  by  the  security  forces  was  as  much,  if  not 
more,  directed  towards  obtaining  intelligence  and  information 
about  terrorist  activities  as  it  was  towards  obtaining 
confessions  for  use  in  court.  It  has  also  been  pointed  out  that 
many  more  people  were  questioned  than  were  prosecuted.  It  is 
probably  fair  to  say  that  the  Diplock  Courts  were  never  called 
upon  to  consider  the  worst  excesses  of  the  security  forces. 
Nevertheless  the  enactment  of  Section  6  of  the  Northern  Ireland 
(Emergency  Powers)  Act  1973  clearly  made  a  major  difference  to 
the  law  on  admissiblity. 
Notwithstanding  the  absence  of  a  jury,  issues  of  admissibility  of 
confessions  in  the  Diplock  Courts  fall  to  be  determined  on  the 
voir  dire  and  if  the  statement  is  excluded  the  Judge  will  often 
stand  down  under  section  6(2)(1i)  (later  section  8(2)(11)).  If 
the  statement  is  not  excluded,  the  practice  seems  to  be  that  the 
evidence  need  not  be  reheard  but  must  be  expressly  reconsidered 
at  the  trial  stage.  ' 
The  first  judicial  comment  on  the  now  legislation  camo  in  the 
unreported  case  of  Rv  Cony  in  1973,  The  Lord  Chief  Justice 
entertained  no  doubt  that  many  statements  which  would  previously 
have  been  excluded  as  being  involuntary  were  now  to  be 309 
admissible: 
"Section  6  of  course  has  materially  altered  the 
law  as  to  the  admissibility  of  statements  by 
singling  out  torture  and  inhuman  and  degrading 
treatment.  This  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  such 
things  have  always  made  for  the  exclusion  of  an 
accused's  statement  since  they  deprive  it  of  its 
voluntary  character.  Accordingly  Section  6(2) 
would  merely  be  a  statement  of  the  obvious  if  it 
did  not  in  conjunction  with  Section  6(t)  render 
admissible  much  that  previously  must  have  been 
excluded.  There  is  no  need  now'to  satisfy  the 
Judge  that  a  statement  is  voluntary  in  the 
sometimes  technical  sense  which  that  word  has 
acquired  in  relation  to  criminal  trials,  "  2 
i 
The  first  reported  decision  on  the  test  of  "torture  on  inhuman  or 
degrading  treatment"  was  R-v  eHet,  heringtori  d0r 
.1 
S.  4,  where  Lord  Lowry  LCJ  was  the  trial  judge  in  a  typical 
terrorist  case  relating  to  the  murder  of  two  police  officers  with 
the  only  evidence  against  the  accused  being  their  confocsions. 
The  accused,  who  all  gave  ovidenca,  had  alleged  that  they  had 
been  maltreated  in  police  custody.  In  addition  medical  evidence 
was  led  of  certain  injuries  which  had  been  found  on  them  during 
their  time  in  custody  and  which  were,  up  to  a  point.  consistent 
with  their  allegations.  The  injuricc  were  not  particularly 310 
severe  and  certainly  did  not  indicate  the  use  of  torture  or 
inhuman  treatment.  However,  Lord  Lowry  considered  that  degrading 
treatment  "while  it  must  overlap  considerably  with  torture  and 
inhuman  treatment,  must  also  cover  conduct  which  does  not 
necessarily  fall  within  the  first  and  second  types  of  behaviour 
mentioned  in  the  section.  "  His  Lordship  accordingly  found  that 
if  the  treatment  necessary  to  cause  what  the  doctors  had  seen 
had  been  meted  out  to  persons  being  interrogated  in  custody,  it 
was  degrading  treatment.  His  Lordship  also  took  the  view  that 
once  prima  facia  evidence  of  torture  or  inhuman  or  degrading 
treament  had  been  adduced,  it  was  for  the  prosecution  to  prove 
beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  that  the  accused's  statement  had  not 
been  obtained  by  it.  His  lordship  set  out  four  reasons  for  his 
view: 
1.  The  context  of  section  6  is  that  of  a  criminal 
trial  and  the  prosecution's  standard  of  proof  of 
issuse  in  such  a  trial  (even  when  they  must  first 
be  raised  by  the  defence)  is  proof  beyond 
reasonable  doubt; 
2.  The  use  of  the  word  "satisfied"  in  section 
2(4)  (sic)  must  imply  proof  beyond  reasonable 
doubt; 
3,  At  common  law  where,  with  a  view  to  the 
admission  or  rejection  of  statement  evidences  the 
Issue  for  the  trial  judge  in  one  of  voluntariness, 
the  proof  must  be  beyond  reasonable  doubt; 
4.  A  statute,  particularly  where  it  abridgee  the 311 
rights  of  an  accused,  must  in  case  of  ambiguity  be 
construed  co  as  to  alter  the  law  as  little  a 
possible  consistently  with  the  language  used. 
Lord  Lowry  accordingly  held  that  the  prosecution  had  not  die- 
charged  the  onus  and  the  statements  were  inadmissible.  One  of 
the  accused,  Hetherington,  had  made  a  separate  written  statement 
admitting  membership  of  the  Z.  R.  A.  but  Lord  Lowry  applied  t 
Flynn  and  Leonard  '-1  and  took  the  view  that  it  "would  be 
unrealistic  to  find  that  such  influence  as  may  have  existed  Cthe 
previous  day]  had  been  dissipated  effectively  by  the  time  this 
statement  was  made.  " 
Two  years  later  the  issue  first  came  before  the  Court  of  Criminal 
Appeal,  presided  over  by  Lord  Lowry,  in  Rv  :  [h  mason  119771-NI 
_ 
74 
and  the  opportunity  was  taken  to  clarify  some  of  the  procedural 
issues. 
The  accused  was  charged  with  the  murders  of  four  soldiers  who  had 
been  blown  up  by  a  remotely-detonated  bomb.  -Ho  had  been  arrested 
within  hours  of  the  explosion  and  was  interviewed  five  times  by 
the  police  in  the  space  of  one  day.  At  the  fourth  interview  he 
intimated  that  he  would  make  a  written  statement,  but  before 
doing  so  he  gave  a  verbal  statement  and  drew  certain  diagrams  of 
the  bomb. 312 
At  the  trial  the  accused  alleged  that  he  had  been  subjected  to 
torture  or  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment  in  that  he  had  been 
made  to  stand  with  his  arms  and  legs  out-stretched,  was 
frequently  kicked  in  the  ribs  and  testicles,  was  subjected  to 
verbal  abuse,  was  made  to  do  press-ups  and  other  exercises.  He 
also  alleged  that  he  was  punched  in  the  abdomen,  slapped  across 
the  face  and  twice  had  a  plastic  bag  put  over  his  head,  He 
collapsed  during  the  fifth  interview,  but  medical  evidence  was 
adduced  by  the  Crown  to  the  effect  that  this  was  due  to  a 
hysterical  reaction,  the  doctors  also  giving  evidence  that  they 
had  seen  no  evidence  of  physical  maltreatment.  A  certain  amount 
of  contrary  medical  evidence  was  adduced  by  the  defence,  but 
having  heard  all  the  evidence  the  trial  judge  ruled  in  favour  of 
admitting  the  statments. 
On  appeal  it  was  held  that  he  was  fully  entitled  to  do  so  and  the 
Court  of  Appeal's  judgment  adds  nothingf  to  Lord  Lowry's  expo- 
sition  of  the  law  regarding  admisniblity  in  Hethorington, 
However  the  Court  took  the  opportunity  of  issuing  a  "reminder"  of 
the  position  relating  to  a  voir  dire  governed  by  Section  6(2)  of 
the  1973  Act.  Under  the  statute,  once  prima  facie  evidence  of 
the  making  of  the  statement  was  adduced  by  the  Crown,  the  accused 
had  to  raise  a  prima  facie  case  of  torture  or  inhuman  or 
degrading  conduct  before  admissibility  became  a  triable  issue. 
The  correct  course  was  for  the  defence  to  make  its  case  under 
Section  6(2)  and  only  if  a  triable  issue  was  raised  did  it  become 313 
the  duty  of  the  Crown  to  rebut  the  defence  case  and  prove  beyond 
reasonable  doubt  that  it  was  wrang. 
Lord  Lowry  also  commented  on  the  duty  of  the  judge  when  giving 
judgment  in  a  trial  in  a  Diplock  court.  Such  a  judge  has  no  jury 
to  charge  and  will  therefore  not  err  if  he  does  not  state  every 
legal  proposition  and  review  every  fact  and  argument  on  either 
side.  His  task  is  to  reach  conclusions  and  give  reasons  to 
support  his  view  and,  preferably,  to  notice  any  difficult  or 
unusual  points  of  law  in  order  that  if  there  is  an  appeal,  it  may 
be  seen  how  his  view  of  the  law  informed  his  approach  to  the 
facts. 
There  have  been  no  further  reported  cases  bearing  directly  on  the 
issue  of  "torture  or  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment"  and  the 
issue  seems  to  have  effectively  been  settled  by  Lord  Lowry's 
decision  in  Hetherington. 
In  any  event  the  improvement  in  police  practices  which  followed 
the  Bennett  report  would  clearly  go  a  long  way  towards  reducing 
the  scope  for  the  defence  to  rely  on  police  maltreatment,  As 
will  be  diccussed  later,  the  courts  themselves  made  it  clear  that 
even  where  the  conduct  complained  of  fell  short  of  torture  or 
inhuman  or  degrading  treatment,  a  statement  might  still  be 
excluded  as  a  matter  of  judicial  diocrotion, 314 
In  Rv  O'Halloran  1  19791  NI  45  and  other  unreported  cases,  4  the 
courts  themselves  ruled  out  physical  violence  entirely.  In 
O'Halloran  the  Lord  Chief  Justice  saids 
"This  court  finds  it  difficult  in  practice  to 
envisage  any  form  of  physical  violence  which  is 
relevant  to  the  interrogation  of  a  suspect  in 
custody  and  which,  if  it  had  occurred,  could  at 
the  same  time  leave  a  court  satisfied  beyond 
reasonable  doubt  in  relation  to  the  issue  for 
decision  under  Section  6  (now  Section  8).  " 
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(ii)  Judicial  Discretion 
The  first  reported  case  in  which  the  courts  had  to  address  the 
question  of  the  effect  of  Section  6  of  the  1973  Act  on  the 
Court's  discretion  to  exclude  evidence  '  and  the  decision  which 
effectively  set  the  trend  for  subsequent  cases  was  Rv  McCormick 
and  Others  [19771  NI  105.  a  decision  of  Lord  Justice  McGonigal 
sitting  at  first  instance.  The  learned  judge's  long  and  erudite 
judgment  shows  that  he  had  no  doubt  that  Section  6  did  not 
deprive  him  of  a  discretion  to  reject  otherwise  admissible 
evidence.  In  what  was  in  effect  the  preamble  to  his  judgment  his 
Lordship  observed: 
"Section  6(1)  stresses  the  limited  nature  of  the 
objections  which  can  be  taken  by  providing  that 
unless  excluded  by  Section  6(2)  the  relevant 
statement  may  be  admitted  in  evidence.  Thin  is, 
of  course,  subject  to  the  overall  discretion  of 
the  trial  judge  to  exclude  any  evidence  on  the 
ground  that  its  prejudicial  effect  outweighs  ito 
probative  value.  " 
Before  the  question  of  discretionary  exclusion  could  price,  it 
was  necessary  to  determine  whether  the  statement  in  fact  passed 
the  test  laid  down  in  Section  6(2).  In  determining  this  issue, 
his  Lordship  noted  that  the  terma  of  Section  6(2)  were  derived 
from  Article  3  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  for 
guidance  he  turned  not  to  existing  English  or  Trish  authorities 316 
but  to  the  judgment  of  the  European  Commission  in  Trel5nd  y 
United  Kingdom  and  their  earlier  decision  in  what  was  generally 
known  as  the  Greek  Case. 
The  main  points  of  the  Commission's  report  in  rreland  v  ted 
King  ors  and  in  particular  their  definitions  of  "torture", 
"inhuman  treatment"  and  "degrading  treatment"  have  already  been 
mentioned  '  but  it  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  in  the  Gee 
Casa  the  Commission  had  distinguished  between  acts  prohibited 
under  Article  3  and  "a  certain  roughness  of  treatment"  which  "may 
take  the  form  of  slaps  or  blows  of  the  hand  on  the  head  or  face". 
In  the  view  of  the  Commission  such  roughness  was  "tolerated  by 
most  detainees  and  even  taken  for  granted.  " 
Applying  the  Commiseion'r  definitions,  which  he  noted  appeared  to 
"accept  a  degree  of  physical  violence  which  could  never  be 
tolerated  ...  under  the  common  law  test,  "  Lord  Justice  McGonigal 
came  to  the  view  that., 
"A  statement  which  is  trade  is  admissiblc  under  the 
Section,  however  induced,  unless  induced  by 
conduct  falling  within  the  descriptive  terms 
"torture  or  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment"  in  the 
sense  used  in  the  section  and  it  is  only  excluded 
by  the  section  even  in  those  three  cases  if  the 
acts  complained  of  were  acts  done  in  order  to 
induce  the  statement.  "  -" 317 
His  Lordship  then  addressed  in  more  depth  the  question  of 
judicial  discretion: 
"That  does  not  mean,  however,  that  these  courts 
will  tolerate  or  permit  physical  maltreatment  of  a 
lesser  degree  deliberately  carried  out  for  the 
purpose  of  or  which  has  the  effect  of  inducing  a 
person  interviewed  to  make  a  statement.  Not  only 
would  such  conduct  amount  to  an  assault  and  in 
itself  be  an  offence  under  the  ordinary  criminal 
law  but  it  would  be  repugnant  to  all  principles  of 
justice  to  allow  such  conduct  to  be  used  as  a 
moans  towards  an  end,  however  desirable  that  end 
might  be  made  to  appear.  ... 
It  is  at  this  stage,  however,  when  a  statement  has 
passed  the  test  of  admissiblity  under  section  6 
that  the  trial  Judge's  discretionary  powers  have 
to  be  considered,  and  it  is  the  proper  exercise  of 
these  powers  which  provide  an  extra-statutory 
control  over  the  means  by  which  statements  are 
induced  and  obtained.  " 
After  a  review  of  earlier  authorities,  his  Lordship  then  stated: 
"It  is  clear  from  the  authorities  ...  that  the 
judicial  discretion  to  exclude  evidenco  is  widely 
based  and  includes  cases  where  statements  have 
been  obtained  by  maltreatment.  It  does  not,  of 318 
course,  mean  that  every  incidence  (sic)  of  mal- 
treatment  will  lead  as  of  course  to  exclusion. 
Each  case  must  be  considered  on  its  merits  and  the 
discretion  ..,  Is  still  the  discretion  of  the 
individual  trial  Judge,  In  considering  its 
exercise  in  any  case  the  trial  judge  must  take 
into  account  not  only  the  conduct  complained  of 
but  its  effect  on  the  person  subjected  to  it  and 
all  other  relevant  circumstances.  " 
However,  the  judge  should  also  have  regard  to  the  standard  of 
maltreatment  necessary  to  exclude  a  statement  under  section  6  and 
should  take  care  not  to  defeat  the  will  of  parliament: 
"If  he  exercises  his  discretion  without  regard  to 
the  section  he  will  in  all  probability  exclude 
statements  obtained  in  circumstances  not 
considered  by  Parliament  to  warrant  exclusion.  .., 
The  effect  of  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  if 
unfettered  by  the  existence  of  section  6  might  be, 
therefore,  to  negative  the  effect  of  section  6  and 
under  the  guise  of  the  discretionary  power  have 
the  effect  of  reinstating  the  old  common  law  test 
in  so  far  as  it  depended  on  the  proof  of  physical 
or  mental  maltreatment.  In  my  opinion  the 
judicial  discretion  should  not  be  exercised  co  as 
to  defeat  the  will  of  parliament  as  expressed  in 
the  section.  While  I  do  not  suggest  its  exercise 319 
should  be  excluded  in  a  case  of  maltreatment 
falling  short  of  section  6  conduct,  it  should  only 
be  exercised  in  such  cases  where  failure  to 
exercise  it  might  create  injustice  by  admitting  a 
statement  which  though  admissible  under  the 
section  and  relevant  on  its  face  was  in  itself  ... 
suspect  by  reason  of  the  method  by  which  it  was 
obtained.  ...  This  would  require  consideration  not 
only  of  the  conduct  itself  but  also,  and  since  the 
effect  of  any  conduct  varies  according  to  the 
individual  receiving  it,  possibly  equally 
important  its  effect  on  the  individual  and 
whether,  to  use  the  words  of  the  Commission  Report 
...  the  maltreatment  was  such  as  to  drive  the 
individual  to  act  against  his  will  or  conscience.  " 
In  McCormick  Lord  Justice  McGonigal  had  made  it  clear  that  once 
the  point  of  admissiblity  was  taken,  the  onus  was  on  the 
prosecution  to  satisfy  the  judge  that  the  statement  was  taken  in 
a  manner  and  in  circumstances  which  justify  its  admission  in 
evidence,  whether  decided  by  section  6  or  against  an  exercise  of 
judicial  discretion.  A  year  or  so  later  in  Rv,  2týcý  [  197  lý  NI 
tl4  his  Lordship,  again  sitting  at  first  Instance,  had  to  deal 
with  the  question  of  judicial  discretion  in  the  situation  where 
the  accused  refused  to  recognise  the  court  and  refused  to  take 
any  part  in  the  proceedings.  As  the  result  of  the  accused's 
attitude  to  the  court,  the  point  of  admissiblity  was  not  "taken" 320 
in  the  normal  sense  and  his  Lordship  effectively  raised  it  ex 
proprlo  mote  If  there  was,  the  learned  judge  considered, 
something  in  the  evidence  which  raised  a  doubt  in  his  mind  as  to 
its  admissiblity,  he  had  to  consider  that  even  though  the  accused 
for  reasons  of  his  own  had  elected  to  take  no  part  in  the  case, 
In  Milne  the  accused  had  been  interviewed  for  39  hours  out  of  72 
and  during  this  period  he  had  eaten  (by  his  own  choice)  nothing 
more  than  a  Twix  bar.  In  the  course  of  the  Crown  evidence  it 
came  out  that  at  one  paint,  towards  the  end  of  the  interviewing 
process  and  shortly  before  he  made  an  incriminating  statement, 
the  accused  had  claimed  to  be  "all  mixed  up"  and  "not  thinking 
straight"  and  a  short  time  later  told  his  interrogators  that  he 
was  still  "confused".  The  statement  was  clearly  admissible  on 
the  basis  of  section  6  but  Lord  McGonigal  decided  to  exercise  his 
discretion  to  exclude  it: 
"It  does  not  ... 
follow  that  length  of  time  or 
persistent  questioning  is  in  itself  such  as  to 
mean  a  statement  is  not  voluntary,  but  if  there  is 
evidence  to  suggest  that  it  1.  c  not  or  may  not  he 
it  is  for  the  Crown  to  satisfy  the  court  that  it 
is.  If  the  crown  fails  to  satisfy  the  court.  that 
the  statement  is  voluntary,  then  although  the  case 
may  not  come  under  section  6(2)  the  court  must,  in 
my  opinion}  consider  whether  it  should  be  excluded 
as  a  proper  exercise  of  the  court's  discretion. 
...  The  application  of  the  discretion 
...  depends 321 
solely  on  the  court  ...  looking  at  the  facts  and 
circumstances  of  a  particular  case  and  deciding 
whether  as  a  fact  it  is  satisfied  that  the  state- 
meet  was  a  voluntary  statement.  That  Is,  that  it 
was  not  made  by  a  person  driven  by  the  conditions 
or  circumstances  under  which  it  was  made  to  act 
against  hi  will  or  conscience.  " 
By  the  time  of  the  next  reported  decision,  'R  v  4cGrmth  [19.801  NT 
9,  a  Judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeal,  the  Northern  Ireland 
(Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1978  had  been  passed,  and  Section  6  of 
the  1973  Act  had  become  Section  8  of  the  1978  one.  The  point  in 
McGrath  was  one  of  some  novelty,  and,  it  is  submitted,  little 
hope  of  success.  The  accused  had  been  arrested  three  times  in 
connection  with  the  same  offence,  in  June  1976,  March  1977  and 
finally  in  November  1977  when  he  made  an  oral  admission  and  a 
written  confession,  One  oddity,  not  followed  up  in  the  brief 
report,  is  that  after  he  was  arrested  in  March  1977  the  accused 
was  bailed  in  May  1977  and  the  charge  was  "dropped"  in  October, 
the  month  before  his  third  and  final  arrest, 
The  basic  point  in  is  r  th  was  that  the  repeated  arrests  amounted 
to  mental  torture,  or  at  least  Inhuman  treatment.  Defence 
counsel  argued  that  the  conduct  had  to  be  Judged  from  the 
standpoint  of  the  effect  on  the  victim,  independently  of  the 
intention  of  the  person  responsible.  The  trial  judge,  Lord 
Justice  Gibson,  had  taken  the  view  thatt 322 
"In  order  to  constitute  treatment  within  the  act 
there  must  be  either  physical  or  mental  ill- 
treatment  and  that  that  must  be-of  a  very  grave 
nature.  ,..  All  physical  or  mental  illtreatment  in 
not  torture  or  inhuman  or  degrading,  and.  I  have 
also  come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  1.11treatmont 
which  would  fall  within  the  section  must  be  done 
with  the  intention  of  causing  either  physical  or 
mental  suffering  and  that  that  physical  or  mental 
suffering  must  be  of  a  very  high  degree  and  it 
must  have  been  done  also  as  the  section  indicates 
with  the  purpose  of  inducing  a  statement,  So 
those  are  the  physical  acts,  there  must  be  grave 
physical  ilitreatment  and  secondly  the  intention 
of  causing  a  high  degree  of  suffering  and  the 
motive  must  be  to  produce  a  statement.  I  am  quite 
satisfied  that  it  is  not  enough  to  intend  merely 
to  do  an  act  which,  in  the  result,  without  any 
foresight  by  the  police  officer,  does  produce 
suffering,  that  to  my  mind  in  not  anything,  within 
the  section,  that  is  to  say  in  order  to  bring  a 
case  within  the  section  one  must  do  morn  than  be 
satisfied  that  the  suffering  resulted  from 
conduct;  it  must  be  shown  that  at  least  there  is  a 
prima  facie  case  that  suffering  was  intended  or  at 
least  foreseen  when  the  conduct  was  adopted.  " 323 
The  appeal  court  approved  the  trial  judge's  interpretation  of 
section  8(2)  and  commented  that  on  the  findings  in  fact  there  was 
nothing  which  could  have  prevented  him  from  being  satisfied 
beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the  accused  had  not  been  subjected 
to  torture  or  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment.  They  added  that: 
"Section  8(2)  is  aimed  at  discouraging  the 
deliberate  infliction  of  suffering  rather  than 
contemplating  the  incidental  effect  on  a  suspect 
who  becomes  the  victim  of  conduct  which  is  not 
deliberately  bad  conduct.  The  words  'subjected  to' 
in  section  8(2)  appear  to  us  to  lend  further 
support  to  this  opinion  since  they  appear  to  look 
to  a  situation  where  the  victim  is  deliberately 
made  the  subject  of  the  outlawed  conduct.  " 
Rv  Culbert  019821  Mt  90  does  not  particularly  advance  the  law, 
but  its  importance  lies  in  the  opinion  of  the  Court  of  Appeal 
that  the  guidelines  for  police  interviewing  which  had  been  laid 
down  after  the  Bennett  report  did  not  relate  to  the  inter- 
pretation  of  section  8(2)  and  did  not  set  a  standard  by  which  to 
decide  whether  a  person  had  been  subjected  to  inhuman  or 
degrading  treatment. 
The  final  case  in  this  category,  v  Dub  0[  M41  NI  ?  q2.  is  not 
particularly  remarkable  but  Includes  a  first  instance  judgment  by 
Hutton  J.  running  to  some  20  pages  in  which  the  law  is  compre- 
hensively  and  carefully  considered  In  a  manner  which  would  put 324 
many  a  Scottish  judge  to  shame,  Hutton  J's  Judgment  in  Dil.  o  is 
a  synthesis  of  the  existing  law  and  the  application  of  that  law 
to  the  facts  of  the  case  and,  despite  its  impressive  command,  in 
fact  adds  little  of  real  consequence  of  its  own.  In  essence  the 
judgment  comes  down  to  this.  If  there  has  not  been  torture, 
inhuman  or  degrading  treatment,  statements  by  a  terrorist  suspect 
made  after  a  period  of  searching  questioning  in  custody  will  be 
admissible  notwithstanding  that  at  the  outset  the  suspect  did  not 
wish  to  confess  and  the  questioning  caused  him  to  speak  when 
otherwise  he  would  have  remenined  silent. 
One  particular  point  of  intereEt,  (if  only  because  it  is  stated 
in  a  single  sentence  of  120  words!  ),  is  the  learned  judge's 
explicit  disavowal  of  what  Mirftold  terms  the  "disciplinary 
principle"  4  in  relation  to  the  exclusion  of  statements  to  the 
police 
"Further,  in  a  case  such  as  thth  where  the  court 
decide  that  the  statements  are  admissible  and 
where  the  court  further  decides  in  relation  to  the 
circumstances  of  that  particular  case  and  the 
course  of  questioning,  including  the  length  and 
times  of  the  interviews  as  it  affects  the 
particular  accused,  that  there  is  no  ground  for 
exercising  the  court's  discretion  to  exclude  the 
statements,  I  consider  that  the  court  should  not 
exercise  its  discretion  to  exclude  the  etatementc, 
and  thereby,  In  effect,  bring  about  the  acquittal 325 
of  the  accused  on  certain  counts  for  the  sole 
reason  that  it  wishes  to  ensure  that  in  other 
cases  the  police  will  not  follow  a  certain  course 
in  conducting  the  interviews  of  other  suspects.  " 
Notes 
1,  The  issue  had  previously  arisen  in  two  unreported  first  instance  cases  LY 
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4.  Mirfieid  p70  et  seq.  See  Rv  Sarni  1979)  2  All  ER  12221  [1310)  AC  402 326 
(iii)  The  Relationshijý..  bctj2een  the  Emergency  wars  Legislation 
and  Non-Scheduled  Offences 
When  the  Diplock  Commission  first  conceived  the  concept  of  the 
"Scheduled  Offences"  they  did  so  on  the  basic  that  the  offences 
were  "commonly  committed"  by  terrorists.  However  like  any  other 
country  Northern  Ireland  has  its  share  of,  cay,  murders  or 
manslaughters  which  owe  nothing  to  terrorism,  Since  the  whole 
thrust  of  the  Emergency  Powers  legislation  was  directed  towards 
combatting  terrorism,  it  is  clearly  inappropriate  that  a  domestic 
murder  or  some  equally  obviously  non-terrorist  crime  should  be 
tried  before  a  Diplock  Court  and  subject  to  the  special  rules  of 
evidence  presently  under  discussion.  The.  Northern  Ireland 
(Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1973  accordingly  provided  `  that  the 
Attorney  General  could  certify  that  certain  offences  should  not 
be  treated  as  scheduled  and  when  this  was  done  the  offences  fell 
to  be  dealt  with  as  ordinary  crimes  and  subject  to  the  ordinary 
rules  of  procedure  although  Section  8  continues  to  apply  in 
relation  to  the  admissiblity  of  statements  even  when  the 
scheduled  offence  is  "certified  out".  2 
Inevitably  the  scheduled  and  non-scheduled  offences  will  overlap 
and  there  will  be  anomalies.  Complaints,  have  also  boon  voiced 
that  the  Attorney  General  fails  to  "certify  out"  appropriate 
cases  so  that  the  prosecution  can  take  advantage  of  the  absence 
of  a  jury  and  lower  standards  of  admissibility  in  the  Diplock 
courts. 327 
Only  one  reported  case  has  touched  on  this  area,  and  then  only 
indirectly,  this  being  Rv  McBrten  and  Harman  119§41  Ni  280  a 
non-Diplock  trial  for  murder.  Harman  had  been  arrested  for  the 
murder  of  her  husband.  The  murder  would  appear  to  have  been 
claimed  by  the  I.  R.  A.  and  presumably  for  this  reason  Mrs  Harman's 
arrest  was  carried  out  under  Section  12  of  the  Prevention  of 
Terrorism  (Temporary  Provisions)  Act  1976.  Following  her  arrest 
the  accused  was  taken  to  Castlereagh  where  she  was  held  for  three 
days  and  questioned  five  times  making  two  written  statements  and 
a  number  of  verbal  admissions.  Objection  was  taken  to  the 
admission  of  this  evidence  at  her  trial  and  since  the  crime  was 
non-scheduled  the  matter  fell  to  be  determined  by  the  common  law. 
Various  arguments  were  put  forward  in  support  of  the  defonce' 
argument  that  the  statements  had  been  obtained  by  oppression.  In 
particular  it  was  argued  that  for  a  person  suspected  of  a  non- 
scheduled  offence  to  be  brought  to  Castlereagh  at  all  was 
oppressive,  in  the  same  way  as  the  circumstances  of  interrogation 
at  Holywood  were  held  to  be  oppressive  in  Ry  Flynn  and  Jeonard.  4 
Having  reviewed  the  leading  English  authorities,  Carswell  J.  had 
little  difficulty  in  rejecting  this  argument  along  with  the 
others  put  forward  in  support  of  the  claim  of  oppression. 
Having  found  that  the  statements-wore  admiscibio  an,  a  matter  of 
law,  Carcwoll  J.  then  had  to  decide  whether  to  exercise  his 
discretion  to  exclude  them  as  having  been  unfairly  obtained.  The 
defence  argued  that  Mrs  Harman's  arrest  under  section  12  was 328 
invalid  and  unlawful  as  was  her  consequent  detention.  If  she  had 
been  arrested  at  common  law  she  would  have  been  brought  before  a 
Magistrates'  Court  as  coon  as  practicable  after  24  hours  had 
elapsed  from  the  time  of  her  arrest.  If  this  had  happened  she 
would  not  have  been  in  a  position  to  make  certain  of  the  later 
statements.  It  was  also  alleged  that  the  police  had  been  in 
breach  of  the  Judges  Rules  by  failing  to  charge  the  accused  when 
they  had  sufficient  evidence  to  do  so.  All  these  arguments  were 
rejected  by  the  learned  judge  whose  conclusions  included  the 
following.  ti)  The  statements,  both  verbal  and  written  were 
voluntarily  made  and  part  of  a  "continuing  process  of 
revelation".  (ii)  The  police  were  acting  in  good  faith  In 
arresting  Mrs  Harman  under  the  1976  Act.  They  might  have  been 
right  or  wrong  in  their  decision  to  do  so  but  his  Lordship  was 
satisfied  that  the  police  did  not  act  with  the  deliberate 
intention  of  putting  the  accused  as  a  disadvantage,  or  with  the 
object  to  wear  down  or  break  her  will. 
r 
Mcßrien  and  H?  rman  is  hardly  a  landmark  in  the  law  of  confessions 
but  It  is  of  importance  as  one  of  the  few  recent  Northern  Ireland 
decisions  concerning  the  common  law  tests  of  voluntariness  and 
the  absence  of  oppression  and  the  exercise  of  judicial  discretion 
in  a  common  law  catting,  Carswell  Pa  decision  is  entirely  in 
accordance  with  contemporary  English  case  law. 
Notes 
1,  Schedule  4  Notes  1  and  2 
2,  G,  Mogan  and  C,  Walkar  Political  violence  in  [teland  p11U 
3,  eg  Q,  Walsh  The  Use  and  Ouse  of  t  ergency  Legislation  in  Northern  Ireland 
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9.7  The  Baker  Rg+  the  northern  n(,  nr  (ync 
Provisions)  Act  1987_ 
The  Westminster  government  continued  to  be  keen  to  normalise  the 
legal  position  in  Northern  Ireland  as  far  as  possible  and  in 
April  1983  Sir  George  Baker  was  appointed  to  review  the  operation 
of  the  Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1978  with  the 
following  terms  of  reference; 
"Accepting  that  the  temporary  emergency  powers  are 
necessary  to  combat  terrorist  violence,  and  taking 
into  account  Lord  Jellicoe's  review  of  the  working 
of  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  (Temporary 
Provisions)  Act  1976  as-  it  affects  Northern 
Ireland,  to  examine  the  operation  of  the  Northern, 
Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1978  in  order 
to  dertermine  whether  its  provisions  strike  the 
right  balance  between  the  need,  on  the  one  hand  to 
maintain  as  fully  as  possible  the  liberties  of  the 
individual  and  on  the  other  to  provide  the 
security  forces  and  the  courts  with  adequate 
powere  to  enable  them  to  protect  the  public  from 
current  and  foreseeable  incidence.  (sic)  of 
terrorist  crime;  and  to  report.  " 
The  Baker  review  wau  published  in  1984.1 330 
Broadly  stated,  Baker  took  the  view  that  circumstances  in 
Northern  Ireland  left  little  room  for  manoeuvre  and  that  it  would 
be  irresponsible  to  abandon  the  emergency  powers  entirely.  His 
report  was  long  and  comprehensive,  and  dealt  with  all  aspects  of 
the  legislation,  although  the  view  has  been  stated  that  its  value 
is  diminished  by  inconsistent  interpretation  of  the  terms  of 
reference.  2 
Baker  came  down  in  favour  of  the  retention  of  single-judge 
Diplock  courts  for  the  trial  of  scheduled  offences  but  considered 
that  there  should  be  many  more  scheduled  offences  which  might  be 
"certified  out"  and  hence  tried  before  non-Diplock  courts.  3 
From  time  to  time  the  allegation  had  been  made  that  the  Diplock 
judges  were  becoming  "case  hardened".  Baker  defined  this  to  mean 
that  the  judge  "has  heard  it  all  before;  therefore  he  does  not 
believe  the  accused;  therefore  he  is  or  becomes  prosecution 
minded".  '`'  While  the  possibility  of  this  happening  was 
acknowledged,  the  judges  themselves  recognised  the  danger  and 
Baker  rejected  the  allegation  of  "case  hardening". 
When  he  turned  to  the  question  of  evidence,  and  for  present 
purposes  the  aspect  of  greatest  interest  is  evidence  in  relation 
to  statements  by  the  accused,  Baker  explicitly  endorsed  the  need 
to  gain  evidence  through  interrogation  and  he  reviewed,  with 
general  approval,  the  way  in  which  the  Northern  Irish  courts  had 
operated  Section  8  (and  its  predecessor  Section  6).  He  rejected 
the  criticism  that  the  combined  effect  of  Rv  McCormick  and  &v 331 
Milne  I  had  been  to  erode  the  minimum  standard  of  Article  3  and 
Article  7  of  the  International  Covenant  on  Civil  and  Political 
Rights  and  stated  his  own  view  that  "no  physical  violence  of  any 
degree  would  now  be  tolerated  and  I  cannot  believe  that  violence 
could  occur,  unless  the  accused  was  the  aggressor.  "  He  also 
strongly  favoured  the  tape  recording  of,  interviews.  7 
As  Lord  Gardiner  had  done  some  years  previously,  Sir  George  Baker 
argued  that  the  discretion  under  which  the  Northern  Irish  Judges 
had  rejected  confessions  not  specifically  excluded  under  the 
statute  should  itself  be  placed  on  a  statutory  footing.  Baker 
noted  "Here  as  elsewhere  it  is  very  much  a  question  of  how  the 
Act  looks.  The  difference  between  what  is  said  in  the  section 
and  what  really  happens  in  court  is  said,  and  I  have  some 
sympathy  with  this  view,  to  produce  vagueness  and  complexity 
which  confuses  ordinary  folk,  More  importantly  it-gives 
opportunity  for  exploitation,  exaggeration  and  half  truths  for 
propaganda  purposes,  "  *3  Baker  also  observed  thatt 
In  recent  years  few  confessions  have  been 
excluded.  It  is  impossible  to  say  in  every  case 
whether  they  were  rejected  in  the  exercise  of  the 
judges'  discretion  but  certainly  40%-45%  were, 
Should  anyone  seek  to  use  this  as  an  argument  to 
support  a  suggestion  that  judges  are  case-hardened 
I  emphasise  that  allegations  of  physical  ill- 
treatment  have  virtually  ceased  since  the 
implementation  of  Bennett's  recommendations  in 332 
1979.  Counsel  tell  me  that  fights  with 
allegations  of  confessions  obtained  by  violence 
are  a  thing  of  the  past.  "  I 
Baker  recommended  that  Section  8  should  be  redrafted  to  exclude 
violence  and  to  include  the  judges'  discretion, 
The  legislative  answer  to  the  Baker  Report  was  the  Northern 
Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1987  which  made  various 
amendments  to  the  1978  Act  based  on  Baker's  recommendations.  10 
The  general  thrust  of  the  1987  Act  was,  as  might  be  expected, 
towards  "normalising"  the  procedures  used  against  terrorism.  The 
1987  Act  provided  a  new  Section  8  of  the  1978  Act  in  the 
following  terms: 
80)  In  any  criminal  proceedings  for  a  scheduled 
offence,  or  for  two  or  more  offences  at  least  one 
of  which  is  a  scheduled  offence,  a  statement  made 
by  the  Accused  may  be  given  in  evidence  by  the 
prosecution  in  so  far  as- 
(a)  it  is  relevant  to  any  matter  in  issue  in  the 
proceedings,  and 
(b)  it  is  not  excluded  by  the  court  in  pursuance 
of  subsection  (2)  below  or  in  the  exercise  of  its 
discretion  referred  to  in  subsection  (3)  below 
(and  has  not  been  rendered  inadmissible  by  virtue 
of  such  a  direction  as  is  mentioned  in  subsection 
(2)(M)  below). 333 
(2)  Where  in  any  such  proceedings- 
(a)  the  prosecution  proposes  to  give,  or  (as  the 
case  may  be)  has  given  in  evidence  a  statement 
made  by  the  accused,  and 
(b)  prima  facie  evidence  is  adduced  that  the 
accused  was  subject  to  torture,  to  inhuman  or 
degrading  treatment,  or  to  any  violence  or  threat 
of  violence  (whether  or  not  amounting  to  torture) 
in  order  to  induce  him  to  make  the  statement, 
then,  unless  the  prosecution  satisfies  the  court 
that  the  statement  was  not  obtained  by  so 
subjecting  the  accused  in  the  manner  indicated  by 
that  evidence,  the  court  shall  do  one  of  the 
following  things,  namely- 
ti)  in  the  case  of  a  statement  proposed  to  be 
given  in  evidence,  exclude  the  statement; 
(ii)  in  the  case  of  a  statement  already  received 
in  evidence,  continue  the  trial  disregarding  the 
statement;  or 
(iii)  in  either  case,  direct  that  the  trial  shall 
be  restarted  before  a  differently  constituted 
court  (before  which  the  statement  in  question 
shall  be  inadmissible). 
(3)  It  is  hereby  declared  that,  in  the  case  of 
any  statement  made  by  the  accused  and  not  obtained 
by  so  subjecting  him  as  mentioned  in  subsection 
(2)(b)  above,  the  court  in  any  such  proceedings  as 334 
are  mentioned  in  subsection  (1)  above  has  a 
discretion  to  do  one  of  the  things  mentioned  in 
subsection  (2)(i)  to  (iii)  above  if  it  appears  to 
the  court  that  it  is  appropriate  to  do  so  in  order 
to  avoid  unfairness  to  the  accused  or  otherwise  in 
the  interests  of  justice. 
(4)  This  section  does  not  apply  to  a  summary 
trial. 
Although  the  new  Section  8  appears  to  broaden  the  range  of 
conduct  which  makes  confessions  inadmissible  by  adding 
specifically  "violence  or  threat  of  violence"  as  a  ground  for 
exclusion,  the  difference  is  more  apparent  than  real,  Clearly 
the  new  provision  would  strike  at  the  "certain  roughness  of 
treatment"  which  the  European  Commission  regarded  as  acceptable 
in  the  Greek  Case  and  which  Lord  rust  ice  McGonigal  was  prepared 
to  accept  in  Rv  McCormick  and  Others,  but  the  Courts  themselves 
had  already  prohibited  violence  in  RY  Q'ýIallTrani.  ''  it  has  also 
been  pointed  out  that  the  new  Section  8  leaves  some  important 
issues  unresolved,  notably  whether  and  to  what  extent  it 
precludes  psychological  or  mental  pressure  on  the  accused.  12. 
Another  unresolved  issue  is  the  effect  of  threats  of  violence 
against  third  parties  (such  as  members  of  the  accused's  family). 
With  all  due  deference  to  Lord  Gardiner  and  Sir  George  Baker,  the 
present  writer,  being  a  Scot  and  used  to  the  broad  application  of 
judicial  discretion  in  many  contexts,  finds  it  difficult  to 335 
understand  what  purpose  is  served  by  placing  this-discretion  on  a 
statutory  basis.  The  Northern  Irish  courts  had  quickly  held 
themselves  to  retain  their  discretion  to  exclude  statements  and 
had  exercised  that  discretion  in  a  wise  and  careful  way,  treading 
the  delicate  line  between  allowing  the  common  law  rules  to  re- 
establish  themselves  by  the  back  door  and  allowing  an  unaccep- 
table  degree  of  latitude  to  the  security  forces, 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  statutory  discretion  now  available  to 
the  Judges  in'Northorn  Ireland  is  wider  that  that  enjoyed  by  the 
English  judges  under  PACE,  since  in  the  former  case  the  court  may 
exclude  the  statement  "if  it  appears  to  the  court  that  it  is 
appropriate  to  do  so  in  order  to  avoid  unfairness  to  the  accused 
or  otherwise  in  the  interests  of  Justice,  "  while  under  PACE  the 
test  is  that  the  evidence  "would  have  such  an  adverse  effect  on 
the  fairness  of  the  proceedings  that  the  court  ought  not  to  admit 
it.  "  13  The  present  writer  is  unable  to  see  any  material, 
practical  difference  between  these  two  provisions.  He  would 
submit  that  if  judicial  discretion  exists  at  all,  it  cannot  be 
fettered  and  exists  precisely  in  order  to  deal  with  issues  which 
by  their  nature  do  not  admit  of  statutory  regulation  or  otherwise 
fall  outside  the  provisions  of  the  existing  law.  As  one  eminent 
Scottish  judge  put  it: 
"The  purpose  of  the  £common  law]  discretion  is 
that  it  should  be  sufficiently  wide  and  flexible 
to  be  capable  of  being  exercised  in  a  variety  of 336 
circumstances  that  may  occur  from  time  to  time  but 
which  cannot  be  foreseen.  "  14 
To  attempt  to  put  such  a  discretion  on  a  statutory  footing,  other 
than  perhaps  simply  to  confirm  its  existence,  seems  a  pointless 
exercise,  particularly  since  the  appellate  process  exists  to  deal 
with  any  unwise  or  inappropriate  use  of  judicial  discretion. 
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9.8  The  Northern  a  (Emergency  a)  Legislation 
Overview  and  Conclusions 
At  the  time  of  drafting  this  chapter,  July  1991,  yet  another 
attempt  to  resolve  the  problems  of  Northern  Ireland  has  come  to 
naught  with  the  failure  of  the  so-called  "Brooke  Initiative". 
The  Loyalist  paramilitary  organisations  have  called  off  a 
ceasefire  which  they  had  called  during  the  talks  and  I.  R.  A.  bombs 
have  recently  been  planted  in  Preston  and  London,  The  situation 
is  both  familiar  and  depressing,  as  is  the  realisation  of  the 
extent  to  which  political  violence  and  its  consequences  has 
become  a  part  of  normal  life  for  many  of  the  population  in 
Northern  Ireland.  It  is  difficult  for  an  outsider  to  understand 
what  lies  behind  the  troubles  and  it  is  even  more  difficult  to 
imagine  where  a  solution  is  likely  to  be  found.  It  is  clear  that 
legislation  to  deal  with  terrorist  violence  is-going  to  be 
required  for  the  foreseeable  future, 
It  has  been  pointed  out,  rightly,  that  there  is  an  inherent 
. 
illogicality  in  trying,  on  the  one  hand,  to  deal  with  terrorists 
as  common  criminals  and,  on  the  other  hand,  providing  special 
powers  and  rules  for  use  in  terrorist  cacao  and  the  Northern 
Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1987  is  a  further  step  towards 
the  assimilation  of  terrorism  legislation  and  "ordinary"  criminal 
procedure.  How  much  further  this  process  of  "normalisation"  can 
go  is  unclear. 338 
Although  subject  to  considerble  criticism,  much  of  it  politically 
motivated,  the  Diplock  Courts  appear  to  have  operated  in  a 
reasonably  successful  manner  and  when  compared  with  the  alter- 
native  of  internment  are  much  the  lesser  of  two  evils.  Such 
courts  appear  to  comply  with  the  minimum  standard  laid  down  in 
Article  6  of  the  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  and  they  are 
regarded  as  sufficiently  fair  to  warrant  extradition  by  courts  in 
the  United  States  and-the  Irish  Republic.  Even  Dermot  Walsh  has 
to  admit,  albeit  grudgingly,  that  there  would  be  significant 
problems  in  returning  to  trial  by  jury. 
The  absence  of  a  jury  is  not  significant  in  many  cases  because 
the  defendant  pleads  guilty.  Moreover  in  a  trial  before  a  jury 
the  admissibility  of  a  disputed  confession  normally  falls  to  be 
determined  by  the  judge  before  the  matter  reaches  the  Jury. 
Although  allegations  of  "case  hardening"  have  been  made  against 
the  Diplock  courts,  no  such  allegations  have  ever  been  proved. 
The  special  rules  on  admissiblity  of  confessions  appear  to  have, 
in  the  words  of  Hogan  and  Walker,  "attained  their  objective  of 
feeding  sufficient  evidence  into  the  court  system  without 
reliance  on  witnesses"  and  this  has  been  achieved  without  either 
official  resort  to  treatment  contrary  to  Article  3  of  the 
European  Convention  or  abrogation  of  the  minimum  standards  of 
legal  process  under  the  Convention.  2  There  has,  however,  been  a 
cost.  While  one  can  dismiss  the  description  of  Section  8  as  "one 
of  the  most  miechievious  and  humanly  degrading  (provisions]  ever 339 
to  appear  in  the  criminal  legislation  of  any  country"  3  as  both 
extravagant  and  inaccurate,  if  not  downright  foolish,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  the  reputation  and  standing  of  the  security 
forces,  courts  and  state  were  damaged  particularly  during  the 
1970c. 
However,  if  one  lesson  is  to  be  learned  from  the  experience  of 
Northern  Ireland  it  is  the  danger  of  the  complacent  assumption 
that  savage  brutality  by  the  forces  of  law  and  order  in  the 
interests  of  obtaining  evidence  and  intelligence  "couldn't  happen 
here".  It  could  and  it  did.  While  the  situation  in  Northern 
Ireland  is  complicated  by  historical  and  cultural  factors  absent 
elswhere  in  Britain,  the  experiences  of  the  early  1970s  show 
beyond  peradventure  the  need  for  the  supervision,  whether  by 
electronic  means  or  otherwise,  of  what  takes  place  in  police 
stations.  It  appears  that  the  law  in  Northern  Ireland  has  now, 
after  a  very  shaky  start,  reached  a  reasonable,  and  above  all 
practical,  compromise  between  the  need  to  take  dangerous 
terrorists  out  of  circulation  and  the  need  to  protect  civil 
liberties.  As  far  as  the  present  writer  is  aware,  the  critics  of 
the  Emergency  Powers  legislation  have  never  been  able  to  suggest 
any  real  alternative  to  the  test  of  "torture  or  inhuman  or 
degrading  treatment"  which  does  not  involve  a  real  risk  of  a 
return  to  the  situation  in  the  early  1970s  when  it  was  clear  that 
the  common  law  test  of  voluntariness  was  found  wanting. 
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9.9  Rocent  Developments 
(i>  The  Criminal  EdeQted  Order 
Apart  from  the  brief  description  of  the  legal  position  prior  to 
1973,  the  whole  of  this  chapter  has  been  devoted  to  matters 
directly  concerned  with  the  emergency  situation  in  Northern 
Ireland.  The  general  criminal  law  of  the  Province  was  little 
affected  by  the  emergency  provisions,  and  indeed  remained 
virtually  untouched  throughout  the  entire  period.  However  recent 
developments  have  brought  about  major  changes  in  the  general  law, 
which  in  the  case  of  the  Criminal  Evidence  Order  may  owe  more  to 
expediency  than  anything  else  and  it  is  now  proposed  to  turn  away 
from  terrorism  per  se  and  consider  these  changes. 
As  previously  discussed,  Section  16  of  the  1973  Act  (later 
Section  18  of  the  1978  Act)  brought  about  a  fairly  modest 
restriction  in  the  right  to  silence  by  requiring  a  person  to 
answer  questions  concerning  his  identity  and  movements  and  what 
he  knows  about  any  recent  explosion  or  other  recent  incident 
endangering  life  or  concerning  any  person  killed  or  injured  in 
any  such  explosion  or  incident.  Apart  from  this,  the  emergency 
legislation  had  virtually  no  effect  on  the  right  to  silence  which 
was  broadly  similar  to  the  pro-PACE  English  position.  It  would 
appear  that  the  Northern  Irish  judges  tended  to  refrain  from 
making  adverse  comments  to  juries  about  the  failure  to  testify 
and  also  from  drawing  adverse  inferences  in  cases  where  they  cat 
as  a  tribunal  of  fact.  I 342 
It  is  therefore  somewhat  surprising  that  the  most  drastic  cur- 
tailment  of  the  right  to  silence  in  the  United  Kingdom  was 
brought  about  not  specifically  in  the  context  of  terrorism,  but 
rather  in  the  context  of  the  reform  of  the  general  Northern  Irish 
law  of  criminal  evidence  and  procedure.  The  Criminal  Evidence 
(Northern  Ireland)  Order  1988,  :  which  pre-dated  the  report  of 
the  (English)  Working  Group  on  the  Right  of  Silence,  effectively 
abolished  the  right  to  silence  in  all  criminal  proceedings  in 
Northern  Ireland.  The  suggestion  has  been  made  '  that  the 
operative  factor  in  the  decision  to  move  on  the  right  to  silence 
in  Northern  Ireland  was  the  upsurge  in  terrorist  violence  in  the 
summer  of  1988. 
In  any  event,  whatever  the  reason  for  it,  '  this  major  change  in 
the  law  was  brought  about  not,  as  one  might  have  expected,  by 
lengthy  and  detailed  consideration  and  parliamentary  debate  but 
by  an  Order  in  Council  introduced  in  parliament  as  a  "reserved 
matter"  under  Schedule  3  of  the  Northern  Ireland  Constitution  Act 
1971  4  The  Order,  which  was  not  preceded  by  a  proposal, 
progressed  from  draft  to  law  in  the  startling  period  of  three  and 
a  half  weeks.  One  effect  of  this  procedure  was  that  the  Order 
had  to  deal  with  the  general  criminal  law  since  legislation 
relating  specifically  to  terrorism  would  have  required  a  Bill  in 
Parliament. 
The  government  claimed  that  the  propossle  in  the  Order  were 
brought  forward  only  after  the  most  careful  thought.  Their 343 
position  was  explained  by  the  Secretary  of  State  in  the  following 
terms: 
"For  some  time  the  government  has  been  reviewing 
the  law  on  criminal  evidence  in  Northern  Ireland 
in  the  light  of  the  grave  challenge  from 
continuing  terrorist  violence  and  from  other 
serious  crime,  particularly  racketeering.  They 
have  had  before  them  a  formidable  body  of 
persuasive  evidence  for  change,  including  the 
acknowledged  difficulties  faced  by  the  police  in 
bringing  to  justice  hardened,  professional 
criminals,  often  assited  by  able  legal  advisers, 
who  are  thoroughly  trained  in  resisting  police 
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questioning,  and  in  the  case  of  terrorists,  who 
even  publish  in  their  news  sheets  detailed 
instructions  on  techniques  for  resisting 
questioning  under  the  heading  'Whatever  you  say, 
say  nothing'.  ... 
These  practices  are  now  widely 
recognised  and  imitated  throughout  the  criminal 
elements  in  Northern  Ireland.  "  5 
Later  in  the  debate  Mr  King  added: 
"...  I  was  asked  whether  I  have  any  figures,  The 
R,  U.  C.  informs  me  that  of  all  those  detained  for 
questioning  in  connection  with  serious  crimes, 
including  terrorist  offences  in  Northern  Ireland, 
just  under  half  refuse  to  answer  any  substantive 344 
questions  while  in  police  custody.  Many  of  those 
people  will  not  answer  any  questions.  It  is  clear 
that  in  too  many  cases  justice  is  being 
thwarted.  "'- 
The  legislative  procedure  adopted,  as  well  as  the  terms  of  the 
Order,  received  a  sharp  response  from  the  Standing  Advisory 
Commission  on  Human  Rights,  a  body  established  by  law  to  advise 
the  Secretary  of  State  on  matters  relating  to  human  rights  in 
Northern  Ireland.  7  The  Commission  were  disturbed  that  they  had 
not  been  consulted  and  had  only  learned  of  the  publication  of  the 
Draft  Order  through  the  media.  They  were  concerned  that  the 
Draft  Order  had  been  laid  before  the  Home  Office  Working  Group 
(on  which  the  Northern  Ireland  Office  was  represented)  had 
reported.  They  were  particularly  concerned  at  the  fact  that  the 
matter  had  not  been  dealt  with  by  Bill.  After  calling  on  the 
government  to  publish  the  figures  claimed  to  justify  their 
position,  the  Commission  observed: 
"If  the  purpose  of  the  inference  provicione  is 
principally  to-deal  with  terrorist  finances  and 
the  'wall  of  silence'  encountered  in  interrogating 
persons  suspected  of  terrorist  offences,  then,  as 
'provisions  for  dealing  with  terrorism  or  sub- 
version'  are  'excepted'  matters  for  the  purpose  of 
the  Northern  Ireland  Constitution  Act  1973,  it 
would  in  our  view  be,  appropriate  for  Government  to 
proceed  by  Bill.  We  note  here  that  the  Prevention 345 
of  Terrorism  (Temporary  Provisions)  Bill  was  laid 
before  Parliament  in  November  1988.  The  Bill 
contained  provisions  concerned  with  terrorist 
funds  and  withholding  information  which  might  be 
of  material  assistance  in  preventing  acts  of 
terrorism  and  apprehending  terrorist  offenders. 
Arguably,  the  Bill  could  have  been  a  vehicle  for 
introducing  inference  provisions.  This  would  not 
have  precluded  use  of  the  Order  procedure  for 
amending  the  general  criminal  law  of  Northern 
Ireland,  which  is  a  'reserved'  matter  under  the 
1973  Act,  should  this  have  been  thought  desirable 
following  full  consultation  in  light  of  the 
conclusions  of  the  working  party.  In  all  the 
circumstances,  the  doubt  remains  that  the  Order 
procedure  without  a  Proposal  was  used  to  as  to 
minimise  the  opportunity  for  public  debate.  "  0 
The  Commission  discussed  at  some  length  the  reports  of  the  CLRC 
and  the  RCCP  and  noted  the  difference  of  views.  Their  own 
conclusion  was  stark: 
"These  differing  views  of  the  CLRC  and  a  majority 
or  the  RCCP  underscore  our  point  that  the  decision 
to  lay  the  Draft  Order  before  Parliament  before 
the  working  group  had  reported  to  the  Home 
Secretary  was  a  mistake,  In  our  opinion  this 346 
decision  will  not  have  helped  maintain  confidence 
in  Northern  Ireland's  administration.  "  9 
Broadly  stated,  the  Order  permits  the  drawing  of  adverse 
inferences  from  silence  in  four  basic  situations:  where  the 
accused  on  being  questioned  or  charged  fails  to  mention  any  fact 
relied  on  in  his  defence;  where  the  accused  fails  without  good 
reason  to  give  evidence  at  his  trial;  where  the  accused  fails  to 
account  for  any  object,  substance  or  mark  on  his  person,  clothing 
or  footwear  or  otherwise  in  his.  possession  or  in  the  place  where 
he  is  arrested;  and  where  the  accused  fails  to  account  for  his 
presence  at  a  ,  place  at  or  about  the  time  an  offence  was 
committed.  In  all  cases  as  well  as  drawing  an  adverse  inference 
the  court  may  treat  the  accused's  failure  or  refusal  as,  or  as 
capable  of  amounting  to,  corroboration  of  any  evidence  given 
against  him  in  relation  to  which  his  failure  or  refusal  in 
material. 
Article  3  of  the  Order  allows  the  court  when  deciding  inter  alle 
whether  there  is  a  case  to  answer  or  whether  the  accused  is 
guilty  of  the  offence  charged  to  have  regard  to  evidence  that  the 
accused 
"(a)  at  any  time  before  he  was  charged  with  the 
offence,  on  being  questioned  by  a  constable  trying 
to  discover  whether  and  by  whom  the  offence  had 
been  committed,  failed  to  mention  any  fact  relied 
on  in  his  defence  in  those  proceedings;  or 347 
(b)  on  being  charged  with  the  offence  or 
officially  informed  that  he  might  be  prosecuted 
for  it,  failed  to  mention  any  such  fact, 
being  a  fact  which  in  the  circumstances  existing 
at  the  time  the  accused  could  reasonably  have  been 
expected  to  mention  when  so  questioned,  charged  or 
informed  as  the  case  may  be...  " 
A  new  form  of  police  caution  has  been  introduced: 
"You  do  not  have  to  say  anything  unless  you  wish 
to  do  so  but  I  must  warn  you  that  if  you  fail  to 
mention  any  fact  which  you  rely  on  in  your  defence 
in  court,  your  failure  to  take  this  opportunity  to 
mention  it  may  be  treated  in  court  as  supporting 
any  relevant  evidence  against  you:  If  you  do  wish 
to  nay  anything,  what  you  say  may  be  given  in 
evidence.  '° 
Article  4  permits  the  drawing  of  inferences  from  a  failure  by  the 
accused  to  give  evidence  at  the  trial,  Under  Article  4(2)  the 
court  must  warn  accused  persons  of  the  effect  of  a  refusal  to 
testify  and  the  following  terms  have  been  approved  by  the  Supreme 
Court  judges: 
"The  court,  as  it  is  required  to  do  by  law,  is 
about  to  call  on  you  to  give  evidence  in  your  own 
defence.  I  am  also  required  by  law  to  tell  you 
that  if  you  refuse  to  come  into  the  witness  box  to 348 
be  sworn  or  if,  having  been  sworn,  you  refuse, 
without  good  reason,  to  answer  any  question,  then 
the  court  (or  the  jury)  in  deciding  whether  you 
are  guilty  or  not  guilty  may  take  into  account 
against  you  to  the  extent  that  it  considers  proper 
your  refusal  to  give  evidence  or  to  answer  any 
questions  and  of  relevant]  your  refusal  may  also 
be  regarded  by  the  court  (or  the  jury)  as 
corroboration  of  the  evidence  given  against  you, 
I  now  call  upon  you  to  come  to  the  witness  box  to 
be  sworn  and  to  give  evidence  in  your  defence.  "  11 
i 
Article  4(5)  specifically  provides  that  the  article  does  not 
render  the  accused  compellable  to  give  evidence  on  his  own 
behalf,  but  it  scarcely  needs  to  be  said  that  there  will  be 
considerable  pressure  on  the  accused  to  testify.  While 
inferences  may  not  be  drawn  if  the  accused  fails  to  testify  "for 
good  cause"  Article  4(6)  provides  that  any  refusal  shall  be  taken 
to  be  without  good  cause  unless  the  accused  is  entitled  to  refuse 
to  answer  by  virtue  of  any  statutory  provision  or  on  the  ground 
of  privilege  or  unless  the  court  in  the  exercise  of  its  general 
discretion  excuses  him  from  ancwering. 
It  would  also  appear  that  the  prosecution  may  now  comment  on  the 
failure  of  the  accused  to  testify  since  Article  400)  repeals  the 
prohibition  on  prosecutorial  comment  formerly  contained  in 349 
Section  1(b)  of  the  Criminal  Evidence  (Northern  Ireland)  Act 
1923.1' 
Under  Article  5  an  adverse  inference  may  be  drawn  if  the  accused 
fails  to  account  for  the  presence  on  his  person,  clothing  or 
footwear  "or  otherwise  in  his  possession"  or  in  any  place  in 
which  he  is  at  the  time  of  his  arrest  "any  object,  substance  or 
mark  or  ...  any  mark  on  any  such  object".  There  are  certain 
provisos  before  inferences  may  be  drawn.  A  constable  must 
"reasonably  believe"  that  the  presence  of  the  object,  substance 
or  mark  may  be  attributable  to  the  accused's  participation  in  the 
commission  of  an  offence,  the  constable  must  inform  the  accused 
of  his  belief  and  he  must  request  the  accused  to  account  for  the 
presence  of  the  object,  substance  or  mark. 
Article  6  makes  a  similar  provision,  and  applies  the  same 
provisos,  where  the  accused  fails  to  account  for  his  presence, 
having  been  found  by  a  constable  at  or  about  the  time  the  offence 
for  which  he  was  arrested  is  alleged  to  have  been  committed  and 
the  constable  "reasonably  believes"  that  the  accused's  presence 
at  that  place  and  at  that  time  may  be  attributable  to  his 
participation  in  the  commission  of  the  offence, 
Articles  3  and  4  clearly  owe  their  origin  to  the  Eleventh  Report 
of  the  CLRC  I-'  but  Articles  5  and  6  are  apparently  based  on 
Sections  18  and  19  of  the  Criminal  rustico  Act  1984  of  the  Irish 
Republic.  It  would  appear  that  in  the  Republic  these  powore  have 350 
not  been  used  and  it  is  also  noteworthy  that  they  were  enacted 
there  for  a  limited  period  of  four  years  and  would  cease  to 
operate  at  the  conclusion  of  that  period  unless  there  was  a 
resolution  of  each  House  of  the  Irish  Parliament  that  they  should 
continue  in  operation.  14 
It  would  appear  that  the  Standing  Advisory  Committee  on  Human 
Rights  was  not  the  only  body  to  be  unhappy  with  the  Criminal 
Evidence  Order.  A  certain  amount  of  information  has  "leaked" 
which  suggests  that  the  Northern  Irish  judges  were  a  great  deal 
less  than  enamoured  of  it.  16 
In  court  judicial  reaction  to  the  1988  Order  has  been  cautious 
and  it  has  been  common  for  judges  to  comment  that  they  are  not 
prepared  to  use  Article  4  to  bolster  up  a  weak  case  and  this  has 
occurred  in  some  cases  involving  possession  of  firearms  and 
explosives  where  the  defendant  has  remained  silent  both  before 
and  at  the  trial.  The  view  has  been  taken  by  certain  Judges  that 
before  an  adverse  inference  can  be  drawn  the  weight  of  the 
prosecution  evidence  should  be  "Just  ...  on  the  brink  of  the 
necessary  standard  of  proof.  "  16 
On  the  other  hand,  in  one  case  where  the  accused  had  made  a 
qualified  admission  to  the  police  but  refused  to  give  evidence 
the  judge  took  the  view  that  the  refusal  to  give  evidence  and  to 
give  substance  to  the  exculpatory  part  of  his  admission  entitled 
the  court  to  discount  that  part  of  the  admission.  17 351 
In  certain  other  cases,  including  the  infamous  murder  of  the  two 
army  corporals,  the  courts  appear  to  have  used  inferences  in  a 
manner  closer  to  that  presumably  intended  by  Parliment.  10 
The  present  situation  with  regard  to  the  drawing  of  inferences 
from  silence  is  unclear  although  it  is  apparent  that  the  order 
has  not  had  the  dramatic  effect  which  the  government  had  hoped. 
The  Order  has  only  been  in  force  for  some  two  years  and  as  yet 
there  has  been  no  opportunity  for  guidance  from  the  Court  of 
Appeal.  J.  A.  Jackson  suggests  that  the  courts  have  to  decide 
whether,  on  the.  one  hand,  the  Order  "licences  drawing  whatever 
inferences  are  logically  tenable  from  silence".  In  this  case, 
while  caution  could  still  be  advocated  there  would  be  no  need  for 
restrictions  such  as  the  "on  the  brink"  standard.  On  the  other 
hand,  Jackson  suggests,  the  view  might  be  taken  that  since  the 
Order  did  not  specifically  abolish  the  right  to  silence,  the 
right  should  still  be  taken  into  account  as  a  legal  principle  and 
that  whatever  the  logic  of  the  situation  it  should  not  be  legally 
proper  to  draw  inferences  unless  the  prosecution  evidence  is  on 
the  brink  of  the  necessary  standard. 
Jackson  also  suggests  that  the  Order  is  neither  fair  nor  effec- 
tive  in  achieving  the  end  of  encouraging  those  suspected  of 
terrorist  activity  to  answer  questions  when  there  was  not  enough 
evidence  to  convict  them.  It  is  not  fair  because  the  cautions 
that  are  to  be.  given  induce  criminal  suspects  to  respond  to 
questioning  at  a  stage  when  a  reliable  record  may  not  be  able  to 352 
be  produced  of  what  they  have  said  and  when  there  may  be  no 
evidence  against  them.  It  is  not  effective  becauce  the  percons 
to  whom  it  was  intended  to  apply  are  the  very  people  who  will 
wait  to  see  how  judicial  attitudes  develop  and  in  the  absence  of 
any  guidance  on  what  matters  may  be  taken  into  account  in 
determining  what  inferences  "appear  proper"  it  is  still  open  to 
the  triers  of  fact  to  take  account  of  the  right  to  silence. 
The  present  writer  respectfully  agrees  with  Mr  Jackson's  view  and 
would  add  that  as  well  as  being  ill-conceived  and  obscure  the 
Order  smacks  of  pandering  to  police  lobbying  without  any  real 
thought  being  given  to  the  consequences.  Further  Judicial 
decisions,  and  in  particular  decisions  of  the  Court  of  Appeal, 
must  be  awaited  before  firm  conclusions  can  be  drawn,  but  in  the 
meantime,  as  Jackson  neatly  puts  it: 
"The  right  of  silence  has  been  regarded  as  a 
sacred  cow,  but  the  lesson  for  those  who  view 
abolition  or  curtailment  of  the  right  as  a  panacea 
for  the  conviction  of  offenders  is  that  they  may 
be  just  as  guilty  of  putting  their  faith  in  a 
sacred  cow,  "  19 
Notes 
1,  J,  ß.  Jackson  Curtailing  the  Ri'ht  of  Silence,  lessons  from  Northern  Ireland 
E199)]  Cria  LR  404  at  p410,  Hereinafter  cited  as  "Jackson.  Curii!  lin,  ' 
2,  S,  I,  1988  No,  1987 
3,  J,  D,  Jackson  RRcont  CavvJop,  ants  in  Criminil  Evidence  [19395  NILQ  105  at 
10$,  Hereinafter  cited  as  "Jackson,  Covelopment? 
4,  For  an  explanation  of  the  complex  concept  of  'reserved"  and  "transferred" 
matters  and  their  import  see  B,  Dickson  rho  Legs!  System  of  Northern  Ireland 
(Belfast,  1984)  p32  at  seq 
S,  H,  C,  Dab  vol  140  Col  193,8  November  1988 353 
6,  ibid  Col  187 
7,  Fourteenth  Report  1987-89,  H,  C,  Paper  394  (HMSO,  1969)  pp9-19  and 
Appendices  A  and  6 
8,  Report  para  13,  Emphasis  in  original, 
9.  Report  papa  18,  Emphasis  in  original, 
10,  Jackson  DOvelopients  pi  12 
11,  Jackson  Curtailing  p410  n26 
12.  Jackson  Davvlvpaents  p11S 
13,  Cmnd  4991  discussed  supra 
14,  The  Irish  Act  and  its  history  is  the  subject  of  a  note  by  P,  McEntee  and  0. 
McGuinness  published  as  Appendix  A  to  the  Fourteenth  Report  of  the  Standing 
Advisory  Committee  on  Human  Rights 
1$,  See  The  Independent  December  28  1988 
16,  Jackson  Curtailing  p410 
17,  Gamble  and  Others  unreported  19$2,  quoted  in  Jackson  Curtailing  at  p411 
18,  Jackson  Curtailing  pp411-412 
19,  Jackson  Curtailing  p415 354 
(ii)  Thg  Police  and  Criminal  P  ýNgrthern  Ireland)  Order 
1959 
The  above  Order  has  introduced  into  Northern  Ireland  virtually 
the  same  regime  as  was  introduced  in  England  and  Wales  by  PACE 
and  its  associated  Codes  are  in  very  similar  terms  to  the  revised 
English  versions.  Since  PACE  has  already  been  discussed  earlier 
in  this  work,  Ia  few  brief  supplementary  comments  will  suffice. 
The  provisions  in  the  Order  relating  to  the  treatment  of  persons 
in  custody  are  practically  the  came  as  under  PACE  although  the 
definition  of  a  "solicitor"  is  restricted  to  a  person  qualified 
to  practice  under  the  Solicitors  Act  1974  or  the  Solicitors 
(Northern  Ireland)  Order  1976  and  there  is  no  provision  for  the 
establishment  of  duty  solicitor  schemes.  2 
Persons  detained  under  the  Prevention  of  Terrorism  (Temporary 
Provisions)  Act  1989  are  excluded  from  the  PACE  regime.  However 
such  persons  are  subject  to  the  safeguards  under  the  Northern 
Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1987  which  provides  rights  of 
intimation  and  access  to  legal  advice  broadly  similar  to  those 
provided  under  the  Order. 
In  relation  to  confession  evidence,  Articles  74  and  76  of  the 
Order  are  the  equivalents  of  Sections  76  and  78  of  PACE 
respectively.  However  neither  of  these  Articles  applies  in 
relation  to  scheduled  offences.  Article  74  has  no  effect  "in 355 
relation  to  criminal  proceedings  to  which  Section  8  of  the 
Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1978  applies"  and 
Article  76  does  not  affect  the  admissiblity  of  a  statement  under 
Section  8  of  the  1978  Act. 
The  net  result  is  that  the  Northern  Ireland  courts  will  have  to 
continue  to  apply  different  tests  of  admiooiblity  depending  on 
whether  they  are  dealing  with  scheduled  or  non-scheduled  offences 
although  in  practical-terms  the  differences  are  slight,  a 
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Chapter  10  Inquisitorial  and  Adversarial  Systemar.  A  Comparative 
View, 
10.1  Introduction. 
The  procedure  followed  in  the  criminal  courts  of  the  western 
countries  is  conventionally  divided  into  two  types,  inquisitorial 
and  adversarial.  This  division,  although  convenient,  is  never 
absolute  (and  is  probablyoverrated  anyway)  since  every  legal 
system  displays  some  characteristics  of  both  types  of  procedure. 
Indeed  one  respected  French  commentator,  A.  Esmein,  claims 
"mixed"  procedure,  in  which  he  includes  the  procedure  of  his  own 
country,  as  a  third  distinct  system.  '  More  recently  the 
suggestion  has  been  made  that  the  appropriate  terms  are 
"adversary"  to  denote  the  Anglo-American  model  and  "non- 
adversary"  to  denote  the  continental  European  one.  3However  in 
this  work  the  traditional  nomenclature  is  retained  and  the  modern 
systems  are  referred  to  as  inquisitorial  or  adversarial  and  it  is 
accepted  that  they  will  be  only  predominantly  of  the  one  type  or 
the  other. 
The  essential  difference  between  the  two  systems  is,  as  Lord 
Devlin  has  pointed  out,  apparent  from  their  names  -  adversarial 
procedure  is  a  trial  of  strength,  inquisitorial  is  an  inquiry: 
"The  question  in  the  first  is:  are  the  shoulders 
of  the  party  on  whom  in  laid  the  burden  of  proof 
,.,  strong  enough  to  carry  and  discharge  it?  In 357 
the  second  the  question  is:  what  is  the  truth  of 
the  matter?  "  3 
The  traditional  view  is  that  under  inquisitorial  procedure  the 
inquiry  is  a  continual  process.  There  is,  at  least  in  the  case 
of  serious  crimes,  supervision  of  the  investigative  process  by'a 
judicial  official  who  is  responsible  for  the  preparation  of  a 
dossier  embodying  the  results  of  his  inquiries,  including  the 
questioning  of  the  accused  and  the  witnesses,  which  is  then  used 
as  the  basis  of  the  case  at  the  trial  stage.  The  trial  itself  is 
seen  an  the  culmination  of  the  investigation  and  it  follows  that 
the  judge  will  be  "in  the  driving  seat"  to  a  much  greater  extent 
than  his  adversarial  counterpart,  assuming  responsibility  for  the 
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calling  and  questioning  of  the  witnesses  in  a  way  which  is 
entirely  alien  in  adversarial  procedure. 
The  French  system  is,  despite  Eemein'c  view,  often  regarded  as 
the  classic  model  of  modern  inquisitorial  procedure,  and  indeed 
the  French  Code  d'Instructon  Criminelle  of  1808  was  the  prototype 
for  the  rest  of  the  continent. 
Under  adversarial  procedure,  the  trial  is  the  centrepiece  and 
everthing  that  goes  before  it  is  a  preparation  for  the 
battlefield.  The  preparation  and  presentation  of  evidence  lies 
with  the  parties  and  the  judge  acts  as  a  neutral  referee  in  a 
contest.  He  has  little  or  no  concern  with  the  evidence-gathering 
process  and  will  generally  know  nothing  about  the  case  other  than 358 
the  evidence  which  the  parties  lead  before  him,  his  right  to  call 
or  examine  witnesses  on  his  own  initiative  being  very  limited. 
Modern  English  procedure  is  almost  wholly  adversarial,  while 
Scottish  procedure  is  adversarial  at  the  trial  stage  but  displays 
definite  features  of  inquisitorial  methods,  particularly  judicial 
examination  and  the  practice  of  the  Procurator  Fiscal,  the  public 
prosecutor,  conducting  a  confidential  investigation  in  serious 
cases  culminating  in  the  submission  of  a  "precognition"  to  Crown 
Office  before  a  case  is  Indicted. 
The  earlier  discussion  of  the  proposals  for  the  interrogation  of 
suspects  before  a  neutral  third  party  I  leads  naturally  to  a 
consideration  of  the  inquisitorial  system  of  procedure.  Even 
though  there  may  be  no  foreseeable  prospects  of  the  wholesale 
introduction  of  continental  methods  into  British  courts,  the 
growing  importance  of  the  European  dimension,  as  well  as  the 
outcry  which  followed  the  Guildford  and  Birmingham  scandals, 
means  that  such  method  should  not  be  ignored.  Indeed,  on  the 
contrary,  they  should  be  examined  to  see  what  lessons  can  be 
learned.  The  writer  would,  however,  recall  the  cautionary  note 
sounded  earlier  in  this  work  -a  system  which  works  well  in  one 
country  will  not  necessarily  work  equally  wall  when  exported. 
Outside  continental  Europe,  the  French  cyctem  is  the  best  known, 
and  the  beet  documented  in  English.  The  German  cyctem,  although 
stemming  from  a  common  root  with  the  French  has  atypical  features 359 
of  its  own  which  render  it  less  suitable  for  comparative 
discussion,  particularly  the  abolition  in  1975  of  the  Unterr- 
suchungsrichter,  the  office  equivalent  to  the  French 
, 
fuge 
d'instruction,  the-latter  being  one  of  the  most  characteristic 
and  widely  discussed  elements  in  modern  inquisitorial  procedure. 
Germany  law  also  has  the  so-called  Legalitbtsprinzip  or 
"principle  of  legality"  whereby  the  German  public  prosecutor  "is 
obligated,  unless  otherwise  provided  by  law,  to  take  action 
against  any  activities  which  may  be  prosecuted  ...  to  the  extent 
that  sufficient  factual  particulars  may  be  obtained.  "  6 
Accordingly  in  this  chapter  the  model  is  largely  the  French 
system. 
In  preparing  an  analytical  model  for  the  purpose  of  comparing 
four  highly  disparate  systems  of  procedure,  B.  S.  Ingraham  makes 
the  pertinent  point  that  despite  their  diversity  all  the  systems 
of  procedure  share  the  same  essential  skeletal  structure 
comprising  intake,  screening,  charging  the  accused  and 
safeguarding  his 
.  rights,  adjudicating,  sanctioning,  and  appeal. 
Nonetheless  there  are  important  practical  and  philosophical  , 
differences  and  differences  of  emphasis  between  the  two  types  of 
procedure,  not  least  in  the  position  of  the  accused  and  the 
manner  in  which  the  court  may  treat  him.  Inquisitorial  systems 
emphasice  abstract  truth  and  substantive  justice,  believing  that 
justice  is  impossible  without  the  truth.  Adversarial  systems  on 
the  other  hand  stress  the  autonomy  and  dignity  of  the  litigant 
(even  if  he  is  morally  in  the  wrong)  and  insist  on  a  fair  fight 360 
under  procedural  rules  that  are  so  devised  that  there  is  a  fair 
distribution  of  wins  and  losses  regardless  of  merit,  r- 
However  it  has  been  argued  that  the  theory  is  becoming  incrcas- 
ingly  separated  from  the  reality,  that  there  is  in  fact  very 
little  difference  between  modern  inquisitorial  and  adversarial 
systems  and  in  particular  that  the  notion  of  judicial  supervision 
of  the  investigative  process  is  a  myth.  Although  this  point  of 
view  had  previously  been  advanced  7  its  clearest  and  most 
unequivocal  statement  was  by  Goldstein  and  Marcus  in  1978.  ' 
Their  views  received  a  sharp  response  from  Langbein  and  Weinreb, 
9  and  a  detailed  refutation  from  Volkmann-Schluck.  °  Goldstein 
and  Marcus  can  rightly  be  criticised  for  at  least  apparently 
assuming  "that  the  French  procurcur  and  German  Staatsanwalt  are 
simply  district  attornies  who  speak  a  foreign  language;  that  the 
French  police  fudiciaire  and  the  German  Polizei  are  just  the 
homicide  squad  of  an  American  city  dressed  in  different  uniforms; 
that  the  fuge  d'instruction,  the  Richter  and  the  American  trial 
judge  are,  beneath  the  robe,  one  and  the  same.  "  In  particular 
they  seem  to  miss  the  vital  point  that  the  continental  prosecutor 
will  be  a  person  of  judicial  status  who,  as  a  state  official, 
will  be  expected  to  be  neutral  and  bound  to  ascertain  not  only 
incriminating  but  also  exonerating  circumstances. 
Nevertheless,  Goldstein  and  Marcus's  essential  thesis,  that  in 
France  and  other  continental  countries  ordinary  criminal  matters 
are  routinely  investigated  only  by  the  police  and  that 361 
prosecutorial  decisions  usually  rely  entirely  on  evidence 
gathered  by  the  police,  has  not  been  convincingly  refuted. 
Indeed,  Scottish  practice  would  appear  to  offer  support  to  their 
thesis  since,  despite  the  theoretical  supervision  of  the  police 
by  the  Procurator  Fiscal,  the  vast  majority  of  summary  complaints 
are  initiated  on  the  basis  simply  of  a  police  report  with  no 
further  inquiry.  11 
The  views  of  Goldstein  and  Marcus  are  also  to  an  extant  supported 
by  two  English  writers,  Lidstone  and  Early,  who,  in  an  article 
written  before  the  passing  of  PACE,  attributed  the  erosion  of  the 
distinction  between  adversarial  and  inquisitorial  methods  to  the 
activities  of  the  police: 
"In  fact  it  is  arguable  that  the  patterns  of 
policing  are  the  same  in  either  system  and  it  is 
police  practices  which  shape  or  change  the  chaps 
of  the  system  producing  a  different  system  in 
practice  whether  in  theory  it  be  accusatiorial  or 
inquisitorial,  It  follows  that  both  systems  are 
converging,  following  a  similar  pattern  of  police 
illegalities  being  condoned  by  and  absorbed  into 
the  system  despite  running  counter  to  central 
elements  within  those  systems.  In  both  systems 
the  single  most  important  pressure  producing 
change  is  the  need  to  interrogate  suspects  and  the 
increasing  recognition  of  this  need  by  the  judi- 
ciary  and/or  the  legislature  which  facilitates 362 
interrogation  by  the  police  by  granting  greater 
powers  of  detention  or  arrest  for  questioning  and 
allos  the  police  to  exert  a  measure  of  autonomy 
from  judicial  supervision.  "  12 
The  authors  argued  that  various  developments  in  France  in  the 
early  1980s,  together  with  the  power  of  detention  under  Section  2 
of  the  1980  Act  in  Scotland  and  the  general  erosion  of  suspects 
rights  in  England  before  PACE 
may  cause  us  to  consider  whether  the  label 
'accusatiorial'  or  'inquisitorial'  has  any  meaning 
at  the  pro-trial  stage  and  to  ask  whether  the 
right  to  silence,  although  in  theory  defined 
differently  in  those  systems,  does  not  also  in 
practice  converge  so  as  to  mean  as  little  to  the 
accused  whatever  his  nationality  and  however  one 
describes  the  system  into  which  he  is  drawn.  " 
It  is  a  simple  and  inescapable  fact  that  whatever  provisions  are 
made  in  Codes  or  statutes,  the  initial  investigation  of  criminal 
matters,  (if  not  the  entire  inquiry)  will,  in  all  procedural 
systems  of  which  the  writer  is  aware,  be  carried  out  by  the 
police. 
This  aspect  will  be  considered  further  later  but  before  doing  oo, 
the  modern  French  system  and  its  historic  development  will  be 
described. 363 
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Adversarial  procedure  is  known  to  have  developed  earlier  than 
inquisitorial,  and  it  certainly  existed  in  a  fairly  sophisticated 
form  in  Republican  Rome,  involving  popular  accusation  and  oral,, 
public  proceedings  before  courts  consisting  of  a  presiding 
praetor  and  between  32  and  75  Jurymen  who  rendered  the  decision 
when  the  speeches  of  the  parties  had  been  completed  and  all  the 
evidence  was  in.  The  exact  details  of  the  procedures  followed 
are  not  entirely  clear,  and  there  was  never  a  general  system  of 
criminal  procedure  since  each  law  contained  special  provisions 
relative  to  the  formal  accusation,  the  proof  and  the  prosecution 
of  the  particular  crime  concerned.  However  it  appears  that  there 
was  considerable  concern  for  the  defence  of  the  accused,  and 
there  was  nothing  calculated  to  bring  about  a  confession.  Ecmoin 
suggests  that  even  where  the  accused  confessed  in  open  court 
there  still  had  to  be  a  trial  before  judgment  could  be  entered 
against  him.  Although  under  certain  conditions  a  slave  might  be 
tortured,  a  freeman  could  not. 
Although  Roman  procedure  always  remained  prodominantly 
adversarial,  even  to  the  time  of  Justinian,  inquisitorial 
elements  began  to  develop  under  the  emperors.  As  Ecmein  puts  it, 
inquisitorial  procedure  "agrees  with  a  centralising  and  despotic 
power.  "  The  judge  had  to  take  a  more  active  part  in  the 365 
discovery  of  the  truth,  the  accused  was  now  subjected  to  torture 
and  the  examination  by  the  magistrate  was  now  directed  more 
towards  the  procuring  of  a  confession. 
With  the  decline  in  liberty  and  the  emergence  of  imperial 
despotism,  Roman  adversarial  procedure  began  to  decay  and 
eventually  matters  degenerated  to  the  point  where  the  system  of 
popular  prosecution  became  little  more  than  legalised  blackmail. 
Such  strong  measures  had  to  be  taken  against  professional 
accusers  that  all  private  complaints,  were  effectively  discouraged 
and  official  involvement  in  the  discovery  of  crime  increased 
greatly. 
Up  to  the  thirteenth  century,  procedurp,  throughout  Europe, 
including  England,  remained  primarily  adversarial  in  nature. 
However,  from  the  latter  part  of  that  century,  inquisitorial 
procedure  as  a  system  in  its  own  right  began  to  spread  through 
the  Continent.  The  system  can  be  said  to  have  begun  in  Canon 
criminal  procedure  in  1215  when  Innocent  III  persuaded  the 
Lateran  council  to  make  modifications  in  Church  procedure,  which' 
until  then  had  been  modelled  on  early  Roman  adversarial  methods. 
After  1215  it  became  the  duty  of  the  Judge  to  make  a  secret 
investigation  of  the  facts  in  every  case  in  which  he  received  a 
complaint  that  an  offence  had  been  committed  and  also  in  every 
case  in  which  there  were  rumours  that  an  individual  subject  to 
the  ecclesiastical  courts  had  committed  a  crime.  The  accused 
could  be  examined  in  secret  and  on  oath  and  he  did  have  a  limited 366 
opportunity  to  defend  himself  since  the  names  and  depositions  of 
the  witnesses  (who  would  also  be  examined  on  oath)  were 
communicated  to  him.  If  the  judge's  investigation  indicated  that 
the  accused  was  guilty,  he  could  be  punished. 
Inquisitorial  procedure  was  first  introduced  into  lay  courts  in 
Northern  Italy  and  from  there  it  spread  to  France,  Germany  and 
other  European  courts,  England  alone  avoiding  its  advance.  By 
the  sixteenth  century,  adversarial  procedure  was,  for  practical 
purposes,  extinct  in  Continental  Europe. 
Esmein  identifies  the  two  predominant  features  of  inquisitorial 
procedure  at  this  time  as  (a)  the  secret  inquiry  to  discover  the 
culprit  and  (b)  the  employment  of  torture  to  obtain  hin 
confession.  As  noted  above,  the  use  of  torture  to  extract 
confessions  had  begun  in  the  Roman  Empire.  It  underwent  a 
revival  at  the  end  of  the  twelfth  century  when  it  began  to 
replace  ordeals  as  a  method  of  proof.  By  the  end  of  the 
fourteenth  century  torture  for  this  purpose  had  become-general 
practice  and  virtually  a  fundamental  institution  of  inquisitorial 
criminal  procedure 
There  were  also  a  number  of  other  typical  features.  Detection 
and  prosecution  were  both  performed  by  the  state.  The  character 
of  the  judge  had  shifted  from  that  of  an  arbiter"chonsn  by  the 
parties  to  a  representative  of  the  ruler  with  an  exclusive  right 
to  administer  justice.  The  Judge  was  not  limited  to  deciding  on 367 
evidence  laid  before  him  by  the  parties  . 
He  proceeded  with  the 
inquiry  of  his  own  accord  and  following  certain  rules.  In  other 
words,  within  the  limits  set  by  the  law,  it  was  the  function  of 
the  Judge  to  search  for  evidence  and  the  inquiry  was  not  a 
confrontation  between  two  parties.  To  quote  Ecmein  again,  "The 
open  duel  between  accuser  and  accused  is  replaced  by  the 
insidious  attack  of  the  judge.  " 
Inquisitorial  procedure  also  produced  the  idea  of  the  right  of 
appeal  to  a  higher  judge  and  led  to  the  system  of  legal  proofs, 
both  seen  as  counterbalancing  the  powers  of  the  judge.  In  the 
case  of  legal  proofs,  the  fudge  could  not  convict  unless  he  had 
before  him  certain  kinds  and  quantities  of  evidence,  but  on  the 
other  hand,  if  he  did  have  such  evidence  before  him  he  was 
required  to  convict,  irrespective  of  his  personal  opinion. 
In  France  inquisitorial  procedure  was  enacted  into  law  by 
ordonnances  in  1498  and  1539  and  definitively  codified  by  the 
Ordonnance  Criminalle  of  1670,  Although  this  latter  statute  is 
one  of  the  greatest  watersheds  in  European  criminal  procedure,  it 
legitimised  the  continuation  of  practices  of  quite  horrifying 
barbarity.  A  trial  court  which  was  in  doubt  about  its  verdict 
could  order  the  "preparatory"  torture  of  an  accused.  "In  the 
perplexity  in  which  judges  find  themselves,  when  they  coo  very 
strong  presumptions  against  the  accused,  and  when  all  the  means 
of  proof  are  exhausted,  they  are  driven  to  the  resource  of  the 
preparatory  torture.  "  The  Ordonnance  did  restrict  this  power 368 
somewhat,  Title  XIX,  Article  i  provided  that  the  corpus  delictt 
must  have  been  established  and  there  must  have  been  "considerable 
proof".  If  the  accused  did  confess  under  torture  he  had  to  be 
interrogated  again,  without  torture,  to  see  if  he  stuck  to  the 
confession.  There  were  also  provisions  permitting  appeal  and 
preventing  the  repetition  of  torture.  On  the  other  hand  the 
system  of  torture  "under  reservation  of  proofs"  was  allowed  to 
continue.  Under  this  system,  in  effect,  an  accused  who  had 
successfully  resisted  torture  without  confessing,  and  thus  could 
not  be  convicted  of  the  offence  with  which  he  was  charged,  could 
again  be  tortured  to  justify  the  infliction  of  a  lesser  penalty.  2 
However,  the  1670  Ordonnance  is  the  ultimate  statement  of  pure 
Inquisitorial  procedure  and  it  governed  French  practice  down  to 
the  Revolution,  some  of  its  elements  still  being  relevant  today. 
The  core  of  the  procedure  under  the  Ordonnance  was  the  pre- 
liminary  phase,  the  instruction.  Its  object  was  de  preparer, 
rechercher,  ordonner  et  composer  tout  co  qul  auf  necessaire  pour 
parvenir  a  la  condamnation  ou  a  1'absolution  do  1'accusd.  The 
whole  purpose  of  the  instruction  was  to  obtain  sufficient 
evidence  in  order  to  satisfy  the  system  of  legal  proofs,  by 
which,  as  previously  noted,  the  trial  court  was  required  to 
convict,  irrespective  of  personal  opinion,  if  presented  with  a 
sufficient  quantum  of  proof.  0 369 
Offences  were  usually  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  lieutenant 
criminal,  as  the  examining  magistrate  was  then  known,  either  by 
private  individuals  or  by  the  procureur  du  rof.  Once  the 
lieutenant  was  satisfied  that  a  crime  had  taken  place,  he  would 
begin  a  secret  investigation  to  discover  the  person  responsible. 
Witnesses  were  heard  secretly  and  separately  and  whatever  they 
said  would  be  taken  down  in  writing.  During  the  instruction  the 
intersts  of  the  prosecution  were  represented  by  the  procurour  du 
roi  who  had  access  to  the  case  papers  at  any  time  and  who  was 
consulted  in  all  important  decisions. 
Once  the  identity  of  the  likely  culprit  was  established,  he  would 
be  brought  before  the  lieutenant  criminel  for  interrogation. 
This  would  usually  be  the  first  he  heard  of  the  accusation 
against  him.  The  interrogation  would  be  under  oath  and  was  one 
of  the  most  important  parts  of  the  entire  instruction.  The 
lieutenant  was  directed  to  give  special  attention  to  it  "in  order 
to  obtain  the  truth  through  the  fog  with  which  the  guilty 
individual  seeks  to  surround  it.  "  Moreover,  in  most  cases,  the 
heavier  sentences  could  not  be  pronounced  unless  the  accused  had 
confessed.  The  interrogation  took  place  in  secret,  with  only  the 
magistrate,  his  clerk  and  the  accu3ed  being  present.  The  accused 
was  prohibited  from  consulting  counsel  at  this  stage  and,  in  the 
case  of  capital  crimes,  at  any  other  stage  of  the  proceedings. 
The  interrogation  could  be  repeated  as  often  as  the  lieutenant 
though  necessary.  The  result  of  the  interrogations  was  reduced 
to  writing. 370 
Once  the  accused  had  been  interrogated,  the  witneosec  were  again 
brought  before  the  magistrate  for  recollement  when  their  prior 
depositions  would  be  read  to  therm  and  they  would  be  asked  if  they 
persisted  in  their  testimony  or  had  anything  to  add  or  change. 
After  recoIlement,  the  accused  would  be  confronted  with  the 
witnesses  and  the  lieutenant  would  read  the  depositions  to  the 
accused  in  the  witnesses'  hearing.  This  was  the  accusod's  only 
chance  to  object  to  the  witnesses  or  their  depositions,  although 
witnesses  were  unlikely  to  change  their  evidence  after 
recollement  since  they  would  then  be  liable  to  proceedings  for 
perjury, 
Once  the  preliminary  procedure  was  finished,  the  case  was  said  to 
be  instruct  and  in  theory  it  passed  from  the  hands  of  the 
lieutenant  criminal  to  the  procureur  du  roc  for  any  final  motion 
he  might  make,  and  then  to  the  reporting  judge  whose  duty  it  was 
to  analyse  the  proceedings  and  exhibit  the  results  to  the  trial 
court.  In  practice,  however,  cases  were  frequently  reported  by 
the  lieutenant  himself  which,  of  course,  meant  that  the  accused 
was  left  entirely  at  the  mercy  of  the  magistrate  who  had 
conducted  the  entire  investigation  and  without  the  benefit  of  any 
impartial  evaluation  of  the  results  of  the  instruction. 
Under  the  system  of  legal  proofs  there  was,  as  Ploocowo  puts  it, 
no  life  in  the  trial  procedure.  Apart  from  a  final  interrogation 
of  the  accused  by  the  presiding  judge,  the  trial  court  neither 
saw  witnesses  nor  heard  evidence.  All  it  was  required  to 371 
determine  was  whether  the  evidence  gathered  during  the 
instruction  satisfied  the  legal  requirements  of  a  complete  proof. 
If  it  did  the  judges  were  required  to  convict  the  accused.  If 
the  requirements  for  a  complete  proof  were  not  satisfied,  but  the 
evidence  was  nonetheless  substantial,  the  accused  might,  as 
already  noted,  with  some  very  limited  safeguards,  be  subjected  to 
"preparatory"  torture  with  a  view  to  extorting  a  confession. 
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(ii)  Criticisms  end  Reform  of  the  1670  Procedure 
Although  the  1670  Ordonnancc  had,  as  Esmein  points  out,  the  vital 
but  incidental  benefit  of  furnishing  a  solid  foundation  for 
criminal  law,  laying  a  basis  for  learned  commentaricc  and  making 
a  scientific  study  of  criminal  procedure  a  possibility,  it  is 
hardly  surprising  that  the  procedure  outlined  in  the  previous 
section  produced  appalling  miscarriages  of  Justice  and  began  to 
attract  criticism  and  adverse  comment  from  philosophers,  clerics 
and  sometimes  from  judges  themselves.  Indeed,  criticism  of  the 
brutality  of  the  procedure  had  been  voiced  shortly  after  the 
promulgation  of  the  Ordonnance. 
Initially,  criticism  tended  to  be  directed  towards  the  use  of 
torture  rather  than  the  inquisitorial  system  per  to,  By  the 
eighteenth  century,  however,  the  whole  system  wat  under  attack 
from  the  philosophers  of  the  age  of  enlightenment,  notably 
?  4ontesquieu,  Aeccaria  and  Voltairs.  The  secrecy  of  nccu  atione, 
the  abuse  of  pre-trial  detention,  the  use  of  torture  and  other 
weaknesses  in  the  ayetem  were  all  condemned. 
The  reformers  sought  models  for  a  new  and  better  cyotem  and  two 
particular  systems  attracted  attention,  that  of  republican  Rome 
and  that  of  England.  For  the  philosophero  the  main  attraction  of 
the  latter  system  war,  the  uuce  of  the  jury  which  determined  the 
guilt  or  innocence  of  the  accused  on  the  basis  of  the  evidence 
led  before.  The  public  nature  of  the  trial  and  the  idea  of 373 
committal  proceedings  by  a  grand  jury  before  a  person  could  be 
brought  to  trial  were  also  attractive  features. 
By  the  late  eighteenth  century  the  spirit  of  reform  was  abroad 
and  change  was  inevitable.  Preparatory  torture  was  abolished  in 
1780  and  preliminary  torture  went  in  1788.  In  1789  the 
Constitutional  Assembly,  in  anticipation  of  further  reforms, 
passed  a  provisional  law  which  inter  alia  required  laymen  of  good 
repute  to  assist  the  investigating  magistrate  in  his  preliminary 
operations  prior  to  the  interrogation  of  the  accused  and 
permitted  the  accused  the  assistance  of  counsel  who  was  present 
at  the  interrogation  of  the  witnesses  and  had  access  to  all  the 
documents  in  the  case. 
In  1791  English  procedure  was  imported  virtually  wholecale  into 
France  but  it  was  an  early  example  of  the  unwisdom  of  attempting 
simply  to  import  into  one  country  a  system  which,  while  operating 
successfully  in  its  country  of  origin,  was  not  necessarily  suited 
to  conditions  elsewhere.  Out  went  the  lieutenant  criminel  and 
the  procureur  du  rat,  the  office  of  justice  of  the  peace  was 
introduced  as  was  the  grand  jury  and  the  idea  of  public  jury 
trial. 
Post-revolutionary  France  was  in  a  state  of  chaos  with  disorder 
and  widespread  criminality  and  the  now  eyotem  was  unable  to 
provide  the  necessary  repression  of  crime  or  social  protection 
and  was  short-lived.  Laws  of  1795  and  1801,  particularly  the 374 
latter,  showed  a  distinct  tendancy  towards  the  old  methods, 
resurrecting  the  lieutenant  criminelle  and  his  secret 
examinations  as  well  as  the  public  prosecutor. 
Notas 
I,  See  generally  Esmein  Part  II  Title  II  Chapter  II 
(iii)  The  Code  d'  soi  1808 
In  1808  there  was  promulgated  the  Code  d'Jnstruction  Crimine.  Ile 
combining  elements  of  the  earlier  procedure  under  the  1670 
Ordonnance  and  the  English  procedure  introduced  in  1791.  The 
Code  survived  virtually  intact  in  France  for  a  hundred  and  fifty 
years  and  was  the  dominant  influence  throughout  Europe  in  the 
nineteenth  century. 
It  had  become  evident  that  confessions  obtained  by  the  threat  or 
use  of  force  were  not  freely  made  and  tended  to  be  lacking  in 
trustworthiness,  and  the  reforms  now  incorporated  in  the  Code  had 
their  roots  in  the  dacire  to  avoid  any'danger  of  a  return  to  the 
brutalities  of  the  old  procedure,  especially  interrogation  under 
torture,  for  the  purpose  of  extracting  a  confession, 
The  Code  also  provided  that  the  accused  could  no  longer  be 
required  to  take  the  oath  and  to  answer  questions,  and  since 
there  were  no  longer  any  effective  legal  means  of  forcing  an 
accused  to  answer  questions,  the  Code  effectively  gave  the 
privilege  against  self-incrimination.  I 375 
Esmein,  who,  as  already  noted,  considered  the  1808  French  system 
to  be  "mixed"  rather  than  inquisitorial,  lists  its  main 
characteristic  features: 
1.  Accusations  must  now  be  made  by  a  special  functionary,  a 
public  prosecutor  acting  In  the  name  of  the  state;  judges  can  no 
longer  take  cognisance  themselves  of  criminal  denunciations  by 
secret  informers, 
2.  The  judgment  is  rendered  by  magistrtates  and/or  lay  jurors. 
3.  The  proceeding  is  divided  into  two  stages:  the  first,  the 
preliminary  investigation,  is  entrusted  to  an  investigating 
magistrate  (the  fuge  d'instruction)  and  results  in  an  official 
evidentiary  record  (dossier)  which  becomes  the  basis  of  the 
prosecutor's  accusation;  the  second,  the  public  trial,  in  which 
the  evidence  is  presented  orally  or  in  documentary  form  and  the 
defendant  is  given  the  opportunity  to  confront  his  accusers  and 
to  submit  evidence  of  innocence  as  well  as  evidence  of 
Justification. 
4.  The  system  of  legal  proofs  is  abolished  and  replaced  with  a 
system  of  free  evaluation  of-the  evidence  by  the  triers  of  fact, 
subject  to  the  standard  of  their  being  "thoroughly  convinced  by 
it"  before  finding  guilt,  However,  the  judge  or  jury  is  no 
longer  required  to  state  the  evidentiary  basic  of  his  or  their 
judgment. 
Since  1808  the.  aim  of  French  procedure  hie  been  to  lay  before  the 
court  all  the  facto  concerning  both  the  offence  and  the  porcan 
alleged  to  have  committed  it  so  that  it  may  judge  the  accused. 376 
There  are  three  main  steps  to  achieving  this  aim: 
1.  the  making  of  detailed  pre-trial  inquiries 
2.  by  examining  the  personality  of  the  accused  and 
3.  by  placing  the  onus  of  eliciting  the  evidence  at  the  trial  on 
the  judge  rather  than  on  the  parties  to  the  case. 
Great  emphasis  is  laid  on  the  pro-trial  inquiries  which  allow  an 
investigation  into  anything  which  may  have  a  bearing  on  the  case. 
Prosecution  is  essentially  public  in  nature  although  the  partie 
civile  has  certain  rights  to  instigate  proceedings  which  are  not 
enjoyed  by  the  victim  of  a  crime  in  Britain.  As  in  Scotland  the 
vast  majority  of  cases  in  France  are  first  reported  by  the  police 
to  the  public  prosecutor  who  enjoys  a  broad  discretionary  power 
not  to  prosecute  no  matter  how  serious  the  offence,  a. 
There  were  a  number  of  gradual  reforms  of  procedure  from  1897 
onwards  mainly  directed  towards  strengthening  the  accused's 
rights,  notably  the  law  of  1897  giving  the  right  to  legal 
representation  during  the  instruction,  and  in  1958  the  Code  de 
Procddure  Pdnale  was  promulgated  to  replace  the  1808  Code.  It 
made  various  alterations  of  detail,  but  as  far  as  investigative 
and  trial  procedure  are  concerned,  they  are  still  recognisably 
based  on  the  1808  model.  4 
At  the  time  when  the  1958  Code  was  being  considered,  the  queotton 
was  raised  whether  the  traditional  system  should  be  abandoned. 
The  reasoning  behind  this  suggestion  was  that  although  the 377 
instruction  was  nominally  under  the  charge  of  the  Juge 
d'Instruction  most  of  the  practical  work  of  the  investigation  was 
done  by  specialised  officers  of  the  police  judiciare  who  disliked 
any  too  close  supervision  of  their  work  by  the  Juge  and  often 
obtained  from  him  a  delegation  of  powers  amounting  virtually  to  a 
blank  cheque.  It  was  suggested  that  this  situation  might  be 
regularised  by  increasing  the  powers  of  the  police  and  limiting 
the  role  of  the  jugs  to  the  judgment  of  incidents  in  the  course 
of  the  instrucion.  However,  this  idea  was  rejected  as  tending 
too  much  towards  the  adoption  of  adversarial  methods  and,  on  the 
contrary,  the  1958  Code  increased  the  control  of  the  jugs  over 
the  police.  6 
More  recently  the  fuge  d'instrurtion  has  again  been  under  attack, 
and  in  1985  a  law  was  passed  under  which  hic  functions  would  have 
been  performed  by  a  collegiate  body  of  three  judges,  in  order  to 
avoid  the  inconsistencies,  errors  and  abucos  occasionally 
attributable  to  individual  magistrates.  However  this  law,  which 
would,  at  the  very  least,  have  been  highly  costly  to  implement 
was  repealed  some  two  years  later  without  having  been  brought 
into  effect.  ' 
Modern  French  criminal  procedure  is  complex  and  a  detailed 
exposition  is  outwith  the  scope  of  this  work.  However  it  to 
noteworthy  that  depending  on  the  type  of  procedure  followed  the 
accused  is  liable  to  be  questioned  by  the  police,  by  the 
prosecutor  (procurour),  by  the  fuge  d'thstruction  and  by  the 378 
president  of  the  trial  court.  Although  he  cannot  be  compelled  to 
answer  questions,  is  never  placed  on  oath  and  has  no  liability  to 
prosecution  for  perjury,  the  accused  only  enjoys  the  privilege 
against  self-incrimination  and  not  the  wider  right  to  silence  as 
it  is  has  been  defined  and  discussed  earlier  in  this  work,  since 
adverse  comment  may  be  made  and  adverse  inferences  drawn. 
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10.3  Modern  French  Procedure  Under  the  1958  Code 
(i)  Preliminary  vex;  atio  ýt  bt  Polign 
(a)  General  Principles 
It  should  be  noted  that  in  France  there  are  two  separate  bodies 
of  police,  the  police  judicalre  and  the  police  administrative. 
The  police  judiciare  are  subject  to  the  control  of  the  Procureur 
do  is  Republique,  although  if  the 
, 
fuge  d'instruction  is  in  charge 
of  the  inquiry,  the  police  judiciare  are  answerable  to  him. 
Within  the  police  fudiciare  there  to  a  further  division  into 
agents  and  officiers,  the  latter  having  much  greater  powers. 
Unless  otherwise  specified,  this  chapter  refers  to  powers 
exercised  by  officiera  of  the  police  judieiaire  In  parsing  it 
is  noteworthy  that  for  certain  purposes  officiera  of  the  police 
audiciaire  appear  to-include  such  improbable  candidates  as  local 
mayors  and  forestry  officials.  I 
Article  14  of  the  1958  Code  requires  the  police  fudici.  ira  to 
"investigate  breaches  of  the  penal  law,,  collect  evidence  and  seek 
out  the  perpetrators,  even  if  a  Judicial  investigation  has  not 
been  opened"  and  Article  75  requires  them  to  "undertake 
preliminary  investigations  either  on  the  instructions  of  the 
procureur  or  on  their  own  authority.  " 
In  order  to  avoid  falling  into  the  came  trap  ac  Gaidetein  and 
Marcus,  it  should  also  be  remembered  that  the  French  procureur  is 380 
part  of  the  magistrature  with  the  status  and  authority  which  that 
entails.  2 
To  an  outside  observer,  one  of  the  most  striking  features  of 
French  criminal  methods  is  the  paucity  of  formal  rules  of 
evidence,  and  particularly  the  absence  of  anything  equivalent  to 
the  exclusionary  rules  in  regard  to  involuntary  or  unfairly 
obtained  confessions  which  operate  in  England  and  Scotland.  All 
evidence  which  is  reasonably  probative,  whatever  it  may  be,  is 
admissible  in  criminal  proceedings  because  for  the  French  there 
is  one  supreme  proof  which  overshadows  all  others  and  alone 
decides  the  issue  -  the  intime  conviction  or  profound  personal 
conviction  of  the  judges  and  jurors. 
This  principle  is  set  out  in  Article  353  of  the  Code  which- 
requires  the  president  of  the  trial  court  to  rend  the  following 
instruction,  which  must  also  be  posted  prominently  in  the 
retiring  room  of  the  courts 
"The  law  does  not  ask  an  accounting  from  judges  of 
the  grounds  by  which  they  become  convinced;  it 
does  not  prescribe  for  them  rules  on  which  they 
must  make  the  fullness  and  sufficiency  of  a  proof' 
particularly  depend;  it  requires  of  them  that  they 
ask  themselves,  in  silence  and  reflection  to  seek 
out,  in  the  sincerity  of  their  conscience,  what 
impression  the  evidence  reported  against  the 
accused  and  the  ground  of  his  defence  have  made-on 381 
their  reason.  The  law  asks  them  only  the  mingla 
question,  which  encompasses  the  full  measure  of 
their  duties.  'Are  you  thoroughly  convinced?  "' 
There  Is  in  French  law  no  "legal"  evidence  as  opposed  to  evidence 
which  would  be  forbidden  and  if  the  court  admits  all  types  of 
evidence  it  is  because  each  item  of  proof  has  value  insofar  as  it 
produces  this  personal  conviction-3  In  other  words  if  a  French 
court  admits  evidence  which_a  Scottish  court  would  regard  as 
having  been  obtained  unfairly,  it  does  so  on  the  basis  that  its 
probative  value  is  diminished  by  the  manner  in  which  it  was- 
obtained.  Although  the  French  do  not  operate  what  one  would 
regard  as  an  exclusionary  rule,  they  do  have  an  important  rule 
that  evidence  must  be  lawfully  secured  and  any  evidence  secured 
in  breach  of  the  law  must  be  excluded  from  the  judicial  hearing 
under  pain  of  nullity. 
Although  in  France  everyone  is  under  a  legal  requirement  to 
identify  himself  to  the  police,  France  recognises  the  privilege 
against  self-incrimination  in  the  sense  that,  apart  from  matters 
of  identity,  a  French  accused  is  entitled  to  remain  silent  in  the 
face  of  questioning  by  the  police,  the  pracureur  and  the  fuge 
d'instruction.  However  only  at  the  stage  of  examination  by  the 
jugs  d'instruction  need  the  accused  be  informed  that  ho  is  free 
not  to  make  a  statement.  Thera  would  not  appear  to  be  anything 
in  French  methods  equivalent  to  the  police  caution  in  Britain. 
Instead  of  the  indirect  control  of  an  exclusionary  rule,  French 382 
law,  at  least  in  theory,  relies  on  judicial  supervision  as  a 
means  of  controlling  the  police.  Historical  attachment  to  the 
idea  of  judicial  examination  of  the  accused  would  appear  to 
militate  against  police  attempts  to  secure  e  confession  of  guilt. 
However,  as  will  be  explained,  this  may  well  be  an  illusion. 
The  general  French  view  appears  to  be  that  the  procedure  of 
instruction  criminelle,  the  "patient  preliminary  examination  of 
the  evidence,  which  is  sifted  and  studied,  heard  and  reheard, 
until  as  far  as  possible  all  inconsistencies  have  been  eliminated 
and  until  those  which  have  not  been  eliminated  have  been  thrown 
into  sharp  relief"  6  must  be  conducted,  not  by  the  police,  but  by 
a  person  of  judicial  status.  Sheehan  comments  that  French  courts 
are  suspicious  of  confessions  made  to  the  police  particularly  if 
retracted  during  the  Instruction  or  the  trial  and  auch  will  only 
be  regarded  as  part  of  the  evidence  against  the  accused,  the 
trial  court  having,  '  in  accordance  with  the  principle  of  the 
intime  conviction,  complete  discretion  as  to  what  it  makes  of  the 
confession.  6 
At  the  time  when  the  Code  of  1808  was  framed  it  would  never  have 
occurred  to  anyone  to  allow  the  preliminary  investigation  of  a 
crime  to  be  carried  out  entirely  by  the  police  who,  at  that  time 
lacked  the  independence,  impartiality,  knowledge  of  the  law,  and 
sometimes  even  the  intelligence  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  the 
procedure.  As  in  Britain  the  quality  of  the  police  in  Franca  has 
improved  enormously  since  the  early  nineteenth  century,  but  the 383 
Freench  still  take  the  view  that  in  criminal  matters,  where  the 
liberty  of  the  subject  is  at  issue,  the  process  of  investigation 
should  not  be  left  to  the  police  who  are  prima  facie  unlikely  to 
be  impartial,  but  to  a  judge  whose  independence  and  impartiality 
are  beyond  question.  The  purely  investigative  functions  of  the 
juge  d'in:  truction  could  be  taken  over  by  the  police,  but  the 
police  are  generally  thought  to  be  too  anxious  to  secure 
convictions  and  the  procedure  of  instruction,  involving  as  it 
does  an  independent  judicial  officer,  is  seen  as  shielding 
innocent  persons  from  over-zealous  police  interrogation,  7  As 
previously  noted,  the  possibility  of  departing  from  the 
traditional  system  and  limiting  Judicial  control  of  the  police 
was  considered  and  rejected  at  the  time  when  the  1958  Code  was 
under  consideration. 
Nevertheless  the  fact  remains  that  when  a  breach  of  the  criminal 
law  occurs,  it  will  normally  be  reported  in  the  first  inotanco  to 
the  police.  The  police  may,  in  the  course  of  normal  preliminary 
inquiries,,  detain  in  custody  persons  who,  they  believe,  can  help 
them  with  their  inquiries.  There  would  not  appear  to  be  any 
requirement  for  "reasonable  suspicion"  or  a  similar  test.  This 
period  of  detention,  or  garde  d  vue  may  last  for  up  to  twenty 
four  hours  although  it  may  be  extended  on  the  written  authority 
of  the-procureur  to  a  total  of  forty  eight  hours,  "  Police 
brutality  and  coerced  confessions  are  as  strongly  prohibited  in 
France  as  in  any  other  country,  and  there  are  detailed 
requirements  for  the  keeping  of  careful  records  of  all  that 364 
happens  during  the  garde  h  vue.  These  records  form  a  document 
known  as  a  proces-verbal  which  will  in  turn  become  part  of  the 
dossier.  In  addition  the  accused  may  request  a  medical 
examination  which  must  be  granted  if  the  detention  is  extended 
beyond  twenty  four  hours.  00, 
However  good  the  protection  of  the  accused  may  be,  it  does  not 
alter  the  fundamental  point  that,  as  one  writer  delicately  puts 
it,  "There  is  no  doubt  that  the  possibility  of  detention  has  some 
intimidating  effect  on  a  person  who  Is  faced  with  a  request  by 
the  police  to  give  information.  " 
The  French  police  are  required  to  inform  the  procureur  "without 
delay"  of  offences  brought  to  their  notice.  Where  the  matter  is 
a  crime,  the  procureur  is  obliged  to  request  an  investigation  by 
the  . fuge  d'instruction  and  where  the  matter  is  a  ddlit  he  has  a 
discretion  to  do  so.  10  This  issue  is  clouded  by  the  possibility 
that  the  procureur  may,  with  the  consent  of  the  accused  'correct- 
ionalice"  serious  crimes,  ie  reclaoeify  crimes  as  deiitc.  This 
is  likely  to  happen  because  the  procureur  believes  that  the 
powers  of  punishment  available  in  the  Cour  d'assises  is 
disproportionately  severe  in  relation  to  the  seriousness  of  the 
offence  and  that  the  facts  of  the  case  do  not  Justify  the 
elaborate  and  costly  trial  procedures  of  that  court.  One  effect 
of  corroctionalisation,  whether  intentional  or  not,  will  be  to 
free  the  police  from  the  constraints  of  control  by  the  jugs 
d'instruction.  In  1980,  for  example,  only  0.4%  of  all  cases 385 
reported  to  French  prosecutors  were  referred  to  jugas 
d'instruction.  1'  This  figure  alone  suggests  that  Goldstein  and 
Marcus  may  have  been  justified  in  describing  pro-trial  Judicial 
supervision  in  France  as  a  "myth".  12  Even  allowing  for  their 
misinterpretation  of  the  role  of  the  procureur,  they  argue, 
convincingly,  it  is  submitted,  that  whether  it  is  a  magistrate  or 
prosecutor  who  conducts  the  formal  investigation,  most 
investigative  work  will  have  been  carried  out  by  the  police 
before  any  other  official  enters  the  picture,  because  the  police 
learn  about  the  crime  first,  are  better  trained  than  prosecutors 
or  Judges  to  use  the  technology  of  factfinding,  and  often  wich  to 
avoid  the  formal  procedures  of  the  instruction.  This  latter 
point  is  thought  to  be  of  particular  importance  in  France  since 
it  is  only  when  the  accused  is  brought  before  the  jugo 
d'instruction  that  he  has  any  right  to  legal  advice  and  the  right 
to  be  told  of  his  right  of  silence. 
Even  when  the  jugo  has  begun  an  investigation,  there  may  not  be 
much  supervision  of  the  police.  In  most  cases  the  jugo  will 
issue  a  commission  rogatairs  in  favour  of  a  named  police  officer, 
authorising  him  to  carry  out  most  of  the  routine  tasks  of 
criminal  investigation.  Professor  Vouin  comments  "Thus  it 
frequently  happens  that  an  examining  magistrate,  soloed  of  a 
crime  committed  the  day  before,  delegates  the  examination  -  and 
hears  no  more  of  the  crime  for  several  monthet  This  is  clearly 
dangerous  for  the  accused.  "  13  Under  the  commission  rogatoiro  the 
police  have  powers  to  cite  witnesses,  -to  put  them  on  oath  and  to 386 
require  them  to  testify,  a  power  which  is  normally  otherwise 
unavailable,  although  even  under  a  commission  rogatoire  the 
police  may  not  question  a  person  who  has  been  formally  charged-14 
If  in  the  course  of  their  inquiries  the  police  discover  that  the 
evidence  is  pointing  with  force  and  consistency,  dos  indices 
graves  at  concordants  de  culpabllit,  towards  the  guilt  of  a 
particular  person,  they  are  bound  not  to  question  him,  or  to 
desist  from  questioning  him  further.  Thereafter  he  may  only  be 
interrogated  by  the  fuge  d'instruction  in  person.  However,  the 
sole  arbiters  of  when  the  crucial  point  arrives  appear  to  be  the 
police  themselves,  16 
In  fact  the  interrogation  of  a  person  as  a  witness  under  oath, 
despite  evidence  which  creates  a  strong  suspicion  against  him,  is 
only  wrong  if  its  purpose  oA  result  is  to  evade  the  rights  of 
the  defence.  Moreover  it  has  been  hold  that  since  the  fuge 
d'tnstrucion  and  any  official  acting  by  virtue  of  a  com.  'ission 
rogetaire  from  him  is  under  a  duty  to  discover  whether  the  person 
being  interrogated  actually  participated  in  the  crime  being 
investigated,  continuing  the  interrogation  of  that  person  as  a 
witness  under  oath  after  he  confesses,  without  formally  charging 
him  is  not  regarded  as  being  for  the  purpose  with  the  result 
of  eluding  the  rights  of  the  defence.  IS 
Even  if  the  police  do  acknowledge  the  situation,  Anton  note 
that  in  practice  they  will  merely  advise  the  cucpact  of  his  right 387 
to  be  brought  before  the  jage  and  will  ask  him  whether  he 
consents  to  waive  his  right,  which  is  not  infrequently  done. 
Anton  observes  that  while  it  is  possible  to  argue  that  this  is 
within  the  letter  of  the  (1958)  Code,  it  is  hardly  within  its 
spirit  and  it  can  only  be  justified  on  the  basis  of  the  urgency 
of  police  investigations.  11 
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(b)  LFnquete  Flagrante  -a  Special  Case 
In  cases  which  are  classified  as  a  crime  or  ddlit  and  where  the 
offence  has  been  discovered  either  as  it  was  being  committed'or 
having  "recently"  been  committed,  there  is  a  procedure  known  as 
L'Enqudte  Flagrante  which  affords  wide  powers  to  the  police 
judiciare  and  the  procureur  to  investigate  the  offence  as  one  of 
urgency  and  in  certain  circumstances  without  the  intervention  of 
the  fuge  d'lnstruction.  I 
The  procedure  known  as  garde  A  vue  has  already  been  mentioned, 
but  under  i'enquete  flagrant  the  powers  available  to  the  police 
are  somewhat  greater  than  in  routine  preliminary  Inquiries  and  in 
certain  limited  circumstances  the  possibility  of  detention  for 
ninety  six  hours  exists.  : 
A  person  detained  under  this  procedure  is  not  considered  an 
accused  and  may  be  questioned  by  the  police  judiciairo  although 
he  does  not  appear  to  be  under  a  legally  enforcable  obligation  to 
answer  questions  not  related  to  the  issue  of  his  identity.  4  He 
is  not  entitled  to  legal  advice  or  representation  during  his 
detention.  In  order  to  prevent  abuses  the  police  judiciairo  are 
required  to  state  in  their  report  the=duration  of  the 
interrogations  and  the  length  of  the  intervals  between  them, 
However  there  has  been  a  long  series  of  decisions  to  the  effect 
that  procedural  irregularities  in  the  garde  A  vue,  while  possibly 389 
giving  rise  to  criminal  or  disciplinary  sanctions,  do  not  render 
inadmissible  statements  obtained  as  a  result.  4 
This  system  would,  like  "correctionalisation",  appear  to  be  open 
to  the  objection  that  it  invites  the  procureur  to  delay  the 
involvement  of  the  fuge  in  order  to  allow  the  police  a  free  run 
at  the  suspect.  However  Sheehan,  whose  views  on  the  point  are 
more  sanguine  than  certain  other  commentators,  suggests  that  this 
criticism  is  without  foundation 
'"...  bearing  in  mind  the  frequent  refusal  of 
accused  persons  to  answer  the  police  while  giving 
full  explanations  to  the 
, 
fuge  d'instruction,  the 
reserve  placed  by  the  courts  on  confession,  made 
to  the  police,  and  the  general  attitude  of  the 
magistrats  of  the  Ministern  public.  Furthermore, 
unless  substantial  incriminating  evidence  already 
existed  against  a  suspect  it  would  be  pointless 
for  the  police  to  arrest  him  in  the  hope  of 
gaining  a  confession,  since  failure  to  do  so  would 
only  result  in  the  accused's  release  at  the  end  of 
the  period  of  detention.  "  rp 
Lidstone  and  Early  take  a  very  different  view,  and  quota  an 
article  by  a  senior  French  judge  who  was  critical  of  the  role  of 
the  procureur  in  deciding  to  extend  the  period  of  garde  A  vuo. 
The  judge,  M.  Arpaillange,  argued  that  in  many  instances 
prolongation  to  forty  eight  hours  is  automatic,  allowing 390 
extensive  police  contact  in  an  environment  created  for  no  other 
purpose  than  to  subjugate  the  will  to  that  of  the  interrogator. 
Under  I'enqudte  flagrante  the  suspect  is  liable  to  questioning 
by  the  procureur  and  prolonged  police  involvement  with  him  whilo 
in  custody  will  diminish  the  importance  of  the  examination.  6 
A  suspect  who  has  been  detained  under  garde  a  vue  will  be  brought 
before  the  procuraur  who  has  the  right,  which  is  usually 
exercised,  to  question  him.  During  the  questioning  the  accused 
may  not  be  legally  represented.  At  the  time  Sheehan  carried  out 
his  research,  he  noted  that  the  attitude  of  the  procureur 
generally  was  that  the  purpose  of  the  examination  was  to  ensure 
that  there  was  a  reasonable  case  to  answer  and  that  proceedings 
were  not  taken  against  an  innocent  person.  The  Identity  of  the 
accused  will  be  confirmed  and  he  will  be  asked  a  few  questions 
about  the  main  facts  of  the  case.  The  accused  has  the  right,  to 
put  forward  any  explanation  and  if  this  is  accepted  by  the 
procureur  he  may  drop  proceedings  against  the  accused  and 
liberate  him  there  and  then.  The  examination  is  not  intended  to 
extract  a  confession  or  obtain  further  evidence  against  the 
accused  and  the  procureur  will  generally  not  enter  into  any  form 
of  cross  examination.  If  the  accused  makes  a  statement  or 
answers  any  questions,  the  procureur  will  dictate  this  in 
narrative  form  to  a  clerk  or  typist  and  the  resulting  statement 
will  be  signed  by  the  suspect  and  the  procureur  Thereafter  the 
procureur  will  decide  how  to  dispose  of  the  case. 391 
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(ii)  Questioning  by  the  Tute  d'Instructton 
As  already  noted,  in  all  cases  classified  as  crimes  (ie  the  most 
serious  matters)  the  procureur  is  obliged  to  request  an 
investigation  by  the  fuge  d`instruction  and  in  cases  classed  as 
ddlits  he  has  a  discretion  to  do  so. 
If  it  takes  place,  the  investigation  will  be  secret  in  the  sense 
that  only  the  accused,  the  procureur  and  any  partie  civile  will 
be  informed  of  the  progress  and  content  of  the  inquiry.  The 
secrecy  is  intended  to  protect  the  interests  of  the  accused  by 
preventing  harmful  publicity.  All  steps  taken  by  the  fuge  and 
any  statements  by  the  accused  or  witnesses  will  be  recorded  in  a 
dossier  to  which  the  procureur  and  the  accused's  legal  represent- 
ative  have  a  right  of  access. 
The  function  of  the  fuge  d1inatruction  is  to  collect,  examine  and 
investigate  all  the  evidence  relating  to  the  case  and  thereafter 
to  decide  whether  the  case  should  be  remitted  for  trial  and*  if 
soy  to  which  court,  The  ju  e  is  only  concerned  with  sufficiency 
of  evidence  and  is  not  required  to  decide  on  issues  of 
credibility.  His  decisions  must  be  motivated  in  law  and  thus 
issues  of  credibility  or  his  personal  view  of  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  accused  are  irrelevant.  His  powers  are  clearly 
inquisitorial  and  it  is  his  duty  to  ascertain  the  facts  rather 
than  leaving  the  matter  in  the  hands  of  the  parties. 393 
The  Juge  d'instruction  has  the  right  to  interrogate  the  accused, 
something  which  the  French  consider  a  normal  part  of  the 
investigation.  Apart  from  being  conducive  to  the  ascertainment 
of  the  truth,  the  questioning  allows  the  accused  to  put  his  point 
of  view  and,  since  he  becomes  aware  of  the  case  against  him  it 
assists  him  to  organise  his  defence.  It  ensures  that  the  dossier 
is  balanced  and  does  not  merely  represent  the  prosecution's  case. 
Examination  by  the  Juge  d'instruction  will  take  place  in  his 
office  and  will  be  less  formal  than  a  trial.  Nevertheless, 
French  law  recognises  that  precautions  are  necessary  to  ensure 
that  the  interrogation  is  conducted  in  conditions  which  safeguard 
the  rights  of  the  accused  at  all  times  and  that  there  is  no 
attempt  to  extract  a  confession  by  any  moans  or  at  any  cost. 
The  accused  will  not  normally  be  interrogated  on  his  first 
appearance,  although  the  Code  does  permit  this  "if  urgency 
results  either  from  the  condition  of  a  witness  in  danger  of  death 
or  from  apparent  preparation  for  disappearance.  "  It  is  also 
permitted  in  the  investigation  of  a  flagrant  delict  when  the  fuge 
d'instruction  is  present  at  the  scene.  The  report  of  the 
interrogation  should  mention  the  reason  for  the  urgency. 
More  commonly,  however,  at  the  time  when  the  accused  first 
appears  before  him  the  fuge  will  establish  his  identity,  acquaint 
him  expressly  with  each  of  the  acts  that  are  imputed  to  him  and 
advise  him  that  he  is  free  not  to  make  a  statement.  The  minute 394 
of  the  interrogation  must  include  a  record  of  the  accused  having 
been  advised  that  he  need  not  mako  a  statement. 
If  the  accused  does  wish  to  make  a  statement,  the  fuge  will 
receive  it,  and  at  this  stage  questioning  will  normally  be 
limited  to  clearing  up  ambiguities  in  the  st,  atoment,  although  the 
accused  may  also  be  asked  if  he  admits  the  accuracy  of  any  prior 
statements  made  to  the  police.  Professor  Anton  notes  that,  "It 
is  highly  probable  that  the  suspect,  now  formally  an  accused 
person,  will  wish  to  make  a  statement,  for  French  criminals  in" 
the  vast  majority  of  cases  exhibit  a  quite  spontaneous  desire  to 
confess  all.  " 
The  clerk  of  court  will  take  down,  at  the  Juge'o  dictation  a 
minute  of  the  proceedings.  At  the  end  of  this  dictation  the  jugo 
d'instruction  must  advise  an  unrepresented  accused  of  his  right 
to  legal  representation  and  this  advice  and  the  nccusod'a  reply 
are  incorporated  into  the  minute  of  the  proceedings  which  will  be 
signed  by  the  accused  and  the  clerk.  Counsel  may  be  designated 
for  the  accused  if  he  desires,  irrespective  of  his  financial 
situation. 
Failure  to  inform  the  accused  of  his  right  not  to  make  a 
statement  or  of  his  right  to  1cga1  advice  will  nullify  both  the 
instant  and  any  subsequent  proceedings. 395 
The  final  step  at  the  first  appearance  will  be  for  the  jugs  to 
decide  whether  the  accused  should  be  detained  in  custody 
(detention  preventive).  The  Code  declares  that  this  should  be 
exceptional,  but  it  appears  to  be  widely  used,  particularly  in 
the  case  of  serious  crime,  and  it  is  conceded,  even  by  some 
French  commentators,  that  abuses  occur.  2  Manfred  Pieck  2.  " 
describes  the  juges  d'instruction  as  being  "unsparing"  in  their 
use  of  this  power,  particularly  if  the  accused  refuses  to  speak. 
After  the  first  examination,  the  jute  d'instruction  may  examine 
the  accused  on  as  many  occasions  as  he  wishes,  for  example  to 
take  account  of  new  evidence  discovered  in  the  course  of 
interviewing  the  witnesses,  although  prior  to  each  interrogation 
he  must  summon  counsel  for  the  accused  to  enable  him  to  be 
present  at  each  interrogation.  The  accused  can  only  be  heard  in 
the  presence  of  his  legal  representative  unless  he  expressly 
waives  this  right.  The  dossier  must  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of 
counsel  at  least  twenty  four  hours  before  each  interrogation,  but 
in  practice  the  jugs  will  allow  counsel  access  to  the  dossier 
whenever  he  wishes  it.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  this  means 
that  the  accused  will  be  in  a  position  to  know  the  precise 
evidence  against  him  before  he  is  first  interrogated  on  the 
facts,  and  thus  an  astute  criminal  can  devise  a  defence 
compatible  with  the  evidence  for  the  prosecution,  3 
The  procuraur  and  any  partie  civ$la  may  also  be  present  at 
subsequent  interrogations  and  although  the  juge  has  the  exclusive 396 
right  actually  to  ask  the  questions,  the  procureur  and  the  legal 
representative  of  the  partie  civile  have  the  right  to  euggest 
questions  for  him  to  put. 
At  these  subsequent  examinations,  the  fuge  d'inatruction  will 
question  the  accused  in  great  depth,  in  the  same  way  as  the 
accused  would  be  cross-examined  In  a  British  trial.  There  is  no 
restriction  on  the  nature,  content,  form  or  number  of  the 
questions  but  the  accused  always  has  the  right  not  to  answer. 
However  the  fuge  may  make  "appropriate  comments"  whenever  the 
accused  refuses  to  answer  his  questions  and  unfavourable 
inferences  will  undoubtedly  be  drawn  by  the  Jupe  and  all 
subsequent  Judges  or  jurors.  It  is  probably  for  this  reason  that 
accused  persons  rarely  refuse  to  make  any  reply  at  all  to  the 
questions  put  to  them.  4 
The  fuge  will  dictate  the  accused'e  answers  in  the  form  of  a 
statement  either  at  the  end  of  the  examination  or  in  the  course 
of  it  if  it  is  lengthy.  At  the  end  of  the  examination  the  Jug© 
will  read  the  statement  over  to  the  accused  who  can  correct  any 
inaccuracies.  Thereafter  it  to  signed  by  the  jugo  and  the 
accused. 
At  these  subsequent  Interrogations,  if  there  are  discrepancies 
between  the  accused's  statement  and  evidence  from  witnesses,  the 
fuge  may  elect  to  hold  a  confrontation.  In  this  procedure  he 
will  interrogate  the  accused  again,  and  if  he  maintains  his 397, 
version,  the  fuge  will  introduce  the  witness  and  ask  him  to 
repeat  his  version  in  the  hearing  of  the  accused  and  vice-versa. 
He  will  then  ask  each  to  comment  on  the  evidence  of  the  other  and 
will  cross-examine  both  parties  closely  on  any  points  of 
difference.  s  It  is  hoped  that  the  accused  will  thus  be  induced 
to  admit  facts  which  he  has  hitherto  denied,  and  the  process  can 
be  regarded  as  a  partial  substitute  for  cross  examination.  A 
confrontation  is  subject  to  the  same  procedural  safeguards  as  any 
other  interrogation  and  the  usual  minute  of  the  proceedings  will 
be  prepared  for  the  dossier. 
One  step  beyond  confrontation  is  reconstruction  of  the  offence 
whereby  the  juge,  his  clerk,  the  procureur  and  counsel  for  the. 
parties  proceed  to  the  scene  of  the  crime  and  an  attempt  is  made 
to  re-enact  what  actually  happened  at  the  time  of  the  crime.  The 
accused  and  the  witnesses  are  asked  to  repeat,  as  far  as 
possible,  their  actual  words  and  movements.  In  seriouc  crimes 
the  procureur  will  always  ask  for  a  reconstruction  since  it  is  a 
practical  way  of  proving,  as  nearly  conclusively  as  possible,  the 
truth  or  otherwise  of  a  particular  version  of  the  facts.  Ac 
Anton  puts  it,  "It  is  based  upon  the  familiar  truth  that,  while  a 
person  may  tell  one  or  two  lies  with  an  appearance  of 
verisimilitude,  he  will  find  it  difficult  to  tell  many 
successfully,  and  still  more  difficult  to  rehearse  a  whole  course 
of  conduct  which  is  false.,  '  "I 398 
Sheehan,  sanguine  as  always,  comments, 
"While  each  individual  Jugs  has  his  own  style, 
many  feel  that  the  informality  of  the  proceeding  -- 
as  opposed  to  the  trial  itself  -  is  more  conducive 
to  the  accused  speaking  freely.  In  that  way  an 
innocent  person  has  nothing  to  lose  and  has  a 
better  chance  to  establish  his  innocence  since  the 
fuge  will  investigate  any  defence  evidence  with 
the  same  resources,  thoroughness  and  impartial 
approach  which  he  brings  to  bear  on  the 
prosecution  evidence.  "  7 
He  also  observes  that  any  unjustifiable  attempt  by  the  accused  to 
reserve  his  defence  until  the  trial  while  finding  out  the 
strength  of  the  case  against  him  in  advance  is  liable  to  be 
looked  upon  with  suspicion.  0 
In  complex  or  important  cases  the  jage  will  hold  a  final 
examination  of  the  accused  recapitulating  the  main  points  of  the 
case  and  the  accused's  answers  thercta. 
Since  the  purpose  of  a  French  criminal  trial  is  to  judge  the 
accused,  "on  Auge  1'homme,  pas  les  faits",  and  also  because  guilt 
and  penalty  are  determined  simultaneously  by  the  trial  court,  it 
is  regarded  as  fundamental  that  the  triers  of  the  facts  should  be 
fully  informed  as  to  the  evidence,  or  absence  of  evidence,  of 
criminal  propensities  on  the  part  of  the  accused.  Accordingly 399 
the  jugo  d'instruction  will  also  prepare  a  section  of  the  dossier 
including  exhaustive  detail  about  the  accused's  life  history. 
This  "Dossier  du  Personnalite'  will  include  all  possible 
information  about  the  accused  whether  favourable  or  unfavourable, 
including  his  casier  judiciaire  or  criminal  record,  and  will  be 
available  to  the  trial  court. 
Once  the  instruction  is  complete  and  the  fuge  has  coma  to 
provisional  conclusions,  the  dossier  is  sent  to  the  procureur  for 
his  views.  Representations  may  also  be  made  to  the  fuge  by  the 
accused's  counsel  and  counsel  for  any  partie  civile.  Thereafter 
the  fuge  will  pronounce  an  interlocutory  order  formally  closing 
the  instruction. 
If  the  fuge  considers  that  a  case  has  been  established  against 
the  accused  he  will  refer  the  case  to  the  appropriate  court.  If 
the  case  is  appropriate  to  the  highest  court,  the  Cour  d'assices, 
the  doasior  must  be  studied  by  the  Chambre  d'accucation,  or 
indicting  chamber  which  considers  matters  anew,  examines  the 
regularity  of  the  procedure  and  comes  to  a  definite  decision  as 
to  what  proceedings  should  follow,  Parties  and  counsel  will  be 
summoned  to  an  oral  hearing  by  the  Procureur  C  ndral, 
After  the  Chambre  d'accusation  has  considered  the  matter,  its 
decision  will  be  communicated  to  the  parties.  It  may  order 
further  steps  to  be  taken  to  elucidate  the  facto  and  it  may  refer 
the  dossier  back  to  the  fuge  d'instruct.  ton;  it  may  also  alter  or 400 
vary  in  any  way  the  fuge's  findings,  but  if  it  finds  that  the 
facts  appear  to  disclose  a  crime,  it  will  order  the  accused  to  be 
arraigned  before  the  Cour  d'essiEes. 
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(iii)  The  Trial 
This  section  relates  only  to  conventional  French  trials,  the 
simplified  procedure  available  in  the  Tribunal  de  Police  is  not 
further  considered.  '  It  is  at  the  trial  stage  that  French 
procedure  is  at  its  least  inquisitorial  and  most  adversarial,  and 
consequently  of  least  interest  in  the  present  discussion.  There 
are  several  points  of  similarity  with  British  procedure,  partic- 
ularly  the  public  nature  of  the  proceedings,  the  presumption  of 
innocence  and  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  prosecution.  Never- 
theless  the  procedure  followod  at  the  trial  differs  in  several 
important  respects  from  that  followed  in  Scotland  or  England. 
In  the  first  instance  it  should  be  noted  that  the  French  system 
does  not  recognise  a  plea  of  guilty  by  the  accused  and  accord- 
ingly  all  proceedings  take  the  form  of  a  trial.  The  court  will 
only  give  its  decision  after  an  examination  of  the  evidence 
although  this  will  obviously  be  fairly  cursory  if  the  accused 
does  not  intond  to  challenge  it  and  the  proceedings  will  be 
shorter.  2  There  are  also  provisions  for  trial  in  the  ebcence  of 
the  accused  which  are  much  wider  than  those  available  in 
Scotland,  although  yet  again  the  court  will  consider  the  evidence 
carefully  before  reaching  a  verdict. 
In  cases  which  have  been  remitted  for  trial  in  the  'Cour  d'asslscs 
the  accused  will  have  a  preliminary  private  interview  in  chambcrc 
with  the  president  of  the  court.  This  interview  will  usually  be 402 
confined  to  the  establishment  of  the  accused's  identity  and 
procedural  matters  such  as  legal  representation.  The  facts  will 
not  normally  be  explored,  although  there  is  nothing  to  prevent 
the  president  from  hearing  the  accused  on  the  fundamentals  of  the 
case.  The  inevitable  record  of  the  proceedings  will  be  made  and 
signed  by  the  clerk  of  court,  the  president  and  the  accused,  4 
The  president  has  a  ,  rarely  exercised  power  to  adjourn  the  trial 
and  order  a  supplementary  investigation  if  he  considers  that  the 
case  is  not  ready  for  trial.  Professor  Vouln  explains  that, 
"Thus  the  examination  (instruction)  is  continued  even  after  the 
Judgment  for  committal,  right  up  to  the  opening  of  the  hearing  in 
the  Court  of  Assize.  ... 
French  law  will  not  countenance  the 
opening  of  the  trial  at  assize  and  its  pursuance  to  a  final 
judgment  except  at  the  end  of  a  completed  examination  which 
guarantees  the  validity  of  the  judgment  which  will  cnyue,  "s 
At  the  trial  the  proceedings  will  normally  commence  with  the 
president  of  the  court  examining  the  accused,  having  first 
studied  the  dosier,  or  the  police  report  if  thorn  has  been  no 
Instruction,  This  examination  was  not  provided  for  In  the  1808 
Code,  Under  that  statute  the  proceedings  were  to  begin  with  the 
prosecutor  presenting  his  case  and  the  president  was  only  to  put 
possible  questions  to  the  accused  after  each  witness  had  given, 
evidence.  However  the  custom  was  quickly  establichod  that  it  was 
the  presiding  Judge  who  opened  the  proceedings  by  making  the 
accused  undergo  an  examination  with  the  object  of  revealing  his 403 
pact,  his  personality  and  the  nature  of  hic  defence.  The  1958 
Code  decided  that  the  president  was  to  examine  the  accused  and 
take  note  of  his  declarations  but  he  wes  under  a  duty  not  to 
disclose  him  opinion  as  to  guilt. 
The  president  will  ask  the  accused  about  his  personal  background, 
including  previous  convictions,  the  charge  will  be  read  to  him 
and  excerpts  from  the  witnesses'  statements  will  be  put  to  him, 
If  the  accused  disagrees  with  a  statement  made  by  a  witness  or 
gives  evidence  contrary  to  it  the  president  will  frequently  cross 
examine  him  vigorously,  in  the  same  manner  as  cross-examination 
at  a  British  trial.  He  will  certainly,  do  so  if  he  thtnke  the 
accused  is  lying  or  withholding  evidence.  The  president's  role 
is  that  of  an  investigator  and  not  an  arbiter,  although  to  the 
outsider  his  actions  can  give  the  impression  that  he  is  more  of  a 
prosecutor  than  a  Judge.  15 
The  accused  is  not  on  oath  and  may  at  any  time  refuse  to  answer 
which  sometimes  reduces  the  president's  examination  to  nothing 
more  than  a  monologue.  However  the  accused  cannot  avoid  being 
interrogated  and  his  demeanour  and  attitude  are  adaminicloc  of 
evidence  which  the  court  may  take  into  consideration.  Accord- 
ingly  although  silence  does  not  amount  to  a  tacit  confession  of 
guilt,  it  will  not  only  result  in  the  court  drawing  an  adverse 
inference,  but  it  will  also  reinforce  the  prosecution  ovidence. 
In  any  event  the  prosecution,  who  are  not  subject  to  any 
restriction  on  comment,  will  make  the  most  of  the  accused'c 404 
silence.  7  It  follows  that  there  is  considerable  pressure  on  the 
accused  to  answer  the  president's  questions, 
The  trial  court  may  also  consider  any  statement  made  by  the 
accused  to  the  police  or  fuge  d1instruclon  and  once  again  the 
right  of  the  court  to  what  Professor  Pieck  terms  "uncontrolled 
evaluation"  0  means  that  it  can  consider  the  refusal  of  the 
accused  to  explain  himself  when  reaching  its  verdict. 
Once  the  president  has  concluded  hic  examination,  the  prosecutor 
may  question  the  accused  and  then  the  lawyer  for  the  partie 
civile  and  the  accused's  own  counsel  may  suggest  questions  which 
will  be  put  to  the  accused  at  the  president's  discretion, 
although  if  the  examination  has  been  thorough  it  is  unlikely  that 
many  such  questions  will  be  necessary. 
After  the  questioning  of  the  accused  has  been  completed,  the 
president  will  examine  the  witnesses  who  have  been  cited.  "'  The 
witness  will  be  asked  to  give  his  evidence  in  narrative  form,  not 
by  question  and  answer.  If  the  witness's  evidence  conflicts  with 
that  of  the  accused,  the  president  may  interrupt  the  witness  and 
question  the  accused  further.  Generally  there  is  an  absence  of 
rigid  procedural  rules,  the  court  being  given  as  much  freedom  as 
possible  to  obtain  all  the  facts  about  the  case. 
After  all  the  evidence  has  been  heard,  the  partite  will  address 
the  court,  the  defence  having  the  last  ward,  and  tho  court  will 405 
give  it  verdict,  possibly  after  an  adjournment.  There  is 
virtually  no  reliance  on  precedent,  each  case  being  decided  on 
its  merits.  The  court,  as  already  noted  requires  to  have  a 
profound  personal  conviction  of  the  accused's  guilt  before  it  can 
convict  him. 
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Sheehan  p74 4.06 
10.4  D  srussi.  on  and  'valuation 
it  would  be  an  exercise  in  futility  and  sterility  to  compare 
inquisitorial  and  adversarial  methods  with  a  view  to  proving  that 
one  was  in  some  way  superior  to  or  better  than  the  other,  It  is 
impossible  to  view  any  system  of  criminal  justice  in  isolation 
from  its  origins  and  the  nature  of  the  society  which  it  serves. 
A  system  of  criminal  justice  is  strongly  related  to  its  under- 
lying  historical,  social  and  political  environatont,  as  well  as 
the  structure  of  authority  on  which  it  is  based.  Dr  Volkmann- 
Schluck,  while  noting  that  the  same  categories  of  actors  with 
roughly  similar  functions  appear  in  both  procedural  systems,  viz 
police,  prosecutors,  defence  lawyers  and  judges,  points  out  that 
they  "differ  in  the  way  they  perform,  in  their  self  esteem,  in 
their  social  position  in  society  and  in  their  behavioural  expect- 
ations.  "  I  Further  and  fuller  reference  will  be  made  to  this 
point  later. 
It  ir.  noticeable  that  commentators  from  one  tradition  tend  to  be 
critical  of  their  own  methods  and  to  look  to  the  other  tradition 
to  provide  the  solution  to  whatever  problem  is  presently 
exercising  them.  Thus  continental  comnentetoro  fecod  with  the 
delays  and  other  problems  of  the  instruction  look  toward--  the 
Anglo-American  tradition  for  speed,  efficiency  and  openneas  while 
Anglo-American  jurists  emberaused  by  some  scandal  such  as  the 
Guildford  Four  or  alarmed  by  abuses  of  plow-bargaining  in  the 
United  States  are  arguing  in  favour  of  inquisitorial  method--  and 407 
particularly  earlier  judicial  involvement.  The  article  by 
Goldstein  and  Marcus  is  virtually  the  only  work  by  Anglo- 
Americans  which  is  seriously  critical  of  continental  procedures 
and  while  many  of  their  criticisms  were  based  on  mistaken 
premises,  one  of  the  main  burdens  of  their  complaint  appeared  to 
be  that  modern  continental  methods  were  not  sufficiently 
inquisitorial. 
It  was  previously  noted  that  the  two  systems  have  tended  to 
converge,  and-it  is  probably  fair  to  say  that  the  systems  which 
are  fundamentally  inquisitorial  have  tended  to  move  further 
towards  adversarial  methods  than  vice-versa.  The  adoption  of  the 
jury  in  France  and  the  introduction  of  cross-examination  in  Spain 
(in  1882)  are  but  two  of  the  many  examples. 
Certain  criticisms  which  are  levelled  at  inquisitorial  methods 
are,  it  is  submitted,  more  criticisms  of  the  way  in  which  such 
methods  are  presently  applied.  They  are  not  necessarily 
criticisms  of  inquisitorial  methods  per  se  and  they  thus  fall 
largely  outwith  the  scope  of  this  work  and  can  be  dealt  with 
shortly, 
Into-this  category  falle  the  claim  that  judges,  and  principally 
juges  d"instruction,  are  often  young  and  inexperienced  and,  since 
they  normally  begin  training  straight  from  university,  lacking  in 
experience  of  the  "real  world,  "  Sheehan  points  out  that  the 
maximua  age  for  entry  to  the  Centre  Nationale  d'iftude  Judir.  arc 408 
is  27  although  an  avocat  with  ten  years  experience  may  apply  for 
direct  entry  to  the  magistrature,  which  is  considered  desireable, 
partly  because  the'Centre  Nationale  cannot  produce  enough 
candidates  and  partly  because  it  widens  the  spectrum  of  can- 
didates  to  the  magistrature.  Inquisitorial  methods  clearly 
require  a  substantial  number  of  prosecutors  and  judges,  and  it 
would  appear  that  there  is  probably  less  interchange  with  the 
mainstream  legal  profession  than  there  is,  say,  between  the 
solicitor  branch  of  the  profession  in  Scotland  and  the  Procurator 
Fiscal  service,  France  tending  very  much  towards  acareer 
magistracy.  2A  related  criticism  is  that  French  training  methods 
tend  to  produce  stereotype  magistrates  with  little  scope  for 
individuality.  Sheehan  observes  that  even  if  this  criticism  were 
justified,  it  would  also  presumably  ensure  a  more  uniform 
application  of  justice. 
Likewise  the  criticism  that  inquisitorial  methods  result  in  undue 
delay  before  accused  persons  are  brought  to  trial  is,  it  is 
submitted,  a  criticism  of  the  application  of  the  methods  rather 
that  the  methods  themselves.  To  say  this  is  not,  of  course,  to 
minimise  the  seriousness  of  the  problem.  It  is  accepted  that  it 
is  quite  insupportable  to  have  a  person  who  is  presumed  innocent 
incarcerated  for  for  an  extended  period  before  guilt  has  been 
proved,  and  French  law  provides  several  unhappy  examples,  despite 
the  explicit  requirement  in  Article  137'of  the  1958  Code  that 
pre-trial  detention  is  an  exceptional  measure.  The  most  extremo 
example  known  to  the  writer  is  the  case  quoted  by  Professor 
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Hamoon  of  a  woman  detained  on  a  murder  charge  for  four  years 
before  her  first  trial  which  then  turned  out  to  be  abortive 
because  of  the  inadequate  preparation  of  the  case,  which  had  to 
be  sent  back  for  an  instrucion  supplement  sire,  although 
mercifully  the  accused  was  allowed  bail  at  that  point.  13 
Clearly  the  process  of  instruction  is  liable  to  take  time,  but 
the  writer  would  suggest  that  there  does  not  appear  to  be  any 
reason  why,  if  the  political  will  existed,  the  situation  could 
not  be  improved  by  an  increase  in  the  resources  available  to  the 
police  Judiciare,  an  increase  in  the  number  of  juges 
d'instruction  and  the  imposition  of  an  absolute  maximum  time 
limit  for  proceedings,  akin  to  the  Scottish  110-day  rule. 
Alternatively,  German  experience  shows  that  the  system  can  still 
operate  and  retain  its  fundamentally  inquisitorial  character  even 
if  the  entire  instruction  procedure  is  abolished,  albeit  at  the 
expense  of  a  greater  burden  on  the  public  prosecutor,  whose 
status  and  integrity  must  necessarily  be  high.  4 
The  German  experience  has  been  controversial  and  it  has  to  be 
admitted  that  the  jugc  d'inmtructJon  is  a  figure  who  is 
demonstrably  independent  from  the  police  and  who  has  the  power  to 
direct  their  inquiries.  Any  prosecutor  is  bound  to  be  much  more 
closely  identified  with  the  police  than  a  truly  independent 
judicial  figure  and  this  can  lead  to  the  suspicion  (possibly  well 
founded)  that  the  police  are  less  subject  to  supervision  than 
they  ought  to  be.  Goldstein  and  Marcus  say  that  in  Germany  "Pro- 410 
trial  investigation  follows  Code  requirements  only  as  much  as  the 
police  choose  to  adhere  to  them.  They  take  their  force  through 
the  degree  of  obligation  felt  by  the  police  to  follow  legal 
rules,  rather  than  through  on-the-spot  judicial  supervision  or 
after-the-fact  remedies  for  breach  of  the  Code.  "  6  However  Dr 
Volkmann-Schluck  points  out  that  the  German  Code  does  contain  an 
exclusionary  rule  in  respect  of  evidence  extorted  from  the 
accused  by  physical  abuse,  drugs,  torture,  weariness,  hypnosis, 
deceit  or  unlawful  threats  or  promises  and  the  German  courts  have 
expanded  this  notion  to  the  concept  of  Rechtskreistheorie,  an 
untranslatable  German  concept  only  approximately  rendered  as  the 
doctrine  of  the  sphere  of  individual  rights,  which  allows 
evidence  to  be  excluded  if  the  police  intrude  into  the 
constitutionally  protected  sphere  of  fundamental  civil  rights. 
To  return  to  the  French  model,  even  commentators  who  are 
sympathetic  to  French  methods  concede  that  there  is  probably  soma 
force  in  the  argument  that,  notwithstanding  the  existence  of  a 
theoretical  presumption  of  innocence,  the  procedure  of 
Instruction  by  its  nature  leads  to  a  presumption  of  guilt  at  the 
trial  stage.  One  of  the  main  aims  of  the  instruction  is  to 
prevent  persons  against  whom  there  is  insufficient  evidence  being 
placed  on  trial  and  it  is  only  a  short  logical  stop  from  that 
point  to  the  assumption  that  a  person  who  is  placed  on  trial  must 
be  guilty. 411 
Sheehan  comments  that  in  the  tribunal  do  police  and  tribunal 
correctionnel  the  presumption  of  innocence  may  sometimes  be  "more 
theoretical  than  practical"  since  the  president  of  the  court, 
having  read  the  police  report  or  dossier  before  the  trial  must 
often  find  it  difficult  not  to  pro-judge  the  case.  In  the  tour 
d'assises  jurors  likewise  may  sometimes  be  influenced  by  the 
knowledge  that  the  accused  has  only  been  committed  for  trial 
after  exhaustive  pre-trial  inquiries,  At  the  time  when  Sheehan 
did  his  research,  the  acquittal  rate  of  the  tribunal 
correctionnel  was  around  5%,  but  some  of  this  was  due  to 
extraneous  factors  such  as  prescription  and  amnesty  and  the 
overall  conviction  rate  was  "exceedingly  high".  Sheehan- 
acknowledges  that  it  is  virtually  Impossible  to  form  any  firm 
conclusion  as  to  the  reason  for  this  situation  and  contents 
himself  with  the  observation  that  it  "may  prove  the  efficacy  of 
pro-trial  inquiries  in  ensuring  that  no  innocent  person  is 
wrongly  sent  for  trial,  or  alternatively  it  may  be  taken  to  prove 
that  such  inquiries  do  effectively  pro-judge  the  case.  "  ' 
Anton,  who  regards  French  procedure  properly  applied  as 
"scrupulous  in  the  interests  of  the  accused,  "  makes  a  similar 
point  when  he  comments  that,  "The  immensely  careful  preliminary 
investigations  of  the  fuge  d'instruction  make  it  unlikely  that 
persons  who  in  France  are  sent  for  trial  are  guiltless.  While 
they  are  still  in  law  presumed  to  be  innocent,  a  common  sense 
appreciation  of  the  situation  suggests  that  they  are  in  fact  morn 
likely  than  not  to  be  guilty.  That  in  France  acquittals  do  from 412 
time  to  time  take  place  seems  to  be  more  a  reflection  of  the 
French  juryman's  traditional  generosity  of  sentiment  and 
suspicion  of  authority  than  a  reproach  to  the  quality  of  work  of 
the  juges  d'instruction.  11  $ 
There  would  not  appear  to  be  any  easy  answer  to  this  problem,  if 
indeed  it  is  a  problem,  other  than  to  trust  the  intergity  of 
those  charged  with  adjudication  at  the  trial.  Nevertheless,  the 
role  which  the  presiding  judge  to  required  to  adopt  at  the  trial 
must  make  it  difficult  for  all  but  the  moct  detached  individual 
to  separate  his  "common  sense"  from  his  judicial  function,  and  it 
must  contribute  to  the  blurring  of  the  distinction  between 
prosecution  and  judgment  which  is  sometimes  criticised,  However, 
Professor  Vouin,  who  is  never  slow  to  criticise  his  own  country's 
institutions,  thinks  that  the  role  of  the  presiding  judge,  and 
particularly  his  discretionary  power  to,  take  any  step  which  he 
believes  of  value  for  discovering  the  truth,  is  as  likely  to  be 
of  benefit  to  the  accused  as  to  be  a  threat  to  him.  0 
The  presiding  judge's  role  also  means  that  the  accused  is  lace 
dependent  on  legal  representation  the  quality  of  which  may  be 
poor}  that  evidence  is  less  likely  to  be  distorted  by  unfair  or 
manipulative  cross-examination"  and  that  the  outcome  of  the  trial 
is  less  likely  to  be  influenced  by  the  suppression  of  evidence  or 
ability  of  pleaders  to  influence  the  jury.  Whether  any  or  all  of 
these  points  are  "good"  or  "bad"  is  of  necessity  a  matter  on 413 
which  differing  views  can  sincerely  be  hold  and  little  would  be 
gained  by  discussing  them  further  in  the  present  context. 
Of  much  more  interest  in  the  present  discussion  is  the  French 
attitude  towards  the  questioning  of  the  accused.  At  the  start  of 
this  work  the  right  to  silence  was  defined  as  "the  right  of  the 
accused  not  to  testify  at  his  trial  and  the  right  of  the  suspect 
to  refuse  to  answer  police  questions  without  incurring  adverse 
consequences  such  as  a  penal  sanction,  a  presumption  of  guilt  or 
adverse  comment  at  the  trial.  "  It  is  clear  that  while  a  French 
accused  is  not  liable  to  a  penal  sanction  if  he  refuses  to  speak, 
any  such  refusal,  certainly  before  the  jugo  d'instruction  or  at 
the  trial,  will  result  in  adverse  comment  being  made  and  an 
unfavourable  inference,  if  not  a  presumption  of  guilt,  being 
drawn,  and  therefore  a  French  accused  does  not  enjoy  the  right  to 
silence  as  it  is  understood  in  Britain. 
It  is  important  to  appreciate  that  the  French  attitude  stems  at 
least  in  part  from  the  fact  that,  unlike  the  British  position 
where  the  pre-trial  and  trial  phases  of  the  process  arc  clearly 
separate  entities,  with  the  latter  boing  virtually  self- 
contained,  the  French  view  the  whole  procedure  as  a  continuum 
with  the  trial`being  simply  the  final  Otago  in  a  continuous 
process,  rather  that  an  end  in  itself.  The  French  accused  is 
brought  into  the  process  at  a  much  earlier  stage  that  he  would  be 
in  Scotland  or,  even  more  co,  in  England,  Professor  Hamcon 
suggests  that  it  would,  in  France,  be  thought  "most  grossly 414 
improper"  if  the  inquiry  were  conducted  ox  Parte  without  the 
presence  of  the  person  principally  interested  in  its  outcome. 
The  presence  of  the  suspect  during  the  process  of  Instruction  is 
regarded  as  an  important  right.  "That  an  official  should  be 
allowed  to  gather  together  evidence  against  a  citizen  and  to 
construct  a  case  against  him  without  his  knowledge  and  without  a 
right  in  him  to  make  representations  to  that  official  and  to  put 
forward  his  own  view  of  the  situation  from  the  start  -  that  would 
generally  be  judged  in  France  to  be  monstrous,  "  I*  It  follows 
from  this  that  the  accused  is  expected  to  participate  in  the 
instruction,  in  order  that  the  truth  may  be  determined,  and  if 
he  does  not,  adverse  conclusions  are  inevitable.  In  fact  it 
appears  that  few  French  accused  remain  completely  mute.  An 
important  reason  for  this,  which  is  absent  in  Britain,  in  that 
there  is  no  separate  hearing  or  procedure  for  determining 
sentence  and  an  accused  who  totally  refüces  to  respond  will 
forfeit  the  opportunity  of  being  heard  on  the  question  of 
punishment. 
The  distinction  between  the  pre-trial  and  trial  phases  of  the 
case  which  is  so  noticeable  in  British  procedure  is,  it  is 
submitted,  largely  artificial  and  conaiderahly  disadvantageous. 
In  Britain  things  done  (or  not  done)  by  the  police  without 
Judicial  supervision,  or,  at  the  moot,  under  theoretical 
supervision  by  the  Procurator  Fiscal,  can  have  a  profound  effect 
on  the  outcome  of  the  trial.  This  can  work  both  ways  and  can 
produce  results  which  are  undesiroable  from  the  point  of  view  of 415 
ascertaining  the  truth,  On  the  one  hand,  evidence  can  be 
obtained  irregularly  and  the  means  of  obtaining  it  can  be 
suppressed  leading  to  a  wrongful  conviction  such  as  that  of  the 
"Guildford  Four.  "  Even  where  there  is  no  deliberate  intention  to 
mislead,  the  tendency  of  the  police  to  assume  that  a  suspect  is 
ipso  facto  guilty  can  blind  them  to  alternative  views  of  the- 
facts  and  lead  to  the  under-estimation,  or  possibly  even 
suppression,  of  important  evidence  pointing  to  a  conclusion  which 
does  not  fit  the  established  police  view.  Factors  such  as  these 
played  important  parts  in  the  miscarriages  of  justice  in  the 
Timothy  Evans  "  and  Confait  1:  2  cases.  It  in  submitted  that  it 
is  both  unreasonable  and  illogical  to  expect  the  police, 
particularly  in  England  where  they  are  by  long  tradition  much 
closer  to  the  prosecution  process  than  in  Scotland,  to  act  at  all 
times  in  a  "quasi-judicial"  spirit.  Such  a  role  is  theoretically 
unsound  and  to  borrow  Lord  Devlin's  colourful  expression, 
"Undoubtedly  a  practical,  resourceful  and  adaptable  man  can  fly 
quite  a  long  way  contrary  to  theory,  but  theory,  if  it  in  cound, 
must  in  the  end  get  him  down.  "  '3 
On  the  other  hand,  a  technical  infringement  of  an  exclusionary 
rule,  which  may  in  itself  be  obscure  or  complex,  can  lead  to  the 
exclusion  of  important  evidence  and  the  collapse  of  the  case 
against  a  person  who  is,  on  any  objective  criterion,  guilty  of 
the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged.  The  Australian  writer  G.  E.  P. 
Brouwer  puts  this  point  succinctly  when  ho  says,  "The  common  law 
system's  evidentiary  rules  are  quite  distinctive  in  the  way  in 416 
which  they  exclude  evidence  which,  although  logically  relevant, 
is  regarded  as  unfair  or  as  dangerously  misleading.  Ironically, 
many  of  the  rules  themselves  are  often  misleading  on  account  of 
their  subtlety  and  the  refined  sophistry  with  which  they  are 
imbued.  "  'I  Even  if  the  transgression  is  blatant  or  the  result  of 
something  other  than  ignorant  inadvertance,  it  is  not  necessarily 
self-evident  that  the  acquittal  and  release  of  a  dangerous 
criminal  is  an  appropriate  response.  In  a  sense  the  courts  are 
in  a  no-win  situation  since  the  repeated  acquittal  of  guilty 
persons  as  the  result  of  the  exclusion  of  evidence  can  lead 
public  opinion  to  conclude  that  the  courts  are  "soft  on 
criminals"  and  failing  to  protect  the  public.  On  the  other  hand 
the  repeated  condoning  of  police  illegalities  would  inevitably 
tend  towards  an  erosion  of  civil  liberties,  Such  a  development 
would  be  liable  to  be  particularly  sinister  since  the  ordinary 
person  is  unlikely  to  feel  that  he  requires  protection  from  the 
police  by  means  which  allow  dangerous  criminals  to  go  free  until 
the  police  illegalities  cease  to  be  tolerable,  by  which  time  the 
situation  may  be  beyond  redemption. 
Problems  of  this  natura  are  at  their  most  acute  in  the  United 
States  where  the  legitimate  efforts  of  the  police  and  other  law 
enforcement  agencies  can  come  close  to  being  frustrated  by 
exclusionary  rules.  Nevertheless  the  Scottish  taut  of  "fairnece 
to  the  accused",  while  being  less  rigid  than  the  ruler,  applied  in 
some  other  jurisdictions,  may  be  subject  to  the  criticism  that  it 
is  vague  and  lends  itself  to  capricious  application  by  the 417 
courts.  A.  A.  S.  Zuckerman  has,  in  a  different  but  related 
context,  described  the  notion  of  "fairness"  as  "unhelpful  since 
it  can  refer  to  a  multitude  of  aspects  and  merely  furnishes  an 
excuse  for  achieving  whatever  result  is  wanted  without  rigorous 
justification"  'a  and  Lord  Scarman,  a  most  eminent  judge,  has 
referred  in  scathing  terms  to  the  "last  refuge  of  legal  thought, 
that  each  case  depends  on  its  facts.  "  '6  The  present  writer 
would  submit  that  these  comments  are  eminently  applicable  to  the 
present  state  of  Scottish  law,  and  it  is  unsatisfactory  that  the 
question  of  guilt  should  be  determined  on  the  basis  of  a  test 
which  defies  analysis  and  which  can  vary  at  the  whim  of  the 
triers  of  the  facts. 
Such  issues  simply  do  not  arise  in  French  procedure  whore,  for 
most  practical  purposes,  all  evidence  is  admissible  and  subject 
to  evaluation  by  the  court  on  a  quantum  valeat  basis.  Indeed  it 
is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  the  present  work,  consisting  as  it 
does  of  lengthy  discussion  of  admissibility  of  evidence  and 
sufficiency  of  proof,  could  not  have  been  written  about  the 
French  legal  system  since  such  concepts  are  unknown  thorn.  It 
also,  follows  that.  since  French  law  does  not  have  to  cope  with 
concepts  of  admissibility  or  the  problems  posed  by  the 
prohibition  of  inferences  from  silence,  French  courts  arc  spared 
the  need  to  wrestle  with  the  type  of  illogical  rule  condemned  by 
Professor  Cross  as  "gibberish.  "  17 418 
In  practical  terms,  the  French  police  are,  of  course,  likely  to 
be  heavily  involved  in  evidence  gathering  before  the  Instruction 
has  commenced.  As  in  any  other  country  it  is  necessary  to  strive 
for  a  balance  between  controlling  the  pre-trial  activities  of  the 
police  and  ensuring  that  they  are  not  hampered  in  their  invest- 
igations.  The  French  approach  allows  the  police  wide  but  care- 
fully  regulated  powers  in  the  early  stages  of  the  case  when  they 
are  most  likely  to  be  needed,  the  results  of  which  are  then 
subject  to  scrutiny  by  the  procureur  and  in  more  serious  cases  by 
the  fuge  d'instruction  and  the  chambre  d'accusation. 
Nevertheless,  the  police  can  operate  secure  in  the  knowledge  that 
only  evidence  obtained  by  methods  of  outright  illegality  will  be 
excluded. 
Opinions  differ  as  to  whether  the  system  leads  the  French  police 
to  press  for  a  confession.  Brouwer  argues  that  the  fact  that 
French  law  does  not  attach  any  particular  importance  to  a 
confession  correspondingly  places  less  pressure  on  the  police  to 
obtain  one  10  and  Sheehan  takes  a  similar  view.  Is 
on  the  other  hand  we  have  teen  how,  oven  when  they  are  acting" 
within  the  law  the  police  themselves  are  loft  to  take  certain 
crucial  decisions  themselves,  particularly  the  point  at  which 
they  should  atop  questioning  a  suspect.  Stephen  tironoo  arguac 
that  the  system  itself  almost  invites  abusot 
"In  general,  however,  a  coerced  confession  is  not 
rejected  per  -a  if,  after  analysing  all  the 419 
evidence,  the  court  feels  that  the  confession  is 
sincere  and  true.  Thus  the  rights  of  suspects  in 
France,  to  a  large  degree,  depend  on  the 
subjective  evaluation  of  very  difficult  issues  - 
the  sincerity  of  a  confession,  the  substantiality 
of  the  infringement  of  the  rights  of  the  accused, 
and  the  motives  of  the  interrogator.  The  police 
abuse  is  not  the  focal  point  of  the  review. 
Furthermore  the  accused's  right  to  be  informed  by 
the  jugs  d'tnstruction  of  his  right  to  remain 
silent  and  to  have  a  lawyer  may  become 
meaningless,  ...  since  the  suspect  may  be 
interrogated  before  appearing  for  the  first  time 
in  front  of  the  jugs  d'instruction.  ...  tTlhe 
confession  made  to  the  police  ...  goes  into  the 
suspect's  dossier  and,  in  effect,  can  be  used 
against  him  regardless  of  whether  he  claims  the 
privilege  against  self-incrimination  later  in  the 
proceedings.  " 
At  the  end  of  the  day  one  comes  back  to  the  point  that  system,  of 
policing  and  criminal  justice  cannot  be  soon  in  isolation  from 
the  nature  of  the  societies  in  which  they  have  dovelopod, 
Professor  Lloyd  Weinreh  puts  it  thusi 
"Unless  one  starts  (and  finishes)  with  a  view  of 
man  according  to  which  his  nature  is  not 
determined  much  at  all  by  his  surroundings,  it  is 420 
Implausible  that  criminal  process  should  be 
everywhere  alike.  The  particular  forms  that  it 
takes  are  much  more  a  reflection  of  society's 
ground  rules}  its  social  and  political  philosophy 
and  institutions,  than  is  generally  remarked. 
French  procddure  pdnale  for  example  is  profoundly 
affected  by  the  concept  of  L'Etat,  the  state  as  an 
entity  whose  authority  is  not  to  be  questioned 
(even  when  it  is  not  precisely  obeyed)".  2' 
There  is  a  particular  danger  in  assuming  that  what  is  irregular 
or  illegal  in  one  society  is  or  ought  to  be  equally  irregular  or 
illegal  in  another.  Thus  the  interrogation  of  the  accused  by  the 
presiding  judge  which  would  be  simply  unthinkable  in  Scotland  or 
England  is  a  normal  and  accepted  part  of  French  procedure  and 
fully  justifiable  on  the  norms  and  philosophies  on  which  the 
French  system  proceeds.  When  one  looks  beyond  the  trial  procoas, 
there  are  similar  dangers  in  assuming  that  because  the  police  in 
one  country  are  required  to  behave  in  a  particular  way,  the 
police  in  another  country  ought  to  behave  similarly. 
A  particularly  interesting  light  has  been  shed  on  this  issue  by 
Professor  Mirjan  Damatka  of  Pennsylvania  University  22  who  has 
constructed  two  models  of  authority  which  he  calls  tho 
"hierarchical"  and  the  "coordinate"  and  which  represent 
continental  and  Anglo-American  procedures  respectively.  He 
argues  that  by  using  these  modele,  previously  inexplicable 421 
differences  between  the  two  systems  can  be  understood  once  the 
conventional  trial-centered  models  are  displaced  by  another  set 
of  organising  concepts.  According  to  Aamatka,  systems  which 
follow  the  continental  "hierarchical"  model  have  "a  strong 
tendency  to  arrive  at  uniform  policies  through  the  centralisation 
of  authority;  the  rigorously  hierarchical  ordering  of  agencies 
participating  in  the  administration  of  justice;  the  preference 
for  precise  and  rigid  normative  directives  over  more  flexible 
standards;  and  finally  the  great  importance  accorded  official 
documentation.  This  general  bureaucratic  style  of  exercising 
authority  tends  to  be  sustained 
everywhere  by  chosen  methods  of 
training,  recruiting  and  promoting  officials.  "  23 
Ontthe  other  hand,  "animating  the  coordinate  model  is  the  aim  of 
reaching  the  decision  more  appropriate  to  the  circumstances  of 
each  case.  Certainty  of  decision  making  is  recognised  as  an 
important  value,  but  is  less  weighty  than  in  the  hierarchical 
model;  what  appears  to  be  the  best  solution  in  a  particular  case 
will  not  be  readily  sacrificed  to  certainty  and  uniformity  of 
decisionmaking.  Consequently,  the  distinction  between  saying 
thata  particular  decision  is  just  and  that  it  is  in  accordance 
with  the  law  cannot  as  easily  be  made  as  in  the  hierarchical 
model.  The  cast  of  mind  underlying  these  value  preferences 
attaches  great  importance  to  the  rich  variety  of  experience  and 
is  sceptical  of  attempts  to  impress  general  otructurea  on  the 
complexities  of  life.  "  1 422 
Applying  his  hierarchical  model  to  continental  police  forces, 
Damadka  points  out  that  "a  general  feature  of  continental  police 
forces  is  a  high  degree  of  regimentation  and  pervasive 
regulation.  This  feature  escapes  those  observers  who  identify 
regulation  with  external  normative  constraint  on  police  forces. 
However,  both  a  strict  hierarchy  and  a  professional  tradition 
favour  a  great  deal  of  internal  regulation;  uniformity, 
consistency  and  internal  review  by  superiors  are  routine.  In 
fact  the  saturation  of  police  forces  with  internal  regulation 
bears  a  strong  resemblence  to  that  of  the  military.  As  a  result, 
the  police  tend  to  assess  situations  with  reference  to  existing 
internal  regulations.  Substantial  discretion  tends  to  gravitate 
to  higher  echelons  of  the  police  hierarchy;  lower  levels  are 
guided  by  rules  and  subjected  to  extensive  internal  control.  "  2JEý 
Damatka  also  points  out  that  as  far  as  external  conctraintc  on 
police  behaviour  are  concerned  "relatively  few  normative 
standards  can  be  located  in  most  continental  codes  of  criminal 
procedure.  In  his  view  it  is  "startling,  considering  the 
importance  of  police  work  in  all  modern  systems,  to  reflect  on 
the  meagre  regulation  of  police  inquiries  as  compared  to  that  of 
prosecutorial  or  judicial  investigation,  "  Howover,  in  all  but 
the  most  minor  crime,  continental  countries  generally  deny  the 
police  themselves  the  right  to  institute  criminal  procoodingc  and 
the  different  position  of  the  victim  also  acts  as  a  check  on 
unfettered  police  discretion. 423 
Against  this  background  it  becomes  easier  to  appreciate  why 
continental  systems  are  less  in  need  of  the  exclusionary  rules  of 
evidence  that  British  and  American  procedures  find  so  vital.  It 
is  also  much  easier  for  the  continental  policeman  to  understand 
and  appreciate  the  reasoning  behind  such  exclusionary  rules  as  do 
operate. 
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Chapter  11  Conclusions 
11.1  Silence.  Admi,  csiblity  and  Related  Issues 
The  discussion  in  this  work  has  ranged  far  and  wide,  indeed 
rather  further  and  wider  than  the  writer  originally  intended,  but 
it  is  now  proposed  to  return  to  return  firmly  to  the  Scottish  law 
and  to  examine,  in  light  of  what  has  been  learned  both  about  the 
Scottish  system  itself  and  the  problems  and  solutions  in  other 
jurisdictions,  what  changes  might  be  made  to  the  way  that  con- 
fession  evidence  is  dealt  with  in  Scotland. 
Although  certain  bodies,  notable  the  Scottish  Council  for  Civil 
Liberties  and  the  Glasgow  Bar  Association,  are  currently  campaig- 
ning  for  changes  in  individual  aspects  of  the  law,  there  are,  at 
present,  no  active  governmental  or  other  proposals  for  a  major 
overhaul  of  the  Scottish  criminal  justice  system.  Indeed  it  is 
somewhat  depressing  to  reflect  on  how  few  of  the  many  proposals 
made  by  the  Scottish  Law  Commission  actually  find  a  place  in  the 
legisiaive  programme.  With 
. all  due  respect  to  the  S.  C.  C.  L  and 
the  C.  B.  A.  ,  they  are  first  and  foremost  pressure  groups  and  given 
the  level  of  interest  shown  by  the  government  in  Scottish  crim- 
inal  law  it  seems  probable  that  the  systoms  of  evidence  and 
procedure  described  in  this  work  will  continue  without  signif- 
icant  change,  certainly  for  the  foreseeable  future.  There  to 
little  likelihood  of  the  wholesale  introduction  of  the 
inquisitorial  system  into  Scotland  and  experience  has  shown  that 
attempts  to  isolate  individual  elements  from  one  homogenous 425 
system  and  transplant  them  elsewhere  are  unlikely  to  cuccocd. 
Although  the  analogy  is  not  exact,  this  view  is  in  part 
reinforced  by  the  lack  of  success  enjoyed  by  the  trial-within-a- 
trial  in  Scotland. 
However,  this  does  not  necessarily  mean  that,  within  limits, 
change  either  cannot  or  should  not  happen.  It  was  pointed  out  at 
the  start  of  this  work  that  the  otructure  and  powers  of  the 
Scottish  prosecution  system  meant  that  it  was  quite  possible  for 
the  law  to  be  materially  altered  in  practice  while  remaining 
literally.  unchanged.  It  will  also  be  apparent  that  the  major 
pendulum  swings  in  the  admissibility  of  confession  evidence  and 
certain.  important  procedural  changes,  notably  the  introduction  of 
the  trial-within-a-trial  Just  mentioned,  have  coma  about,  without 
any  form  of  legislative  intervention,  simply  as  the  result  of 
judicial  decisions.  Whether  this  state  of  affairs  is  desirable 
or  not  is  a  matter  on  which  the  writer  expresses  no  views  but  it 
is  self-evident  that  if  the  judiciary  wore  so  minded  major 
alterations  could  be  made,  virtually  overnight,  In  the  way  in 
which  Scottish  law  approaches  confession  evidence. 
There  would  not  appear  to  be  any  pressing  reason  or  need  for 
major  changes  in  the  right  to  silence  as  it  precently  exints  in 
relation  to  the  Scottish  police,  There  is  no  sustainable 
argument  for  change  in  Scotland  whether  based  on  "sophinticated 
professional  crime"  or  anything  also.  Thic  view  has  uniformly 
been  supported  by  all  those  Scottish  commentators  and  others  who 426 
have  considered  the  issue  including  Lord  Cameron,  the  Thomson 
Committee,  Sheriff  Macphail  and  the  Scottish  Law  Commiscion. 
Indeed  in  the  present  writer"c  view  there  would  be  considerable 
dangers  in  moving  away  from  the  present  position.  If  it  is 
considered  necessary  to  give  the  police  powers  to  require  answers 
in  particular  cases,  this  should  be  done  by  legislation  tailored 
to  the  requirements  of  the  specific  issue.  The  right  to  expect 
an  answer  could  so  easily  become  the  right  to  expect  the  expected 
answer  and  although  tape  recording  is  a  major  stop  forward  in  the 
protection  of  the  accused,  it  is  by  no  means  a  complete  answer  to 
possible  police  malpractice  since  it  can  only  record  what  takes 
place  in  the  tape-recording  room.  The  fundamental  weakness  of 
tape-recording  is  that  it  still  leaves  open  the  problem  which 
Lord  Cameron  referred  to  in  relation  to  the  judicial'  declaration 
in  Menuel  vH  . 
L4,  Advocate  '  namely  that  it  does  not  assist  in 
determining  "whether  the  accused  or  suspect  had  boon  brought  to 
the  point  of  emitting  a  statement  by  pressure  or  inducement 
exercised  or  offered  by  the  police.  " 
The  writer  would  also  repeat  hie  previously  expraocad  view  that 
non-police  government  investigators  whose  activities  arc  not 
specifically  regulated  by  statute  should,  from  the  porcpectivo  of 
the  right  to  silence,  and  indeed  of  fairness  generally,  be  acoim- 
ilated  to  the  police.  It  seems  to  him  illogical  that  the  right 
to  silence  should  exist  only  in  respect  of  the  police  and  not  in 427 
respect  of  others  employed  by  the  state  to  enforce  compliance 
with  the  law. 
It  is  submitted  that  different  criteria  apply  in  relation  to  the 
accused  who  is  before  the  court  and  when  one  turns  to  consider 
judicial  proceedings,  both  pre-trial  and  trial,  the  present 
Scottish  law  on  the  right  to  silence  is  a  hotch-potch  of  legis- 
lative  compromises  and  vague  judicial  discretionc  exercised  on  an 
ad  hoc  basis  and  in  the  writer's  view  it  is  simply  a  moss.  In 
case  the  writer's  views  are  though  to  be  unduly  hawkish,  it 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  scales  are  already  loaded  two  to 
one  against  the  prosecution  since  Scottish  law  obstinately 
adheres  to  the  historical  anachronism  of  the  not  proven  verdict. 
The  modern  form  of  judicial  examination  is,  in  the  writer's 
experience,  in  danger  of  becoming  nothing  more  than  an  irrelevant 
waste  of  time  and  resources.  This  is  largely  duo  to  the  practice 
of  many,  if  not  all,  solicitors  advising  accused  persons  simply 
to  refuse  to  answer  questions.  While  that  is  a  perfectly  proper 
position  to  take  in  terms  of  the  current  interpretation  of  the 
law,  it  is  hardly  in  accordance  with  the  intentions  of  the 
Thomson  Committee  who,  as  the  result  of  representations  medo  to 
them,  considered  that  Judicial  examination  would  inter  alia 
afford  to  an  accused  at  the  earliest  possiblo  stage  in  the, 
judicial  process  an  opportunity  of  stating  his  position  an 
regards  the  charge  against  him,  2  Thomson  also  envisaged  judicial 
examination  as  preventing  the  fabrication  of  a  (aloe  line  of 428 
defence  and  also  as  protecting  the  interests  of  an  accuced  who 
has  been  interrogated  by  police  officers  by  ensuring  as  far  as 
possible  that  any  answers  or  statements  had  been  fairly  obtained 
and  not  distorted  out  of  context.  .3  On  the  current  atato  of 
matters  such  aims  are  not  even  being  addressed,  let  alone 
satisfied. 
The  first  and  most  pressing  need  is  for  the  High  Court  to  state 
clearly  and  unequivocally  that  legal  advice  is  not  a  legitimate 
reason  for  failure  to  answer  proper  questions  at  judicial  exam- 
ination.  At  a  suitable  opportunity  it  should  be  made  clear  that 
the  decision  in  MgGheg  v  H.  M,  Advocate  4  is  purely  on  its  own 
facts  and  does  not  derogate  from  Alexander  v  11,  M,  AjyQcmj9  41  and 
McEwan  yHM  Advocate,  'a  Secondly  it  is  submitted,  that  thoro 
should  be  more  robust  use  of  Judicial  comment.  While  the  trial 
judge  in  McObee  went  hopelessly  off  the  rails  on  a  factual  basic, 
it  is  submitted  that  the  general  tenor  of  hie  comments  is  quite 
appropriate  in  a  situation  where  the  accused  is  told  expressly 
that  adverse  inferences  are  liable  to  be  drawn  if  he  fails  to 
mention  at  judicial  examination  a  fact  which  he  later  relics  on 
in  hic  defence.  It  is  also  thought  that  the  High  Court  could, 
with  advantage  lay  down  some  general  format  for  the  judicial 
admonition,  possibly  by  Act  of  Adjournal. 
Turning  now  to  the  trial  stage,  while  the  writer  would  not  bn  in 
favour  of  the  accused  becoming  compellable  at  hic  QWt  trial,  a 
position  which  would  conflict  with  the  principle  of  the  advers- 429 
arial  system,  he  would  respectfully  suggest  that  a  second  look 
should  be  taken  at  the  proposals  of  the  Thomson  Committee  to 
permit  the  prosecution  to  comment  on  the  failure  of  the  accused 
to  give  evidence  once  a  prima  facie  case  has  been  established 
against  him.  This  would  do  little  more  than  homologate  the 
present  position.  The  question  of  whether  inferences  should  be 
drawn  from  the  accused's  failure  to  give  evidence  is  rather  more 
difficult,  but  an  explicit  provision  permitting  the  drawing  of 
inferences  along  the  lines  proposed  by  Thomson  would,  once  again, 
probably  do  little  more  than  regularise  what  in  fact  already 
happens.  While  making  no  inroads  into  either  the  presumption  of 
innocence  or  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  Crown,  such  a  provision 
would  have  the  result  that  the  accused  and'his  advisers  would 
know  that  he  remained  silent  at  his  peril  and  it  would  also 
materially  simplify  the  judge's  task-tn  charging  the  jury. 
When  one  turns  to  consider  the  issue  of  admissiblity,  it  is 
submitted  that  there  are  overwhelming  reasons  of  policy  against 
the  unfettered  admissiblity  of  all  confessions.  The  extreme 
example  of  Northern  Ireland  shows  just  what  can  happen  when  the 
controls  of  the  normal  legal  process  are  removed.  Northern 
Ireland  apart,  the  general  record  of  the  police  policing 
themselves  does  not  inspire  great  confidence. 
Accepting  then  the  need  for  the  courts  to  have  the  power  to 
exclude  confessions,  it  has  to  be  conceded  that  the  feirnoce  tect 
is  likely  to  remain  the  basic  of  the  law  for  the  forooccabla 430 
future  and  a  rigid  exclusionary  rule  would  be  quite  contrary  to 
the  history  and  spirit  of  Scottish  law.  However,  it  is  submitted 
that  the  fairness  test  is  in  danger  of  moving  too  far  in  the 
direction  of  unfettered  admissiblity,  if  indeed  that  point  has 
not  already  been  reached,  One  of  the  main  reasons  for  this  state 
of  affairs  is  the  failure  of  the  High  Court  to  articulate  the 
policy  or  rationale  of  exclusion  in  Scots  law,  Mirfield  has 
provided  a  masterly  exposition  of  the  principles  behind  exclusion 
in  English  law  I  but  such  an  exercise  would  simply  be  impossible 
in  Scotland.  One  of  the  few  attempts  to  rationalise  and  expound 
the  Scottish  position  was  made  by  the  Thomson  Committee  who  noted 
that  Scots  law  has 
"proceeded  not  so  much  on  any  fundamental  con- 
stitutional  or  philosophic  basis,  such  as  tha 
privilege  against  self-incrimination,  as  on  a 
conception  of  fairness  and  a  determination  by  the 
courts  to  control  police  activity  in  the  interests 
of  fairness.  What  has  bean  in  issue  has  been  not 
so  much  the  truth  of  the  accused's  statements  as 
the  propriety  of  the  circumstances  in  which  they 
were  made.  Statements  improperly  obtained  are  not 
evidence  ,  however  reliable  or  obviously  true. 
They  are  excluded  by  the  courts  because  an 
exclusionary  rule  is  the  only  effective  weapon 
possessed  by  the  courts  to  control  police 
interrogation.  It  is  of  course  true  that 
statements  extorted  by  unfair  means  are  for  that 431 
reason  unreliable,  but  Scots  law  excludes  not  only 
those  statements  but  also  statements  whose  only 
taint  is  that  they  were  made  at  a  certain  stage  of 
the  investigation.  " 
This  statement  bringe  Scots  law  close  to  what  Mirfield  calls  the 
"disciplinary  principle"  and  which  he  explains  thus: 
"It  looks  to  cases  which  have  not  yet  arisen.  If 
the  police  are  denied  the  use  of  evidence  in  the 
present  case  because  of  their  failure  to  achieve 
acceptable  standards  of  conduct,  they  will  be  more 
likely  to  achieve  acceptable  atandardo.  in  future 
cases.  In  the  short  term,  both  the  policemen 
involved  in  the  present-case  and  other  policemen 
who  get  to  know  about  the  decision  of  the  court  to 
exclude  the  evidence  will  be  deterred.  In  the 
logg  term,  perhaps,  the  courts  will,  by  Mining 
the  boundaries  of  proper  conduct  in  euch  n 
concrete  fashion,  educate  policemen  to  respact 
those  boundaries.  " 
This  statement  in  a  sense  returns  the  present  issue  to  its 
starting  point.  Now  can  the  police  be  expected  to  learn  leocons 
if  the  courts  do  not  articulate  the  reasons  for  exclusion  beyond 
such  an  unhelpful  statement  as  "moans  which  place  cress- 
examination,  pressure  and  deception  in  close  company"  10  the 
elements  of  which  can  mean  what  the  courts  went  them  to  mean,  ºr 432 
and  which  begs  more  questions  than  it  answers?  When  doeo  it 
cease  to  be  legitimate  to  "keep  asking  questions  and  probing  and 
probing  and  probing"  12  and  shade  into  "interrogation  cross- 
examination  and  pressure"?  '3  The  answer  will  certainly  not  be 
found  in  any  of  the  cases  examined  in  this  work. 
To  put  the  point  the  other  way  round,  if  the  exercise  of  the 
exclusionary  discretion  is  intended  at  least  in  part  to  send 
messages  to  the  police,  what  lessons  are  the  police  likely  to 
learn  when  the  decision  on  fairness  is  effectively  left  to  the 
jury  with  its  inscrutable  verdict?  It  might  be  argued  that  the 
jury  are  the  arbiters  of  what  is  acceptable  to  society,  but  even 
if  it  were  apparent  that  they  had  acquitted  the  accused  because 
they  held  a  confession  to  have  been  unfairly  obtained,  the 
conclusion  that  the  police  would  most  probably  to  draw  is  that 
the  jury  members  were  anti-police.  In  the  writer's  experience 
the  last  thing  that  the  police  are  likely  to  do  is  to  consider 
that  they  themselves  were  in  some  way  at  fault.  The  position 
would  of  necessity  be  different  if  the  trial  judge  (or  the  appeal 
court>  were  to  spell  out  clearly  and  unequivocally  the  reason  for 
the  exclusion  as  has  happened  in  some  of  the  cases  on  cautioning, 
notably  H.  M.  Adyocete  v  Docherty  ',  *  and  a*,  is 
Accordingly,  if  the  underlying  rationale  of  Scottish  law  in 
indeed  a  desire  to  control  police  behaviour  in  the  intcroatc  of 
fairness,  it  is  respectfully  submitted  that  the  Scottich 
judiciary  should  look  beyond  the  bare  facts  of  the  the  case 433 
before  them  and  should  explain  clearly,  and  in  a  way  likely  to  be 
understood  by  the  police,  exactly  why  a  confession  to  excluded, 
In  addition,  judges  should  be  encouraged,  if  not  actually 
required,  to  give  juries  guidance  as  to  what  factors  should  be 
taken  into  account  in  assessing  fairness. 
The  issue  of-legal  advice  during  police  questioning  to  another 
fraught  area  and  a  subject  on  which  reasonable  people  may 
sincerely  hold  diametrically  opposing  opinions.  The  writer's 
view  is  that  if  the  legitimacy  of  investigative  police 
questioning  is  accepted,  as  it  clearly  is,  and  provided  there  is 
an  accurate  record  of  what  took  place,  there  is  no  pressing 
reason  for  a  change  in  current  Scottish  practice.  If  there  was 
to  be  a  right  to  legal  advice  during  police  proceedings  such  a 
change  could  not,  it  is  submitted,  simply  be  introduced  in 
isolation  and  many  other  aspects  of  the  law  would  require 
reconsideration.  At  the  most  basic  level,  there  in  at  present  no 
provision  for  extending  the  six  hour  detention  period  under 
Section  2  of  the  1980  Act.  What  would  happen  if  the  police 
legitimately  and  properly  detained  a  serious  criminal  under 
Section  2  but  his  regular  lawyer,  no  doubt  for  good  and 
sufficient  reason,  was  unable  to  attend  the  police  station  for 
three  hours?  Should  the  police  have  the  power  to  extend  the 
period  of  detention  so  that  the  six  hours  starts  to  run  when  the 
solicitor  arrives?  Could  the  suspect  properly  be  interrogated  in 
the  presence  of,  say,  a  duty  solicitor  he  had  never  mot  before? 
McGhee  v  H.  M.  Advocate  appears  to  suggest  that  the  absence  of  the 434 
accused's  "own"  solicitor  is  a  legitimate  reason  for  failure  to 
answer  at  judicial  examination.  Should  the  fact  that  the  accused 
has  been  questioned  in  the  presence  of  a  solicitor  load  the 
courts  to  comment  adversely  on  his  silence  as  appears  to  be 
happening  in  England?  If  so,  the  wording  of  the  caution  should 
surely  be  altered  as  it  is  clearly  unfair  to  comment  adversely 
when  the  accused  has  been  told  that  he  need  not  answer  and  this 
in  turn  throws  the  entire  argument  back  to  the  Collision  between 
the  right  to  silence  and  the  need  for  investigative  police  quest- 
ioning  which,  as  was  previously  pointed  out,  is  the  basis  of  most 
of  the  problems  in  relation  to  confession  evidence. 
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It  is  no  longer  a  logically  tenable  position  to  argue  that  nobody 
can  be  convicted  in  Scotland  solely  on  the  evidence  of  his  own 
extra-judicial  confession  and  the  writer  hopes  that  be  has 
convinced  any  sceptics  that  as  a  practical  issue  Scots  law  offers 
no  more  protection  to  the  accused  against  false  or  fabricated 
confessions  than  does  English  law,  the  consequences  of  which  can 
be  seen  in  the  Timothy  Evans  and  Guildford  pour  cases  to  name  but 
two  infamous  examples.  The  lessons  are  not  new  -  Dickson 
identified  most  of  the  potential  danger  areas  over  one  hundred 
years  ago.  The  writer  has  already  made  clear  his  opinion  that 
the  issue  of  sufficiency  of  confession  evidence  in  Scotland 
requires  urgent  and  complete  reappraisal  if  this  country  is  not 
to  produce  similar  miscarriages.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  the 
recent  comments  of  the  Lord  Justice-Clerk  '  will  mark  the 
beginning  of  such  a  reappraisal. 
Scots  low  will  require  to  decide  for  once  and  for  all  whether  an 
extra-judicial  confession  does  or  does  not  require  to  be 
corroborated  and,  if  the  latter,  what  level  of  supporting 
evidence  will  be  necessary,  The  present  parlous  state  of  the  law 
has  coma  about  entirely  as  the  result  of  judicial  decisions  and 
it  would  be  open  to  the  High  Court  to  reverse  the  trend  without 
any  need  for  legislative  intervention. 436 
In  the  writer's  view  no  confession  to  the  police  which  has  not, 
at  the  very  least,  been  tape  recorded  should  be  admissible  unless 
the  prosecution  satisfies  the  court,  beyond  reasonable  doubt, 
that  there  were  compelling  reasons  for  the  failure  to  record, 
The  requirement  to  tape  record  should  be  extended  to  all  police 
interviews  and  not  just  those  conducted  by  the  C.  I,  D..  In 
particular  it  should  be  extended  immediately  to  terrorist 
suspects.  Experiments  should  be  carried  out  with  video  recording 
with  a  view  to  establishing  whether  it  offers  material  advantages 
over  tape  recording. 
The  special  status  of  the  confession  as  a  source  of  evidence 
should  be  ended  as  should  the  assumption  that  a  confession,  being 
against  the  accused's  interest,  is  likely  to  be  truo.  It  should 
become  merely  one  source  and  as  such  should  require  corroboration 
consisting  of  a  second  wholly  independent  source.  In  other  words 
the  historic  Scottish  concept  of  corroboration  should  be 
reasserted. 
While  there  is  undoubtedly  scope  for  the  continued  existence  of 
the  special  knowledge  rule,  this  should  be  returned  to  the  true 
principle  set  out  by  Alison  and.  restricted  to,  ideally,  facto 
known  only  to  the  perpetrator  of  the  crime  and  unknown  to  the 
police  or,  at  the  very  least,  to  facto  which  arg  known  only  to 
the  police  and  the  perpetrator.  Caces  like  ra 
M.  M.  Advocete  and  MacDonald  M.  Acivo  e,  t  n3  fail  entirely  to 
address  the  issue  of  the  protection  of  ,  the  accused  and  should  be 437 
reconsidered  and  overruled  at  the  first  opportunity.  Where  the 
facts  are  known  to  the  police  as  wall  as  the  perpetrator,  and  the 
confession  is  denied,  the  judge  should  be  required  to  warn  the 
jury  expressly  of  the  dangers  inherent  in  confescion  evidence, 
there  being  an  existing  precedent  in  the  case  of  identification 
evidence.  a 
It  is  somewhat  ironic  that  one  of  the  judges  most  responsible  for 
the  current  state  of  the  law,  Lord  Justice-General  Emsito,  should 
have  written  the  following: 
In  all  our  criminal  courts  in  Scotland  the  object 
of  the  trial  is  to  enable  the  Crown  to  secure  the 
conviction  of  the  guilty  by  proof  beyond  reason- 
able  doubt  upon  evidence  sufficient  in  law;  and  at 
the  same  time  to  ensure  that  the  protection  which 
the  law  seeks  to  afford  to  the  innocent  is  denied 
to  none.  What  is  at  stake  in  a  criminal  trial  is 
the  interest  of  the  community,  and  it  must  never 
be  forgotten  that  that  interest  requires  of  a 
civilised  system  of  criminal  law  -  which  the  law 
of  Scotland  undoubtedly  is  -  that  even  if  its 
administration  results  In  the  acquittal  from  time 
to  time  of  the  apparently  guilty  it  should  involve 
the  minimum  of  risk  at  any  time  of  the  conviction 
of  the  innocent.  Some  may  nowadays  be  heard  to 
say  that  the  protection  which  our  law  affords  to 
the  accused  is  too  great  and  that  it  should  be 438 
reduced  to  simplify  the  conviction  of  the 
criminal.  The  arguments  of  the  advocates  of 
change  are  familiar  but,  in  my  opinion,  no  change 
deserves  serious  consideration,  in  spite  of  the 
laudable  object,  if  the  result  of  its  adoption 
would  be  to  increase  to  any  significant  extent  the 
risk  of  the  conviction  of  the  innocent.  If  an 
increased  risk  of  convicting  the  innocent  is  the 
price  of  a  greater  prospect  of  convicting  the 
guilty,  then  as  far  as  I  am  concerned  it  is  a 
price  which  no  sound  and  just  system  of  law  can 
seriously  afford  to  pay.  "" 
It  ie  tempting  to  suggest  (with  respect,  of  course)  that  it  might 
have  been  no  bad  thing  had  his  Lordship  and  his  brotheren  borne 
these  reflections  in  mind  particularly  when  dealing  with  the 
issue  of  the  special  knowledge  confession.  Smith  v  N.  4. 
Advocate.  6  decided  a  more  four  years  after  the  above  passage  was 
written,  set  off  a  trend  which  is  only  now  being  recognised  as 
having  indeed  led  to  a  real  danger  of  the  conviction  of  the 
innocent. 
As  in  co  many  other  areas  of  modern  life,  technology  is  now 
beginning  to  make  its  mark  in  Scotland's  criminal  justice  cyctem 
and  the  introduction  of  modern  electronic  methods  in  police 
stations  will,  it  is  hoped,  lead  to  a  considerable  improvement  in 
the  accuracy  of  the  record  and  hence  enable  prosecutor  e,  tourte 439 
and  ultimately  the  public  at  large,  to  have  greater  faith  in 
confession  evidence. 
However,  there  is  not,  and  never  must  bei  any  room  for 
complacency,  English  and  Northern  Ireland  experience  have  shown 
the  terrible  dangers  which  can  arise  from  unsupervised  and 
unrecorded  police  interrogation.  Scotland  appears  so  far  to  have 
avoided  a  major  confession-based  miscarriage  of  justice.  It  must 
never  be  allowed  to  happen. 
Notes 
1,  Glasgow  Herald  10  October  1991 
2,1297  SCOR  217 
3,1996  SLT(N)  85 
4,  McAvoy-y-H.  M. 
-AdYAridt 
19.91  SCCR  121 
5,  Tha  Role  of  Judges  in  Society  in  Scotland  (1974)  19  JL$$  20S  at  209 
6,  (197R)  SCERIUPALM 440 
Mad) 441 
Bibliography 
Anon  -  Evidence  In  the  Criminal  Cases  Bill  (1897)  4  SLT  256 
Anon  -  Mr  Tustice  Hawkins  on  the  Evidence  of  Prisonerc  (1898)  fi 
SLT  8 
Anon  -  Evidence  of  Accused  Persons  (1898)  6  SLT  126 
Anon  -  The  Working  of  the  Criminal  Evidence  Act  1898  (1900)  16 
SLR  305 
Anon  -  Police  Commission  Report  1929  SLT  (News)  77 
Anon  -  Prisoners'  Evidence  1933  SLT  29 
Anon  -  An  Aspect  of  Criminal  Procedure  (1956)  62  SLR  221 
Anon  -  Corroboration  of  Evidence  in  Scottish  Criminal  Law  1958 
SLT  (News)  137 
Anon  -  Fairness  to  the  Accused  (1959)  4  JLSS  84 
Anon  -  The  Silence  of  the  Accused  (1961)  6  JLSS  164 
Anon  -  Conviction  of  the  Guilty  (1972)  17  JLSS  183 
Anon  -  Silence  that  Beats  the  Law  (1972)  40  Sc  Law  Gazette  56 
Anon  -A  Question  of  Fairness  1977  SLT  (News)  140 
Anon  -  Interrogation  and  the  Test  of  Fairness  1979  SLT  (News)  189 
Anon  -  Hearsay  and  Self-serving  Statements  at  Judicial  Exam- 
ination  1985  SLT  (News)  355 
Adams  J.  E.  -  An  Englishman  Looks  at  Thomson  (1976]  Crim  LR  609 
Alison  A.  -  Principles  and  Practice  of  the  Criminal  Law  of 
Scotland,  (Edinburgh  1832  &  1833) 
Andrews  J.  A.  (ad)  -  Human  Rights  in  Criminal  Procedure.  (The 
Hague,  1982) 
Anton  A.  E.  -  L'Instruction  Crimineile  (1960)  9  American  Journal 
of  Comparative  Law  441 
Archbold  (ed  Mitchell  at  al)  -  Criminal  Pleading,  Evidence  and 
Practice  (42nd  edn).  (London,  1985). 
Ashworth  A.  3'.  -  Some  Blueprints  for  Criminal  Investigation  (19761 
Grim  LR  594 
Auld  R.  E.  -  The  Admissiblity  of  Tape  Recordings  in  Criminal  Pro- 
ceedings:  a  Comparative  Note  t1961]  Grim  1,  R  598 
Baker  R.  W.  -  The  Hearsay  Rule  (London,  1950) 442 
Baldwin  J.  &  McConville  M.  -  Police  Interrogation  and  the  Right 
to  See  a  Solicitor  (19791  Crim  LR  145 
Baldwin  J.  &  McConville  M.  -  Confessions  In  Crown  Court  Trials; 
Research  Study  No.  5  (HMSO  1980) 
Baldwin  J.  -  Police  Interviews  on  Tape  (1990)  140  Now  IL  662 
Balfour  (Sir)  J.  -  Practicks  (1754)  (Reprinted  as  Stair  Society 
Vols.  21  and  22,1962  &  1963) 
Barnes  J.  A.  &  Webster  N.  -  Police  Interrogation  -  Tape  Recording. 
Research  Study  No.  8  (HMSO,  1980) 
Beltrami  J.  The  Defender  (Edinburgh,  1980) 
Birch  D.  -  The  PACE  Hots  Up  -  Confessions  and  Confusions  Under 
the  1934  Act  [19891  Crim  LR  95 
Birch  D.  -  The  Evidence  Provisions  (1989)  40  NILQ  411 
Birch  D.  -  Corroboration  in  Criminal  Trials:  a  Review  of  the 
Proposals  of  the  Law  Commission's  Working  Paper  119901  Crim  LR 
667 
Black  G.  F.  -A  Calendar  of  Cases  of  Witchcraft  in  Scotland  1510- 
1727.  (New  York,  1938) 
Black  R.  -A  Question  of  Confidence  1982  JLSS  299,389 
Bonner  D.  -  The  Baker  Review  of  the  Northern  Ireland  (Emorgency 
Provisions)  Act  1978  (19843  Public  Law  348 
Boyd  R.  -  Justices  of  the  Peace  (Edinburgh,  1787) 
Boyle  K.,  Hadden  T.  ,  Hillyard  P.  -  Law  and  State:  The  Case  of 
Northern  Ireland  (London,  1975) 
Boyle  K.,  Haddon  T.,  Hillyard  P.  -  Ten  Years  on  In  Northern 
Ireland  (Cobden  Trust,  1980) 
Boyle  K,  &  Hannum  H.  -  Ireland  in  Strasbourg  (1976)  11  Ir  Sur 
(NS)  243 
Brookens  D.  '-  Guildford  -a  Warning  (1989)  34  JGSS  448 
Brouwer  G.  E.  P.  -  Inquisitorial  and  Adversarial  Procedures  -a 
Comparative  Analysis  (1981)  55  Aunt  TL  207 
Brown  H.  H.  -  Police  Evidence  (1896)  12  SLR  203 
Brown  H.  H.  -  The  Evidence  of  the  Accused  in  Criminal  Procedure 
(1898)  5  SLT  182 
Brownlie  I.  -  Police  Questioning,  Custody  and  Caution  119601  Crim 
LR  298 443 
Burnett  J.  -A  Treatise  on  Various  Branches  of  the  Criminal  Law 
of  Scotland.  (Edinburgh,  1811) 
Cameron,  Lord  -  Scottish  Practice  in  Relation  to  Admissions  and 
Confessions  by  Persons  Suspected  or  Accused  of  Crime  1975  SLT 
(News)  265 
Carson  W.  G.  -  Policing  the  Periphery:  the  Development  of  Scottish 
Policing  1795-1900  (1984)  17  A&NZ  Jo.  Crim  207 
"Chief  Superintendent"  -  Preliminary  Investigation  of  Offences 
(19611  Crim  LR  70 
Cohen  M.  -  The  Unsworn  Statement  from  the  Dock  (19813  Crim  LR  224 
Comerton  A.  E.  -  Confessions  in  the  Criminal  Law  (1964)  15  NILQ 
166 
Cooke  R.  K.  -A  Police  Officer's  Notes  [  19541  Crim  LR  833 
Cooper  (Lord)  T.  M.  -  The  Scottish  Legal  Tradition  (Saltire 
Society,  reprinted  with  additional  material  by  M.  C.  Malton  and 
W.  D.  H.  Sollar,  1991) 
Coutts  J.  A.  (ed)  -  The  Accused  -A  Comparative  Study,  (London, 
1966?. 
Cowen  Z.  and  Carter  P.  B.  -  Esaays  on  the  Law  of  Evidence  (Oxford, 
1956) 
Cross  R.  -  The  Right  to  Silence  and  the  Presumption  of  Znnoconce 
-  Sacred  Cows  or  Safeguards  of  Liberty?  (1970)  It  JSPTL  66 
Cross  R.  -  The  Evidence  Report  -  Sense  or  Nonsense?  (19731  Crim 
LR  329 
Cross  R.  -  Cross  on  Evidence  (7th  edn  by  C.  Tapper),  (London, 
1990). 
Curran  J.  H.  and  Carnie  J.  K.  -  Detention  or  Voluntary  Attondanco  - 
Police  Use  of  Detention  under  Section  2,  Criminal  Juotico 
(Scotland)  Act  1980  (HMSO,  1986) 
Damadka  M.  -  Structures  of  Authority  and  Comparative  Criminal 
Procedure  (1975)  84  Yale  LJ  480 
Devlin  (Lord)  P  --  The  Criminal  Prosecution  in  En,  land,  (Oxford, 
1960) 
Devlin  (Lord)  P-  The  Judges  (Oxford,  1979) 
Dickson  D.  -  The  Legal  System  of  Northern  Ireland  (Bolfaat,  1984) 
Dickson  B.  (ed)  -  Civil  Liberties  in  Northern  Ireland.  -(Btlfant, 444 
1990) 
Dickson  W.  G.  -A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Evidence  in  Scotland  (2nd 
edn)  (Edinburgh,  1887) 
Duff  A.  and  Simmonds  N.  (eds)  -  Philosophy  and  the  Criminal  Law 
(Weisbaden,  1984) 
Elliot  D.  W.  -  Elliot  and  Phipson  Manual  of  the  Law  of  Evidence 
(12th  edn)  (London,  1987) 
Erskine  J.  -  Institute  of  the  Law  of  Scotland  (Edinburgh,  1773) 
Esmein  A.  (trans.  Simpson)  -A  History  of  Continental  Criminal 
Procedure  with  particular  reference  to  France  (London,  1914). 
Esson  A.  M.  R.  -  Comment  on  Co-accused  1972  SLT  (Newt)  17 
Fenwick  H.  -  Access  to  Legal  Advice  in  Police  Custody:  a  Funda- 
mental  Right  (1989)  52  MLR  104 
Findlay  M.  &  Duff  P.  -  The  Jury  Under  Attack.  (London,  1988) 
Frase  R.  S.  -  Comparative  Criminal  Justice  as  a  Guide  to  American 
Law  Reform  (1990)  78  California  Law  Review  539 
Galligan  D.  J.  -  The  Right  to  Silence  Reconsidered  1988  Current 
Legal  Problems  69 
Gene  C'.  H.  W.  and  Stoddart  C.  N.  -A  Casebook  on  Scottish  Criminal 
Law  (Edinburgh,  1980) 
Gibb  A.  U.  -  Law  from  over  the  Border  (Edinburgh,  1950) 
Gibb  A.  D.  -  Fair  Play  for  the  Criminal  (1954)  66  JR  199 
Gibbons  T.  -  Questioning  and  Treatment  of  Persons  by  the  Police 
(1989)  40  NILQ  386 
Glazebrook  P.  R.  (ed)  -  Reshaping  the  Criminal  La;  A  (London, 
1976), 
Goldstein  A.  S.  &  Marcus  M.  -  The  Myth  of  Judicial  Supervision  in 
Three  "Inquisitorial"  System,,  France,  Italy  and  Germany 
(1978)  87  Yale  LT  240  -  .I 
Gooderson  R.  N.  -  'The  Interrogation  of  Suspects  (1970)  48  Can  Bar 
Rev  270 
Gordon  G.  H.  -  The  Burden  of  Proof  on  the  -Accused'  1968  SIT  (Newo) 
29,37 
Gordon  G.  H.  -  Institution  of  Criminal  Proceeding:  in  Scotland 
(1968)  19  NILQ  249 
Gordon  G.  H.  -  Miscarriages  of  Justice  (1989)  34  JLSS  359 445 
Gottleib  A.  Confirmation  by  Subsequent  Fact  (1956)  72  LQR  209 
Greef  R.  -  Talking  Blues  -  the  Police  in  their  own  Words. 
(London,  1990) 
Grant  A.  -  Videotaping  Police  Questioning:  a  Canadian  Experiment 
119873  Crim  LR  375 
Grant  D.  -  The  Thin  Blue  Line  (London,  1973) 
Gray  J.  W.  R.  -  Chalmers  and  After.  Police  Interrogation  and  the 
Trial  Within  a  Trial  1970  JR  1 
Greer  D.  S.  -  Admissiblity  of  Confessions  and  the  Common  Law  in 
Times  of  Emergency  (1973)  24  NILQ  199 
Greer  D.  S.  -  The  Admissibility  of  Confessions  Under  the  Northern 
Ireland  (Emergency  Provisions)  Act  1978  (1980)  31  NILQ  205 
Grosskurth  A.  -  Scotland's  Pitfalls  1991  Legal  Action  7 
Guthrie,  Lord  -  Criminal  Justice  in  Scotland  (1950)  66  SLR  1 
Heydon  J.  D.  -  Statutory  Restrictions  on  the  Privilege  against 
Self-Incrimination  (1971)  87  LQR  214 
Hoffman  L.  H.  What  Happened  to  the  Voire  Dire?  (1967)  83  LQR  338 
Hogan  G.  and  Walker  C.  -  Political  Violence  and  the  Law  in 
Ireland  (Manchester,  1989) 
Hrones  S.  -  Interrogation  Abuses  by  the  Police  in  Franco  -a 
Comparative  Solution  1969  Crim  LQ  68 
Hume  (Baron)  D.  -  Commentaries  on  the  Law  of  Scotland  Respecting 
Crimes  (4th  edn)  (Edinburgh,  1844,  reprinted  1986) 
"I.  D.  W.  "-  Where  Silence  is  Golden  1958  9LT  (News)  13 
Ingraham  B.  A.  --  The  Structure  of  Criminal  Procedure.  (Now  York, 
1987) 
Irving  B&  Hilgendorf  L-  Police  Interrogation,  'tho  Psychological 
Approach;  Research  Study  No.  1  (HMSO,  1980) 
Irving  B-  Police  Interrogation,  a  Case  Study  of  Current- 
Practice;  Research  Study  No.  2  (HMSO  1980) 
Irving  B.  a  Mackenzie  I.  -  Police  Interrogation:  The  Effects  of 
the  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984  (London,  1989) 
Jackson  J.  D.  --  The  Northern  Ireland  (Emergency  Provision.  )  Act 
1987  (1988)  39  NILQ  103 
Jackson  J.  D.  -  Recent  Developments  In  Criminal  Evidence  (1989)  40 
NILQ  105 446 
Jackson  J.  D.  -  Curtailing  the  Right  to  Silence:  Lessons  from 
Northern  Ireland  119917  Crim  LR  404 
Jackson  R.  M.  -  The  Machinery  of  Justice  in  England  (7th  edn) 
(Cambridge,  1977) 
Jennings  A.  (ed)  -  Justice  Under  Fire:  The  Abuse  of  Civil 
Liberties  in  Northern  Ireland  (London,  1988) 
Jescheck  H-H.  -  The  Discretionary  Powers  of  the'  Prosecuting 
Attorney  in  West  Germany  (1970)  18  American  Journal  of 
Comparative  Law  508 
Johnston  A.  M.  -  Has  an  Accused  Person  too  many  Rights? 
(1969)  14  JLSS  309 
Joy  H.  H.  -  On  the  Admissibility  of  Confessions  and  Challenge  of 
Jurors  in  Criminal  Cases  In  England  and  Ireland,  (Dublin, 
1842) 
"Justice"  -  Preliminary  Investigation  of  Criminal  Offences  11960) 
Crim  LR  793 
"Justice"  -  Miscarriages  of  Justice  (London,  1989) 
Kadish  S.  A.  (ed)  -  Encyclopedia  of  Crime  and  Justice  (New  York, 
1983) 
Kahn-Freund  0.  -  On  the  Uses  and  Misuses  of  Comparative  Law 
(1974)  37  MLR  1 
Kee  R.  -  Trial  and  Error  (London,  1989) 
Kennedy  L,  -  Ten  Rillington  Place.  (London,  1961) 
Kock  G.  L.  (trans)  -  The  French  Code  of  Criminal  Procedure  (New 
Jersey,  1964) 
Krauss  D.  -  The  Reform  of  Criminal  Procedure  1n  the  Federal 
Republic  of  Germany  1979  JR  202 
Langbein  3.  H.  -  Torture  and  the  Law'  of  -Proof.  "  (Chicago,  1977) 
Langbein  J.  H.  &  Woinreb  L.  L.  -  Continental  Criminal  Procedure.  - 
"Myth"  and  Reality  (1978)  87  Yale  LJ  1549- 
Law  I-  The  Thomson  Report  1976  SLT  (News)  89 
Law  Society  of  Scotland  -  Evidence  Code  -  1.  -Memorandum  of 
Observation  to  Scottish  Law  Commission  (1970)  15  JLSS  3 
Law  Society  of  Scotland  -  Criminal  Procedure.  ,  Observations 
submitted  to  the  Thomson  Committee  (1972)  17  JLSS  7 
Lewis  W.  I.  -  Manual  of  the  Law  of  Evidence  in  Scotland  (Edin- 447 
burgh,  1925) 
Lidstone  K.  W.  &  Early  T.  L.  -  Questioning  Freedom.  -  Detention  for 
Questioning  in  France,  Scotland  and  England  (1982)  31  ICLQ  409 
Lyttleton  A  et  al  -  The  Criminal  Law  of  Evidence  (1897)  5  SLT  126 
McConville  M.  &  Baldwin  J.  -  Courts  Prosecution  and  Conviction 
(Oxford,  1981) 
McConville  M.  &-Morrell  P.  -  Recording  the  Interrogation  -  have 
the  Police  got  it  Taped?  119833  Crim  LR  158 
MacDermott,  Lord  -  The  Interrogation  of  Suspects  in  Custody  1958 
Current  Legal  Problems  I 
Macdonald  (Sir)  J.  H.  A.  -A  Practical  Treatise  on  the  Criminal  Law 
of  Scotland  (5th  edn).  (Edinburgh,  1948) 
Mackay  of  Clashfern  Lord  -  The  Relationship  between  the  Police 
and  the  Prosecution  (1984)  52  Sc  Law  Gez  11 
McKenna  (Sir)  B.  -  Criminal  Law  Revision  Committee's  Eleventh 
Report:  Some  Comments  119721  Crim  LR  605 
Mackenzie  (Sir)  G.  -  Laws  and  Customs  in  Matters  Criminal 
(Edinburgh,  1699) 
MacLean  A.  J  -  Tape  Recording  of  Police  Interrogations  (1986)  112 
SCOLAG  9,  (1986)  113  SCOALO  21 
McNair  M.  -  The  Early  Development  of  the  Privilege  against  Self- 
incrimination  (1990)  10  OILS  66 
Macphail  I.  Q.  -  Judicial  Examination  (1982)  27  JLSS  (Workshop 
Supplement)  296 
Macphail  I.  D.  -  Evidence  -A  Revised  Version  of  a  Research  Paper 
on  the  Law  of  Evidence  in  Scotland  (Edinburgh,  1987) 
Mark  (Sir)  R.  -  In  the  Office  of  Constable  (Glasgow,  1978) 
Menlowe  M.  A.  -  Bentham,  Self  Incrimination  and  the  Law  of 
Evidence  (1988)  104  LQR  286 
Mill  7.  -  The  Scottish  Police  °-  Their  Powers  and  Duties 
(Edinburgh,  1944) 
Mirfleid  P.  -  Confessions  -  the  Person  stn  Authority  Requirement 
119811  Crim  LR  92 
Mirfield  P.  -  Confessions  and  Oppression  (1983)  3  OILS  289 
Mirfield  P.  --  Confessions.  (London.  1985) 448 
Moody  S.  and  Tombs  J.  -  Prosecution  in  the  Public  Interest  (C-din- 
burgh,  1982) 
Moody  S.  -  The  Operation  of  the  Judicial  Examination  Procedure.  -  a 
Study  in  two  Scottish  Cities  (Scottish  Office,  1986) 
Murphy  P.  -  Truth  on  the  Voire  Dire  -a  Challenge  to  Wong  Kam- 
Ming  [19791  Crim  LR  364 
Narain  B.  J.  -  Public  Law  in  Northern  Ireland  (Belfast,  1975) 
Parker  C.  F.  -  Confessions  in  Magistrates  Courts  [19771  Crim  LR  74 
Patey  J.  -  Recent  Reforms  in  French  Criminal  Law  and  Procedure 
(1960)  9  ICLQ  383 
Pattenden  R.  -  The  Judge,  Discretion  and-the  Criminal  Trial 
(Oxford  1982) 
Pattenden  R.  -  Should  Confessions  be  Corroborated?  (1991)  107  LQR 
317 
Pieck  M.  -  The  Accused's  Privilege  Against  Self  Incrimination  in 
the  Civil  Law  (1962>  11  American  Journal  of  Comparative  Law 
585 
Ploscowe  M.  -  The  Development  of  Present  Day  Criminal  Procedures 
in  Europe  and  America  (1935)  48  Yale  LJ  433 
Plucknett  T.  F.  T.  -A  Concise  History  of  the  Common  Law  (London, 
1956) 
Plumptre  1.  -  The  Right  of  Silence  Disappears  (1989)  139  Now  LI 
1070 
Prentice  D.  D.  -  Confessions  -  Controlling  the  Police  (1968)  31 
MLR  693 
Price  C.  and  Caplan  J.  -  The  Confait  Confession.  (London,  1977) 
"P.  W.  P.  "  The  Right  to  Silence"  1987  SLT  (News)  17 
Radley  T.  B.  -  Recording  as  Testimony  to  the  Truth  t  19543  Crim  LR 
96 
Renton  R.  W.  &  Brown  H.  H.  -  Criminal  Procedure  according  to  the 
Law  of  Scotland  (5th  edn  by  G.  H.  Gordon),  (Edinburgh,  1983) 
Reid  W.  M.  -  Police  Interrogation  1964  SLT  (News)  89 
Roughead  W,  -  Twelve  Scots  Trials  (Edinburgh,  "1913) 
Roughead  W.  -  The  Riddle  of  the  Ruthvens  and  Other  Studies 
(Edinburgh,  1919) 
Roughead  W.  -  Olengarry's  Way  and  Other  Studios  (Edinburgh,  1022) 449 
Roughead  W.  -  Mainly  Murder  (London,  1937) 
Rowe  P.  -  The  Voire  Dire  and  the  Jury  (1986]  Crim  LR  226 
Samuels  A.  -  The  Legal  Response  to  Terrorism  (19841  Public  Law 
365 
Sanders  A.  &  Bridges  L.  -  Access  to  Legal  Advice  and  Police 
Malpractice  (19901  Crim  LR  494 
Sargent  W.  -  Battle  for  the  Mind.  (New  York,  1957) 
"Scots  Advocate"  -  Scots  Law  Regarding  Confessions  (19611  Crim  LR 
592 
Scott-Moncrieff,  W.  G.  (ed)  -.  The  Records  of  the  Proceedings  of 
the  Justiciary  Court,  Edinburgh  1661-1678  (Scottish  History 
Society,  vol.  xiviii)  (Edinburgh,  1905) 
Sharpe  S.  -  Electronically  Recorded  Evidence,  (London,  1989) 
Sheehan  A.  V.  -  Criminal  Procedure  in  Scotland  and  Franca.  (HMSO, 
1975) 
Sheehan  A.  V.  at  ei  -  Criminal  Procedure  (Edinburgh,  1990) 
Smith  D.  B.  -A  Note  on  Judicial  Examination  1961  SLT  (News)  179 
Smith  J.  C.  -  Questioning  by  the  Police.  Some  Further  Points  I 
(1960)  Crim  LR  347 
Smith  K.  J.  M.  -  Induced  Voluntary  Confessions  (1982)  45  MLR  673 
Smith  T.  B.  -  British  Justice  the  Scottish  Contribution.  (London, 
1961) 
Smith  T.  B.  -  The  British  Commonwealth  Development  of  its  Laws  and 
Constitutions,  vol,  1.  (London,  1955) 
Softley  P.  -  Police  Interrogation:  an  observational  study  in  four 
police  stations.  Home  Office  Research  Study  No.  61  (HMSO,  1980) 
Stair  Society  -  An  Introduction  to  Scottish  Legal  History  (vol 
20)  (Edinburgh,  1958) 
Stein  P.  and  Shand  J.  -  Legal  Values  in  Western  Society  (Edin- 
burgh,  1974) 
Tait  G.  -  Summary  of  the  Powers  and  Duties  of  a  Constable  in 
Scotland  (3rd  edn).  (Edinburgh,  1815) 
Tait  0.  -A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Evidence 
. in  Scot,  Jand  (ist 
edn).  (Edinburgh,  1824) 
Thankerton  Lord  -  The  Administration  of  the  Criminal  Law  in 
Scotland  (1937)  49  JR  35 450 
Towe  T.  E.  -  Criminal  Pre-Trial  Procedure  in  France  (1970) 
American  Journal  of  Comparative  Law  483 
Volkmann-Schluck  T.  -  Continental  European  Criminal  Procedures: 
True  or  Illusive  Model?  (1981)  9  Am  J  Crim  L1 
Vouin  R.  -  The  Protection  of  the  Accused  in  French  Criminal  Pro- 
cedure  (1956)  5  ICLQ  1 
Walker  A&  Walker  NML-  The  Law  of  Evidence  in  Scotland. 
(Edinburgh,  1964) 
Walker  D.  M.  -  The  Scottish  Jurists  (Edinburgh,  Green,  1985) 
Walsh  D.  J.  P.  -  The  Use  and  Abuse  of  Emergency  Legislation  in 
Northern  Ireland  (Cobden  Trust,  1983) 
Wilkinson  A.  B.  -  The  Scottish  Law  of  Evidence  (Edinburgh,  1986) 
Williams  G.  -  The  Proof  of  Guilt  (3rd  edn).  (London,  1963) 
Williams  G.  -  The  Autentication  of  Statements  to  the  Police 
119791  Grim  LR  6 
Williams  G.  -  The  Tactic  of  Silence  (1987)  137  New  LJ  1107 
Williams  G.  -  The  "Right  of  Silence"  and  the  Mental  Element 
119881  Crim  LR  97 
Willis  C.  F.  -  The  Tape  Recording  of  Police  interviews  with 
Suspects,  an  Interim  Report  Home  Office  Research  Study  No.  82 
(HMSO  1984) 
Willis  C.  F.  ,  Macleod  J.  ,  Naish  P.  -  The  Tape  Recording  of  Police 
Interviews  with  Suspects  -a  Second  Interim  Report  Homo  Office 
Research  Study  No.  97  (HMSO  1988) 
Willock  I.  D.  -  The  Jury  In  Scotland  (Stair  Society  vol  23, 
Edinburgh,  1966) 
Willock  I.  D.  -  The  Guildford  Four  Case:  Could  it  Happen  In  Scot- 
land?  (1989)  158  SCOLAG  168 
Wilson  J.  G.  -  The  Trial  of  Peter  Manuel  (London,  1959) 
Wilson  W.  A.  -  The  Logic  of  Corroboration  (1960)  66  SLR  101 
"W.  J.  L.  "-  Criminal  Evidence  Bill  (1897)  5  SLT  5 
Wof  finden  B.  -  Miscarriages  of  Justice  (London,  1987) 
Wozniak  E.  G.  M.  -  The  Tape  Recording  of  Police  Interviews  with 
Suspected  Persons  in  Scotland  (SHHD,  1985) 
Yea  M.  H.  -  Diminishing  the  Right  to  Silence:  the  Singapore 
Experience  (19833  Crim  LR  89 451 
Zander  M.  -  Acceess  to  a  Solicitor  in  the  Police  Station  [19721 
Crim  LR  342 
Zander  M.  -  The  Investigation  of  Crime:  A  Study  of  Cases  Tried  at 
the  Old  Bailey  (19793  Crim  LR  203 
Zander  M.  -A  Matter  of  Justice  (Oxford,  1989) 
Zander  M.  -  The  Police  and  Criminal  Evidence  Act  1984  (2nd  edn) 
(London,  1990) 
Zeidler  W.  -  Evaluation  of  the  Adversary  System:  As  Comparison, 
Some  Remarks  on  the  Investigatory  System  of  Procedure  (1981) 
55  Aust  LJ  390 
Zuckerman  A.  A.  S.  -  The  Right  Against  gel  f  Incrimination:  An 
Obstacle  to  the  Supervision  of  Interrogation  (1986)  102  LQR  43 
Zuckerman  A.  A.  S.  -  Illegally  Obtained  Evidence  --  Discretion  as  a 
Guardian  of  Legitimacy  1987  Current  Legal  Problems  55 
Zuckerman  A.  A.  S.  -  Trial  by  Unfair  Means  -  the  Report  of  the 
Working  Group  on  the  Right  to  Silence  119891  Crim  LR  855 
Zuckerman  A.  A.  S.  -  The  Principles  of  Criminal  Evidence  (Oxford, 
1989) 
iý  ý 
,.  ýý"ý 